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The Editorial Team of JSRI

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Religious Fundamentalism and the Globalization of Intolerance

After the fall of communism, there emerged the idea that ideology was extinguished, and that ideological conflict has been reduced to silence. The increasing importance of the new “spiritual rebirth” movements raises the question of the global phenomenon of the resurrection of ideologies on a religious basis. The experience of secularization involves a secularization of identity. We have chosen as an example the case of Marxism, with its attempt at a reconstruction of identity with the help of the “disenchanted” of religion and the theorizing of the *praxis*. As a consequence of the crisis caused by the secularization of identity, today we are facing new religious movements. These are no longer important from the point of view of their tradition or past, but rather are important as religious ideologies that announce the possibility of the emergence of an ideological global conflict.

To many thinkers, the end of the Cold War seemed to open a new era, one in which the world either should have been under the monopoly of a great power and there should have been no more room for ideological conflicts, or the world should have become a multiplicity of powers, without an ideological pattern.

Far from the anticipated “end” of ideologies, we are today facing new ideological patterns, seeking to take part in this vast game of globalization. The end of ideologies is only a myth, lying alongside other myths: the death of art, the death of philosophy, the death of religion, etc.

It is true that modernity determines a deep change in these fields, but the announcing of an “end” is nothing other than a mythical-eschatological scenario for the embellishment of the postmodern man’s cultural experience. The effects of modernization upon the individual and his community seem to have a real strong

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influence upon the existence of an individual identity in a global world. One of the most interesting points of view on the reconstruction of identity in the XXth century reveals the crucial role of the relationship between religion and modernity in the dynamics of identity. According to Gilles Kepel, the causes that brought the view about the “end” of religion at the beginning of the XXth century are the same causes which, in the 70’s, initiated a turning point in the relationship between religion and politics, determining, in this context, a new religious discourse¹. In the context of secularization as an ideal to the Modern Age, Kepel perceives the birth of a movement that claims the founding of a new society upon the solid ground of the sacred. Due to the collapse of communism in the Eastern Europe, we can see that the reaction to the globalization of the Western World in the ex-communist countries and in the world’s global relationships involves the rising of a large variety of religious movements of “rebirth”. This is the basis for the rebirth of an ideological global conflict.

The secularization of identity

Modernity brings a certain change of view which determines a transfer of symbols and mechanisms, of signification and power, from the structures connected to religion to those connected to social life, and especially, to those connected to politics. We can find here a continuous transfer from religious imagery to political

imagery, from religious behaviors to ritualizing of every day life, and especially, to ritualizing of the social and political behaviors.

This phenomenon is the result of a long process, in which the substitution of religious principles by modern ideologies gives credit, for a while, to the secularized shaping of the world. The need for myth and religion is compensated by a series of mythologies created by European modernity.

Perhaps the most significant and the most influential of all these mythologies, even if reduced today to a lower level of activity, is the mythology of communism. Daniel Bell perceives the fact that, as early as the XIXth century, there has been an endeavor for the “disenchanted” of religion. The “disenchanted” theme finds some remarkable references for itself in Feuerbach’s anthropological critique of religion or in Marx’s materialistic critique. This “disenchanted” theme has the mission to remove the interest from man’s spiritual metamorphosis towards the social change and the transformation of reality².

Following this line of argument, we mention the fact that, for Feuerbach, “Religion, at least the Christian religion, is the approach of man towards himself or, more exactly, towards his being, but an approach towards his being as towards another being. The divine being is nothing else but the human being, or more precisely: man’s being separated from the enclosures of the individual man, that is truly, bodily objectified, that is perceived and worshiped as another being different from him; consequently, all the determinations of the

divine being are determinations of the human being”³. Therefore, the essence of religion is not a theological essence, but an anthropological one. This conclusion determines the need for a new kind of being-in-the-world and a new construction of identity. The human being is no longer a creature analogous to the Divine, following God’s values or God’s commands; the world no longer has this transcendent impulse, which determines its dynamics. The man and his world shape and actualize the personalized transcendent and the world made by the model of the archetype-world. Thus, the anthropological critique of religion reveals the fact that “religion is man’s spiritual dream. But even our dreams have a trace of reality, except that we cannot see anything real or necessary, but delightful, imaginary and accidental. Thus, I do not constrain religion – neither the speculative philosophy or theology – to anything else but to the opening of its eyes, or, more precisely, to the opening to the outside its insight-oriented eyes, that is, by transforming the object of the representation into an object of reality”⁴.

Marx follows the same path when he denounces the fantastical reality of the Heavens. Just as Feuerbach, Marx also considers that the Heavens are nothing more but the reflection of the image of man, that religion is nothing but an alienation of human realities. Religion inspires a delusion-world, which gives birth to the need for the illusion. The Marxist critique of religion has the mission of unmasking the alienating dynamics of religion, the mission of setting us free. This critique is very important for Marx, but only as a first step in the un-

masking of many alienation processes. The historical task of Marxism is to unmask, as a first step, the alienation caused by religion; than, as a second step, the unmasking of the secularized forms of alienation⁵.

To Marx, religion is the ideological form *par excellence*. The crisis of religion offers the pattern for the generalized critique of every idealism, and especially, of every ideology. In *The German Ideology* – which says that Marx and F. Engels tried “to settle accounts to our own previous philosophical conscience”⁶ – ideology is said to propose an upside-down image of the world, a distorted reality.

Trying to outrun any ideological dissimulation of reality, Marx shows the fact that the imaginary explanation of the world and of man must be forgotten, that any view of the world must begin with the real man and with “the production of material life in itself”⁷. The way in which individuals “make” production is considered to be determining not only for their understanding of the way they are, but also for their social and political relationships, for the way in which the new spirit of Marxism can function as an option and as a scientific view of the world.

At least two elements, I think, might be helpful for the understanding of man and the deconstruction of ideology theorized by Marx. These elements are included in the well-known *Theses on Feuerbach*. In the second thesis we are told that the truth is not a theoretical problem, but rather a practical problem. In the eleventh thesis it is stated that the problem consists not in the terms of the philosophical interpretation of the world,

but in the practical action of its change. Therefore, the dismantling of the mechanisms of ideological thinking can be made with a magic key of Marxism contained in the formula “It is not the conscience that determines life, but it is life that determines the conscience”⁸.

Gradually, there comes out in the evolution of Marx’s thinking the fact that this negative concept of ideology permits a positive view about ideology. In the *Preface* to the work *Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx presents to us the well-known thesis concerning the relationships between the real economical basis and the super-structure to which correspond the determined forms of the social conscience. In this framework, there is a real opening towards the Marxist integration of ideology as a revolutionizing science of material production. “We ought to make a distinction between the material revolutionizing of the economic conditions of production, which can be established scientifically, and political, legal, religious, artistic or philosophical forms, in one word ideological, forms in which people become aware of this conflict, solving it by struggle.”⁹ Marx strictly relates the changing of ideological forms to the revolutionizing of the economic basis. Once the bourgeois forms of structuring of material production are annihilated, Marx thought that he could radically change “the entire huge superstructure”. Once the antagonistic forms of the “social production process” are eliminated, the “pre-historical age of human society”¹⁰ should end, and man should find a new identity for himself.

The revolutionizing of the economical structure by the practical development of Marx’s and Engels’s ideas is accomplished by Lenin. Lenin fights against exploitation and oppression, using intolerant and rebellious methods found in the previous tradition of Marxism, to which he gives a new meaning, by announcing the necessity of a proletarian dictatorship. Lenin considers that economical oppression inevitably determines various political and social forms of oppression, as well as the decay of the spiritual and moral order. In *Socialism and Religion*, Lenin writes, “religion is one of the forms of spiritual exploitation, which oppresses people”¹¹. Following Marx, he affirms “Religion is opium for people”. He also understands this expression, most favorite of Marx, in the way that “Marxism always sees religion and contemporary churches, all the religious organizations, as instruments of the bourgeois reaction, which serve the defending of exploitation and the narcotizing of the working class”¹².

Lenin agrees with the contemporary thinking that proposes a separation of religion from the State; thus, religious institutions must be separated from the State, the State must not recognize any official religion, it must be atheistic; the citizens must not benefit from rights depending on some religious affiliation. Though, Lenin asserts, “on no account can we consider religion as a private problem concerning our own party”¹³. He achieves an ideological paradox in considering that religion is a private problem for the State, but that it is not a private problem for the Proletarian Party. The party must struggle “with the help of the ideological weapon”

for the elimination of “religious obscurantism” and for the “advancement of atheism”. To Lenin, the problem of religion must not be rationally treated, but rather it should be integrated into the class struggle¹⁴. Despite all this, Lenin does not militate for the permanent interdiction of religion, nor for a total war against religious beliefs. He adopts an ideological struggle that should lead to the recovery of the primary elements of religion and faith, and that should also follow “the removal of the social roots of religion”¹⁵. Integrating the struggle for the enlightenment of masses into the general struggle of the Communist Party, Lenin shows that “the Party pursues the annihilation of the relationship between the exploiting classes and the organizing of religious propaganda, as well as the real liberation of the working class from religious prejudices, by organizing to the greatest extent possible a scientific, educational, and anti-religious propaganda with this view. At the same time, one should carefully avoid any offending of the religious beliefs, which would only result in the reinforcement of religious fanaticism”¹⁶. We should not imagine that this care for the religious emotions of the people endowed with religious beliefs is a concern of Marxism. These cautions are taken only to avoid a new separation, that between the believers and the non-believers, in a theory which idealizes the accomplishment of the unity. This is not an act of social tolerance towards religious beliefs. The course of the events, especially in the Soviet Union, as well as in other countries influenced by Marxism, shows that the relationship of political structures to religion took the form of a viru-

lent propaganda and radical attitude towards religion. A climate of generalized intolerance was specific to all Marxist totalitarian regimes.

The whole effort of the opposition of the Party doctrine against religion is the logical result of the will of Marxism to change the world with the use of non-transcendent principles. The narcotizing of religion, Lenin argues, is nothing but a imaginary remedy, which produces alienation (as Marx explains). The escape from religion is an opening to the *praxis* and to the creation of a world made by the principles of the working class. This aspect involves a secularization process generated by the transformation of the economic basis, with all the consequences implied in the changing of the superstructure.

According to Engels, Marx discovered the general law of historical development. In the name of this law, Marxism justifies any revolutionary changing of the world. This is that which is supposed to help us return to what is fundamental: the *praxis* and the real man; to the certainty that nobody can elude the unique law, which Marxism establishes as an absolute law. Any exception from the strict rule of Marxist ideology means banishment from the system. In the ideological field, conversion is a strict necessity. It is a form of recognizing yourself as a human being, capable of adapting to an implacable historical destiny. The *Entmythologisierung* (disenchanting) of religion leads to the establishment of a new ideological eschatology. Exploited by the ideologies in his struggle against religion, the modern man has to look for another source of “sense” or “reason”.

One must find a new basis for the definition of identity. Marxist ideology replaces religion, assuring a strong basis for the construction of identity. The human model of the working class is no longer religious; it is ideological. The Marxist thinkers show that the ideological forms, which correspond to the various forms of social conscience, do not exhaust that which is considered to be the Marxist ideology. Although it is the view of a single social class, Marxist ideology would best correspond to a global understanding of society, because, as a result of the Marxists opinion, the ideals of the working class would better correspond to the ideals of man in general. Such a belief could justify any action of the proletarian “conquest” of the world. The classical Marxist thinking and all its theoretical deviation can be viewed as a whole. This thinking could be described, as Hannah Arendt said, as the logic of an idea. This basic idea is Marx’s work. This idea develops itself in theoretical and practical structures, as the unique dynamic of a coherent system (Marxism). This said, we do not want to diminish the importance of theoretical and practical Marxism. We merely want to sustain that Marxism is a global conceptualization of modernity, which can be understood as the development of a modern myth, with multiple sequences and rituals, integrated into a unique story. It is the story of the human being, shaped by a particular ideological model.

The case of Marxism is an example of what modernity brings to identity reconstruction, using the deconstruction of religion for the structuring of the hu-

man universe. We could choose here Nietzsche and his “God is dead”, with all his impact on the XXth century, with all the prestige of his work in the academic communities. We could choose psychoanalysis and its revolution of the interior and spiritual world of man. We preferred Marxism as an example, because the ideological aspect is much more consistent and clear. More than that, we can say that the political separation between the “socialist” and the “capitalist” world not only determined a separation of the world, but it also initiated an ideological conflict.

The persuasive force of Marxism can be explained in many ways. Concerning the central ideological model of the world, it might seem important that Marxism developed under the influence of a total ideology, which made it a “secularized religion”¹⁷, employing all the energies of religion in a political transformation of the world. Concerning the relationship between ideology and religion, we take Rene Girard’s opinion as highly important: “The tendency to completely eliminate the sacred prepares the tacit return of the sacred, in a form not transcendent but rather immanent.”¹⁸ Actually, despite all the secularization, the political imaginary penetrates the transparent tissue of ideology and accomplishes the mediation role, analogous to ‘mystery’ in case of the sacred. It is not an accident that ideology seeks to regain the totality of the real for the human being, acting as do theological systems, in the founding of the cosmic, human being. In this context of secularization of the human being and of identity, a conflict appears between religious groups and modernity. The

consequences of the influence of modernity involve a crisis of identity and a global rebirth of religious movements.

The “spiritual rebirth” movements and the new ideological conflict

Today we are facing a unitary phenomenon, which, in a variety of forms, seems to implicate the democracies of the West, the Eastern European countries and, more evidently, the Middle East and Arab countries. We are talking about the rebirth of interest in religion and the appearance of politically religious movements in the new world order.

One of the most famous analyses on this subject, despite all the generalizations and errors, is S. Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civilizations”. According to this theory, if in the time of the Cold War, the world was bipolarized and divided in a sum of states engaged in an ideological, economic, and military competition, after the Cold War, the world has become multi-polarized and multi-civilized. The new separations in international relationships do not involve ideological features so much as cultural aspects. The clash determined by political ideas is replaced by a clash of civilizations, of culture and religion. In these global reconfigurations, a central place is occupied by the problem of identity. The new division of the world no longer cares for political interests, but rather for solidarities of identity, especially solidarities that rely on

common or related religious identities¹⁹. Another important finding of Huntington is that, while the great religions are a creation of cultures outside of the Western World, all the great ideologies are products of our civilized world. Huntington even considers that non-civilized people are incapable of producing ideologies. But “the ideologies that have embodied the late Western civilization are in decay, and their place is taken by religions and by other basic cultural forms of identity”²⁰.

We agree with the increase of importance of the cultural aspect, and especially the religious aspect, in the new dynamics of the international relationships. It is evident that the problem of identity is a stringent problem, in the context of a deepening internal crisis of modernity and its dynamics. But we have strong reservation regarding Huntington’s thesis on the decline of ideologies.

My view is that Huntington, following Kepel, gives a good explanation of the movements of spiritual rebirth both in the Western field and in the spaces that, indistinctly, without a negative shadow, we name the Orient. Modernization involves both the individual and the society. This process involves an increase of economic and political power, but also the alienation and crisis of the individual. The social and the individual consequences have an important role in the process of cultural and religious rebirth²¹.

This is the phenomenon that can be observed in the case of the Western spiritual “rebirth” movements of the 70’s, or in the ex-communist countries after 1989.

The identity crisis generated by the secularized religions, like ideologies, has created a response that seeks for a rebirth of a model that came from revelation or traditional religions. The clash of civilizations, the inter-religious conflict, prophesized by Huntington, is far from being separated from the ideological field. The new movements that arise on the structure of the great religions are more like religious ideologies than they are like spiritual “rebirth” movements. That’s why it is necessary to distinguish between Islam and Islamism (political Islam); we have to distinguish between the various forms of Christianity and the nationalist or religious ideologies growing in this field; between Judaism and political extremism; the list is always opened. To distinguish more clearly between religion and ideological religion claiming the name of a particular religion, we will speak about the notion of *fundamentalism*.

A strict separation between religion and religious fundamentalism is not an easy task. Lawrence J. Silberstein sees fundamentalism as an ideal model, as a mental construct. In this case it would be necessary to show more clearly what characteristics we have in mind when we talk about fundamentalism. But the majority of authors show the difficulty of defining the essence of fundamentalism. It is almost impossible to reveal a series of intrinsic characteristics that could be detected repeatedly at the level of the various movements or views that we put under the sign of fundamentalism. A definition of the essence of fundamentalism would make the concept itself impossible; thus, we would see fundamentalist acts without fundamentalism.

We are obliged to shape the frame of a possible separation between real religious tradition and ideological forms, that is, the political movements disguised as religious tradition. From this motive, we will here attempt to present the eleven “family traits of fundamentalism”, exposed by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby.²²

1) Fundamentalism is a form of religious idealism. In this context, the transcendent is the only immutable force; it offers a strong and irreducible basis for the personal and communal identity; beneath this identity lays Divine revelation seen as the whole, undifferentiated Truth.

2) The shaping of identity on the basis of revelation makes the fundamentalists refuse secularized reality or any trace of relativism.

3) The identity is shaped by a series of dramatic events of Divine origin. In this sense, fundamentalists give credit to some particular moments of history, which they relate to their tradition or their sacred texts and interpret according to an esoteric reckoning of time and space.

4) Based on the dynamics of opposition, fundamentalists mythologize their enemies. They see their enemies in a mythical or eschatological scenario, with the help of the rhetoric of negation. Thus, without even searching for the real identity of their enemy, fundamentalists trace limits which protect and purify the group.

5) Another characteristic is the aggressiveness of fundamentalist missionary activity. Often, the moderate

parties, which try to live in peace with the other, are excluded from the group.

6) The ingredient that moves fundamentalist activism is the idea of an imminent danger. Fundamentalisms appear and develop in periods of crisis. This crisis can be real or imaginary, but it always appears as a threat. The crisis is a crisis of identity.

7) The rhetoric of the crisis justifies any extreme measures. Fundamentalism contains a totalitarian impulse. In many cases, fundamentalism desires a total transformation of society, with the help of the replacement of existing structures with a system emanating from religious principles.

8) In developing this kind of system, which includes society, politics, and economy, fundamentalism proves to be selective towards the tradition and modernity. Fundamentalists carefully select from the original doctrine only these elements that serve their ideological purposes. The fundamentalists extract the ancient doctrines out of their original context, institutionalize them, and use them as ideological weapons against all those elements that seem hostile to them.

9) The charismatic leadership plays a central role in the interpreting of tradition, in evaluating modernity, and in the selective extraction of elements from both of these spheres.

10) Fundamentalists prove that their strategies are more closely related to modernism than to tradition. With all the resentments towards modernity, they use its weapons to fight against secularization.

11) Fundamentalists appeal to the masses. The appeal to the masses could be successful because of the use of mass communication systems (radio, television, etc.). Marty and Appleby illustrate very convincingly the fact that the centers of the new identities are not synagogues, churches, nor mosques, but rather radio and television. These elements are significant to the cultivation of the intolerance which can be seen to be a global phenomenon.

We could probably see aspects of fundamentalism in religious activities that do not seem quite ideological. What is characteristic to the religious ideologies is their totalitarian instinct. As was in the case of secularized religion (Marxism), the totalitarian impulse generated violence and intolerance.

Marty and Appleby also mention the fact that the constant component of fundamentalism is the idea of *fighting*. This struggle is intrinsic to all family traits of the spiritual “rebirth” movements, under the sign of fundamentalism. Although it is usually known as violence, the idea of *fight* has many meanings: 1) *Fighting back* – by which we see that fundamentalists are militants and retaliate because they see their identity threatened. 2) *Fight for* – a view of the world adopted or inherited, which they want to strengthen or impose as a universal view; 3) *Fight with* – implies a use of “weapons”. These include elements that are considered fundamental and are transformed in fetishes; 4) *Fight against* – the others. The others are real or imaginary enemies, but also can be moderate elements which try to adapt their personal beliefs to the conditions of modernity; 5) *Fight under*

God – more visible in the case of the theistic religions, referring to personalized transcendence²³. All the traits explained by these two authors have a strong ideological characteristic.

Michael von Bruck shows that when we talk about fundamentalism, we must be conscious of two aspects of this movement: on one side, the negation of every relativity of the knowledge specific to the fundamentalist movement; and on the other side, its refusal to accept any integration or assimilation in the name of relativism. Western relativism created a large variety of negations and refusals. The tendency of the Western world to expand its forms outside the Western world makes inevitable an increase of the crisis of identity and the expanding of relativism in the territories outside the Western world. Von Bruck emphasizes two sources of negation and refusal: an individual source, based on the fear of the individual of losing his or her identity or the identity of his community, because of his weak faith in God; and a social source, which exploits the political aspect, that is, the insecurity of individuals within a much larger group. Many groups, for political reasons and for the purpose of establishing a unique, absolute identity, evidence the desire for comfort and security offered by a strong identity²⁴.

Fundamentalism is a religious idea. Restating the religious aspect might seem redundant, because every fundamentalist movement claims to be a spiritual “re-birth” movement. But problems appear once we try to explain the ideological character of these movements, to reveal their social and political transformation pur-

poses, with the help of a particular form of power. Reflecting upon the ideas of James Davison Hunter, Hava Lazarus-Zafeh, Laurence L. Silberstein, Joan Scott, Lionel Caplan, Bruce Lawrence and others, we can assert that: 1) fundamentalism is a product of our modernity, and its sources of ideology cannot be situated later than the beginning of the XX-th century; 2) the crisis of identity is the central component of the fundamentalist movements, and their opposing politics fight against secularization; 3) The various forms of the conflict between the religious groups and modernity involve more of a *dialectical* movement, than a real opposition movement; 4) fundamentalisms produce, legitimize, and promote social forms and particular cultures as absolute; 5) fundamentalism seeks particular identities for individuals and groups, identities seen as a model for the “re-birth” of all humanity; 6) fundamentalism defines and structures experience following a set of beliefs, views, and assertions, which are vague enough not to constitute a very coherent and rigid doctrine, creating space for future developments and adaptation; 7) fundamentalisms contain too large a variety of political ideas, social needs, and legitimatising schemes to embody a unique essence.

If we judge it in the context of globalization, we will observe that fundamentalism has a large variety of forms, that it claims its existence from different cultural contexts and religious doctrines. Fundamentalism is a global phenomenon that constitutes itself as a plurality of fundamentalisms, which do not have a certain territorial or cultural circumscription, which are not related

to certain territories, but rather to global influence zones.

If we should speak of a new conflict of ideologies, that is, of the conflict between religious fundamentalisms and democratic order, than this conflict should not separate the world into “political blocks” or “political worlds”. There is no “Iron curtain” that should draw strict lines between two worlds. The fundamentalisms have a local structure that integrates itself in a large net of global structures. The conflict between a democratic ideological order and fundamentalist religions determines another kind of polarity, a polarity in which the “local” becomes “global”, and the “global” follows the trace of the “local”. Religious ideologies create identity types, which can sustain the most unexpected solidarities. The solidarity between intolerance and violence is a common pattern of totalitarian ideology. The new religious ideologies become totalitarian ideologies because of their tendencies to influence the new global order and to engage in conquest of an absolute “vital space”.

Notes

* Translated by Stefan Maftai

1 Gilles Kepel, *Dumnezeu își ia revansa (God takes revenge)*, Ed. Artemis, Bucuresti, 1994, p. 8.

2 Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology in the West*, in *The End of Ideology Debate* edited, with an introduction by Chaim I. Waxman, A Clarion Book Published by Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986, p. 89.

3 Ludwig Feuerbach, *Esenta Crestinismului (The Essence of Christianity)*, Ed. Stiintifica, Bucuresti, 1961, p. 45.

4 Ludwig Feuerbach, *Esenta Crestinismului (The Essence of Christianity)*, ed. cit., p. 21.

5 “The critique of Heavens becomes the critique of earth, the critique of religion becomes the critique of right, the critique of theology becomes the critique of politics”, cf. K. Marx, F. Engels, *Despre religie (On Religion)*, Ed. politica, Bucuresti, 1960, p. 38.

6 K. Marx, *Contributii la critica economiei politice (Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy)*, Ed. de stat pentru literatura politica, Bucuresti, 1954, p. 11.

7 K. Marx, F. Engels, *Ideologia germana (The German Ideology)*, Ed. de stat pentru literatura politica, Bucuresti, 1956, p. 22.

8 K. Marx, F. Engels, *Ideologia germana (The German Ideology)*, ed. cit., p. 23.

9 K. Marx, *Contributii la critica economiei politice (Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy)*, ed. cit., p. 10.

10 K. Marx, *Contributii la critica economiei politice (Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy)*, ed. cit., p. 10.

11 V. I. Lenin, *Despre religie*, Ed. de stat pentru literatura politica, Bucuresti, 1956, p. 7.

12 V. I. Lenin, Cu privire la atitudinea Partidului muncitoresc fata de religie (*Concerning the Attitude of the Party towards Religion*), in *Despre religie (On Religion)*, ed. cit., p. 19.

13 V. I. Lenin, *Despre religie (On Religion)*, ed. cit., p. 8.

14 V. I. Lenin, *Despre religie (On Religion)*, ed. cit., p. 10.

15 V. I. Lenin, Cu privire la atitudinea Partidului muncitoresc fata de religie (*Concerning the Attitude of the Party towards Religion*), in *Despre religie (On Religion)*, ed. cit., p. 21.

16 V. I. Lenin, Din “Proiectul de Program al C.C. al P. C. (b) din Rusia” (*Extract from “The Project of The Party in Russia”*), in *Despre religie (On Religion)*, ed. cit., p. 49.

17 Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology in the West*, in *The End of Ideology Debate* edited, with an introduction by Chaim I. Waxman,

A Clarion Book Published by Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986, p. 96.

18 Rene Girard, *Violenta si sacrul (Violence and The Sacred)*, Ed. Nemira, Bucuresti, 1995, p. 349.

19 S. Huntington, *Ciocrnirea civilizatiilor (The Clash of Civilizations)*, Ed. Antet, Bucuresti, 1998, p. 36.

20 S. Huntington, *Ciocrnirea civilizatiilor (The Clash of Civilizations)*, ed. cit., p. 77.

21 S. Huntington, *Ciocrnirea civilizatiilor (The Clash of Civilizations)*, ed. cit., p. 111.

22 We synthesize the eleven “family traits” from the analysis of the authors in *Fundamentalism Project*, vol. I, *Fundamentalism Observed*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1991, pp. 814-833.

23 Martin E. Marty, R. Scott Appleby, *Fundamentalism Project*, vol. I, *Fundamentalism Observed*, ed. cit., pp. IX-X.

24 Michael von Bruck, *Identifying Constructively Our Interreligious Moment*, in *Interfaith Theology, A Reader*, ed. by Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Oneworld, Oxford, 2001, p. 48.

Reflexii neortodoxe despre toleranta

C. Mureseanu presents in an essayistic approach the history of *tolerance* as a concept. Its very domain may be described as regarding the relations among human beings. The concept has been dealt with different approaches as the philosophical, moral and political one. The article focuses especially on the religious tolerance, and also on the opposition of the pair of terms: tolerance vs. intolerance.

Pedanteria, urîcioasa deformatie profesionala, îmboldeste pe erudit sa înceapa aproape orice discutie prin a explica de unde provine conceptul sau cuvîntul puse în cauza.

Asa si acum: *toleranta*, dupa o escapada prin limba franceza, descinde, aproape neschimbata, din latinescul *tolerantia*, cu neidentificate radacini indo-europene mai vechi.

Împlinindu-si prima etapa a datoriei, eruditul continua cu o definitie sau cu o istorie a problemei ce se vrea riguros articulata, încît sa lumineze si sa-i faca sa cada în admiratie pe toti aceia care pîna atunci crezusera a sti si singuri despre ce era vorba.¹

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Ca multe alte performante ale spiritului evoluat, sindromul toleranței și cel al intoleranței își au originile în reacțiile biologice instinctive ale ființei umane, de autoconservare față de altcineva sau altceva. Ele s-au insinuat, treptat, și în reacții de ordin psihic, inițial și acestea în forme elementare, iar pe încetul – tot mai „argumentate”.

Privind prin această optică, se deduce că la început a fost intoleranța. Pe cei care, în lupta pentru viață, au riscat prematur a se aventura în atitudinea opusă, selecția naturală i-a sancționat, decimându-i.

Augmentarea forței, a iscusinței, a mijloacelor de autoapărare au substituit treptat brutalei și instinctivei reacții primare de respingere, o senzație de siguranță relativă în fața agresiunii, sau a unei pure și simple prezente alogene.

A jucat un rol și ceea ce s-ar numi, peste măsura de pretentios pentru acele vremuri „de început de leat”, - creșterea economică. Ea a evidențiat inutilitatea nimicirii celui învins, a consumării sau alungării lui. „Celălalt” putea să fie folositor, ca supus ori ca tovarăș. Indivizii izolați sau grupurile umane mici erau slabe în lupta pentru supraviețuire. Asocierea era de rigoare, mărind randamentul acțiunilor de procurare a hranei, în primul rând din vânarea animalelor mari și puternice. Nu numai asocierea din necesitate, dar și transformarea în rob a celui dinții învins în luptă au fost – oricât de hazardată ar părea afirmația – un prim gest de toleranță. Evident, unul dictat de interesul instinctual, și lipsit cu totul de vreo conotație morală.

Într-un sens demult întâlnit, în vechi licăriri de conștiință, dar dezvoltat până în ziua de azi, alături cu alte nuanțe ale sale, *a tolera* însemna a rabda, a suferi ceva din partea unor agenți obiectivi, cărora nu li se putea opune o ripostă (de ex. a rabda o nenorocire). Omul percepea, prin urmare, foarte irezistibile ce se abateau asupra-i. În fața lor nu putea face altceva decât să se resemneze. Împacarea cu soarta, atitudine întâlnită frecvent în cultura antică, era substanțial diferită de gestul toleranței, fiindcă acesta din urmă presupunea acceptarea deliberată macar a câtorva din inconvenientele unor situații alternative cu care omul se confrunta. Toleranța nu are ca substrat pasivitatea, ci este o atitudine cu resorturi la fel de active ca și intoleranța: dipoli spirituale, cu reacții contrare la un anumit stimul exterior.

Toleranța e diferită și de indiferența preconizată de un Cioran; fiindcă indiferența se constituie prin anularea interesului față de tot ce te înconjoară, chiar și față de propriul destin, pe când toleranța receptează universul ambiental, ia o atitudine „în petto” față de componente ale acestuia, admitându-le legitimitatea și libertatea de exprimare chiar atunci când e în dezacord transant cu ele.

Abia când se insinua pe teritoriul relațiilor interumane, toleranța începe să devină ea însăși: respecta prezența și comportarea dezagreabile ale cuiva, cel mult ținându-se la distanță de ele, dar nu bruscându-le, ci consumându-și tacit repulsia.

Până la stadiul autocenzurării reacțiilor de respingere acută a expresiilor sau ideilor rostite de cineva, toleranța

a fost subminată de orgolii și de concepții obtuze, expresii ale înfatuatei multumiri de sine, refuzând înțelegerea a ceea ce nu era plamadit după chipul și asemanarea sa.

A mai fost alterată și de alcoolemia organică a certitudinilor, a convingerilor proclamate ca fiind de necontestat.

Pe ele, același Cioran le-a desființat, interzicând acomodarea cu cele eventual scăpate cu viața: „Când refuzi să admiti că ideile pot fi schimbate între ele, singele curge ... Sub hotărârile ferme se înalță un pumnal; ochii înflăcărați prevestesc crimă. Niciodată spiritul sovaitor, atins de hamletism, n-a fost primejdios. Principiul raului rezidă în tensiunea voinței, în inaptitudinea pentru pacea desăvârșită, în megalomania prometeică a unei rase care crăpa de idealuri și explodează sub convingeri ...”.²

Necesitatea acomodării cu alții s-a ideologizat în formule generale, religioase și filosofico-morale. Delimitarea între aceste două secțiuni ale spiritului reclama unele precizări. Filosofia și morala s-au înțeles în a considera pe om ca specimen universal, esențialmente identic cu el însuși, având aceleași atribute fundamentale, oriunde și oricând, și îndreptățit a beneficia de același tratament.

Cu religiile, lucrurile sunt mai nuanțate, spre a nu spune mai complicate. Evident, din punctul de vedere al conceptului pus aici în discuție nu are sens a fi invocate decât marile religii universale, care continuă în lumea contemporană, și pe ale caror concepții socotim ca le cunoaștem bine.

În interiorul tuturor sistemelor respective, toleranța a fost uneori un concept rigid, alteori o idee „în mers”, în evoluție, în transformare în sensuri divergente. Câteodată o religie a practicat, inițial, spiritul de toleranță între membrii ei, sau în raport cu adepții alteia, pentru ca ulterior să instaureze, treptat, teze și practici din ce în ce mai restrictive. În alte cazuri, evoluția a decurs invers: de la o îngustime inițială de vederi, spre un larg orizont de comprehensiune – cel puțin unul declarativ.

Crestinismul a avut o scurtă perioadă de claustrare în sine, după care a pasit spre o deschidere „către toate neamurile”; apoi a coborât către un climat intolerant, ale cărui limite sunt a se fixa, „grosso modo”, între cruciade și secolul Luminilor. În prezent, parcurge din nou un drum invers.

Nu se poate însă omite faptul că religiile, în speta creștinismul, au fost alterate de ingerințele salbatice ale puterii lumesti. De ce fel de toleranță se putea vorbi, orice ar fi încercat să spună biserica, în societatea franca descrisă de un Grigore din Tours sau un Pseudo-Fredegăr? Asemenea exemple au fost, din nefericire, prea numeroase ...

Islamul a fost și a rămas intolerant, brahmanismul cam tot așa. Nici iudaismul nu e dispus la recunoașterea adevărilor altor credințe. Deși acuzat, cu ură absurdă, de felurite grozavii, el a manifestat însă, în realitate, mai mult un fel de „intoleranță defensivă” față de alte credințe, severitatea exercitând-o cu precădere înăuntrul său. Budismul, cu a sa profundă meditativitate de

factura morala, nu pare pornit sa persecute pe cei de alte convingeri.

Toleranta si intoleranta stau în relatie cu apetente ale psihicului, cu o anumita terapeutica interioara a acestuia, pe care si-o realizeaza când printr-o metoda, când printr-alta: prin a-si impune liniste, sau, dimpotriva, a prefera starea de tensiune.

Îndeobste, sufletul omenesc se simte împacat când nu are probleme, îndoieli, ci se complăce în certitudini, – obiective, sau create de el si absolutizate subiectiv. Credinta, ca stare sufleteasca, este – în orice religie care merita acest nume – generatoare de certitudini odihnitoare. O terapeutica recunoscuta ca eficienta. „Neliniștita e inima mea, pîna nu se odihnește întru Tine, Doamne!” – a spus Sf. Augustin.

Pierderea credintei, absenta ei, indiferent de motive si circumstante, lasa sufletul sa pluteasca între doua ape, nesigur în alegerea cailor sale, tulburat din aceasta cauza, „bolnav de-amurguri” – cum frumos a spus cîndva un poet.

Victoria pe care si-o proclama ratiunea în momentul în care crede a fi descoperit un adevar nu se compara cu starea oferita de credinta patrinsa de adevarul *ei*, revelat si imuabil.

Prima este o euforie, agitata maladiu de obsesia autodepasirii în drum spre alte descoperiri în nesfîrsitul si aleatoriu univers al adevarurilor posibile.

A doua înseamna pace, împacare întru sine. După celebrul vers al lui Leopardi, e un „dulce naufragiu în imensa mare a infinitului”. Rezulta ca toleranta nu are cum sa fie o componenta organica a credintei, ca

aceasta nu o proclama, atunci cînd o face, decît conventional, „pentru imagine”. Credinta, si atunci cînd se distanteaza, declarativ, de orice veleitate tiranica asupra mintii si a sufletului, continua a se socoti în posesia unui adevar unic pe care, cu oricîta blîndete l-ar propune, nu-l poate, prin definitie, împarti cu un altul.

Asa cum si simtul comun o percepe, toleranta este cu precadere apanajul spiritului rational, al libertatii de gîndire, al intelectului evadat din edenicul spatiu dogmatic si patruns de celebra sentinta a lui Montaigne: „Le monde n'est que variété et dissemblance”³,

Disjunctia dintre credinta si spirit rational nu constituie, din parte-ne, o evaluare, o ierarhizare, ci o constatare perfect neutra. Sunt spatii diferite, complementare, cel mult cu sfere tangente, dar principial non-interpenetrabile.

Fiindca l-am amintit pe Montaigne, se cuvine sa încheiem cu o reverenta dinaintea unor scurte cugetari asupra temei noastre, pe care i le datoram.

„Vazut-am, în timpul meu, vina aducîndu-se unor scrieri, fiindca sunt curat omenesti si filozoficesti, fara amestec al teologiei.

... Dumnezeuiasca învatatura își tine rangul mai bine deoparte, ca doamna si stapînitoare, ce trebuie sa fie mai presus de tot, fara sa ceara învoire si sprijin.

... Filozofia – spune Sf. Ioan Crisostomul – de aceea este alungata din sfînta învatatura, ca o slujitoare de prisos si socotita nevrednica sa vada, fie [si numai] în trecut si din prag, altarul sfintelor comori ale învataturii ceresti, fiindca vorbirea omului are tipare mai prejos si

nu trebuie sa se foloseasca de maretia, înaltarea si taria cuvîntului dumnezeiesc”.⁴

Note

1 Spre a-i multumi pe neopuristi, am propune sa nu se zica “toleranta”, ci “întreolalta îngaduinta”. Numai ca istoria neamurilor si a limbilor evolueaza asa de repede si de învalmasit, încît de la o vreme autohtonismele încep sa para neologisme si viceversa ...

2 *Précis de décomposition*, Paris, Gallimard, 1949, p. 8.

3 Lumea nu e decît felurime si neasemuire. *Eseuri*, II.II.

4 *Eseuri*, I, LVI (6).

On Tolerance and Acceptance of the Other

In this text, the problem of tolerance is discussed in the light of recent works of Umberto Eco and Stefan Afloroaei. The author argues that in the case of tolerance, the success lies not in *tolerating* the other, (not even in the weaker sense of the word), but rather in *accepting* him. The acceptance of the Other is the complete and powerful meaning of tolerance. *Acceptance* ends where the very presence of the concept of *tolerance* is undermined and compromised by its history of colonialism and exploitation. Therefore, the primary solution to understand and apply tolerance is the *recognition of alterity*, in an inner and outer meaning alike.

In one of his essays published in *El Pais*, Umberto Eco considered a mere gaffe minister Berlusconi's statement on the superiority of Western culture, a minor fact, in other words. "What is not minor and what should preoccupy us all: politicians, religious leaders and educators alike, is that some expressions and even impassioned articles legitimated these declarations and transformed them into subjects that captivate the teenager's mind and possibly lead him to rash conclusions as dictated by the moments' feeling"¹. To hate, dissension, and intolerance, eventually.

Basically, Umberto Eco is right. The mass media today has a colossal influence. It creates leaders (false ones at times), it demolishes statues, and changes men-

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talities. True indeed, in the process of taking over and commenting upon them the premier's words may lead to confusion and intolerance. Still, I am not willing to excuse the Italian Prime Minister as Eco has. His was no minor gaffe. As a matter of fact, Berlusconi's statement is extremely important on account of the current political and symbolic position of the initiator. A public statement, be it false (as the example above) or not, becomes real by the very fact that it is interpreted as real (the celebrated sociological theorem of Thomas).

Unfortunately, I am under the impression that Silvio Berlusconi has not reconsidered his belief by admitting the mistake. He continues as a prisoner of the stereotypes of the Enlightenment and of progressive origins, which regard the West as the hub of the universe, with all the other religions, cultures and civilizations as mere appendices to the European history. I do not think that Berlusconi has graduated – as quite a few European politicians have indeed – any course in the history of religions or cultural anthropology. Then I can only assume that he lacks a profound knowledge of the Islam as well as the culturally activated propensity to understand and tolerate his Muslim fellows. Perhaps it is not far from the truth to say that Silvio Berlusconi is through his famous statement the prototype of the Western politician. Pragmatic, tactful and diplomatic, but hardly knowledgeable in issues of the philosophy of alterity and the social imaginary.

The public persona of Berlusconi embodies the weaker form of the concept of *tolerance*. For him, “to tolerate” means that the parties involved are necessarily

situated on different positions. From this perspective, X in his capacity of Western politician tolerates the other, because X is *a priori* invested with a special status, a superior one by necessity, and the other, whether part of the minority or not, lives by his consent only. X *tolerates* in the sense that he *accepts* the proximity of the other's residence in the community. Still, X does not necessarily honor the other, all the less impart the coordinates of his “superior” culture. His logo reads as follows: *By the very fact that the Other is different from myself, he is inferior to me. To a certain degree, I can tolerate him, but I needn't bear his cold smelly breath down my nape. Keeping the distance is compulsory*². Still, the risks of this weaker form of tolerance can be quite vehement. In the extreme, they might lead to intolerance and crime.

The sequences of this malefic intellectual mechanism are hardly a novelty in history. To start with, due to its differentiated status, the Other is beheld as charged with negativity. This intolerability may easily pass into discourse and into actions. In one of his splendid texts, Stefan Afloroaei illustrates the road from “being different” to “being considered the adversary” by different situations drawn from history³. Stefan Afloroaei exemplifies the negative load of the *alter* by using the Latin equivalent, where *alter* means *only the other, the adversary, the opposite*, etc. Moreover, in public confrontation *altera pars* (the other party) is suggestively associated with *avocatus diaboli*. Also, *altera avis* (the other bird) refers to imminent misfortunes and stands for the implicit evil of the time. Not to mention *alter homo*, equated to *the barbarian*, hardly a chance associa-

tion. His social condition is often that of the foreign wanderer, the plebeian and the servant, the insane and the damned.

Often than not, the encounter with the Other takes the shape of the relation between the nomad and the sedentary. This is the case of Borges' *Histories on Horsemen* and of the binary, classical by now, "European-Indian" in *The Discovery of America* by Tzvetan Todorov. The famous Night of Saint Bartholomew, alongside the dark September 11, have become apparent indications of the demonization of the Other and of an impressive failure of tolerability.

Today, all these can not be imputed to either one side. To a certain degree, politicians, citizens, public institutions and the media alike are to be blamed. The media have their own instruments to cultivate and to perpetuate some dichotomous social relations that in certain contexts may favor an increase in intolerance. This is possible when crime becomes symbolic through stigmatization, manipulation and intolerance. The specific reference is to such Manichaean pairs as "we – they", "white - black", "Christians – non Christians", "civilized – barbarian", "Europeans – Orientals," etc. One such element copiously used is *the stereotype*. The term entered the Humanistic Sciences in the 1930s. Today, it circumscribes the assembly of rules and attributes of which some represent personality traits. In the media, the stereotype takes the form of a synthetic and necessarily simplified presentation of the quotidian events.

In the quick pace of events today, journalists do not pause to analyze and to understand what is happening. Perhaps they are not sufficiently trained to do so. Under these circumstances, the journalists fall into a trap infinitely more injurious to us all: they merely recount, fully persuaded that nothing else needs to be done to facilitate understanding. This explains the manner in which the Other (be he Christian, Protestant, Oriental, or Muslim) is depicted in the Romanian media. Availing oneself of the description only of the alterity, one can not accede to the truth of the alterity, to its symbolic and religious meanings. This is where the stereotype intervenes as "the expression itself of the collective knowledge that claims validity in any historical circumstance"⁴. What was said yesterday about my fellow, who is different and thus tolerated, is perfectly valid today, and will be tomorrow, too. It should not come as a surprise, then, that terrorism is "Arab", fundamentalism is "Islamic," and despotism is unquestionably "Eastern" to most of us. These "old remnants" (in F. Tönnies's terms), handed down generations via prosaic communication are kept alive and potent in our minds and by our social conduct. Just as textbook science, they stand for a truth as formulated, among others, by Thierry Hentsch⁵. According to him, "the collective imaginary of the West about the East (especially the Muslim East), expresses much more truth about the subject (he who sees) than about the object (he who is seen)"⁶. In other words, it says much more about our deficient tolerance for the Other than we are feel in-

clined to understand and accept, and infinitely less about the object of our tolerance.

I argue that in the complicated alchemy of tolerance one should focus on those who tolerate. The success lies not in *tolerating* the other, (not even in the weaker sense of the word), but rather in *accepting* him. The acceptance of the Other is the complete and powerful meaning of tolerance. *Acceptance* ends where the very presence of the concept of *tolerance* is undermined and compromised by its history of colonialism and exploitation. Umberto Eco considers the acceptance of the Other as the great bargain of cultural anthropology today.

Cultural anthropology “has been developed with the intention of amplifying the *culpability* of the West towards the others, with the *Others* particularly defined as barbarians, as societies without history or as primitive communities”⁷. By paraphrasing Mircea Eliade, I argue that a definite therapy for the Western culpability is the creative hermeneutics and the history of religions. Why? Because the mentalities and the life styles of the others, be they exotic or not, are ultimately religious. The knowledge of religions, of symbols and of the sacred rituals is yet the key to understanding and acceptance. This is also valid for the cases where the motives of the modern West are not repentance and remorse over past history nor a detached curiosity for the Other’s culture and life style.

Eliade’s considerations need to be updated. Today, the problem is not only to accept the Other as one’s equal yet different, but also to ascertain him as a free

citizen in one’s own home. Yesterday, “*the anthropologist said that one should respect the others’ life style as long as they keep their places*”⁸. Today, they have moved into ours and we ask legitimately if the rules still hold. At this point I subscribe to Eco’s simple answer: *it depends*. I can accept/tolerate the Other to pierce his lips, nose, navel or eyebrows. I can accept/tolerate him to practice circumcision or rogation five times a day. Yet, in Eco’s terms, I can hardly tolerate western ID cards with photos of women wearing a veil, the refusal of blood transfusion for sick children, or the wish of the last cannibal in New Guinea to have a barbecued child for every Sunday lunch, to use Eco’s exemplification.

Everywhere in the world there are written and unwritten rules that can not be disregarded. An exaggerated enforcement may lead, paradoxically, to a *dictatorship of the minority* and to a reversal of the tolerance ratio. In such situations, the tolerated could very well be a representative of the mainstream: heterosexual, orthodox, and invariably tributary to the classic testamentary models and the *establishment*. The only solution I see to avoid the occurrence of these inverted replicas of the world is to respect the established mores. (Cases where a fundamentalist or a totalitarian regime sets up the standards are by definition exempt from the above rules).

Despite the mistakes it has made, the West is fully entitled to this. As Eco emphasized, the West “invested money and energy in the study of the habits and customs of the others”. In contrast, the others have never been permitted to study the habits and customs of the

West, except in schools abroad under white management. There are, however, a few cases when the West did accept the others to study at Oxford or Paris. Everybody knows what happened afterwards: the graduates returned home to organize fundamentalist movements sympathizing with their co-nationals who had not enjoyed the same educational opportunities. Furthermore, there is a history of intellectuals who studied alongside the English and then went on to struggle for the independence of India”⁹. Such history has now taken different shapes today. Muslims graduate from the Western Universities and then fight against the American politics, against the atheist West through its own instruments. This in particular is regarded as the will of non-Western countries to “enter history” by means of fundamentalism and intolerance.

All the motive fundamentalists may invoke aside – regardless of their color and their faith – one thing is obvious: the intolerance of the other is the exterior and visible sign of an interior schizophrenia. Any authentic encounter of the alterity entails the scenario of a *descentus ad inferos*. It is a symbolic death, followed by a renewal and the encounter with the Other within oneself. In Hegel’s terms, our conscience “expulses the alterity violently”¹⁰, but at the same time, by the same exercise, the conscience sustains the alterity. The conscience maintains and updates the alterity in its negative forms. The reason might be the necessary venting of tensions and frustrations accumulated over time. It is the theme of *pharmakos*, in an exemplary analysis by Renè Girard in his work.

It is only evident that the odyssey of alterity should be spiritually fruitful. The alterity demands a regular expulsion followed by the assumption of an alter ego. The process underlies the existence of every individual or community. This *back and forth* mechanism might as well be taken for a necessary existential therapy. You succeed in knowing yourself better through the faces of the Other. Moreover, when this spiritual circuit is blocked, the ego enters schizophrenia. All links with the diversity of the world are severed, and the latter is demonised. This is exactly how the Ego fully illustrates the ultimately negative aspect, the intolerance.

For this reason I believe that the primary solution for tolerance is the *recognition of alterity*, interior and exterior alike. This should be the first and foremost bargain of the education. I recall an example by Umberto Eco. „The Academie Universelle des Cultures has a special department in charge of creating authentic material on different topics (color, religion, usage, customs, etc). The material is intended for educators in all countries willing to educate their colleagues to accept the people who are different from themselves”¹¹. How? Firstly, children should not be told the lie that all are equal. Children keenly realize that some of their neighbors and colleagues are not equal to them because of the difference in skin color, eye shape, eating habits, and/or not taking the Eucharist. Moreover, they shouldn’t be told that all are God’s creatures, either. The animals are God’s creatures too. Still, nobody has ever seen a goat at the desk, teaching orthography. This is why children should be told that human beings are very different one

from another. One should also explain thoroughly what the differences consist in. And all this in order to make pupils understand that differences should be a source of spiritual fulfillment”¹². A source of tolerance and even acceptance of the Other. Developing a good relationship with the alterity will then complete this pedagogical exercise in the alternative understanding of the difference.

The following lesson may be then to *discover the similarities with the Other*. With children, it is not easy to justify the existence of similarities in bodies, interests and religions. One should beware of the dangers of syncretism. Only after understanding the hidden play of similarities and of dissimilarities, one can pursue tolerance and acceptance. This is the great lesson in history that should be learned at Kabul or Bagdad. But who knows? Maybe some of us played truant when it was taught!

Notes

* Translated by Maria Boariu

1 Umberto Eco. (2002). “Războaiele sfinte: patimă și ratiune”. [“The Holy Wars: Passion and Reason”] in *Adevărul literar și artistic*. [Romanian version]. 612.

2 It is also interesting that the difference entailed by the Other has often been transposed in olfactory terms. For details, see Ioan Petru Culianu, *Călătorii în lumea de dincolo*, [Journeys into the Nether world] translated by Gabriela Oisteanu and Andrei Oisteanu, Bucharest. Nemira Press. 1994. p 131 and 223. See also Andrei Oisteanu, *Mythos and Logos. Studies and Essays on Cultural Anthropology*. Bucharest. Nemira Press 1997. p. 196-197.

3 Stefan Afloroaei. (1998) “Cercul întâlnirii celuilalt”. [The Circle of the Encounter with the Other] in Silviu B. Moldovan (ed). (1998). *Problema iugoslavă. Studii și marginalii*, [The Yugoslav Issue. Studies and Marginalia]. Timisoara. Meridian 21 Delta Press. p. 158-173.

4 Bichare Klader. (1996). “Stereotipuri occidentale cu privire la Orient” [Western Stereotypes about the East] in *Secolul XX* [The 20th Century]. p. 1-3.

5 Thierry Hentsch. (1988). *L'Orient imaginaire: la vision politique occidentale de l'Est méditerranéen*. Ed. de Minuit. Paris.

6 Bichare Klader. (1996). Western Stereotypes ...p. 59

7 Umberto Eco. (2002). “The Holy Wars...” p 9.

8 *Ibidem*

9 *Ibidem*, P. 10.

10 Stefan Afloroaei. (1998) The Circle of the Encounter... p. 163.

11 Umberto Eco. (2002). “The Holy Wars...”p. 10.

12 *Ibidem*.

Toleranta: etica si/sau politica?

The author's perspective in this text comes from the field of the political phenomenology. In his view, tolerance has preserved its actuality, both from a moral point of view and from a political one. After a preliminary discussion of Locke's basic texts concerning tolerance, the author takes into consideration the recent thoughts of the contemporary Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio, who understands the idea of tolerance as the basic principle of free and peaceful life. In addition, the author makes applied commentaries at the Romanian context, pleading for the necessity of a responsible approach of the issue.

“Deci, dupa cum va spuneam, nu am nimic împotriva religiei cuiva, oricare ar fi ea, cât timp respectivul nu omoara sau nu raneste pe altii pe motiv ca acestia nu cred în religia sa. Dar daca religia cuiva devine extrema, daca îi provoaca un adevarat chin si, în cele din urma, transforma pamîntul într-un han în care a trai devine inconfortabil, atunci cred ca a sosit timpul sa trag persoana respectiva la o parte si sa dezbat acest lucru cu ea.”

(Cuvintele lui Ishmael. Hermann Melville: *Moby Dick*)

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Istoria ideii de toleranta, asemenea istoriei filosofice a tolerantei, reprezinta una dintre cele mai complexe sisteme ideatice ce caracterizeaza evolutia politica moderna si tardomoderna a tarii-insula (Anglia), a continentului (Europa) si a Lumii Noi (Statele Unite ale Americii si Canada). Desi se gasesc radacini comune ale acestor trei linii de evolutie, ele trebuie totusi despartite. Problematika tolerantei nu si-a pierdut din actualitate, nici din punct de vedere moral si nici politic, ceea ce înseamna ca în câmpurile si Stadioanele constiintei si în acelea ale politicii exista în continuare probleme si mize cât se poate de serioase, uneori chiar ucigatoare.

(“Tubeste-ti aproapele ca pe tine însuti” – macar de ne-am putea apropia, în iubirea fata de aproapele nostru, de iubirea pe care o avem fata de noi însine.

11 septembrie 2001 – New York, World Trade Center, Gemenii – razboiul mondial special al mileniului trei. Musulmani si crestini. Granita dintre civilizatii si razboiul posibil dintre ele. Români si maghiari.

Toleranti si tolerati. De fapt, de ce ar trebui sa toleram sa ni se ameninte viata, libertatea, demnitatea, bunurile si aproapele? Sa fie toleranta o idee absoluta? Se poate ea fundamenta fara contradictie în corelatiile sale? Ori sa fie vorba, cel puțin dupa metodologia hobbesiana deloc de neglijat, de o teorema care trebuie sa-si gaseasca o demonstratie corespunzatoare si înainte de asta un *modus operandi* eficace?) Consider ca prin aceasta lista cât se poate de nelinistitoare am legitimat îndeajuns observatia pe care am facut-o cu privire la actualitatea

problemei tolerantei. Lucrurile sînt la fel de incitante si din punct de vedere metodologic, întrucît problema tolerantei este aceea a *limitelor tolerantei*, iar asta nu ar trebui sa însemne ca degradam toleranta la rangul unui simplu instrument politic. Nu, trebuie sa atragem atentia asupra faptului ca, istoric vorbind, în mod fundamental, toleranta a fost o chestiune moral-religioasa si, ca atare abia, politica. Astazi însa pare ca identitatile culturale si etnice patrund în câmpul politicii, la fel cum se întîmpla cu religia în cadrul marilor razboaie religioase europene. (Specialistii ne avertizeaza ca acesta e lucrul cel mai periculos: oricît de imposibil ar parea, chestiunile etnice si culturale trebuie sustrate domeniului politicii, altfel ele se constituie în niste focare de conflict.)¹ Se pare ca grupul problemelor ce se aduna în jurul tolerantei se întregeste în mod necesar astazi cu doua dimensiuni care se pot preciza pornind de la planificarea sociala si management: 1. conflictul si gestionarea conflictelor, 2. dimensiunea reglarii juridice, morale a convietuirii sociale – aceasta din urma are o bibliografie considerabila în ultima vreme.² În acelasi timp, s-au realizat importante sinteze si în domeniul cercetarii traditionale a istoriei ideii de toleranta.³ Impulsurile ce vin dinspre postmodernitate sau dinspre a doua modernitate sînt extrem de importante pentru regîndirea problematicei tolerantei, dar ele nu ne absolvea totusi de obligatia de a reanaliza semnificatia initiala a ideii de toleranta.

I.

Cum se știe, *Tratatul despre toleranță* (1667) și *Scrisoarea despre toleranță* (1685) ale lui John Locke reprezintă două dintre operele fundamentale ale dreptului statal, ale filosofiei statului și ale naturalismului juridic. Conform lui John Locke, credința individuală profundă, adevărata religiozitate care “tinde spre modelarea vieții corecte și cu frica de Dumnezeu” reprezintă prima condiție sufletească prealabilă a îngăduinței religioase. În esență, e vorba de o dispoziție sufletească religioasă – de exemplu, creștinii își îndreaptă privirile înspre Christos – dar în co-relația sufletească conștiința a urmării lui. A separa cu consecvență statul și biserică poate fi considerată a două condiții prealabile a toleranței la Locke. Acest principiu fundamental se constituie din trei momente: 1. Statul este o comunitate creată pentru conservarea și sporirea bunurilor civile, el neavând nici o autoritate în probleme sufletești, căci nu poți domni cu violență asupra conștiințelor. 2. De aici rezultă libertatea conștiinței, cu alte cuvinte, în opoziție cu autoritatea statului vizând chestiunile vieții lumesti, în opinia lui Locke, privitor la probleme legate de mântuirea sufletului, fiecare om dispune de o competență individuală, adică își poate alege în mod liber comunitatea religioasă ce corespunde convingerilor sale sufletești. 3. Din libertatea conștiinței rezultă egalitatea civilă a religiilor și a bisericilor. În ceea ce le privește, judecator nu poate fi nici o autoritate lumească, ci doar Dumnezeu. Însă nici sfera de influență a fetelor

bisericești nu poate fi extinsă la chestiuni civile, întrucât ambele au granițe solide și neschimbătoare. “*Coelum et terram, res disjunctissimas miscet, qui has duas societates origine, fine, materia toto coelo diversas velit confundere.*” Din atare rațiuni provine și lipsa de îngăduință a lui Locke în ceea ce-i privește pe catolici. Statul are competență în chestiuni civile, deci nu e permis să suportăm superioritatea nici unei dogme care se opune bunelor moravuri necesare societății umane sau conservării comunității civile.

Însă – susține Locke – catolicii își revendică privilegiul, cum ar fi acela al încălcării cuvântului dat sau acela al gonirii regilor excomunicați, iar toate acestea se opun libertății civile. Ideea toleranței se asociază întotdeauna cu aceea a intoleranței, dar rămâne întotdeauna o chestiune de decizie – de fixat într-o teoremă filosofică – direcția în care o luăm, aspectele și corelațiile pe care le vizăm, faptul de la care pornim și, în cele din urmă, consecințele ce rezultă în urma acestor decizii – precum într-o matrice cvadruplă: toleranță/intoleranță și conștiință/politică. Din punct de vedere metodologic, chestiunea poate fi prevăzută și calculată, miza este de fiecare dată foarte mare: conștiințe, libertăți și vieți zdrobite. Revenind la Locke, intoleranța sa nu e religioasă, ci una cu rațiuni politice având natura de consecință, iar, calitativ, ea diferă de situația în care o religie e condamnată datorită dogmelor ei considerate a fi eronate din punct de vedere teologic. În ceea ce privește intoleranța față de catolici, legitimitatea ei nu stă în faptul că credința catolică ar fi greșită, ci în consecințele politice ale dogmelor sale. Acesta este

motivul pentru care Locke a respins – în modul cunoscut – și ateismul, întrucât consecințele ultime ale acestuia ar dezbină fundamentele vieții sociale. Trebuie remarcat însă ca poziția teologiei catolice față de ateism este destul de nuanțată, multilaterală și nu lipsită de contradicții. Avem în vedere aici în primul rând formularea conform căreia, dacă ateismul *teoretic* nu are intenții misionare, el poate fi tolerant (chiar până la a se îngrijora față de anumite lucruri). Dar teologia susține *posibilitatea de a-l cunoaște pe Dumnezeu* ca fiind una dintre dogmele sau adevărurile credinței și îi exclude din biserică pe adepții ateismului.⁴ Poziția bisericii în această chestiune a devenit din ce în ce mai nuanțată. La al II-a conciliu de la Vatican, oficiul pedagogic bisericesc s-a ocupat foarte serios de ideile teologice legate de ateism. *Lumen gentium* 16. considera “ateismul inocent” ca fiind o posibilitate reală, care nu îi refuza ateistului mântuirea eternă. *Gaudium et spes* 19.21. spune: “ateismul refuza eventual doar un Dumnezeu care, în realitate, nu există, având în vedere că ateismul se naște adesea din atrofierea capacității de a trăi o experiență religioasă adevărată, adesea el provine din problema teodiceei, respectiv: ateismul este interpretarea deseori falsă a sentimentului în sine legitim de libertate și autonomie a omului contemporan și a aspirației sale de a scăpa în mod activ de laturile economice și sociale.”

Considerațiile lui John Locke – iar acest lucru poate fi văzut chiar și intuitiv – au o orientare imanentă înspre libertate. În opinia sa, individul are aceleași libertăți în viața religioasă ca și în viața civilă. (Viața religioasă înseamnă aici mai degrabă formele exterioare ale

practicării religiei.) E permis deci să mîni turme, să bei vin, să te speli cu apă, să tai miei, să te aduni la ceremonii, să vorbești în cadrul lor, însă nu e permis nici un lucru care i se interzice omului în viața civilă. Cadrele toleranței descrise de Locke sînt trasate, în esență, de libertățile civile. *Cu alte cuvinte, în sens juridic, nici această toleranță nu exprimă altceva decît compromisul dintre forțele sociale interesate de chestiunea religiei și relațiile de putere ale momentului.*

As face observația că, în cadrul raportării noastre – fenomenologia politică – idealul existent al statului autoritar și centralizat nu poate duce “lipsa” nici astăzi de aportul teocratic. Tendința Sinodului Bisericii Ortodoxe Române de a proclama prin Constituție ortodoxia ca fiind religie de stat sau de a pune religia ortodoxă într-o poziție privilegiată prin caile redistribuirii statale – în care se întâlnește cu intențiile remunerative abia ascunse ale statului – exprimă cel mai clar starea retardată a libertății cetățenesti pe de o parte, iar pe de altă parte inegalitatea religioasă – mă refer, evident, la domeniul politic. Mai mult, inegalitatea se manifestă și în indiferența nemăiauzită – aflată deja la limita *justizmord-ului*, a erorii judecătorești, dacă nu chiar în această situație – cu care se raportează statul român la chestiunea restituirii bunurilor bisericesti ale religiilor diferite de cea ortodoxă, indiferența ce a avut ca rezultat ca responsabili de rang înalt ai bisericilor istorice din Ardeal să-și adresat forurilor juridice ale Consiliului European.

La o oarecare retardare a libertăților ne lăsa să ne gândim și faptul că, în chestiuni precum integrarea

diverselor grupuri minoritare (“minoritati sexuale”), luarea de pozitie a bisericilor istorice, prin intermediul mass-media si, deci, în afara bisericii, chiar daca n-a putut fi decisiva, a influentat peste masura calitatea si durata dezbatelor publice si, în ultima instanta, codificarea juridica a acestor probleme.

Din punct de vedere istoric, putem considera adevarat faptul ca procesul ce începe o data cu toleranta se termina cu conceptia rationala despre libertate, iar într-un stat de drept democratic el se fixeaza în institutiile (juridice) liberale ale acestuia – începând astfel din nou, am putea adauga. James Mill (parintele cunoscutului John Stuart Mill) a formulat la începutul secolului al XIX-lea, construind pe bazele depuse de John Locke (constiinta + stat construit pe dreptul natural), exigenta continuarii dezbaterii publice si rationale (care ar functiona ca o adunare populara virtuala), privita astazi ca fiind una dintre instrumentele cele mai importante ale statului modern. El spunea si în cele doua lucrari fundamentale ale sale – *The Liberty of the Press*, 1825 si *The Principles of Toleration*, 1826 – ca nu exista si nu e posibil nici un alt criteriu al adevarului în afara de dezbaterea libera; si cu cât mai mare e publicul democratic sub privirile caruia se poarta aceasta dezbatere, cu atât mai mari sînt sansele adevarului. Libertatea gîndirii nu poate fi despartita de libertatea presei – respectiv, în absenta acesteia din urma, prima este doar o metafora lipsita de sens. Toate acestea ne conduc înspre o interpretare extinsa a tolerantei, de care tine deja si problematica gradelor de libertate, adica daca vorbim de toleranta pornind de la fenomenologia

politica, atunci probele intolerantei statale, de constiinta, respectiv etnic-culturale – ca obiecte de analiza – vor aparea totodata si ele.

II.

Monografiile cele mai importante ale ultimilor ani considera toate ca toleranta este punctul de pornire al libertatii civile si a institutiilor sale, dar si ca ea e reformulata – pentru a folosi o expresie usor plastica – în functie de fluctuatia gradelor de libertate.⁵

Înainte însa de a trece la componentele principale ale problemei îngaduinitei, permiteti-mi ca sa schitez macar contururile acelor corelatii fundamentale asupra carora ne-a atras atentia, în cercetarile sale, János Heltai. (Am scris cîndva si o critica mai amanuntita despre el.⁶) În opinia lui Heltai, principalul izvor maghiar al ideii de toleranta îl constituie lucrarea lui David Pareus din Heidelberg, *Irenicum sive de unione et synodo evangelicorum concilianda liber votivus* (Heidelberg, 1614). Aceasta lucrare are ca scop pacea si unitatea dintre diversele confesiuni protestante, adica argumenteaza în favoarea unei idei de toleranta pozitive, active, împaciuitoare. Autorul compara ideea fundamentala a irenismului cu ideile lui Locke si constata: “irenismul tinteste cu precadere sa transforme libertatea de religie într-un drept confesional al tuturor religiilor, el este unul dintre curentele de gîndire ce pregatesc ideea moderna de toleranta, în masura în care, în cazul unei dezvoltari organice – precum cele din Anglia sau Olanda –

drepturile confesionale reprezinta o anticipare a libertatilor civile.”⁷ Cei mai de seama reprezentanti ai ideii protestante de toleranta înțelese în acest fel sînt Péter Alvinczi, marele partener de dezbateri al lui Pázmány, István Katona Geleji si altii. (Heltai pune sub semnul întrebării auctorialitatea celor doua tratate importante atribuite lui Péter Alvinczi – *Itinerarium Catholicum* si *Querela*.) Ca idee teologica si filosofica, toleranta este la noi, într-una din ramificatiile sale principale, irenismul de la Heidelberg. Trebuie sa accentuam însa ca aici e vorba de fapte de istoria ideilor, si nu de acel eveniment des citat al istoriei politice a Ardealului cunoscut ca edict al lui János I, adica de dieta din 1568 de la Turda, de libertatea deplina a propagării si talmacirii Evangheliei sau de faimosul argument: “caci credinta e darul lui Dumnezeu”. (Edictul nu se referea si la catolici.) Diversele concilii protestante i-au obligat, i-au determinat destul de drastic pe credinciosi sa-si pastreze credinta – pentru aceasta sta marturie cazul de mai târziu al lui János Apáczai Csere.

Întrebarea este deci urmatoarea: este oare toleranta o inventie protestanta? Da si nu: privind dinspre istoria societatii europene în sens mai larg si dinspre istoria ideilor, ea este un eveniment necesar al modernitatii.

În ultima vreme se fac rareori trimiteri la opiniile lui Max Weber, desi chestiunea îngaduintei religioase a fost considerata si de catre el ca una dintre întrebările-cheie ale modernitatii europene, ale evolutiei acesteia. Iata ce spune într-una din notele de subsol rezumative ale lucrării sale *Etica protestanta si spiritul capitalismului*: “Unul

dintre reprezentantii principali ai ideii de îngaduinta este pietismul... Daca facem abstractie de *indiferenta* umanist-iluminata, care, în sine, n-a avut niciodata o *influenta* prea mare, atunci în Occident ideea îngaduintei religioase s-a nascut istoric vorbind din urmatoarele izvoare principale:

1. ratiunea de stat pur politica (arhetipul ei fiind Wilhelm de Orania⁸),
2. Mercantilismul (acest lucru e valabil în mod special în cazul Amsterdamului si al altor numeroase orase, iar apoi în cazul mosierilor si al detinatorilor puterii care îi protejau pe membrii diverselor secte ca purtatori importanti ai valorilor progresului economic),
3. cotitura radicala a religiozitatii calviniste. Doctrina predestinării a împiedicat în mod fundamental ca statul sa ameninte religia cu arma intolerantei, caci statul n-a reusit sa salveze înca nici un suflet.”⁹

Descriind dimensiunea istorica a acestei probleme, Max Weber pune accent pe faptul ca nu de toleranta, ci mai degraba de intoleranta este caracterizat capitalismul european.¹⁰ Întrebarea cui i-a folosit în cele din urma toleranta primeste la Max Weber un raspuns cît se poate de clar: ea i-a folosit bisericii, comunitatilor spirituale, caci numai asa ele au putut da nastere acelei *persona* crestine care e capabila de înfaptuirea vointei divine, urmarea lui Christos; acest lucru si nu altul îi împlineste spiritualitatea. Ideea tolerantei e formulata, deci, aici în cadrul unei comunitati, pe baza anumitor principii si adevaruri de credinta general valabile, iar în afara comunitatii ea e valabila doar daca se pune

problema asocierii, a integrării unui alt individ sau a unei alte comunitati.

III.

Trebuie sa acceptam ipoteza ca, în masura în care îngaduinta religioasa si libertatea constiintei au fost premergatoarele libertatii generale, în masura în care si libertatea ridica o multitudine de întrebări de rezolvat, retrospectiv, si toleranta este o întrebare deschisa. Nimeni nu se naste îngaduator, dar poate deveni. Marele paradox a fost însa dintotdeauna ca nu era permis sa fii îngaduator fata de intoleranta si fata de cei neîngaduatori sau era permis sa fii astfel doar pîna la o anumita limita. Aceste întrebări trebuiesc regîndite în cea de a doua modernitate si în circumstantele noastre, si nu sînt convinși de faptul ca terminologia filosofica abstracta ar fi cea mai buna cale în cazul acesta, poate ca tocmai pe marginea analizării multor cazuri individuale – si ma gîndesc aici si la acel limbaj analitic particular – se vor desena granitele *zonei de îngaduinta*.

Una din constiintele înca în viața ale epocii noastre, marele filosof italian al dreptului Norberto Bobbio nu e doar teoreticianul traditiei kantian-milliene. El a urmarit destul de activ luptele pentru dreptul civil, iar începînd din anii '30 a participat destul de des la ele, deci studiul sau poate fi privit si ca un fel de montura teoretica a miscarilor italiene de drept civil, iar asta nu doar în ceea ce priveste chestiunile referitoare la toleranta.

În lucrarea sa capitala¹¹, Norberto Bobbio accentueaza ca pe parcursul ultimilor patru sute de ani, gîndul tolerantei a suferit o extindere continua în aria semantica ce se întinde de la semnificatiile religioase pîna la cele politice. Astazi, toleranta a fost extinsa la problematica vietuirii împreuna a minoritatilor rasiale, etnice, lingvistice si culturale, adica la “alii”, cum ar fi homosexualii, nebunii, handicapatii. Însa în sensul ei primar, toleranta este totusi chestiunea vederilor si parerilor divergente, una care are nevoie de dezbaterea publica despre adevar, adica despre instrumentele de care dispunem pentru a face posibila convietuirea teoretica si practica a adevarurilor opuse.

(Sa cercetam deci un exemplu. În sensul de mai sus, pentru entitatile/comunitatile române si maghiare din România, chestiunea unei universitati – de stat – de limba maghiara, respectiv statutul juridic al bunurilor bisericesti, nu sînt chestiuni de natura juridica, economica si politica, ci – în 2002 dupa Christos – ele sînt mai degraba adevaruri incompatibile, propuneri de neîngaduit. Fundamentul prejudecării partii românești este separatismul de natura ideologica, respectiv ratiunea de stat româneasca. [În versiunea ei colocviala, “nici o brazda înapoi”, ea este exprimarea dreptului consfîntit al cuceririi.] Fundamentul adevarului partii maghiare, în chestiunea universitatii, este multilateral: istoric, juridic, practic si demografic – în cele din urma, el este o combinatie de elemente de drept natural. Cele doua sisteme de argumente sînt despartite de o distanta imensa – am avut ocazia sa fac experienta acestui lucru chiar la masa tratativelor –, acesta din urma este un fac-

tor visceral ce guverneaza mentalitatea si practica de toate zilele. Acest lucru e bine exprimat de constatarea conform careia cele doua comunitati convietuiesc în spatiu, dar nu convietuiesc în timp.)

Revenind la argumentele lui Norberto Bobbio: cel de al doilea sens al tolerantei este tocmai discriminarea ce s-a nascut în urma logicii prejudecarii. Aceasta duce la o situatie-capcana, respectiv la un discurs a carui acceptare obliga orice comunitate ce dispune doar de grade neevolute de libertate la o situatie pre-istorica. Lipsa de îngaduinta are doua izvoare: prima este convingerea legata de posesia exclusiva a adevarului, refuzul traditiei europene a dialogului (o conceptie despre dialog pe care o datoram totusi filosofiei rationaliste ce vine din traditia socratic-platonica), abandonarea principiului consensului – în cazul în care se presupune ca el a fost cândva cunoscut. În sfera politicii, toate acestea constituie un ansamblu de factori ce slabesc ratiunea de stat.

Toleranta însa, în calitate de ingredient al comportamentului cetatenesc corect înseamna un sistem multilateral de angajamente asumate de bunavoie – iar constiinta acestuia se manifesta pe fetele concetatenilor nostri occidentali, atunci când se confrunta cu mentalitatile noastre est-europene, sub forma unui zîmbet exprimînd într-adevar superioritate. Dupa sugestia lui Norberto Bobbio, de la simplul gînd al tolerantei politice trebuie sa facem un pas înainte catre un model universal real si propriu-zis, caruia trebuie sa-i acordam într-adevar o valoare universala, iar acesta este *convietuirea cetateneasca*: toleranta înseamna

posibilitatea alegerii între a te lasa convins sau înduplecat si a fi fortat sau influentat. În spatele tolerantei concepute astfel se afla nu doar acceptarea pasiva si resemnata a erorii, ci, deja, un angajament activ, încrederea în veridicitatea argumentelor sau a sistemului de argumente ale celuilalt, o conceptie antropologica conform careia celalalt nu își urmareste doar interesele sale nemijlocite si primare, ci este capabil sa le contemple în relatie cu interesul public. În ultima instanta, aceasta atitudine refuza violenta ca mod unic de a-ti valida convingerea proprie. (Sa notam aici ca în societatile moderne exista nenumarate moduri, “împachetate” corespunzator, ale validarii prin violenta a intereselor proprii, într-atît încît indivizi sau grupuri – conform, de exemplu, legii române si maghiare a politiei –, în schimbul unei remuneratii pe masura, pot sa beneficieze de serviciile acestor grupari înarmate.)

Fara a se lansa aici într-o argumentatie de tip istoric, Norberto Bobbio accentueaza ca a constientiza si a accepta/ a face acceptat principiul politic al tolerantei a fost *meritul* marilor iluministi si utopisti, care au stiut sa traga concluziile ultime ale razboaielor religioase europene si le-au fixat pe acestea în reflectii filosofice. Putem adauga ca, în cazul pacii religioase de la Augsburg, constatarea reformistilor si a adversarilor lor, predicatorii, precum si aceea a principilor votanti a fost decisiva: fara institutionalizarea principiului îngaduintei *umanitatea europeana va pieri*. Aceasta este marea traditie europeana a reformatilor, a predicatorilor, a împaratilor, a regilor, a generalilor si a filosofilor: ideea necesitatii indispensabile a îngaduintei, care – se pare –

trebuie replantata, implantata, reprogramata din timp în timp în conștiințele, sufletele, modurile de a gândi și de a acționa, de a se comporta ale oamenilor. În acest sens, principiul toleranței trimite dincolo de toate învățămintele pe care le etalează istoria ideilor sau cea a politicii. Argumentul lui Thomas Morus era simplu: calea viitorului este calea moderatiei, a retinerii, armele puse în slujba religiei pot distruge primele umanitatea. A merge pe calea violentei înseamnă a ajunge la pustietate și la darîmături. Bobbio citează frumosul argument al primeia dintre scrisorile lui Locke: adevărul vorbeste spiritului omului, dar niciodată pe limba armelor – și putem adăuga că arma are aici și un sens figurat. *Dacă adevărul nu-și câștigă valabilitate prin propria-si lumina, el nu si-o va câștiga niciodată prin puterea a altceva decât el.*

În opinia lui Norberto Bobbio, toleranța constă astăzi în acel sens democratic al ei conform căruia instrumentele influențării și ale forței trebuie înlocuite cu acelea ale convingerii și ale înduplecării. (Iar aceste instrumente există din plin în era informațională.) Fără aceste instrumente ajungem nu la rezolvarea conflictelor, ci la escaladarea lor. La toate acestea, filosoful italian al dreptului adăuga și un argument etic: chiar dacă as considera adevărul meu ca având valabilitate absolută, *respectul față de persoana celuilalt* este, pentru mine, absolut. Evident, nu e ușor să realizezi în practică o coerență între aceste două concepții, nu e ușor să încetănești din nou mecanismele sociale ale dialogului și dezbaterii raționale, a trăi și a gândi după imperativul “presupun și permit ca și celălalt să aibă

dreptate”, însă în afara acestor convingeri nu există etică democratică, ci doar masti democratice. Consensualitatea ca valoare este resemnificată și reevaluată la acest sfârșit de mileniu; aminti aici lucrările lui Robert Nozick și John Rawls.

Revenind la Norberto Bobbio și la tradiția kantiană reprezentată de el, aici nu e vorba doar de faptul că toleranța este raul mai mic, adică acceptare a unui model al conviețuirii și refuzul altuia, ci și de acela că ea este singurul răspuns în sensul că libertatea interioară este o valoare mult prea ridicată pentru a putea evita recunoașterea sa. (Această moștenire filosofică provine din stoicism care spune că faptul de a fi o persoană se află în legătură cu reflecția, recunoașterea și previziunea în urma cărora ajungem la convingerile noastre.) În acest sens, toleranța nu e de dorit fiindcă e socialmente utilă și politiceste fructuoasă, ci pentru că e indispensabilă moral. Omul îngaduitor nu e niciodată sceptic fiindcă are încredere în adevărul său. El nu e neutru și indiferent, fiindcă își trăiește activitatea ca angajament necondiționat, la fel cum tot necondiționat respectă și libertatea celuilalt. Concluzia filosofului italian este că ideea îngaduitei este principiul fundamental al vieții libere și trăite în pace, în care cea mai mare problemă este, în mod tradițional, toleranța celor care nu respectă pacea. Limita toleranței este intoleranța, îngaduinta față de intoleranță distruge toleranța. Acesta e un paradox existențial și trebuie să constientizăm foarte bine unde se află limita.

Urmează considerațiile metodologice extrem de importante: 1. îngaduinta este deci întotdeauna

ansamblul tolerantei si al intolerantei, este o confruntare activa si continua, unde, cînd e vorba sa stabilim limita, întîlnim chestiunile legate de libertate. Nu putem fi – nu numai personal, ci si în general – îngaduatori fata de fortele ce pun în pericol viata, libertatea, securitatea, demnitatea, proprietatea si semenii nostri. În astfel de cazuri trebuie sa avem grija de legalitate, adica sa ne putem reprezenta toleranta la nivelul regulatorilor juridici, ceea ce cere cunostinte evolute de drept si o constiinta cetateneasca la fel de dezvoltata, fiind întotdeauna problematic sa fii reprezentantul tolerantei într-un stat/într-o societate aflat(a) pe calea intolerantei. 2. Cînd vorbim de toleranta ne gîndim în general la toleranta pozitiva, adica la un comportament ce stabileste riguros si înțelept obiectul tolerantei, astfel îngaduinta nu are sens decît în legatura cu un obiect al ei fata de care sîntem îngaduatori, ea nu poate face abstractie de momentul focalizarii, al intentiei, deci putem vorbi linistiti de o fenomenologie a îngaduintei. Celeilalte specii a îngaduintei, tolerantei negative îi lipseste aceasta rigoare, ea este un fel de lejeritate nociva despre care moralistii si pedagogii au scris carti ce umplu biblioteci întregi. 3. În sfîrsit, cînd vorbim despre modificarea sensului initial al tolerantei religioase, în urma careia cuvîntul “toleranta” e folosit astazi pentru a descrie mai degraba respectul fata de Alteritate, acceptarea Alteritatii, trebuie stabilit ca nici aceasta nu poate fi neconditionat, ci variabil în functie de continutul Alteritatii, ceea ce ne trimite iarasi la importanta judecatii. Bineînteles, e în continuare valabil programul

secolului al XIX-lea ce cere statului protejarea pozitiva a libertatii constiintei. La fel de valabil e si idealul elaborat în secolul al XIX-lea, care cere democratiei liberale moderne recunoasterea si protejarea legal-institutionala a diverselor minoritati, fara de care toleranta nu poate functiona de o maniera clara, transparenta si regulatoare.

Acolo însa unde problematica tolerantei se ivate cu o asemenea portanta si este atît de la ordinea zilei, într-un astfel de spatiu deci, trebuie sa o spunem ca exista probleme grave în ceea ce priveste convietuirea sociala si reglarea acesteia. Iar asta creeaza motive de neliniste.

Notes

* Tradus din limba maghiara de Alexandru Polgar.

1 “Culturalizarea si educatia au functii alocative si de socializare, care determina decisiv nu doar statutul si modul de a vedea al indivizilor, ci si pe acelea ale grupurilor etnice.” Theodor Hant: *The Political Function of the Educational System in culturally Segmented States*. In: *Zeitschrift für erziehung und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung*, 1984. 2. 191-299. “Oamenii apara privilegiile culturale la fel de încrîncenat precum lupta împotriva discriminarilor culturale.” *Autonomia culturala bazata pe principiul personalitatii: experientele utilizarii*. In: *Staat und Nation in multi-etnischen Gesellschaften*. Passagen Verlag, Wien, 1991. 127.

2 Trimit aici în primul rînd la opera programatica a lui András Lányi.

3 Doua excelente monografii din sirul lung al lucrarilor: János Heltai: *Péter Alvinczi si peregrinii din Heidelberg*. Ed. Balassi, Budapesta, 1994.; Mária Ludassy: *De la toleranta la libertate*, ed. Kossuth, 1992.

4 Denziger-Schönmetzer: *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 32. 1963. 3021., 3023.

5 Pe aceste pozitii se afla poate cel mai important monograf contemporan al lui John Locke, Walter Euchner (*Naturrecht und Politik bei John Locke*. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main, 1969.), respectiv marele filosof italian al dreptului Norberto Bobbio. Studiul sau fundamental este: *La ragioni della tolleranza*. In: *L'età dei diritti*. 1990. Giulio Einaudi editore, Torino.

6 János Heltai: *Alvinczi Péter és a heidelbergi peregrinusok* [Péter Alvinczi si peregrinii de la Heidelberg]. Budapesta, 1994. Annali dell'Institutio Universitaria Orientale di Napoli. Studi Finno-Ugrici, 1995. 287-291

7 János Heltai: *op. cit.* 175.

8 Din punctul de vedere a ceea ce avem de spus nu e inutil sa citam aici deviza lui Wilhelm de Orania: “Sînt un luptator fara speranta.”

9 Max Weber: *Etica protestanta si spiritul capitalismului*. Gondolat, Budapesta, 1982. 1185.

10 “...e perfect eronata conceptia ce apare des si care spune ca *toleranta ca atare* ar fi în avantajul capitalismului. Toleranta religioasa nu e un fenomen modern sau occidental. Ea a existat în China, India, în marile imperii preasiatice ale epocii eleniste, în imperiul roman, în imperiul islamic si, limitata pentru multa vreme doar de *ratiunea de stat* (care reprezinta si astazi limita sa!), ea s-a raspîndit pe teritorii mult mai vaste decît în secolele al XVI-lea si al XVII-lea. Si chiar în aceasta perioada ea era mai putin raspîndita în zone în care *domnea* puritanismul, cum ar fi Olanda si Zeelanda în vremea ascensiunii lor politico-economice sau în puritanele Vechi si Noi Anglii. Occidentul – atît înaintea reformei, cît si dupa – era caracterizat de o *intoleranta religioasa* asemanatoare cu aceea care domnea în imperiul sasanizilor, asa cum aceeaasi intoleranta a dominat în anumite perioade si China, Japonia si India – în majoritatea cazurilor din motive politice. Prin urmare, e cert ca *toleranta ca atare* nu are nici cea mai mica legatura cu capitalismul. *Întrebarea este, cui ea folosit ea.* *op. cit.* 187.

11 *La ragioni della tolleranza*. In: *L'età dei diritti*. 1990. Giulio Einaudi editore, Torino [n. ed. JSRI]

The Limits of Religious Tolerance – a European Perspective*

The paper deals with the question of religious tolerance in Europe's past and present. Tolerance within Christianity (and within the other so called "Abrahamitic" or "Biblical" Religions) is one of the main points. However, the reader is also invited to take a brief look at Europe's pre-Christian past. To some extent, the religious situation of the Roman Empire in particular rather seems to resemble our own experiences with pluralistic societies in today's Europe than medieval and early modern circumstances would do. Even the ancient problems with "religious freedom" can be linked with modern counterparts. So this paper will avoid long retrospectives at the well known facts of Europe's Christian past such as inquisition and European religious wars in order to deal with some more hidden perspectives of European religious history, which were often obscured by the main historiographical narrative.

„Es erübrigt sich der historische Nachweis, daß die Geschichte des Christentums, in dieser Hinsicht die Geschichte jedes Offenbarungslaubens ähnlich, auch eine Geschichte der im Namen der absoluten Wahrheit geübten Intoleranz ist.“¹

The question of religious tolerance within Christianity (and within the other so-called "Abrahamitic" or "Biblical" Religions) is certainly most relevant for medieval and modern Europe. I shall return to it soon. However, before doing so, the reader is invited to take a brief look at Europe's pre-Christian past. To some extent, the religious situation of the Roman Empire in particular seems to resemble our own experiences with pluralistic societies in today's Europe rather than medieval and early modern circumstances. Even the ancient problems with "religious freedom" can be linked with contemporary counterparts. So this paper will avoid long retrospectives at the well known facts of Europe's

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Christian past, such as the inquisition, the European religious wars, and the rising of religious intolerance in the wake of the western reform movement, in order to deal with some more hidden perspectives of European religious history, which are often obscured by the main historiographical narrative.

1. Religious (In)tolerance in a pluralistic environment

It is well known that the process of expansion and the melting of cultures in the Mediterranean region (and in the course of Romanization also in Celtic Europe) of antiquity caused comparably few problems regarding religious questions. When the Roman Empire expanded, the already existing religious plurality offered the structural basis to integrate further deities into its pantheon². Further on, the technique of interpretatio allowed the acceptance of a foreign deity as the equivalent of a deity worshipped according one's own religious tradition. When religious pluralism became more important in republican and early imperial times, people were relatively free to make their own choice concerning what deities they wanted to worship, or in other words, in what cult they wanted to participate actively. In general, this choice was motivated by local traditions as well as family traditions. But also professional and/or other personal criteria played a role. Also there are significant structural parallels concerning the variety of personal religious praxis of the pagans of antiquity and

traditional Orthodox and Catholic veneration of saints. For the single believer it was possible to show veneration to various deities as it was possible to be initiated in various mysteries. Individuals could officiate subsequently as priests of different cults or occupy various priestly functions at the same time. Nor was it completely impossible to be an atheist in practical terms or to adopt a *de facto*-monolatry³. But such self-restriction in general did not imply the explicit denial of other deities nor a strict refusal of other religious forms. In this respect polytheistic religions, which are realised in various cults, are more tolerant in principle than the monotheistic religions⁴. However, this tolerance is not without limits⁵.

Recent developments in India reveal a potential for fundamentalist violence in modern Hinduism. But even in ancient times, religions with a polytheistic structure based on a plurality of cults revealed potentials of intolerance. In principal, heresy and persecution due to religious reasons are alien to religions that do not have dogmas nor "ecclesiastical" structures⁶. Nonetheless the introduction of foreign cults and unaccustomed religious ideas of individuals could cause irritation even in a polytheistic milieu.

Three levels of religious intolerance can be observed:

(1) intellectual criticism of particular practices and/or religious ideas as "*superstitio*" (the classical Roman term for the opposite of true "*religio*") or "*atheism*";

(2) a lack of social acceptance, which could lead to stigmatisation and marginalization, or might even result in physical violence against a person;

(3) and finally, the use of political and juridical instruments in order to put strict limits to a cult/a religion or to stop it completely. In the following, I shall concentrate on the third level.

1.1.1. The Prosecution of “impiety” and foreign cults in Ancient Europe

Single cases are known wherein the Greek *polis* sentenced a person because of “*asebeia*”, “impiety” (and, vice-versa, declared what would be considered respectful behaviour towards the city’s deities). Most famous is the case of Socrates, who was sentenced to death for seducing Athens’ youth, for destroying the belief in the city-deities, and for the introduction of new gods 399 B. C.⁷ Flavius Josephus reports another case, where a Greek priestess was sentenced to death when she had been accused of teaching foreign gods⁸. Though not a problem in principle – Athens had formally adopted various new deities during the 5th century B. C. – novelties in the religious sphere could cause social irritation, which in particular cases ended up in legal prosecution.

At times, the introduction of a foreign cult also caused problems in Ancient Rome, and was accompanied by legal measures as in the Greek cities. In the second century the cult of Bacchus (in Greek, Dionysus), a

cult with orgiastic features, spread from southern Italy to Rome and triggered hostile reactions on the part of the Roman Senate. Exact information on the cult is lacking. Surviving source-materials, such as Livy’s account⁹, are all from the side of the opposition. Here, the emphasis is on the immorality and on the political threats implied in the cult. In 186 B. C., the Roman Senate enacted a decree against the adherents of Bacchus. The decree survived on a bronze tablet, though in a slightly revised version addressing cities from south Italy¹⁰. It did not ban the cult completely, although there were strict injunctions against it. The Senate declared all activities in connection with the cult – such as the construction of a shrine, the nomination of a priest and all performance of rites in public as well as in private – illegal, unless explicit permission was given by the competent authority. In other words, the Roman elite tried to submit the adherents of the suspicious cult to maximal supervision of the civic authorities. As it seems, the rationale for those measures was not so much religion in a narrow sense, but civil order.

1.1.2. Restrictions against NRM in modern democratic societies

Thus the irritation caused by the cult of Bacchus as well as the measures taken by the Roman Senate might be compared to current problems in our days, when European societies are challenged by New Religious Movements¹¹: Conflicts seem almost unavoidable when

a group obviously departs from generally accepted social values and/or tends to come in conflict with those general laws which result from this social consensus. The problems resulting from single divergences - such as the denial of military service or of special forms of medical treatment by members of a religious group such as Jehovah's Witnesses - in general can be solved within a democratic framework in a satisfying way in terms of religious liberty and liberty of conscience as well as of the necessities to protect public order and the rights of others. It is, however, much more difficult to bridge the gap, when a NRM explicitly aims to undermine the democratic and pluralistic principles of the constitutional state. Therefore institutionalized monitoring as well as legal restrictions for some groups with a religious self-image can become an issue even within societies where religious tolerance is considered a positive value and the general standards for religious freedom are high. The USA-based human rights organisations as well as the US-government are quick in assuming that a measure taken by another country implies a violation of freedom of religion. However, a rising European consensus can be observed, that some restrictive measures in this particularly sensitive area cannot be avoided¹².

While there is a wide consensus that some activities and practices (such as sexual abuse of children, drug-trade, or the instigation to commit suicide), which are reported in connection with single groups, are to be considered criminal and punishable under general law, the evaluation of others (in particular the use of specific

psycho-techniques or specific educational practices) is more debated. In general, the total ban of a particular NRM will not be in conformity with basic rights, although civil society might have quite legitimate reasons for feeling uncomfortable with often reported practices and particularly repressive hierarchic structures (such as strict social control and the psychological manipulation of members, and social pressure on persons who want to leave the movement) of various of these groups. In any case, according to European human rights standards, registration as a religious community or with another legal status (association) does not necessarily imply that the unregistered group is denied religious activities¹³.

Single European countries follow an even more restrictive policy. They tend to exclude the practitioners of a particular religious belief, which is considered to be incompatible with general civic values, from sensitive jobs in civic administration¹⁴ and/or had court-decisions which declared such persons as less eligible for guardianship¹⁵. While such decisions were rather disputed¹⁶, there is a wider ranging consensus, that the scene of NRM deserves some monitoring as well as a specific information-policy insofar as children and youth are concerned.

1.2.1. The prosecution of “sacrileges” by ancient Greek and Roman authorities

The term “sacrilege” (*sacrilegium* in Latin) points to another area of conflicts which to some extent are shared by ancient as well as modern societies. As far as is known, court-proceedings and the enactment of new laws in order to ban or restrict a particular cult only rarely occurred in antiquity. However, it was standard that the ancient states prosecuted the disturbance of the possessions of a deity (e.g., the sacred olive trees in Athens), as well as the disturbance of a ritual or of the figurative representation of a god or goddess.

Furthermore some incidents reported in *Lives of Christian Martyrs* have to be understood in this context, e.g., when Thecla is said that she responded to sexual harassment by tearing off the wreath of her offender¹⁷. This accident, already reported in the *Acts of Paul (and Thecla)*, a very early source of the 2nd century, is followed by Thecla’s trial¹⁸. It is significant in this story that the sentence *ad bestias* does not refer to the woman’s Christian confession as such. She is sentenced as *hierosylos*¹⁹, i.e. for *sacrilegium*. The accusation must refer to the tearing-off of the wreath, which was a religious symbol in the pagan-context. So Thecla’s offence might be compared to tearing the robe of a priest or taking his pectoral in the Christian reference-system.

This comparison might help one to understand that the prosecution of such an offence should not be too simply referred to as “religious intolerance”. Legal prosecution for disturbing a religious ceremony or for de-

stroying a pagan statute or – *mutatis mutandis* - for destroying a Christian icon must rather be seen in terms of the protection of the religious space.

1.2.2. Protection of the religious space within the framework of modern pluralistic societies

It seems self-evident that modern democratic states will prosecute such incidents when the violation of personal integrity or property rights are implied, but also that in other cases judicial interference might be justified or even commended. As a recent Austrian law commentary put it: The modern state “*ist nicht mehr Träger von Toleranz im Sinne einer Duldung von anderen, sondern er ist zum Hüter der Toleranz im Sinne eines in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft geltenden Rechtsgebotes geworden.*”²⁰ Thus modern democratic states, which in principal adopt an attitude of neutrality in matters of religion and belief in general, do penalise facts with a religious connotation as European societies always did. However, the main rationale of the respective laws of European criminal codes has considerably changed over time: today it mainly consists in the protection of religious peace among the people of a country rather than in the protection of a particular belief or cult as such²¹.

For example, there have recently been several cases when a theatre-production or film had to be cancelled according to the ruling of a court, which considered the piece liable to hurt religious feelings and thus to disturb the social peace in a country. Religious neutrality from

the part of the state does not hinder a certain protection of believers against the religious intolerance of non-believers, as it otherwise does not hinder the protection of non-believers against aggressive forms of missionary practices²². *“Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a religious majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines. Indeed, in extreme cases the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them.”*²³ The European Court of Human Rights stresses, that the countries enjoy *“a certain margin of appreciation”*, what would be reasonable and efficient ways to grant protection for basic rights. When conflicts of interest arise, the right of religious freedom should be particularly highly estimated, but, of course, must nevertheless be mediated with other basic rights, such as the freedom of art and science, e. g. So recently Austrian public prosecutor’s office refused complaints against a book, which mocks at the church as well as at Jesus and therefore is considered to be blasphemous by a considerable number of people²⁴. In other cases however, there were sentences which declared that the per-

formance of a theatre piece or film, e.g., which was liable to offend Christian believers, had to be cancelled.

The much debated Austrian case of a film based on the piece *“Das Liebeskonzil”* passed European instances. While the European commission ruled that the decision of the Austrian courts to forbid the performance and to confiscate the film was not appropriate, the final decision of the European Court of Human Rights (*“Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria”*²⁵) adjudged the ruling of the Austrian courts. It argued, that *“it is not possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition of what constitutes a permissible interference with the exercise of the right of freedom of expression where such expression is directed against the religious feelings of others. A certain margin of appreciation is therefore to be left to the national authorities in assessing the existence and extent of the necessity of such interference. The authorities’ margin of appreciation, however, is not unlimited. [...]”* In other words: There is no universal standard which could be applied to any comparable case, as even the same piece might be likely to cause greater turbulence in a country, where a majority of people is rather religious in traditional terms, but not in another, where the general attitude is more liberal. According to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, it might even occur that different standards have to be applied in one and the same country (e. g., making a regional difference between the countryside and larger cities). Sometimes it might also be opportune that a court, deciding on a particular case, takes into consideration that a religious minority is more vulnerable (and

thus might react also more sensitively) than the well established majority.

2. The collision of polytheistic and monotheistic beliefs

However, before going on with modern issues, the religious history of antiquity deserves more attention. As it is well known, the most known religious conflict of antiquity concerned Christianity. All three levels – intellectual discussion, social acceptance, as well as the political and judicial sphere – were concerned²⁶. During the last decades the scholarly debate on the relationship of early Christians and the Roman state (as well as on the part which the Greek cities of the Roman empire had in the rising conflicts²⁷) changed the traditional picture of three centuries of permanent persecution. Instead of the traditional interpretation, it is now asserted that long periods of a relatively comfortable status of the Christian minority within Roman society even before its formal legitimisation under Constantine can be detected. However, nobody can deny that an only peaceful picture does not reflect the historical reality. There was more than a single local conflict (as reliably reported by the Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas, for example). Although traditional Christian historiography certainly tended to overdo the extent of ancient Rome's intolerance against its Christian minority, admittedly, organised persecutions took place, in particular in the third and at the beginning of the fourth centuries.

The Roman problems with Judaism and – to a much larger extent – with the new form of biblical religion, Christianity, are not typical of Rome's pluralistic society. Indeed, they resulted from the extraordinary collision of two totally different religious systems, from which one was traditionally linked with the political sphere. When Rome expanded to Greece, for example, it was comparably simple to combine the two different religious systems, which shared a common structure at least in principal. When the Jewish people became part of the *pax Romana*, the Romans instead had to face a religion which refused all traditional forms of religious integration. In a polytheistic context, i. e. from traditional Roman perspective, Israel's veneration of a foreign god, namely JHWH, was no principal problem nor would it have been impossible to integrate the JWHH-cult into the Roman religious system. Conversely, JHWH's inclusion in a pantheon was considered as a blasphemy by most adherents of biblical monolatry, which at the time of Israel's confrontation with the Romans had become a rather developed monotheism. Earlier there were times when at least some Jews might have accepted JHWH's identification with the god of another people in terms of *interpretatio* (which seems to have happened during the rule of the Seleucid dynasty at the eve of the Maccabean riots).

Nevertheless, cohabitation of the polytheistic majority with a monotheistic minority remained possible in the Roman empire – at least as long as the second primarily consisted in native Jews and as long as tolerance seemed to serve the *pax Romana*²⁸. Thus the Ro-

man political elite was willing to grant the Jews, which were widely considered a people with strange customs, various privileges (including the exemption from the participation in such religious ceremonies, which were considered civic duties in principal in imperial times). Of course, such compromises due to state interests were temporally limited. The violent outcome of the structural incompatibility of traditional polytheism and biblical monotheism was postponed, not banned for ever. As it seems, one main reason for the violent outbreaks against Christians within Rome's pluralistic though religiously based society was the missionary expansion of Christianity and its increasing invasion of traditional social segments. General instability of the empire was another.

Eventually the Roman society, which, based on traditional religious principles as it was, became more and more incapable of dealing with an increasing number of monotheists and therefore reacted with brutal violence. However, this period of Roman history was comparably short. With Constantine, peaceful cohabitation of various kinds of pagans, Jews and Christians again became the civic aim. Indeed, as indicated above, doctrinal intolerance is a typical feature of monotheistic religions. So as long as modern emancipation of politics from religion was not in sight, the multi-religious experiment of the 4th century had very little chance. When, in late antiquity, Christian doctrinal intolerance combined with political power, it soon resulted in the well known forms of practical intolerance against pagans (and, to a lesser extent, against Jews).

3. (In)tolerance within Judaism, Christianity, and Islam

Since monotheistic religions do not accept but one god, they have always had a considerable problem with the adherents of faiths other than their own, which is considered the only true religion²⁹. Europe's history is full of examples of the political enforcement of systematic religious intolerance for non-religious reasons: Historical records include discrimination, suppression, expulsions, and even physical extermination of religious dissidents, beginning with the last pagans of antiquity. Indeed, in particular it was Christians themselves who suffered from the doctrinal intolerance of other Christians.

As is well known, the modern quest for tolerance was not born until an enormous number of Christians were killed in the aftermath of the reform movement of the 16th century, during Europe's longest war. There is also a significant change of perception. While tolerance was considered a kind of necessary evil in the 17th century, nowadays it is seen as a value itself by many. At the same time, it became linked with the concept of a democratic state, which grants fundamental rights (including freedom of religion and belief) and adopts to neutrality in matters of religion and belief.

This was an enormous challenge for traditional theology. It took quite a long time for Protestant and Catholic theologians to learn to accept the new concept of church and state relations. Today, they are comfortable with it in general, while the process of positive

theological reception of the new model has just commenced within Orthodox theology. As it seems, positive experience with the new system is its best advocate to hesitating theologians. In the West they had had their chance to learn that a positive concept of religious neutrality on the part of the state does not simply imply rights for unbelievers and religious minorities. They experienced that it also means an increase of freedom for the dominant churches themselves, which, in the traditional Christian based states had always been subject to political interference. Thus it is no wonder that Muslims living in western countries are also more ready to accept the perception of a state that grants freedom of religion but is not itself religious-based than are most Muslims of Islamic states.

Where not yet found, an adequate response to formal tolerance at least remains one of the most important theological challenges of our time. Another important question is positive religious tolerance in the sense of „*Anerkennung fremder Religionen als echter und berechtigter Möglichkeit der Begegnung mit dem Heiligen, ohne daß dadurch die eigene religiöse Überzeugung preisgegeben werden müsse*“⁶⁰. While the recognition of the modern democratic state's new framework for church and state relations has made considerable progress within the last decades, this question remains an extremely important theological problem, and that not only for Muslims.

However, post-biblical Judaism developed a concept of religious tolerance which to some extent is exceptional among monotheistic religions. Unlike Christianity, which already at a very early stage considered

converting pagans as its mission, so-called normative Judaism remained the religion of God's chosen people Israel. According to the Jewish self-image, it is possible for a non-Jew to join Judaism, but it is not necessary. There are only some minimal standards which are considered liable also for the gentiles. They are not obliged to follow the whole *tora* according to Jewish *halacha* (legal decision). There are only six prohibitions (idolatry, blasphemy, unchastity, bloodshed, robbery and the consumption of meat from a living animal) and one positive commend, namely the administration of justice³¹.

It is significant that this concept of the so-called “Noahic commandments” was widely observed even in Palestine, when Jews were a minority within the Roman empire and enjoyed little political power. Christianity also developed in a pluralistic way as long as it was politically powerless. Many theological questions were answered in quite a different way during this period. For a considerable time, the relationship with the Jewish mother-religion as well as with the pagan religion(s), in which most Christian converts had grown up, ranked among the much debated theological issues.

This signifies that the issue of monotheistic (in)tolerance is more ambiguous than the quotation at the beginning of this article might suggest. A particular potential of tolerance is revealed by the biblical canon. The Jewish as well as the Christian canon covers a wide range of theologies and so can be valued as an “ecumenical” event. That, however, is not only a proof for a comparably great readiness to tolerance in formative

times. This spirit was also conserved in the collection of religious basic texts, which believers consider to be normative for all further development of their religion. So the early starting points for tolerance could not completely be superseded by contrary developments, but indeed could and can serve as a tool to criticize such developments as deviations from the original spirit of the biblical religion(s).

When we turn to early Islamic history, the seduction of intolerance which somehow is theologically inherent to all monotheistic religions becomes more visible at an already early stage. Unlike Jesus and his early followers, Mohamad's missionary zeal combined with the pursuit of political expansion from the very beginning. Military conflicts became an integral part of the first formative period of Islam. According to traditional Islamic doctrine, adherents of other cults/religions have no right at all within the "house of Islam". Only the adherents of traditional "book-religions", in particular Jews and Christians, have been tolerated under Islamic rule.

Conditio sine qua non for toleration is the acceptance of the Islamic rule. For Muslims who dissent from mainstream Islam³² and for apostates, however, there is no tolerance. Islamic Law (*Shari'a*) threatens apostasy with capital punishment³³. Today, such intolerance might easily be mistaken for "typical" Islamic, but Christian polemics are out of place facing Christianity's own historic record of intolerance³⁴.

4. The religious neutrality of the modern constitutional state

It cannot be repeated often enough: Modern neutrality in matters of religion and belief on the part of the constitutional state is the answer, which Western European society developed in the wake of Christian intolerance, which, combined with political power escalated in early modern times³⁵. This new concept was born in the particular modern context of (Western) Europe's post-reformation self-destruction. Its relationship with Europe's Jewish-Christian tradition is ambiguous: elements from this heritage did contribute to the new concept of a state, which itself is not based on religion anymore and thus can renounce to be partial in questions of belief. Nonetheless, it was troublesome and took considerable time to enforce such a concept against the Christian tradition. As mentioned above, the Christian churches themselves did not develop a positive attitude towards the new concept before the 20th century³⁶.

That there was a lack of understanding of this concept of state on the part of societies which had different religious-cultural traditions and did not experience the same historical shocks as did Western Europe (which, to some extent, does not only apply to African and Asian societies, but also to those European societies which have traditionally been dominated by Eastern Christian traditions) can be understood. However, a partial reception of modernity, including technical development, the concept of the nation-state and its bu-

reaucracy, has become universal. Also in this context the adoption of the concept of the neutral constitutional state, which grants religious liberty and protects religious tolerance and peace among its citizens, seems to be the only possible option in accordance with human rights³⁷.

It is, however, another question as to what extent it would be possible to make internal tolerance compulsory for religions and particular religious communities, provided that they can and must be held to adopt to internal tolerance at all. The state which is addicted to neutrality in religion and belief meets a particularly difficult situation: non-interference in internal affairs of religious communities and especially non-interference in doctrinal questions is one demand. At the same time, there are obligations in terms of protection³⁸. There must certainly be a distinction between doctrinal tolerance and formal tolerance. The state will not be able to force a religious community to participate in inter-religious or ecumenical dialogues, nor will it be possible to demand religious communities to renounce all missionary activities or spiritual and social sanctions for dissidents and other dissenting members, such as excommunication, dismissal from a monastery, or discharge. It will, however, be mindful of the observance for a certain standard of formal tolerance at least from the part of religious individuals as well as from the part of religious communities. Behaviour contrary to such minimal requires will be sanctioned. When human life is threatened (as in the case of the Iranian writer Salman Rushdie, for instance), religious freedom has

reached an absolute limit, but there are certainly many less dramatic collisions of fundamental rights, where decisions are much more difficult, as discussed above.

Notes

* This paper is based on a larger article on “*Pluralität in den Religionen*”, which is to appear in *Religionswissenschaftliches Handbuch*, ed. by Johann Figl, Tyrolia, Innsbruck, 2003.

1 Leszek Kolakowski, *Toleranz und Absolutheitsansprüche in Christlicher Glaube in moderner Gesellschaft* 26 (1980), pp. 5-38, *ibid.* p. 7: “*It is not necessary to provide historical proof, that the history of Christianity – which, in this regard, is similar to the history of every religious belief rooted in revelation – is also a history of intolerance, performed in the name of absolute truth.*” (own translation)

2 Cf., e. g. Mary Beard / John North / Simon Price, *Religions of Rome. Volume 1 A History; Volume 2 A Sourcebook*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.

3 In the latter sense modern Hindu piety is also often restricted to the veneration of one deity as Shiva or Vishnu alone: cf., e.g., Axel Michaels, *Der Hinduismus. Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Beck, München, 1998, pp. 222ff; 277ff.

4 Gustav Mensching, *Toleranz. I. Religionsgeschichtlich* in RGG 36 (1962), pp. 932 f; *idem, Toleranz und Wahrheit in der Religion*, Weimar, Wartburg-Verlag, 1996 (first edition: Heidelberg, 1955).

5 Ulrich Berner, *Toleranz und Intoleranz in den nichtchristlichen Religionen* in Peter Segl (ed.), *Die Anfänge der Inquisition im Mittelalter*, Bayreuther Historisches Kolloquium t. 7, Böhlau, Köln, 1993, pp. 269-284.

6 Cf. Louise Bruit Zaidman / Pauline Schmitt Pantel, *Die Religion der Griechen. Kult und Mythos*, München, Beck, 1994, pp. 16ff.

7 Cf., e. g., Robert Garland, *Introducing New Gods: The Politics of Athenian Religion*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1992, pp. 136ff.

8 Cf. Flavius Josephus, *Contra Apionem* 2,37.

9 Cf. Livius, *History* 39.

10 See Beard / North / Price 1998, t. 2, 288ff.

11 Cf. Richard Potz / Brigitte Schinkele, *Die "Scientology-Kirche Österreich" – die Voraussetzungen für den Erwerb der Rechtspersönlichkeit als eingetragene religiöse Bekenntnisgemeinschaft in Österreichisches Archiv für Recht und Religion* 46 (1999), pp. 206-251.

12 Cf. Herbert Kalb / Richard Potz / Brigitte Schinkele, *Das Bundesgesetz über die Einrichtung einer Dokumentations- und Informationsstelle für Sektenfragen (EDISG) in Österreichisches Archiv für Recht und Religion* 46 (1999), pp. 353-433, see in particular the appendix (pp. 418ff) with the text of the EU-report on so-called "sects" (A4-0408/97).

13 In some countries of the former Soviet Union, in particular in the Muslim dominated Asian republics, however, the restrictive religious policy of the Communist regime has not yet been dropped with regard to the question of whether unregistered religious communities may function legally. There are also some other countries, such as Belo-Russia for example, which had already adopted a European level of human rights standards after the break-down of the Soviet Union, which now exhibit tendencies backwards which are to be regretted.

14 E. g., in Bayern in Germany.

15 An Austrian case, which was taken to the European Court of Human Rights (*Hoffmann v. Austria*, 15/1992/360/434), became particularly prominent: A former Roman Catholic, mother of two children, had become a member of Jehovah's Witnesses during her marriage. After separation, both parents applied to be granted parental rights over their children. The District Court granted parental rights to the mother and also the Innsbruck Regional Court rejected the appeal of the father. Eventually the Austrian Supreme Court overturned the judgment of the Regional Court, granting parental rights to the father in view of the mother's membership of the Jehova's Wittnesses. Finally, the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights (June, 23rd 1993) was again in favour of the mother - however,

it is remarkable that the European Court of Human Rights did "not deny that, depending on the circumstances of the case, the factors relied on by the Supreme Court (rejection of public holidays, opposition to blood transfusions, position as a social minority) may themselves be capable of tipping the scales in favour of one parent rather than the other" (summary by the registry; see Brigitte Schinkele, *Rechtsprechung in Österreichisches Archiv für Kirchenrecht* 42 [1993] pp. 527ff (with further references); 582ff. - In another Austrian case, the mother's guardianship was partly substituted (after legal intervention of the grandmother), as she was not willing to take her boy out of a Sahaja Yoga boarding-school in India in order to grant schooling in Austria (cf. Brigitte Schinkele, *Rechtsprechung in Österreichisches Archiv für Kirchenrecht* 45 [1998], *ibid.*, pp. 306-317).

16 E. g., the European instance contradicting a decision of the Austrian Supreme Court, which withdrew guardianship from a mother belonging to Jehovah's Witnesses (see above, note 16).

17 Cf. Acts of Paul and Thecla, chap. 26.

18 *Ibid.*, chap. 27.

19 *Ibid.*, chap. 28.

20 Kalb / Potz / Schinkele 1999, p. 385: The modern state "is not anymore a subject of tolerance in the sense of tolerating others, but it has become the guardian of tolerance in the sense of a legal commandment for pluralistic societies." (own translation)

21 Cf. , e.g., Winfried Platzgummer, *Herabwürdigung religiöser Lehren, Meinungsfreiheit und Freiheit der Kunst in Juristische Blätter* 117 (1995), pp. 137-142, *ibid.* p. 138.

22 Cf. Brigitte Schinkele, *Überlegungen zum Phänomen neuer religiöser Bewegungen unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Glaubenswerbung und staatlicher Schutzpflichten* in Carl G. Fürst / Richard Potz / Spyros Troianos, *Kirchenrecht und Ökumene. Festgabe für Panteleimon Rodopoulos*, Kanon t. 15, Kovar, Eichenau, 1999, pp. 253-290.

23 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of *Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria* (11/1993/406/485) from September 20th, 1994.

24 Gerhard Haderer, *Das Leben des Jesus*, Carl Ueberreuter, Wien, 2002.

25 See above, note 24.

26 Cf. the documentation of Peter Guyot / Richard Klein, *Das frühe Christentum bis zum Ende der Verfolgungen*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1997 (first edition: 1993/1994).

27 C.f. the case-study of Reinhard Selinger, *Die Demetriosunruhen (Apg. 19,23-40). Eine Fallstudie aus rechtshistorischer Perspektive* in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 88 (1997), pp. 242-259.

28 Cf., e.g., Alfredo M. Rabello, *The Jews in the Roman Empire: Legal Problems, from Herod to Justinian*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000, and in particular Karl L. Noetichs, *Das Judentum und der römische Staat. Minderheitenpolitik im antiken Rom*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1996.

29 Cf., e.g., Reinhard Feldmeier, Ulrich Heckel (ed.), *Die Heiden. Juden, Christen und das Problem des Fremden*, WUNT t. 70, Mohr, Tübingen, 1994; Konrad Hilpert / Jürgen Werbick (ed.), *Mit den anderen leben. Wege zur Toleranz*, Düsseldorf, 1995; Ingo Broer / Richard Schlüter (ed.), *Christentum und Toleranz*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1996; Werner Brändle / Gottfried Leder / Dieter Lüttge (ed.), *Toleranz und Religion. Perspektiven zum interreligiösen Gespräch*, Hildesheimer Beiträge zu Erziehungs- und Sozialwissenschaften t. 36, Olms, Hildesheim, 1996; Graham N. Stanton / Guy G. Stroumsa (ed.), *Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.

30 Heinz-Josef Fabry, *Toleranz im Alten Testament? Ergebnisse einer Suchbewegung* in Broer / Schlüter 1996, p. 12: "appreciation of foreign religions as real and legitimate possibilities of an encounter with the sacred, without the necessity of abandoning one's own religious conviction" (own translation).

31 Cf., e.g., Klaus Müller, *Tora für die Völker. Die noahidischen Gebote und Ansätze zu ihrer Rezeption im Christentum*, SKI t. 15, Institut Kirche und Judentum, Berlin, 1994.

32 In history they were not only adherents of other legal opinions but quite often also mystics.

33 Cf., e.g., Adel Th. Khoury, *Abfall vom Glauben im Koran und im Rechtssystem* in idem et al., *Handbuch Recht und Kultur des Islams in der deutschen Gesellschaft*, Gütersloher Verlagshaus, Gütersloh, 2000, pp. 236-241.

34 As far as Judaism is concerned, the belief in religious tolerance and peaceful cohabitation with gentiles also made only slow progress, as long as religion was mixed up with politics to a significant extent within biblical Judaism.

35 Cf., e.g., Johannes Schwartländer, *Freiheit der Religion. Christentum und Islam unter dem Anspruch der Menschenrechte*, Forum Weltkirche: Entwicklung und Frieden t. 2, Matthias-Grünwald, Mainz, 1993; Richard Potz, *Der weltanschaulich neutrale Staat und die Religionen. Verhältnis, Rahmenbedingungen und Gefahren in Dialog als Hoffnung der Zeit. Ursprünge, Kriterien und gesellschaftliche Relevanz theologischer Prozesse (Dokumentation der Fachtagung im Rahmen des „Dialogs für Österreich“)*, ed. by Kontaktstelle für Weltreligionen/ Sekretariat d. Österr. Bischofskonferenz, Zeitpunkt, Wien, 1998, pp. 97-107.

36 Cf., e.g., Ernst J. Nagel, *Minderheiten in der Demokratie. Politische Herausforderung und interreligiöser Dialog*, Theologie und Frieden t. 16, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1988, pp. 176ff.

37 Cf. Richard Potz, *Globalisierung und staatliche Souveränität. Auf der Suche nach einer grenzenlosen Gerechtigkeit in Gerechtigkeit in den internationalen und interreligiösen Beziehungen in islamischer und christlicher Perspektive*, ed. by Petrus Bsteh and Seyed A. Miramadi, St. Gabriel, Mödling, 1997, pp. 197-209.

38 Cf. Schinkele 1999, pp. 253ff; Kalb / Potz / Schinkele 1999, pp. 379ff.



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Reconciliation: On the Border between Theological and Political Praxis

Reconciliation is a theologically-charged word with politically-charged implications. The work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) raised questions about reconciliation in a political context including the “parts” or “partners” of reconciliation: truth-telling, repentance, amnesty, reparations, and ultimately forgiveness and justice. This paper explores two questions. First, are theologians ready to give up an exclusive claim on reconciliation as a theological term or, at the very least, be agreeable to the fact that reconciliation might have political as well as theological meanings? Second, if reconciliation is granted unhindered access across the borders of theology and politics, what wisdom from the theological tradition has informed the political praxis of reconciliation, and has political praxis in any way challenged our theological understanding of reconciliation? As responses to these questions, the paper looks at the theological development of reconciliation, with particular attention to the New Testament and subsequent historical praxis. It then discusses points of connection where the theological development has informed political praxis.

I wish to extend my thanks to the Faculty of Roman Catholic Theology who extended the invitation for me to participate in this conference. I am grateful to the Global Partners Project for a grant that has allowed me to make the long journey from Memphis to Cluj. I am very hopeful about our interchange during these next days.

I wish to speak today on a topic that is religiously, culturally and historically urgent: the topic of reconciliation. Reconciliation is a theologically-charged word with politically-charged implications. In fact, I would argue that over the last fifteen years, we have witnessed a dramatic shift in the contextual meaning of the word from the world of theology to the world of politics¹. During this time in the English-speaking world, very few books have been published that explore the Christian theological and ritual praxis of reconciliation while books that explore the political dimensions of reconcili-

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ation proliferate! Such a shift is partially explained by the worldwide attention on the dramatic events in South Africa following the end of apartheid and the establishment, work and final report of the now famous Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The South African experience gave focus to a nascent discussion about what constitutes reconciliation in a political context and raised fruitful questions about the “parts” or “partners” of reconciliation: truth-telling, repentance, amnesty, reparations, and ultimately forgiveness and justice. The religious status of Archbishop Tutu notwithstanding, the TRC loosened the theological moorings of reconciliation and set it adrift in a political sea.

As a theologian, I want to explore two questions about this turn of events. First, are we as theologians ready to give up our exclusive claim on reconciliation as a theological term or, at the very least, are we agreeable to the fact that reconciliation might have political as well as theological meanings? Second, if we are ready to allow reconciliation unhindered access across the borders of theology and politics, what wisdom from our theological tradition has informed the political praxis of reconciliation and has political praxis in any way challenged our theological understanding of reconciliation? In other words, has theology taught politics something about reconciliation and has politics taught theology something in return?

To this end, I first will explore, in broad strokes, the theological development of reconciliation, with particular attention to the New Testament and subsequent his-

torical praxis. I then will discuss points of connection where I believe the theological development has informed political praxis. This will be followed by a brief discussion of where I see political praxis challenging aspects of reconciliation that have been under-emphasized in the theological tradition. The paper will conclude with an attempt to define reconciliation in a way that embraces both its theological and political contexts. I will claim that reconciliation, as a theological reality, is a word that is final in the eschatological hope it implies and non-final in its lived reality. While I will not draw specific conclusions about the religious and political context of Transylvania, I believe that my remarks have implications for this context, which I hope will be explored in our later discussions.

Reconciliation in the Christian Tradition

In the New Testament, Paul speaks of reconciliation as a legal term for the restoration of relationship between husbands and wives (1 Cor 7:11). But in other places, Paul theologically stretches the term to describe the initiative by God to reestablish communion with a humanity that has been justifiably excluded from relationship with God. “For while we were yet enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of His Son, much more surely, having been reconciled, will we be saved by his life” (Romans 5:10)². According to Paul’s theological vision, this is the core of the good news: God has graciously taken the initiative and recon-

ciled human beings to God's self in Christ. This reconciling embrace of humankind broke the reign of sin and alienation, and inaugurated the reign of God where communion with God has both a present and a future possibility. Restored relationship is at the heart of Paul's theological understanding; communion between God and humans is reconciliation. Only as a consequence of this communion are humans saved from death and offered the unlimited possibilities of salvation and redemption.

Paul goes on in his second letter to the Corinthians:

Anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new! All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ, and has given us the ministry of reconciliation. I mean that God, in Christ, was reconciling the world to Himself, not counting human transgressions against them, and that He has entrusted the message of reconciliation to us. This makes us ambassadors for Christ, God as it were appealing through us. We implore you, in Christ's name: be reconciled to God! (2 Cor 5:17-20)

Paul's next theological step is to demonstrate that the reconciled relationship between divinity and humanity through the saving work of Christ is now the model of relationship that those who confess Christ must embody. In other words, Paul believes that Christ has entrusted the ministry of reconciliation to his followers who must undertake the same reconciling work of Christ in their relationships with other human beings. He implies that only by embracing Christ in faith

can one live a life that is both reconciled and reconciling. Divine reconciliation is the precondition to human reconciliation: one must accept God's reconciliation so that one can effect reconciliation as a mediator/ ambassador of Christ's work of reconciliation.

What exactly is this ministry of reconciliation? Is it merely a theological construct to explain the significance of Christ or does it have ethical consequences? If we think of Paul using a model of communion to describe the content of reconciliation, then to live a life of communion implies that the follower of Christ cannot exclude anyone, not even those whose transgressions could be justifiably held against them. Perhaps this is what Paul means when he says, "everything has been made new." But does this imply that sin has no consequences, that forgiveness of the sinner supercedes the demands of justice? If this is the case, why does Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians exhort the community to expel from their midst the man who was living with his father's wife (1 Cor 5:1-13)? How can the followers of Jesus both undertake his ministry of reconciliation and expel certain sinners from their midst?

To answer this problem, one is brought back to the narratives of the Gospels. While exploring every Gospel passage where restored relationship is mentioned or implied would delay us too long, I focus only on the one activity of Jesus of Nazareth that the Gospel's provide an abundant witness: eating³. In narrative after narrative, Jesus is presented as eating meals or promising to eat with people whose place on the socio-economic scale range from top to bottom. The Gospels report

that Jesus uses these occasions to invite forgiveness, to challenge hypocrisy, to teach about justice. In the end, social boundaries are broken and redrawn by Jesus (Shriver 1995, 40). Why at a meal? It is here that Jesus renegotiates social boundaries and challenges all previous barriers as to with whom one can eat. He welcomes the Gentiles, the tax collectors, the prostitutes, the lame, and the list goes on. By making space at the table for those previously excluded from the table, the Gospels portray Jesus as issuing two invitations: he invites those at the table to reconsider their “purity” and make room for those once thought “impure”, and he invites those previously excluded because of their status to consider their lives and make changes. Both invitations are invitations of repentance. In this way, not only does he create space in the exterior place where the meal occurred, but, through repentance, space is created in the interiority of each diner’s heart.

Is not what we see Jesus doing in these Gospel narratives the same thing we hear Paul theologizing about in his letters: reconciliation as restored relationship? Yes and no. I believe a small distinction can be noticed in the “praxis” of Jesus and the “theologizing” of Paul. Jesus literally practices companionship, “breaking bread with” the righteous and the sinner, inviting each to create space for the “other” at the table. The breaking of the bread celebrates this creating of space; otherwise, the meal is not possible. Paul’s theological project, on the other hand, is to use reconciliation as restored relationship as a core theological metaphor to interpret the ministry of Christ as the everlasting reconciliation of

God with humanity. God’s reconciling action precedes any action by humans to effect reconciliation. Yet, Paul cannot escape praxis and must face new pastoral problems that confront the early believers. What if the summons to be a new creation reconciled in Christ is ignored, even after repeated opportunities, by individual members of the community? What must the community do with those who refuse to change their lives? A pastoral solution emerges, that of excluding the sinner from communion with the community, a practice to which Paul witnesses in First Corinthians and which is also seen in Matthew’s Gospel.

If any member of the Church sins against you, go and point out the fault when the two of you are alone. If the member listens to you, you have regained that one. But if you are not listened to, take one or two others along with you, so that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. If the member refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if the offender refuses to listen even to the church, let such a one be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector. (Mt 18:15-17)

These verses speak of a genuine pastoral problem for the early communities. How were they to maintain the literal “companionship” in the example of Jesus yet maintain an ethical standard of behavior that was required by those who professed the name of Jesus? The solution is to expel the sinner from their midst and isolate him. However, such action is not punitive but is medicinal; the sinner is excluded as strong medicine to be healed of whatever is keeping her from responding

to the community's invitation to repentance. Even so, it is startling to find in this passage that the very people the Gospels portray Jesus desiring to eat with (Gentiles and tax collectors) are presented as models of absolute "otherness" that the community must avoid. Already, the meal has become less a vehicle to break down social barriers and more the way barriers of identity are constructed.

It is not surprising that the early Christian church seized upon a communal meal as a way to continue the reconciling ministry of Jesus. However, the exclusion of certain sinners from the Eucharistic table and the pastoral processes developed to lead them back to full communion with the community demonstrate that what begins as a pastoral solution, practiced for the sake of the future salvation of the sinner, soon becomes a way for the community to reaffirm its own identity. And by the fourth century, it becomes a way for the community to exercise direct control over those who it judges to be impure or immoral. We witness a shift from eating as a sign of "a new egalitarianism of spiritual and material resources" as witnessed in the Gospels to eating as a mark of Christian identity over and above other competing identities (Crossan 1991, 263). The increasing harshness of the penitential discipline, including the law that it was available only one time after baptism and the imposition of certain juridical obligations after reconciliation with the Church (such as lifelong celibacy and being banned from church office), leads to its demise as a pastoral strategy. It is eventually replaced by the tradition of confessing

one's faults to a spiritual director, men and women with capacities for spiritual healing and insight, seen in the Eastern desert tradition by the second and third centuries and in the Celtic tradition in the West by the fifth and sixth centuries. Yet, it is interesting to note that even as the practice of this new penitential form becomes dominant, the earliest insight of the ancient church to connect the ministry of reconciliation to a communal meal is not lost totally. The rarely used form of solemn penance, which included excommunication from the Eucharist and the granting of the *pax ecclesia* through readmission to Eucharistic communion, lasted in the sacramentaries until the fifteenth century.

By the time that the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) defines and the Council of Trent (1563) canonizes the four parts of sacramental penance – confession, contrition, penance and absolution – the practice of reconciliation has been totally juridicalized, privatized and clericalized. It has become totally disconnected from the Eucharist, only the ordained could serve as confessors, and emphasis was placed on secrecy through the practice of anonymous confession and the confessional seal. In return for such dramatic developments away from the broader tradition of early church, the ministry of reconciliation was guaranteed to be sacramentally efficacious if all of its parts were present. Moral purity could be restored each time a "good" confession was made. Indeed, such developments came under the reforming eyes of Luther and Calvin who disputed that such a sacramental system could assure the reconciliation of the sinner with God. The result is that while

Luther retained the practice of confession, he changes its' meaning from sacramental efficacy to a way to receive consolation for those open to God's justification. Calvin, on the other hand, abandons the practice altogether since he saw it as anathema to his understanding of justification by grace alone and the priesthood of all believers (Shriver 1995, 52-58). Yet, while the reformers took issue with the juridical and clerical aspects of the ministry of reconciliation, they stressed the role of the divine over the individual in the work of reconciliation and de-emphasized the role of the community. This stress on the priority of the individual over the community is only given more prominence in the eighteenth century Enlightenment.

In our present theological context, we are faced with a variety of questions about reconciliation. Is it possible to reconnect the praxis model of reconciliation as restored relationship/companionship seen in the Gospels with a theology about God's work of reconciliation in Christ? How are we attempting to reconnect the role of the individual with the role of the community in the reconciliation process? How are we attempting to reconnect a theology of reconciliation with fully communal rituals of reconciliation, especially the connection to the Eucharist/ communion? In my own context as a Roman Catholic living in the United States, serious theological reflection about reconciliation beyond "going to confession" or "turning your life over to God" has all but ended. Some might say it is because we have lost a sense of sin, but I disagree. I think we have lost a sense of community and have become

comfortable with our identities at the expense of knowing how to negotiate otherness. Nonetheless, the theological tradition is rich has been instructive about the praxis of reconciliation to political processes of reconciliation.

The Theological Tradition as Instructive to Political Praxis

The wisdom of the theological tradition has been instructive in shaping political praxis. Consider this definition of political forgiveness offered by one contemporary scholar.

Forgiveness in a political context...is an act that joins moral truth, forbearance, empathy, and commitment to repair a fractured human relation. Such a combination calls for collective turning from the past that neither ignores past evil nor excuses it, that neither overlooks justice nor reduces justice to revenge, that insists on the humanity of enemies even in their commission of dehumanizing deeds, and that values the justice that restores political community above the justice that destroys it (Shriver 1995, 9).

While this author is speaks of forgiveness, the definition points to a number of parts that make up a political process of reconciliation. I wish to discuss briefly three areas where the wisdom of theological praxis has been appropriated by political praxis: truth-telling as an act where the community validates individual memory; forgiveness and repentance as invitations to act with

forbearance rather than imitate the act of the enemy; and commitment to repair and redress (justice) through restored relationship⁴.

Truth-Telling as an Act Where the Community Validates Individual Memory

The Christian tradition has no exclusive claim on truth. However, the inextricable connection between truth-telling and reconciliation is indisputable in the tradition. In the sacramental traditions, such truth-telling always occurs in the context of the community and in a safe place. It is the community, or at least one other individual that preserves the correspondence between the act and the memory of the act and leads to a judgment about the significance of the act. The establishment of truth is essential to the honest assessment of the act and provides the means to contextualize the act within the larger trajectory of the moral self. Finally, the truth of the act provides the necessary data on which to base a decision about how the person must redress the act. The result of the truth-telling is not to restore lost innocence, for no one can ever undo an act once committed. It is to lead one to a new place of integration, where the act is integrated within the larger fabric of one's moral life. However, the act of truth-telling makes one vulnerable to retaliation and judgment. The safety of the penitent one must be guaranteed by the moral and institutional authority of the one receiving the confession and by the public ritual context of the

act that gives it greater importance than in another context⁵.

In political processes of reconciliation following what social upheaval or trauma, the first step is always to establish the truth of individual acts. Establishing the truth about what happened provides a basis for a common memory that in turn provides a basis for a new moral order to be established. The process of establishing the truth provides a pattern of truthfulness and honesty on which any new political order must be built. It must be a public process to insure the right of all parties to contribute to a new narrative of truth. Without the validation of wider community, truth remains elusive and prone to the “narrative of the lie” perpetuated by the previous political order (Schreiter 1992, 29-39). In fact, truth-telling in a political process of reconciliation is a key strategy to “re-legitimize” language that has been co-opted by the past regime.

Between 1974 and 1994, twelve truth commissions were established following dramatic changes in the political and social order of individual nations⁶. The success of these truth commissions is related not only to how well they investigate and establish a correspondence between what happened and the memory of what happened, but in insuring the safety of those who come forward to tell the truth. To this end, who is designated to receive the truth and how the truth is delivered become critically important questions. Persons with both moral authority and institutional authority insure that the truth will be heard and the safety of those who come forward to speak the truth will be guaran-

teed. Also, speaking before an established Truth Commission is a public ritual that heightens the importance of what is said by distinguishing it from other less formal or rule-governed contexts.

Forgiveness and Repentance as Invitations to Act with Forbearance Rather than Imitate the Act of the Enemy

The Croatian scholar Miroslav Volf points out that Jesus in the Gospels preaches a message of repentance and forgiveness not just to those who are oppressed but to those who are the victims of oppression (Volf 1996, 114). Often those in the former group are instructed to turn away from greed or violence, but what exactly from what must those in the latter group repent? Volf argues that Jesus' message of repentance addressed to victims is to repent from the impulse to match the greed and violence of the oppressor. In other words, victims must repent from their envy of the wealth of the oppressor and from their desire for violent revenge when violence is perpetrated against them. Volf argues that Jesus asks victims to give up their claim against oppressors as all too often such claims mimic the dehumanizing values of the oppressors. Jesus invites victims to a change of heart towards their oppressors, to repent from their desire to oppress the oppressor, to forgive the oppressor, and to be liberated from the very oppressive values and actions that victimize them. One might consider the Gospel injunc-

tion to forgive one's enemies "not seven times...but seventy-seven times" (Lk 18:22) as an example of how repentance and forgiveness is based on a change of heart that ultimately frees the victim from the values of the oppressor and makes the victim capable of establishing a new kind of relationship with the oppressor. The victim is asked to show forbearance towards the perpetrator, not because the perpetrator is innocent, but to "make something new" through forgiveness as a sign of the kingdom come into the world.

The issues of forgiveness and repentance are thorny ones in political processes of reconciliation. Too often, the value of finding out the truth supercedes the value of those who have perpetrated crimes being asked to show evidence of remorse or repentance. In South Africa, the controversial decision to grant amnesty to those who came forward to establish their role in politically motivated criminal action continues to be fiercely debated. However, looking at it from the theological tradition, the issue of repentance goes beyond that of the perpetrator to include the victim. This does not in anyway imply the victim is responsible for his victimization or should not demand justice from those who have victimized him. We must be very clear on this. What the victim must repent of is the desire to retaliate against the perpetrator or claim superiority against the perpetrator. While the victim cannot prevent her hate of the perpetrator from beginning, she can choose not to give it nourishment; otherwise, should the opportunity present itself, they too will become oppressors. By showing forbearance and perhaps even forgiveness to-

wards their victimizers, they gain a new power in the situation and they disempower the act of the oppressor (Volf 1995, 116). In certain instances, I wonder if granting amnesty to perpetrators might serve to break the cycle of violence and temptation to violence; it shows that the new moral order will no play by the same rules of the former one. It can open the way to genuine social transformation where forgiveness rather than violence can shape a new political order⁷.

Commitment to Repair and Redress (Justice) through Restored Relationship

In the familiar story of the interaction between Zachaeus and Jesus (Lk 19:8), the tax collector tells Jesus that he will pay back “four times as much” what he has cheated from the poor. Did Jesus demand such redress before he would come and stay in Zachaeus’ house? No. Jesus’ expressed desire to come and stay with Zachaeus occasions Zachaeus’ repentance and his desire to redress the wrong he had committed. Put in theological language, the genuineness of Zachaeus’ repentance is proven through his willingness to undertake penance. Is such penance necessary to for God to forgive? Absolutely not, but it is necessary for Zachaeus to create a space in his heart (and house) for those who previously he had not adequately considered. In this story, Jesus is depicted as demanding neither retributive justice (the punishment of the perpetrator) nor restorative justice (the making of a mutually agreeable redress

by the perpetrator to the victim). Jesus is more concerned about sustaining a relationship with Zachaeus than in making a judgment about his past. However, in light of the care shown to him, Zachaeus comes to a judgment about his past that leads him to act decisively, even superabundantly, to fulfill the demands of justice.

In the Roman Catholic ritual tradition, a key role of the confessor came to be that of a judge, one who had to make an informed yet detached judgment about the truth of the confession and the repentance of the penitent. Such judgments were based on the content of the confession rather than personal knowledge of the penitent since the identity of the penitent was unknown. Penance was demanded as proof of the required contriteness of the penitent and was not intrinsically connected to fulfilling the demands of justice created by the sinful act of the penitent. In fact, penance came to be seen more of a punishment for sin that had to be completed not to win God’s mercy, but so that the grace of forgiveness would be appropriately valued and would in no way appear “cheap”. As you know, the issue of the efficacy of penance was the linchpin in Luther’s protest over the sale of indulgences.

In a political context, retributive justice may be harder to accomplish yet is much “cleaner” than embarking down the messy road of restorative justice. Retributive justice simply punishes the perpetrator, usually through prison or death, and pushes him or her to the margins of society. The crime is judged to render the perpetrator so inhuman that restoration of the perpetrator back into the human community is not possible⁸.

On the other hand, restorative justice leaves open the possibility that the perpetrator could fulfill the demands of justice required by the crime and, once fulfilled, resumes an equal place in the community along side of those he had formerly victimized. While both retributive and restorative models of justice take seriously the demands of justice demanded by the crime, one can argue that restorative justice alone creates a space for the perpetrator in the new moral and political order being constructed.

However, even with this model, a problem arises. Who decides what restorative redress must be done and will it ever be enough, especially for violent crimes such as murder and rape? Based on the story of Zachaeus, the Christian tradition reminds us that forgiveness implies justice, but it is a justice based first and foremost on relationship. In the words through which Jesus teaches his disciples to pray “forgive us our debts as we also have forgiven our debtors” (Mt 6:12), justice is not overlooked. It is a part of forgiveness; something is owed to God by us (forgiving others debts) and something is owed to us by others (debts). Yet, only in the reestablishment of relationship can justice be negotiated; otherwise, the debts owed to us and our debts to God will never be paid in full (Niebuhr 1967, 49f). Only the person who is willing to forgive, to create a space for the other in her life, can pursue the demands of justice without falling into the temptation to demand restoration or punishment even at the expense of relationship with the perpetrator (Volf 1995, 122-23). As

Reinhold Niebuhr reminds us, “anything short of love cannot be perfect justice” (Niebuhr 1967, 50).

Political Praxis as Instructive to Theological Praxis

Revisiting the question asked earlier in the paper, are we as theologians ready to give up our exclusive claim on reconciliation as a theological construct or, at the very least, are we agreeable to the fact that reconciliation might have political as well as theological meanings? I have attempted to argue that the very fact that reconciliation is being claimed as a political term is at least in part due to the wisdom of theological reflection and praxis. However, I also want to stress that the political praxis of reconciliation in South Africa, Chile, Guatemala and other places has highlighted aspects of reconciliation that have been under-emphasized in the Christian praxis of reconciliation. Allow me to briefly discuss three such aspects. First, reconciliation is not the same reality as forgiveness. While forgiveness is one step in a reconciliation process, it does not necessitate engagement with the perpetrator. Ultimately, it results from a decision made by the victim, an act of the will to make space for the perpetrator once more as a fellow human being. This decision is made without reference to the stance or situation of the perpetrator nor does it depend on such. The Christian theological tradition has put great emphasis on forgiveness and has tended to equate forgiveness with reconciliation. The

stress has been on seeking God's forgiveness and, to a lesser extent, the community's forgiveness of the sin by an individual penitent. However, political praxis shows us that true reconciliation has many parts and partners with forgiveness being just one aspect, albeit a necessary one, of a larger, more complex picture.

Second, the political praxis has given placed great emphasis on reconciliation as a process. Truth-telling, time for repentance and forgiveness, repair and redress, coming to regard the full humanity of the perpetrator, all of these take time and happen at different moments if they happen at all. True reconciliation between human beings cannot be modeled on the theological understanding of reconciliation between God and humanity where, based on Paul's insight, relationship is restored through the unique salvific act of Christ. While grace from this act provides humans with the ability to undertake the ministry of reconciliation, it does not reduce the hard work of reconciliation into a single encounter. So while theological praxis has given emphasis to the grace of Christ active in a reconciliatory event such as a sacramental encounter (i.e., baptism, penance, Eucharist) or the prayer of a penitent, our human experience of how reconciliation "works" does not confirm the efficacy of such single encounters. It is only through a long and difficult process involving many steps and stages through which relationships, once broken by acts of self-centeredness including violence and greed, are restored. True reconciliation, while based on the grace of a single act, does

not happen in a single act. Political processes of reconciliation confirm this for us.

Third, the political praxis of reconciliation has begun a discourse about the vital role of the community in the reconciliation process. Part of truth-telling is to bring before the community those crimes that have destroyed in some way the moral fabric of the community. This connection between the act of the perpetrator and the life of the community cannot be overlooked. It is exactly this connection that calls for all the parts of a political process of reconciliation to be public. One act impacts the whole so that the whole must play a role in how the act must be redressed and the perpetrator reintegrated back into the whole. This is accomplished practically in the selection of those from the community with the moral credibility to hear the truth and act on it. It also is accomplished through the efforts and talents of many others who shepherd victims and perpetrators through the process. On the other end of the spectrum, theological praxis has come to emphasize either the private confession of sin by the penitent to either a member of the clergy or to God directly. Adequate attention has not been given to the role of the community in the reconciliation process. Theological praxis is challenged by the political praxis to look again at the practice of the early Church and to recover the active role of the community, including the development of many ministries of reconciliation, who will serve as companions on the journey towards restored relationship.

Conclusion: The (In)Adequacy of Reconciliation as a Theological and Political Term

If reconciliation describes the process of companionship/restored relationship where space for the other is made in the identity of the self, then we can locate it as both a theological and political praxis. While the term itself is being loosened from the exclusive domain of theology through its use to connote a political process, such a shift enriches the term rather than diminishes it. We see in the political praxis of reconciliation both the wisdom of the theological tradition and a challenge to expand it.

Yet, as theologians, we are led back to a fundamental question: no matter how one defines reconciliation, is it possible without divine assistance, without grace that alone has the power to transform existence from self-centeredness to other-centeredness? Given our experience of the profound human evil that we witnessed last year in my own country and for sixty years or more in this country, we cannot but be left with the conclusion that true reconciliation is not possible without the irrevocable reconciliation that has come to us in Christ. Paul's theological insight from the first century resonates with even more urgency in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. On it, we rest our hope that a final and everlasting communion between God and humans, between humans and humans, between our will and our action, between humans and the earth, will come. This hope for a New Kingdom of reconciliation

will ultimately not be our work but the work of God who will make "a new heaven and new earth" (Rev 21:1). We cannot lose sight of this hope since it reminds us that all of our efforts to build communities of reconciliation must cooperate with the Spirit of reconciliation alive in our midst.

So while the political claim on reconciliation may enrich our understanding of the complexities of the process, we also are led to the inescapable theological conclusion that true reconciliation is never finished since we ourselves remain unfinished until the time when all hope will be fulfilled. As such, whether reconciliation is a theological or a political reality, it will in every instance remain non-final; even with the best of intentions and with unlimited resources, all the barriers to true and lasting reconciliation will never be fully removed (Volf 1995, 109-110). Yet the "non-finalness" of reconciliation should not cause despair as much as it should animate recommitment to the difficult work of building lives and communities of reconciliation. According to Paul, we have been given the ministry of reconciliation, a ministry that demands that we become sacraments of reconciliation to others. We must be willing to make space at the table, to be the companion of the sinner and the perpetrator as well as the innocent and the victim. Even though our efforts always will be non-final, our efforts will be guided by the vision of a reconciling embrace without limit.

Notes

1 Hannah Arendt was the first to see the religious practice of forgiveness as having political possibilities. See *The Human Condition*, 214ff.

2 All Scriptural quotations are taken from the New Revised Standard Version.

3 Mt 6:12 is another interesting example. Jesus instructs his followers to not ask for forgiveness unless they are already forgiving. This will be discussed later in the paper.

4 I rely heavily on the experience of South Africa here, but I believe the implications reach far beyond this one context.

5 Performance theory speaks of ritual “framing” where the acts performed within the frame take on special significance and so special efficacy. See Bell 1997, 159-164.

6 For an excellent summary of the work of these commissions and implications for notions of truth, justice, and responsibility, see Kritz (ed.) 1995, 225-245.

7 I recognize that this is a contested point and that victim’s often experience a second victimization when perpetrators are treated too leniently.

8 It is striking how many times the metaphor of “animal” is used by victims in their testimony to South Africa’s TRC to describe perpetrators. Viewing perpetrators as non-human mitigates any requirement to reincorporate them into the human community and sets the stage for retributive rather than restorative justice.

On Tolerance - Sketch of a Christian Interpretation

The aim of the article is to provide a Christian interpretation to the concept of tolerance. The idea of tolerance is strongly related to the religion revealed by Jesus Christ. Moreover, Christianity is a religion that opens through love, thus tolerant. Religious tolerance in our era should be examined, as it is pointed out in the article, starting from a reconsideration of the term of "Christian Church". The consensus over these matters would generate a genuine ecclesiastic co-citizenship and place the human person within the completeness of an anthropos liturgos.

We attempt to understand ourselves through the others and then we find in them what we perhaps lack, while at the same time we refuse to admit this and instead we burst out with pride, hate and envy. Conversely, once we notice a shortcoming similar to our own we turn again into sensitive, cheerful and tolerant beings. Why is this so? Because we have not yet discovered our own selves, in accordance with The One who brought into creation our ontos as a resemblance of his own face towards an eternal bringing together for partaking in being in his way. One cannot find 'The proper being' as long as within one's self it has not become clear that 'what is yes should be yes' and 'what is no should be

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no', as long as one is the slave of 'maybe' and 'perhaps'. Orthos anthropos is the one through whom divine mercy and support are extended within the created world; these attributes share no common point with tolerance imposed by some status quo of despotism or helplessness. They are manifestations of divine providence meant to provide for our redemption. Is the Christian faith a religion of firmness when it falls within the realm of 'perhaps'? In this case it becomes sterile ritualism for which God shows no tolerance. The most convincing example in this respect is the attitude manifested by God towards his people in the time of the Prophets. Though God shows understanding, compassion and patience, these virtues can not be equated with tolerance. And this for the simple reason that the question of tolerance is tied to the existence of pluralism within a well-determined state, but in the Old Testament there is no talk of accepted religious pluralism¹. The point of view from which this recognition occurs is predominantly Christian and it is not shared by the mono-personal monotheistic religious, while within Christianity itself it is only an energetic manifestation. This is the reason many theologians have come to believe that tolerance is the result of religious indifference². For G. Chantraine, the idea of tolerance has strong ties with the religion revealed by Jesus Christ. Moreover, in one of his articles he attempts to elaborate on the contention that the concept of tolerance stems from the divine Revelation brought by Jesus Christ. Against this background he describes the evolution of religious tolerance in the 16th century. The

starting point of his demonstration is the ancient polis. In the ancient polis, and also in ancient Egypt and Babylon, political and religious unity were constitutive to each other. Tolerance, if it existed, was delimited by the political authority. A city, a kingdom, could not tolerate other gods, as this would have compromised or even destroyed their political unity. Idols other than the official ones could have been tolerated only to the extent they were not undermining or threatening the state. However, with Christianity, says Chantraine, the framework changed. The deity is a Trinity who is accessible through love, thus tolerant³. The author even provides an exemplification that should work for justifying his personal inference by invoking the episode with the Samaritan woman in the Bible. He upholds that in this case the Saviour was tolerant. This interpretation does not convince us for the following reasons: the woman becomes an apostle for the people in Sihar and these are apparently converted after the preaching of Jesus. In consequence, it is not possible to equate tolerance and the act of allowing some time for the work of redemption. Such interpretations are far-fetched and thus subjective, considering that the text of the Scripture is the main basis for dogmatic expression, while in the field of dogmas there is no concept of tolerance. Sometimes even in the area of moral life, the Apostles are unwilling to allow for this time and those in question are excommunicated. Interconfessional dialogue has its shades of tolerant manifestation, but it should not be forgotten that its main purpose is to reach a common truth which is the revelation of Christ. It follows then that this concept

We shall now proceed to an analysis of the secular concept of tolerance, a concept that is reflective more of individual autonomy than of a communal structure originating in the initial unity and harmony of creation, from whose structure stems natural law as a foundational norm. However, for technical reasons, we shall make use of the concept of religious tolerance, bearing in mind that while it is multi-confessional rather than multi-religious, it is nevertheless operable.

Tolerance – a juridical concept or a norm of living together in a free society?

In order to define the concept of tolerance in a manner as accessible to understanding as possible, we shall have to specify from the very beginning that we are operating in the present study with two concepts of tolerance, one civil and the other religious. More and more often it is said that civil tolerance had found a *terminus a quo* during the seventeenth century, that societies seen as eminently democratic have manifested during their histories attitudes of extreme intolerance, that today, more than ever, there is a need for a concrete manifestation of civil and religious tolerance, meaning the establishment of irenic relations among peoples and, as much as possible, a restructuring of the social sphere along principles that would be of a trinitary-communal – and thus ecclesiastical - nature.

Our study wishes to be a case analysis that would reveal the area zone where civil and religious tolerance

overlap, in a manner close to the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur⁴. Ricoeur has said that the political relates firstly to the field of economics and only secondarily to the realm of ethics. This an empirical criterion that introduces the concept of succession or of contractual time pre-eminence. From this concept can be easily derived the conclusion that secular tolerance is the term through which an owner of the material civilization and guardian of a spiritual civilization allows for and facilitates similar conditions for his co-citizen. Within this framework, in the language of the enlightened absolutism, no recourse is made to the idea of a people, a nation, the accent being on the idea of citizenship, of a person with whom something is shared, the fact of living together translating into this sharing. A special dimension of civil tolerance is represented by religious tolerance. An extensive space in this text will be allotted to the aforementioned dimension, with the aim of delineating the exact organic relationship between the two, and bearing in mind that, from the theological perspective, the organic relation is: ‘religious tolerance, a determining factor for civil tolerance.’⁵ Religious tolerance is not the mere accident of civil tolerance. Rather, it is the concrete vertical transposition, the opening towards the transcendent, of the horizontal, contractual and immanent aspect of civil tolerance. This is why in most cases religious tolerance should be the factual expression of church doctrine, but within this doctrine there are limits for this tolerance, seen as a dialogue of which the function should be first of all pedagogic, i.e. of evangelisation. The biblical position in this matter,

providing for three steps of dialogue and eventually for the exclusion from the Church, is well-known. However, an accurate re-evaluation of the concept of religious tolerance will only be possible after re-considering the concept of Christian Church, of both its inclusive and exclusive meanings. Tolerance is a juridical, technical and theological term, but its most comprehensive theological meaning is the one of mercy, support and time for redemption. The acts or edicts of tolerance, beginning with The Milan Edict (313) or with the declaration of religious peace from Augsburg (1555) up to, in our case, the Civil Tolerance Edict of Joseph II (1781) are nothing but attempts to maintain by means of diplomacy⁶ the unity of the Habsburg Empire. As soon as they reached the constitutive communities, they generated – in the case of Transylvania, for example – instances of intolerance. Moreover, as part of their genesis, there are two concepts that induce the social result to converge towards secularisation. In Ch. O'Brien's words⁷, these are: the attempt to maintain the patrimonial unity of the house of Habsburg and of the Germanic empire, and the mutations which occurred at the cognitive level under the influence of Enlightenment.

Within the brief period that we make reference to, 1780 – 1790, the term tolerance included in Joseph's edict does nothing to change the sense of Leopold's Diplomas. Romanians were tolerated, from the ethnic and religious point of view, meaning that they were allowed to exist. However, the Edict emerges at a time when the Romanians already had a crystallised elite, one

that would use for judicial and argumentation purposes the content of this Edict in order to promote their national ideal.

The Tolerance Edict from Transylvania

In order to provide our analysis with an objective basis, we reproduce here the content of Article 1 of the Complementary Decree of the „Merciful Governors”: „non-Catholic citizens can erect a school or church of the type stipulated in our previous orders (circulars) if their number is 100 families”⁸. The term non-Catholic covers in this case both Christian Orthodox and Jewish believers. The article opens the possibility for building up the two complementary fields – education and religion – through which the Emperor believed that harmonious living together could be achieved. Later on, in the vision of Metropolitan Saguna, these two could bring about a rapprochement to God – the source of authentic tolerance, tolerance that would eventually find a social expression as well. This is why religious tolerance also comprises a prophetic dimension. In the end, it is an eschatological reality, but until then it is also a liturgical, religious and cultural endeavour.

Coming back to the article of the Civil Tolerance Edict – see the Preamble of the Decree of 13 October 1781 – we note that its outcome was to put an end to the state of intolerance that had been established in Transylvania with this territory's inclusion in the Habsburg Empire and especially with its falling within

the sphere of action of the Counter-Reformation. Robert Horvath⁹ showed in a study that this climate of intolerance, this denial of elementary rights pertaining to religion, had radically changed with the accession to regency of Joseph II. The young monarch understood with rapidity that instability within Hungary and Transylvania was a major obstacle against a positive evolution of monarchic principles in these territories. This is why he undertook the reforming task himself.

The politics of Joseph II, also known by the name of josephinism, enacted religious tolerance in a strict sense in order to achieve large scale civil tolerance. The latter could be identified, in his opinion, with the idea of establishing some sort of natural religion. Substituting religious ethics with a type of lay morality for the use of all citizens was, in the Emperor's opinion, a way to achieve everyone's equality before the state. These ideas were in conformity with German theories of natural law put forth by Pufendorf, Thomasius and Wolff and by their Austrian disciples, Professors Beck, Martini and Sonnenfels¹⁰.

Within a such a system, the citizens' formation and education held a prominent place. It professed the removal of education from under the jurisdiction of the Church and the implementation of state control over it, implying the subordination of education to state interests¹¹. The finality of higher education was altered as well. Its purpose was no longer to attain scientific knowledge for better serving theology, but the promotion of scientific disciplines that could contribute to erecting the hereditary institutional framework of the

empire as well as the instruction of state functionaries¹². It is thus crystal clear that the basic structure of josephinism included the reform of education that was aimed in a direction obviously overshadowed by secularisation and whose final point was the achievement of large scale civil tolerance. The economic and administrative reforms that are much more numerous bear testimony in this respect.

Of all his reforms after 1790, it was only the Edict that continued to generate a diversity of attitudes throughout Empire. It is also true that the Catholic world itself experienced a quite obvious shift towards accepting the idea of tolerance, but the vision of a dominant Church continued to survive alongside this view¹³.

The main achievement of the Tolerance Edict together with the decisions of the Diet of 1744 for the condition of Romanians in Transylvania was the fostering of unity between Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Romanians in the context of the struggle for national emancipation as well as the setting up of an extensive educational network.

K. Hitchins¹⁴ has noted in this respect, „the reformatory zeal of Joseph II represented another impulse for the activity of Romanian Aufklaerer. Despite the fact that he shared the ideals of the Enlightenment – rationalism in governance, religious tolerance, and the end of injustices caused by servitude – in his politics he guided himself only by his desire to strengthen the power of central government at the expense of the local privileged classes”¹⁵ – which translated into an atti-

tude of intolerance towards the Romanian Transylvanians on the part of the aristocratic representatives of the three privileged nations. This kind of tolerance edict that eventually brings about intolerance falls within the ambit of political compromise made solely for the sake of politics. Hitchens continues by noting: “the effect for Transylvania of his reforms was a shattering of the very foundation of the authority of the three nations...he weakened the power of the feudal state over the servants...he offered the Romanians the framework within which to work for emancipation”¹⁶.

Tolerance – beyond theoretical discourse or political and administrative decisions

We noted above that Joseph II saw in religious tolerance a transitional way towards civil tolerance and that this represented a manner of getting entangled in the saeculum. We were also suggesting that the ideal of religious tolerance embraces the form of *logos* and has a trinitary structure, that it has dialogue as a foundation and communion as a finality, at least in faith. What do we note as having a pedagogical function during the decade of josephinian tolerance?

1. The creation of premises generating *lex tolerantia* from the dialogues with society, upon listening to its needs.
2. Equidistance towards radicalised religious aspects. I mean here the relations with the Holy Sea, beginning with Pope Paul IV and until Pius VI, who

signed the concordat with Joseph II, the concordat that would regulate the Empire's relations with the Vatican for a period of 50 years.

3. The objective analysis of the spirit of the time. As a negative factor in this respect should be noted inconstancy, the ending of reforms by their very initiator.

All these elements could be included in today's church policy. In what manner? I listen, I share my faith, I do not try to impose it, but I let the person choose and, *in extremis*, I am not a heretic, I pray for that person. Religious tolerance in our era should proceed, as said before, from a reconsideration of the term of Christian Church. This redefinition could be carried out in a completely objective manner, submitting for dialogue the dogmatic sum of the Ecumenical Synods, each part presenting the dynamics of the tradition followed by them and the manner in which the Scriptures were observed until Laodicea. The consensus over these matters would generate a genuine ecclesiastic co-citizenship and restore the human person to the fullness of an *anthropos liturgos*. Being himself an epiphany of Christ, he would become a *homo tolerans*. The best exemplification in this respect is the prayer of the Great Ektenia from the Holy Liturgy: “let us pray to the Lord for the unity of all Churches.”

Christian tolerance is in fact prayer for those still walking in the darkness of ignorance.

Notes:

* Translated by Claudia Muresan

1 Asist. drd. Gelu Calina, Preliminarii la problemele tolerantei, in MO, no. 1 – 4, 2002, p.122.

2 Andre Latreille, apud Georges Chantraine, La doctrine catholique de la tolerance au XVIe siecle, Actes du V-eme Colloque Jean Boisset, 1987, Universite de Montpellier III, p.1.

3 G. Chantraine, quoted work, p. 1-18.

4 Paul Ricoeur, Eseuri de hermeneutica, translated by Vasile Tonoiu, Ed. Humanitas, Bucuresti 1995, p. 231-300.

5 Ioan Chirila, Problema tolerantei în Transilvania în epoca iosefina, in Toleranta si convietuire în Transilvania secolelor XVII- XIX, Limes Publishing House, Cluj Napoca, 2001, p. 132-137.

6 C. O. Brien, Ideas of Religions Toleration at the Time of Ioseph II. A Study of Enlightenment among Chatolics in Aus-

tria, 1969, apud Roland Crahay, La tolerance civile, Universite libre de Bruxelles, 1982, p. 50.

7 Ibidem, p. 50.

8 Ibidem, p. 52.

9 R. Horvat, apud R. Crahay, quoted work, p. 123.

10 C. O. Brien, quoted work, p. 50.

11 Ibidem, p. 52.

12 R. Horvat, p. 123.

13 O. Brien, quoted work, p. 50.

14 K. Hitchins, Conștiinta nationala si actiune politica la românii din Transilvania – 1700 –1868, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj Napoca 1987, p. 62-82.

15 Ibidem, p. 64.

16 Ibidem, p. 82.

The Interpretive Possibilities of the Paradox of the Minority Condition

The author of this paper presents the main interpretative orientations regarding the concept on the minority being of the reformed Transylvanian bishop Makkai Sándor who lived in the inter-war period. The author tries to point out the philosophical, moral, and existential sides of this problem which has become deep-rooted and permanent in the consciousness of the Hungarian intellectuals from Transylvania, and which has been known as the problem of the minority existential paradox. To accomplish this, the author relies on the theoretical and methodological possibilities provided by the philosophical hermeneutics.

Sándor Makkai, former Transylvanian Protestant bishop and professor at the University of Debrecen published his writing entitled *It is impossible* in the *Láthatár* review in 1937¹. "In it he revealed the basic inner paradox of the minority existence. The author's main idea integrated in the mentality as the paradox of minority existence² since the question of minority" cannot have a solution worthy of the human being because the minority category itself is unworthy of the human being, it is spiritually impossible.

The analysis highlighting the paradoxical nature of the minority condition was strongly debated among the

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Hungarian intellectuals of the epoch and in the press. The debate found its echo in Hungary as well, among the representatives of the intellectual groups close to Makkai.³

From what kinds of analyzing perspectives can this issue be approached, what are the emerging and explorable points of view, what are the possibilities of misunderstanding and analysis traps of analysis? Throughout my study, these are among the questions that I am interested in, while I attempt an *interpretive* exposition of the matter of the paradox of minority condition and its approaches in the *It is impossible*-debate. According to my hypothesis, in the *notional content* of the minority condition paradox, different levels of meaning meet and are interwoven. The issue has philosophical, ethical and existential side. The participants in the *It is impossible* debate discuss these aspects, explaining them in more or less detail, but not with such a systematic and methodological approach that their role in the understanding of the minority issue becomes clearly comprehensible. The debate hides just as much as it reveals these possible levels of interpretation in their differentiated nature.

In my study I will expound the meaning of the minority condition paradox on different interpretive levels, in the context of the philosophical, ethical and existential interpretations. My analysis does not take into account all years, connections and final conclusions but it rather aims at asserting a new approach and highlighting a hypothetical raising of a problem, in which it tries

to reveal the deep, substantial philosophicality of the *It is impossible*-issue.

My chosen method is basically *interpretive* and during its realization I try and apply the hermeneutical perspective⁴.

1. The Problem: the Paradox of the Minority Condition

1.1. Why paradox?

At first, the concept of paradox seems understandable, but in fact it has several possible meanings. Solomon Marcus, the famous mathematician, in his book about paradoxes, states at the very beginning that the common characteristic of paradoxes is the challenge of good sense. Paradoxes create a peculiar, unbelievable and absurd situation logically or linguistically, they have a shocking effect on recipients. This is the basic meaning of the original Greek word, too: objection, contrary opinion to a general belief⁵. What is shocking in the paradoxes is the nature of the truth itself. It seems that the paradox opposes the generally accepted truth but is not less true. In other words, in the paradoxes the two faces of one and the same truth are reflected⁶.

The curious analytical mind distinguishes between the two faces of the paradox, views them as contradic-

tory thoughts, and expresses them in statements. From this is derived the insolvability of the paradox for the mind. One of the faces of the truth cannot be definitively tricked against the other. But a change in perspective can solve all paradoxes.

In his article entitled *It is Impossible*, according to his original wish, Makkai wants to draw attention to the inner contradiction of the minority category and the nature of the paradox. But the paradox present in the minority category points to the paradoxical nature of the minority condition. The main impetus and inner motivation lies exactly in this: the minority conscience, under the shocking influence of the paradox within the category, is confronted with the nature of the condition paradox. As a result of the pressuring force of the paradox, the minority intellectual conscience cannot avoid facing the real nature of minority existence. And this reacts adjustingly upon it.

1.2. The paradoxical nature of the minority category

What does the paradox nature of the minority category consist in? The answer follows from the true nature of the category itself. The original meaning of the term *category* is accusation, indictment, judgment, sentence. According to the original function of the category, it is the instrument of human sense that serves the aim of the sense judging over the diversity and scattering of experiences with its help and thus making it

palpable for itself. So, in the category - in the real category - the knot of the existence can be pinned down in such a way that existence is compressed from the perspective of experience, it is organized as a logical unit and thus in the category the real nature of existence, the „fact itself“, opens up to the mind⁷.

Within the minority category the very functionality of the category prevails. It is a mental formation through which the mind makes a unifying and generalizing judgment over a certain group of people: *minority*. And it is exactly in it that Makkai sees the paradoxical nature of the minority category. The minority category grabs a knot of human existence. In this phase, human existence, as in all of its important phases, appears according to its real nature for the mind: as a set quality of existence, namely as its superior quality that is the carrier of the completeness and genuineness of existence. In the case of minorities as well, human existence is human in quality according to its true nature, that is to say, it can be an advanced existence on the horizon of completeness and genuineness. Contrary to this, the minority category with the *minority* label makes a *quantitative* judgment over this knot of human existence in the negative sense, opposing it as *fewness* to the claim of existential completeness. Makkai also emphasizes that this fewness is understood not only as less in number but also from the perspective of values. Minority means not only quantitatively less, but also, in the spiritual sense, of *lesser value*.⁸ By this judgment, the minority category excludes the concerned group of people from its human condition and completeness of human life. Its

quantitative perspective is opposed to human quality and enforces its opposition violently and degradingly against it. This is a challenge towards human dignity that means setting human life in/on the horizon of completeness of existence. The concept of human dignity is set in the center of the European human image by Kantian philosophy. It is closely connected to autonomous, free human existence which constitutes an end in itself that is autonomously capable of freeing itself according to its own inner rules.⁹ This way of existence has “an inner value, that is to say *dignity*”¹⁰. Living a life worthy of a human being is the modern European’s personal perspective, or rather, according to the human image of European culture, it means nothing else but living in the horizon of existential completeness. Dignity is actually a *pursuit*, in the Kantian sense, it is the intelligent, free being’s pursuit of a humanly complete and genuine life. It comprises both the *behavior* towards deserving the good and the *hope* of getting a share the good.¹¹ The minority category deprives the life of a group of people of this dimension, thus it deprives their human existence of its human essence, human quality and human sense: from the pursuit of dignity, from the horizon opening on human completeness and genuineness. This is why it poses the problem: the minority category is not a real category. In the real category, the true nature of human existence should emerge for the mind. But, on the contrary, in the minority category the true nature of human existence is hidden, and an attribute shows up in its place that not only contradicts the real essence of hu-

man existence but also effectively reacts against it in the practical actions that are based on it. The real human existence processes included under the minority category drift in the direction of reduction and impossibility and not towards the completeness of human condition.

So, for Makkai, the paradox included in the minority category in its final form reveals itself in the recognition that the minority category is not a real category. It is a kind of category that contradicts its content and functionality, the real content and functionality of real categories as intellectual instruments. It acts in exact contradiction in the relationship between mind and existence, in opposition with requirements of the original practicality: instead of taking mental order into the experience of existence, it acts with the purpose of destroying order; instead of acting as an instrument of rationalization, it creates an irrational condition. In the final resort, the minority category contradicts the original categorizing aim of sense itself, the meaning of categories: a category opposed to sense. This is why Makkai, as a further step, brings up the issue that such a category does not derive from the natural categorizing propensity of sense rather is a *artificially* created category. Those who created it did not take into consideration the real needs of human sense, but according to certain particular interests opposing human sense they created a project that does not fit in the intellectual order of the human world in a natural way. It does not act in the direction of the rationalization of human existence but towards the creation of irrational conditions.

The minority category was created by political powers as an element of an order-restoring process. But a category produced in such an artificial way creates human situations and relationships opposed to the substance of humanity, so instead of rationalizing human existence, it fosters its irrationalization. Thus, through the minority category, the original political intention is turned upside down, since the political perspective and action carried by it acts in the direction of discontinuing humanity instead of favoring humanity. Through the minority category, the particular political interest and action that should find its true meaning in the universal horizon of humanity is transformed into an attempt committed against humanity. So, in the minority category, the political sphere gets into an indissoluble contradiction with the basic human existential interests expressed in universal humanity; the action serving human purposes and interests becomes anti-human. In the last resort, this is where the paradox carried by the minority category is revealed.

1.3. The paradoxical nature of the minority condition

How does the category-paradox turn into the paradox of the minority condition (or rather destiny paradox) in the analyses of the article by Makkai entitled *It is Impossible*? This process can be immediately traced in the first reflection on the *It is Impossible* article in the writing by Nándor Hegedüs. This is where the “no-

tional confusion” emerges for the first time, identified by Makkai in *Nation and Minority*, according to which the interpreters identify the minority category with the minority condition/destiny. But this “confusion” - in a way unforeseeable and actually incalculable for Makkai - proved to be a *productive confusion* with regard to revealing the paradoxical nature of the minority condition that now has to be faced by the intellectual consciousness of the minority.

Hegedüs drafted three formulations of the condition paradox that represent three levels of meaning, three steps in the direction of understanding the paradoxical nature of the minority condition.

a) The first formulation: One cannot live in a minority condition, but one must (has to)¹². That is to say, the person living in a minority condition faces the contradiction of possibility and necessity (obligation). For him, life at its natural and objective level, as human life, is impossible, but it is still his life that is part of him not by individual choice but external circumstances. This external obligation for him as human being, that is to say moral being, becomes inner obligation, duty, existential commandment: it is compulsory to live an impossible life! On the one hand the contradiction lies between the external fact of life and the inner human impossibility, on the other hand there is the contradiction between the impossibility of possibilities and the obligation, compulsion of circumstances. In this case destiny is the external frame of human life which creates this contradiction within human existence.

b) The second formulation: The minority condition is impossible; if it is still possible, then how is it possible?¹³ Namely, the minority condition is theoretically impossible, as it is not a human destiny, but still the minority condition holds since there are people living in minority condition. The minority condition as theoretical impossibility can be opposed to reality and eliminated from it, but as real frame of human existence it is part of reality, not only as circumstance also as real possibility that acts on it with pressuring force: it is possible that certain people live in minority condition. Thus, in the minority condition, theory and practice, logical expectation and real human condition are again in a contradiction that seems indissoluble.

c) And finally, the third formulation: the minority community (and within it the individual) is continuously facing an „either... or” type of choice: either it should not be a minority, or if it is, then it is not a human community and its individuals are not the accomplices of real human existence¹⁴. The choice is not between real possibilities, rather between mutually exclusive ones: if he wants to exist in a human manner, then he should give up his minority condition, that is to say his human community; and if he sticks to the minority community, then he should give up the possibilities of real human existence. The individuals in question experience such choice situations as a moral and existential paradox; one should choose but it is impossible; at least it is impossible in such a way that the existential interest prevails and man stays a moral being. In such circumstances they experience the trauma of “no

solution.” In these “either... or” situations, the paradoxical nature of the minority condition really shows: *necessity*, that is to say the unsolvable contradiction between fateful obligation and *possibility*. For the one who chooses to maintain his minority condition the natural order of necessity and possibility is reversed: in the choice between necessity and possibility, the obligation excluding possibility counts as the dimension of existence, the heroic choice of which is the command of absolute duty for the one who lives and experiences the minority condition; and the possibility that removes compulsion emerges as an anti-human dimension, the freedom of the escape from obligation.

2. The Main Interpretive Directions of the Minority Condition Paradox

2.1. The minority condition paradox as philosophical issue

On the basis of the *It is Impossible* discussion, the paradoxical nature of the minority condition, the paradox of the minority condition or the destiny paradox can be approached and explained on each of the above-mentioned fundamental levels of meaning, namely, as a philosophical, moral, and existential problem in the same time.

Even though Makkai's text hints several times at the "theoretical" and "fundamental" impossibility, namely at the fact that he does not tackle the problem on a personal, ethical or political level but on a *philosophical* one, the majority of contemporary and later interpreters remained mostly indifferent regarding to this. They have never really dealt with the precisely *philosophical* issue in the "it is impossible."

On a philosophical level, the essence of the minority condition paradox can be pinned down at the point of intersection between two opposite philosophical trends, the neo-Kantian philosophy of values and culture and the Heideggerian-Jaspersian existentialist philosophy characteristic of the spiritual life of the first half of the 20th century, which forms Makkai's philosophical background and interest. The intellectual atmosphere of the beginning of the century, and the formation of the intelligentsia conscience in the Central European cultural environment, including the Transylvanian Hungarian environment, were mainly influenced by neo-Kantianism.

According to the neo-Kantian intellectual conscience, reality and the world of facts are given as the result of an external event, as a kind of compulsion, fate, fatefulness that cannot be changed but from which one can step out into an ideal world, an inner happening that goes on in the world of values and culture in which one can build a world that will develop human completeness in the spiritual and intellectual sense.¹⁵

But according to existentialist philosophy, the philosophical obligation is to understand existence

from the existing, and this understanding makes the presence of being transparent as well as the one questioning life in its existence. This is why this way of understanding of the existence is the existential determinant of the presence itself, as human existence. Here existence itself is questioned, the existence of presence that is an existential happening of the existence itself, and this happening is an inner happening going on exactly in this existence and not an external happening that can be rendered independent. The existence emerging in its own immanent temporality and historicity is the factum of possibilities that became existent in every state of the given's existence, that can be pinned down in its own interpretations.¹⁶

So, from the perspective of existentialist philosophy, for the human being the real world is nothing else but his conception and inner happening. External constraint cannot be removed from it, as the empire of the destiny imposed on him, and there is no way towards the sort of transcendence where the existential lacks of here can be supplied by values that would be born there. This is where the disenchanting influence of the Heideggerian existential philosophy prevails the most for the minority thinker: it makes him see that there is no other real world for men but his own existence and this is nothing else but the materialization of his own possibilities that came into being. Authentic existence means the existential completeness developed in this existence; so the human being can and must develop his completeness in this present condition. From this point of view, the realization of the transcendent di-

mension of values is sheer illusion beyond this existence or without a solid foundation in it.

The possibility of the paradox is hidden in the contradiction that lies between two kinds of philosophical dispositions in the minority intellectual conscience: the one leading the existential possibilities from the practical, fateful, real circumstances into the world of values and culture and the other seeing the possibilities of being in the real existence itself as the only possible developing arena. The deep category feature of this contradiction appears in the fact that the intellectual conscience embracing the neo-Kantian and cultural philosophy approach and the minority ideologies forming in them view minority existence as fate and they focus on what follows from these facts from the perspective of human attitude; in opposition with it the concept-reflection of existential philosophy considers the minority condition as *existence*.

The paradox lies in the philosophical consideration that what is „possible (because it is has to be)” from the point of view of value and cultural philosophy, is „impossible” from the perspective of existential philosophy. Why is it impossible? According to Makkai’s answer, it is impossible because the minority existence category is the impossibility turned into a factum; it’s inner happening is not the possibility that becomes existence but the process toward impossibility and inexistence. The minority existence is not merely an unauthentic existence, a not fully complete existence, but is also the radical denial of an authentic existence, something that does not have any kind of natural

existentiality, towards which there is no naturally practicable way from another condition or existential happening. The minority condition category is not a real category in itself as it is not something that philosophical thinking would naturally notice in the existent. It is not something that could lead our thoughts concerning human existence in a well-defined direction on which the deep, important components of human existence could get to the surface. On the contrary, the minority category reveals to us the human existence deprived of its fundamental human content, thus not wholly human, but rather inhuman and anti-human. In an existential philosophical sense, the minority category is a *philosophical impossibility*.

2.2. The minority condition paradox as an ethical and existential issue

In „It is Impossible” Makkai does not treat the minority condition empirically or from the perspective of every day life, rather, he treats it speculatively. How the minority condition is or is not *practically* bearable for those living it depends on the success of the political, economic, social, and cultural solvability or insolvability of the minority problem. But theoretically the fact is that the minority condition as the ontical medium of human existence is fundamentally „*unbearable in its deepest root,*” because it „*totally contradicts human dignity,*” as a condition in which the human content of existence - humanity - becomes narrow and shrinks instead of

blossoming¹⁷. In other words, the minority condition is not a true, genuine human type of existence. The concrete state does not change the fact that there are minorities on the empirical level of every-day existence, people living in a minority condition who for their personal or community interest face the problems that follow from this condition each day.

The speculative facing of the essence of the problem and its rational analysis have their importance both from an existential and ethical perspective. The two can hardly be separated, not even through the analyzing-interpretive approach.

From an existential point of view it is not the same how, at the level of his conscience, the person living in a minority can face the fundamentals of his existence and can be able to grab it at the roots. Facing the existential problems does not merely mean spiritually reacting to practical life but it is its integrant part. The person living in a minority develops different life strategies, faces his existential problems differently depending on whether he fosters illusions or dramatizes his condition or he weights his possibilities, capacities and instruments. Furthermore, soundly facing life situations is not only a practical requirement for the modern man but a moral one as well, the moral requirement of asserting the value-creating humanity that could be developed in himself and in those close to him. Thus the wish is expressed according to which the modern man should live his life not as the mere shaper of his fate but as a being with duties and obligations towards it. In this sense, living in the prison of illusions or the practi-

cal effectiveness and the lucid reckoning of the conditions of creating values is also the index of the personal and community lifestyle's morality.

The *moral* problem of the minority condition occurs exactly in this aspect. The person living within a minority could overpass the problems of minority emerging from the fundamental nature of his fate if he lived his life as a responsible person according to a rational life strategy. The true sense of his morality should manifest itself in this instead of the heroic acceptance of his fate marked by illusions. And what is more, he should find in it the way of balancing the minority disadvantage with moral surplus. On the contrary, the basic nature of the minority condition itself, revealed at the level of speculative conception, limits the human being and the community to practice the responsibility towards a rational lifestyle and his own existence. This fact is not a conclusion following from the conception but it only manifests itself in it. In reality it is a kind of universal *factum brutum* hidden in particular phenomena, that is valid both independently from the conception and in its absence exactly like the factum according to which minorities and people living in a minority really exist in spite of the undignified nature of the minority condition speculatively understood. But the acceptance or rejection of the nature of the minority condition is an important part of the reality in the life of a minority and it shapes it. This is where the other face of the paradox emerges: accepting and understanding, even speculatively, the real nature of his fate by the person living in a minority is a rational act that sets a boundary to the

limiting character of this condition that is the foundation of the attitude worthy of a human being in opposition with this situation.

The moral problem following from the understanding of the fundamental nature of the minority condition has another facet, too, which leads us to the problem of „Europe’s consciousness.” What does Makkai hint to while saying this? Conscience, just like the mind relating to norm (normative mind, intelligence), is a moral category. According to the human conception of modernity, the action most appropriate to human aims and interests is the action that reveals humanity in the most complete way. It requires at one and the same time both practical effectiveness and solid moral grounds. At the same time, it has to be suitable for the rationally set aims from the perspective of instruments and means and adjust to the moral norms that are rationally acceptable. Conscience is its driving force, being on the one hand the rational understanding of the norm and the necessity of an adequate action, and on the other, lacking external authority constraint, an inner pressuring feeling. The moral being can be recognized mostly because in critical life situations the voice of conscience begins to speak within him, re-orienting the mind back to adjust to the norms in the best interest of the rational effectiveness in the following of aims.¹⁸ Succinctly stated, it sets the moral limits of the aim of rational effectiveness.

This moral delimitation is valid for political actions as well, if it is not an end in itself but relates to humans, that is to say it reveals itself as an action serving the hu-

man aims and interests. Speculatively revealing the fundamentals of the minority condition casts a light on the moral side of the action of the political factors that basically cause the minority situation, on the ethical responsibilities that go hand in hand with the political steps and solutions. From this point of view the political decision of the European powers can be considered an immoral action since it plunged human groups in the minority condition on the basis of the peace treaties. Their decision is immoral even if they acted unconsciously, merely led by pragmatic considerations, that is to say without having thought over the fundamental nature of the minority condition on a theoretical, speculative level. Such a decision that enforces unilaterally pragmatic rationality is immoral because while it has in mind immediate efficiency, it lacks the relation to the norm of the rational considerations. The immorality of such a decision is neither relieved by the fact that they plunged certain groups of people into a minority situation while they discontinued the minority condition for others. But the decision of the political powers proves to be immoral viewed from the other side, too. If they made the decision rationally accepting and understanding the true nature of the minority condition, that is to say even if they understood the undignified nature of the minority condition, they still decided to practically create and preserve such conditions, their action is characterized by the deepest cynicism. In this case, they set against each other two closely linked sides of rationality that serve humanity only as a whole, not separately. The normative mind, lacking practical efficiency

in its idealism, only fosters moral illusions; the practical mind lacking its connection to the norm in its pragmatism merely pursues immediate efficiency.

The European powers, if they plunged groups of people into the minority state either from pragmatic considerations or cynicism did not take into account the word of their conscience. The spiritual element is lacking in their decision, which, for the modern European harmonizes the pure rationality of actions with the moral requirement of a guarantee that the rational act serves humanity.

When Makkai appeals to the (missing) conscience of the European powers, he directs attention to the complete failure of the European way of life and furthermore, to the failure of the European modernity. Rationality and morality is dual and inseparable, since European modernity, which is based on them, bumps up against its own limits because in creating a kind of practice in which these fundamental conceptions can be pitted against each other. In the inseparable contradiction of the minority and nation existence, the minority condition paradox becomes the universal paradox of European modernity, the inseparable paradox of theory and practice, idealism and realism, morality and rationality, culture and politics.

The first phrase of Makkai's text becomes really understandable through this approach, according to which European humanity wrote „its own death sentence” in the peace treatise following the world war¹⁹. Through the peace treatise, European humanity turned against the pure base of the European way of existence, hu-

manity, causing a condition that contradicts it and thus becoming in opposition with its own ideals and possibilities.

Thus it is seen that the minority condition paradox carries the most complete and essential criticism of European modernity.

Notes

* Translated from Hungarian by Szasz Maria-Augusta.

1 See Sándor Makkai, *Nem lehet* (It is impossible) in *Nem lehet. A kisebbségi sors vitája* (It is Impossible. The Debate of the Minority Destiny), (Héttorony Könykiadó, 1989)

2 In his article Makkai gives the following definitions to the issue of *impossibility*: “...I have to say that that I cannot imagine minority life worthy of a human being *at all, because I consider the minority »category« unworthy of man and spiritually impossible.*” (Makkai 1989. 107-108.)

In the Europe refound again in its national consciousness, minority life became impossible and untenable both theoretically and substantially.” (Makkai 1989. 108.)

„So, regardless whether the minority condition can be postponed from a political, economic, social or cultural perspective or not, beyond all this it is unbearable in its deepest roots as it is strongly opposed to human dignity and this is what Europe's conscience, if it has any, should not tolerate and support.” (Makkai 1989. 109)

„The minority condition is not political impossibility or it is not mainly that but it is also *ethical impossibility.*” (Makkai 1989. 111.)

3 The materials of the debate were gathered and systematized by Peter Cseke and Gusztav Molnar at the end of the 80s. They published it at the Héttorony publishing house with the title *Nem lehet. A kisebbségi sors vitája* (It is Impossible. The Debate

of the Minority Destiny). Thanks to their work the materials of the debate became available in a clear form for further analyses and scientific research. The editors themselves contributed to it with an introductory and closing essay.

4 Here I understand the *interpretive* method in the spirit of the Gadamerian and Ricœurian conception. Interpretation is the journey to meaning that opens up in understanding; it is participation in the process of realization of sense. “Interpretation is not such an act, writes Gadamer, that is added to understanding at the end and incidentally but understanding always means interpretation, thus, interpretation is the explicit form of understanding.” (Gadamer 1984. 218.) “...Interpreting means, writes Ricœur, that one chooses the conceptional way opened by the text and go where the text *went*.” (Ricœur 1999. 30.) Interpretation is participation in the building of meaning; in this process the interpreter structures not only the meaning but also himself as interpreter. In the hermeneutical reflection “the *I* and the *meaning* are of the same kind” (Ricœur 1999. 26).

5 (see Marcus 1984. 9)

6 The specialist researching on paradoxes demonstrates that in fact all definitions merged into the following three: 1) The paradox is a contradiction-like statement that is actually true; 2) The paradox is a statement that seems true but in fact it contains a contradiction; 3) The paradox is a valid argumentation that leads to a contradictory conclusion (Falletta 1988.11).

7 István V. Király explains this idea applying it to Aristotle’s use of categories (he was the first to provide philosophical importance to categories): The term *category* “does not have another philosophical sense at Aristotle either but to render those fundamental perspectives on the basis of which a *certain* fact stands on the illuminated arena of judgment, so that its own whole *truthfulness* were decided.” (Király 1999.32)

8 The detailed explanation is also given by Makkai in the *Nemzet és kisebbség* (Nation and Minority): see Makkai 1939. 16-17.

9 The ideal of the intelligent being’s dignity is based on the fact that he “only obeys to the law that at the same time he gives to himself” (Kant 1991a. 68).

10 (Kant 1991a. 68)

11 “So that good became complete, writes Kant in *Critique of Pure Mind*, it is necessary that those who deserved happiness through his behavior, could hope for receiving it, too” (Kant 1995. 610).

12 see Hegedüs 1989. 112

13 see Hegedüs 1989. 112

14 see Hegedüs 1989. 115

15 According to this conception, culture, says Rickert belonging to the school of Baden, “is nothing else but the entirety of those things that either have been directly created by the man acting according to values or if they already exist, he intentionally cherishes them for the sake of the values attached to them. In each process of culture, a certain value acknowledged by man is embodied” (Rickert 1923. 22).

16 “although, says Heidegger, the existence of presence is ontically not only close or the closest but also the presence existence *is* we ourselves. As opposed to this, or maybe exactly due to it, it is the farthest. It is true that understanding this existence is part of the most particular existence and that he dwells in a certain sense of his existence (Heidegger 1989. 105)

17 Makkai 1989. 109

18 Conscience is one of the central categories of the kantian-neo-kantian philosophy. According to Kant’s definition: “Conscience is *the inner court* of the mind (in front of which his thoughts judge or dismiss each other). (Kant 1991b. 554)

19 Makkai 1989.106

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The Romanian Jewry: Historical Destiny, Tolerance, Integration, Marginalisation

To discuss what was the attitude of the Romanian society towards the increasing economic, social and political role of the Jews throughout history is one of the aims of this paper. Serban Papacostea, the outstanding specialist in mediaeval history, makes use of the syntagm "hostile tolerance", which specified the general attitude towards the Jews of the Orthodox mediaeval world of Byzantine origin. Tolerance - defined the unlimited opportunity for Jews to be accepted, settle, move and act freely within the Romanian principalities, all the way to the status of possessing properties in Moldavia and Wallachia. There were, however, mixed feelings of hostility manifest at three distinct levels: mental, juridical and political. As for the mentalities, both popular and high brow education as well as prejudices held the Jews guilty for the death of Christ. Even if physically the Jewish presence in Romania has become symbolical, the history of the Jews, the traditions of the Jewish culture and spirituality, the imprint of the Jewish contribution on the emergence and development of the Romanian society will remain the perennial values of a historiography aspiring to fulfill its duty, forever preserved in the conscience of generations to come.

To reconstruct the historical destiny of the Romanian Jewry, which is still a blank page in our historiography, remains a task for the historians and researchers. Such early attempts as were made by Hasdeu and Iorga to trace "the history of religious tolerance in Romania" or "the history of the Jews in our countries", springing amid the bitter dispute over the civil rights of the Jews in late 19th and early 20th century¹, did not have the expected follow-up in further research which, it was hoped, would produce a synthesis of this important issue. The *Bibliography of the Jews in Romania*, published by Jean Ancel and Victor Eskenasy in Tel-Aviv in 1991², is an inventory of partial contributions and documenting materials, which offer only the starting point for a future historical synthesis. The more recent *History of the Jews in Transylvania, 1623-1944*, published in Romanian and Hungarian versions by Moshe Carmilly-Weinberger, former Chief-Rabbi of Cluj/Kolozsvár

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and Emeritus Professor of Yeshiva University New York, offers an excellent synthetic view on the history of the Jews in this particular region, even while it calls for a collective effort to approach similarly the entire Romanian Jewry³.

The beginnings of the Jewish history in this part of Europe are veiled by the legendary aura created by scholarly Humanism and militant Romanticism. Like other populations in the Central-East-European area, the Jews in Transylvania in mid 19th century, as shown in their political petitions for rights, looked for support in the historical awareness of their early presence in this part of the world. Such claims were put forth by the imaginative 16th century Saxon priest of Talmaciu by the name of Johann Lebel, who tried to trace the origins of the name of his village back to the Talmud. The ancient locals bearing the name had been allegedly called in to help the Dacian king Decebal against a common enemy, the Romans, after the Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed by the legions of emperor Titus⁴. Popular imagination added to, or overlaid, such scholarly constructions with oral folklore⁵, according to which such toponyms as Jidovar, Jidovina, Jidova a.s.o, were the links to the ancient Dacian and Roman fortresses or mediaeval strongholds attributed to hypothetical Jewish colonists⁶.

While thorough historical criticism exposed the lack of foundation and the anachronism even of such folklore (for example, the origin of Talmud predates by far the age of Decebal), archeology, on the other hand, keeps producing hard evidence about the presence of

Jews in Dacia in the first centuries AD. The coins issued by Simon Bar Kochba and discovered in the neighborhood of the Roman military camps in the province of Dacia, the artifacts bearing Hebrew inscriptions, and the sanctuaries devoted to the gods worshipped by the Hellenised Jews of the Diaspora are just a few of the elements that speak of a Jewish presence both among the Roman troops stationed in Dacia and among the colonists brought from “all over the Roman world” to settle the newly conquered province⁷.

These sporadic and scanty beginnings of Jewish life in Dacia fell victim to centuries of invasions in the wake of the collapse of the Roman rule, so that it is as late as the first centuries of the second millenium that documents in either Latin or Slavic offer the proof of the emergence and development of a Jewish society in Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia. After some indirect and uncertain data from the 12th to the 13th centuries, the 14th to 16th centuries provide more and more documentary proofs concerning the Jewish population in the above mentioned provinces. The Jews came to this area from the West (Germany, Bohemia, Hungary), North (Poland) and South (the Ottoman Empire, where the Sephards expelled from Spain found a tolerating haven). Their economic role as revealed in the contemporary documents was of intermediaries in trade on the route that linked Poland to the Black Sea and the Ottoman Empire, across the territory of Moldavia, and also in the relations established between the most important Transylvanian cities (Cluj, Brasov/ Brassó, Sibiu/ Szeben) and the regions across the

Carpathians or the Balkans. The second important component of the Jewish economic activity was that of suppliers of the credit necessary both for the rulers and the urban and rural communities. Several of those who vied for the throne obtained the nomination after resorting to the services of the Jewish creditors who were influential in the Ottoman capital. The nobility, the boyars, as well as the city dwellers raised money from the Jews, who were thus integrated in the economic and social life by gaining properties, paying taxes, participated in court both as the accused or the defended parties or as witnesses. The Jewish physicians, who practiced the courts of the Romanian or Transylvanian princes, were in great demand and efforts were put into bringing them over from Poland or the Ottoman Empire⁸.

This economic and social role, made clear with every documentary material produced, was closely linked to involvement in the complex network of the international relations of the Central – and Southeastern European area. Isac Beg, the Jewish doctor of Ozun Hasan, the Turkmen Khan, during his mission in Europe to form an alliance against the Ottoman Empire, also mediated an improvement in the relations between Stephen the Great of Moldavia and Mathias Corvinus of Hungary, which resulted in an agreement sealed by the granting of mutual trade privileges⁹. In the second half of the 16th century, the Jewish personalities influential in the Ottoman world got directly involved in the political destiny of the Romanian principalities by backing and crediting pretenders to the throne and by inte-

grating Jewish tradesmen into the region in an extended network of obtaining and transmitting information necessary to the expanding Ottoman Empire. Joseph Nassi, Duke of Naxos, adviser and favorite of the Sultan, supported the access to the throne of Moldavia of Alexandru Lapusneanu and Ion Voda cel Cumplit (the Terrible), even while in 1571 he himself was considered a worthy candidate to the throne. From among the creditors from Constantinople who financed Michael the Brave to ascend the throne of Wallachia the main role was played by the influential Jewish financiers of the Ottoman capital¹⁰.

What was the attitude of the Romanian society towards the increasing economic, social and political role of the Jews? Serban Papacostea, the outstanding specialist in mediaeval history, makes use of the syntagm “hostile tolerance”, which specified the general attitude towards the Jews of the Orthodox mediaeval world of Byzantine origin. The first term – tolerance - defined the unlimited opportunity for Jews to be accepted, settle, move and act freely within the Romanian principalities, all the way to the status of possessing properties in Moldavia and Wallachia. Under the protection of the law, the free practice of their religion and the setting up of synagogues and schools complete this facet of the Jews’ status in the Romanian territories during the Middle Ages. There were, however, mixed feelings of hostility manifest at three distinct levels: mental, juridical and political. As for the mentalities, both popular and high brow education as well as prejudices held the Jews guilty for the death of Christ. The mural paintings

of the monasteries in Moldavia and the popular writings about the lives of the saints place the Jews usually among the infidels and the heretics, responsible for the martyrdom of saints, doomed to the flames of Hell.

The juridical codifying of the 17th century following the model of the Byzantine codes stipulated the differences between the Jews and Christians, by forbidding conversion to Judaism, yet favoring those willing to convert to Christianity by granting them pardon for all the previous misdeeds. The fact that the Christian priests were forbidden to have any contact with Jews, to join meals in their homes, to be consulted by Jewish physicians, although not generally observed, is relevant for the mentalities of the epoch and the juridical approached. As for everyday policy, the hostility was motivated by the competition between the local and the Jewish tradesmen, the discontent of the debtors with their creditors, the Jews being considered agents of the Ottoman power in the Romanian provinces. Hence the restrictive economic measures and the onset of the struggle against the Ottoman rule by taking repressive measures against the Jewish creditors, who were at variance imprisoned and compelled to surrender their fortunes to Stephen the Great, or simply killed by Michael the Brave and Aron the Tyrant. Russian sources mention severe measures against the Jews taken by Petru Rares, including their general expulsion from Moldavia. On the other hand, one should not ignore the trade privileges and tax-exemptions granted them by rulers such as Alexandru the Good, Stephen Tomsa or Constantin Brancoveanu, or the protection offered

them by Vasile Lupu against the Cossacks of Hmelnicki. The advice given by Archbishop Matei al Mirelor to the then prince to observe and keep the promises he had made the foreign tradesmen, Jews included, which would gain him fame in their distant homelands, completes the ambivalent status of the Jews in the mediaeval Romanian society, a status characterized by restraint and prejudices of old and new always accompanied and counterbalanced by a permissive tolerance¹¹.

Many similarities could be found in the situation of the Jews in Transylvania, where they made themselves useful as tradesmen, creditors and intermediaries in the relations with the Ottoman Empire beginning with the 14th century. After the first privilege granted in 1251 by Bela IV to the Jews in the Kingdom of Hungary, Transylvania included, a privilege confirmed and renewed by most of his successors until 1526, under the new circumstances as the autonomous principality of Transylvania, Prince Gabriel Bethlen granted them in 1623 a privilege which became the fundamental act of their social, economical and juridical status until mid 19th century. This privilege issued within the context of the policy of revival of the Principality by colonization ensured the Jews the freedom to settle and move within the country, to freely practice trade, to observe their religion without any discrimination, no discriminating signs included. Although these rights were later amended by the decisions of the Diet and the Code of Laws of the Principality limited the right to settle to the town of Alba Iulia/ Gyulafehérvár, these privileged

provisions reiterated periodically in the 17th and 18th centuries provided the Jews in Transylvania with the opportunity to engage in an increasingly dynamic economic activity and to lead a life in their specific tradition¹². The Pinkas (Protocol) of the Community of Alba Iulia (the first and, for a long time, the only organized Jewish community in the Principality) reflects an internal organization with a rabbi who was beginning with the middle of the 18th century the Chief-rabbi of the Transylvanian Jewry, a local leadership elected by the majority vote, a legal system of its own, with taxes destined to cover the needs of the community, and two synagogues for the Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews to practice their cult¹³.

The 18th century, which marks the borderline between the pre-statistics and statistics period, will allow us for the first time a quantitative assessment of the presence of the Jewish population in the area under discussion. In Transylvania, the new Habsburg regime, established at the end of the 17th century, inaugurated the practice of recording the human and material resources by introducing a periodical census. The first general census of the Jews in the Great Principality of Transylvania, at the end of the reign of Maria Theresa (1779), registered 221 Jewish families with 461 children. The first modern census ordered by Emperor Joseph II, registered in the Great Principality 394 Jewish families with 2,094 members representing 0.14% of the entire population. In western present day Transylvania (counties Caras, Timis, Torontal, Arad, Bihor, Maramures, Satu Mare), then part of Hungary, the

number of the Jewish population, registered at the same time, was 6,884. Up to 1840, the demographical evolution of the Jews in Transylvania was rather insignificant, their number never exceeding 3,000-3,500 in the Great Principality. A great increase occurred over the years prior to the Revolution of 1848, and the immediately following, so that the Austrian census of 1850-1851 registered over 15,000 Jewish inhabitants in the province. The reason of this increase is to be found in the massive immigration from the West and the North (Galitzia, Bukovina and Hungary) to the more favorable economic and social conditions offered by the Great Principality. In spite of the continuous increase, the Jewish population of Transylvania did not reach then 1% of the total population. After the civil emancipation in 1867, the Jewish population increased considerably from 23,536 in 1869 to 60,074 individuals in 1910, with an increase in its percentage of the total population from 1.2% to 2.4%. For the whole territory of present day Transylvania before World War I, the Jewish population reached the number of 223,082¹⁴.

In Moldavia, the first census taken by the Russian occupation military authorities during the war with the Turks in 1774 registered 1,300 Jewish families. When Bukovina fell to Austrian rule in 1775, successive statistics point to a decrease in the number of Jewish families from 650 in 1776 to 175 in 1785 due to the expulsions practiced by the new authorities. Later on, the relaxation of the restrictive measures marked a new increase to 554 families in 1791. In the first half of the 19th century, the data available for Moldavia show a sharp in-

crease in the growth of the Jewish population from 11,732 in 1803 to 79,164 in 1838. The explanation of this growth is to be found both in a spontaneous immigration from Poland and Russia, then experiencing poor economic conditions while enforcing severe anti-Jewish policies, and the colonization by the Princes, boyars and the Church with a view to pointing out the value of their respective domains. By 1848, over 60 smaller towns and villages had been set up with Jewish majority population. If we also add the natural increase due to early marriages, ritual sanitary and dietary prescriptions, and the low mortality due to abstinence and stable family life, one has now all the main causes of the growth of Jewish population until 1859-1860 to 134,100 persons, of which 124,897 in Moldavia and only 9,234 in Wallachia. In the same period (1856), the Jewish population in Basarabia, which had been integrated into the Russian Empire in 1812, reached the number of 78,751. By the end of the century, according to the 1899 census, the number of the Jews in Romania doubled, reaching 269,015, and representing 4,5% of the total population. Prior to World War I, in 1912, the census recorded a slight decrease in figures and ratio (239,967 persons and 3,3% as a result of the emigration due to declination of civil rights and the restrictive, anti-Jewish official policy)¹⁵.

Simultaneous with the demographic increase, the 18th-19th centuries marked significant developments at the institutional level too. In Moldavia and Wallachia the leader of the Jewish communities became the so-called Hahambasha established by the Prince of

Moldavia with a substitute in Wallachia. He had administrative, juridical and fiscal competence, the right to nominate the rabbis and the local community leaders. This centralized system was maintained until 1830 when the communities were granted the right to elect their own rabbis and lay leadership¹⁶. In Transylvania, the increase in the Jewish population brought about in the first half of the 19th century the setting up of new communities, in addition to the only legally recognized one of Alba Iulia. These communities with their own rabbis and leaders claimed the right to participate in the election of the Chief-rabbi and demanded an institutional decentralization accompanied by reforms of cult and education. The conflict between the advocates of the reforms and the advocates of the traditional system reached its climax at the inaugurations of the last two Chief-rabbis in 1820 and 1845-1846. In the years preceding the Revolution of 1848, the conflict was taken up by the Hungarian and Saxon newspapers in Transylvania. In the western part of present day Transylvania, in Arad, Chief-rabbi Aron Chorin rallied a powerful group who advocated renewal. Chorin declared himself for the modification of some of the traditional prescriptions, a renewal of the ritual and the substitution of Hungarian and German for Hebrew in sermons.

After the 1848 Revolution, the supporters of the institutional and educational reforms managed to organize two conferences of the representatives of the Jewish communities in Transylvania. In 1852 and in 1866, projects were proposed at these conferences for the re-

organization of the communities and of the school-system and for reducing the prerogatives of the Chief Rabbi. The chance for these projects to be implemented came with the civil emancipation, when in 1868 a congress of the Jewry of Hungary was organized in the new political conditions created by the Austro-Hungarian dualism. The main effect of the centralized institutional and educational system proposed by the Congress was a break between the Jewish communities, which lasted until World War II. Thus, those who acknowledged the resolutions of the Congress became the congressist or neolog communities, while their adversaries declared themselves Orthodox (supporters of a strict observance of ritual prescriptions and of a full community autonomy) or status-quo-ante (partisans of maintaining the situation previous to the Congress)¹⁷.

Beyond these internal problems, the main concern of the Jewish society in the 18th and 19th centuries was emancipation, gaining full civil rights¹⁸. In Transylvania, the first half of the 18th century is characterized, as regards the official policy towards the Jews, by the alternation of restrictive measures taken by central and local authorities with periodical renewals of the privileges gained in the previous century. The situation of the Jews worsened sensibly during the reign of Maria Theresa, when, within a generalized system for Hungary, a special burdensome tax of tolerance was introduced for the Jews in western present day Transylvania. In Banat (counties Caras, Timis and Torontal), a regulation entitled *Judenordnung* was adopted in 1776 restricting drastically the admissible number of Jewish families,

restraining free mobility, the right to practice trade, confining residence to special districts, and strictly limiting the social and economic relations between Jews and Christians. This policy climaxed in 1779-1780, when it was determined that the entire Jewish population of the Great Principality be localized in Alba-Iulia, that all professions except trade were forbidden, and moving out of the area had to stop. The death of the Empress, and the ascension of Joseph II prevented the implementation of these projects, while the new era of Josephinism brought about a policy in the spirit of tolerance.

With a view to integrating the Jewish population into society as a class of useful taxpayers, Joseph issued in 1783 the Edict of tolerance for Hungary, applicable to the Jews in western present day Transylvania too. This meant access to trade training and membership of guilds, free admittance to public schools at every level, universities included, removal of the humiliating distinctive signs and creating opportunities to set up their own school system. In exchange, the Jews were asked to integrate into the general educational system, to introduce the Latin, German or Hungarian languages in their official or business records, to adopt German names¹⁹. In the Great Principality, some partial measures taken, such as permission to promote freely economic activities like peddling or brandy distilling, and stopping the practice of baptizing Jewish new-borns by midwives against their parents' will, are signs of a positive change, without however, finalizing into a general Edict of tolerance²⁰.

During the first half of the 19th century the issue of emancipation became a hot debate at the level of the state central institutions and the local authorities, as well as for the public opinion and the press of the time. Within the context created, the emancipation of the Jews became part of the reform-program promoted by the liberal gentry. Consequently, the Jews in western Transylvania benefited from the measures adopted by the Diet of Hungary in 1840 which provisioned their right to settle and live in all towns except in the mining area, to start factories and practice all trades and commerce. In spite of the claims by the Jewish communities of the Great Principality to civil rights similar to those granted for the rest of the population, the Diet of Transylvania did not consider the request until 1848.

Concomitant to these attempts at official level to improve their status, the Jews of Transylvania conducted a long and tenacious struggle in the towns and villages of the Principality for the right to settle, freely practice economic activities, observe the prescriptions of their cult and build synagogues and schools. The 1848 Revolution, instead of the expected and coveted emancipation brought about an outburst of anti-Jewish persecutions in the main towns of Hungary and Transylvania²¹, while the Neo-Absolutist regime of 1849-1860, introduced by the Austrian Empire following the suppression of the Revolution, annulled such few rights as had been gained in the previous years (the right to purchase properties, for instance). After the liberalization of the political regime in 1860, the idea of emancipation imposed by a process of modernization

in both the social-economic structures and mentalities, was materialized in 1867, conjectured by the new dualist Austro-Hungarian regime's attempts to prove its legitimacy by solving in a liberal spirit the long-debated problem of the Jewish civil emancipation through one of the first laws adopted directly after setting up.

The emancipation of the Jews in Moldavia and Wallachia proved to be a slower and more difficult process, although in mid 19th century the conditions seemed favorable for a positive solution. The liberal generation that prepared and carried out the 1848 Revolution adopted such provisions as "the emancipation of the Israelites and equal rights for all citizens of other denominations" (in Wallachia) or "the gradual emancipation of the Israelites" (in Moldavia). Attracted by these promises and interested in economic, social and institutional modernization and liberalization, the Jews supported the Revolution. The affiliation was maintained in the period following the defeat of the Revolution as part of the general struggle for the unification of the Romanian Principalities under the first ruler of the unified Romania, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, who opened up new ways of putting into practice civil emancipation in the years to come. Thus, some Jewish personalities were appointed to public office and the communal law of 1864 granted the Jews the right to participate, under certain conditions, in the municipal elections. The Civil Code issued in the same year stipulated the individual naturalization of the Jews after a ten-year residence in the country²².

After the overthrow of Cuza, public opinion and the political class's attitude to the issue of Jewish emancipation changed radically. Adopted under street pressure, the 7th article of the 1866 Constitution granted the right to citizenship only to those of the Christian confession. The governments in power until 1872, led by the outstanding politicians of the liberal generation of 1848 such as Ion Bratianu, Mihail Kogalniceanu, or Ion Ghica inaugurated a series of anti-Jewish actions (mass expulsion, interdiction of settling in villages, restriction of economic activities), which were aggravated by an abusive local administration intent on implementing them. There are manifold and complex causes of this radical shift in direction in the Jewish policy of the liberal generation of 1848. The growing demographics of the Jewish population, the massive immigration, the orientation of the Jews towards professions characteristic for the middle class that was just taking shape in the Romanian society, all caused a negative reaction among the liberal political forces, who regarded the Jewish competition as the main obstacle in the building up of the social strata in Romania which they targeted as their main support. Within the electoral system established in 1866, the civil emancipation of the Jews would have meant a radical change in the third college, the electoral stronghold of the liberals. In Moldavia was formed a so-called liberal independent fraction, acutely xenophobic and anti-Jewish, whose indispensable support for the uphold in power of the liberal governments had a great contribution to the unfavorable turn in the liberal policy towards the Jewish issue.

As for the conservative political forces, they proved to be much too moderate as the representatives of the landholders interested in exploiting the economic resources with the help of the Jewish leaseholders and seeking social and political interest opposed to that of their liberal adversaries. Not incidentally then, the conservative government of Lascar Catargiu between 1872-1876 considerably mellowed the anti-Jewish measures of the previous governments, and political personalities of conservative orientation such as P.P. Carp, Titu Maiorescu, and Take Ionescu, endorsed the arrival at a just solution for the Jewish issue in Romania²³.

Under the circumstances, when the idea of emancipation became a reality across Europe and the international Jewish organizations had been acknowledged as politically influent, Jewish emancipation in Romania transcended the area of internal confrontations to attract the interest of the Great Powers in the delicate context of the "Oriental problem". At the end of the 1877-1878 War, when the Peace Congress in Berlin traced the new political frontiers in the Balkans, the Great Powers conditioned the recognition of the recently gained independence by Romania on the amendment of Article 7 of the Constitution to ensure civil rights to all the residents of the country irrespective of their denomination.

On being met with a strong opposition by the political forces and the public opinion in Romania, the modification of the Constitution triggered a real political storm consisting in new elections and changes of governments, whereas the long and tiresome negotia-

tions with the European capitals delayed by more than a year the recognition of the independence of Romania. Finally, an advantage was taken both of the specific contradictions and interests of England, France, Germany and Russia, and of the hesitant attitude of a part of the Jewish leadership in Romania, and a surrogate “solution” was propounded in the re-formulation of Article 7 offering the possibility of individual naturalization for the Jews with a ten-year residence in the country. With one single exception, that of the block-naturalization of the 883 participants in the war for independence, this solution of gaining civil rights for the Jews proved entirely impracticable, and the total number of Jews naturalized between 1878-1913 did not exceed 529²⁴.

From 1878 to World War I, a particularly restrictive legislation was added to this infelicitous solution, an aggravation to the drastic limits set to Jewish participation in industry and trade, in the liberal professions, and in public administration, also blocking access for the Jews to instruction at any level and legalizing the system of Jewish expulsion from the rural areas.

In order to counteract this discrimination, the *Union of the Native Jews* was set up in Bucharest in 1910, assuming the responsibility of coordinating the struggle for emancipation. It was these efforts, the support of the European public opinion and of the international Jewish organizations that prepared the field for the favourable conditions at the end of the World War I which made the Jewish emancipation a reality in Romania. The decrees issued in 1919 by Ion I. C. Bratianu’s

government and the acceptance by Romania, not without resistance, of the guarantees comprised in the Treaty for minorities imposed at the Versailles Peace Conference²⁵, also counted as contributions.

The civil emancipation, gaining full civil rights, did not mean here, as, actually in the whole of Europe (see the Dreyfus case) the expected and hoped for solution for the Jewish issue. The social integration of the Jews proved to be a process which, due to its implications, transcended juridical emancipation, triggering and arousing deep rooted sensibilities, reserves and hostility and, leading, eventually, to some tragic events. On the other hand, the opportunities offered to the Jews by their emancipation in the economic, social, political and cultural life, which they fully turned into account by gaining major positions in the economy, finances, press, the liberal professions, culture and education, caused the birth and rise of an organized type of modern anti-Semitism, one which embarked upon the programmatic elimination of the Jewish factor in society.

In turn, the Jewish community, despite some disposition at being assimilation, on the whole proved to be refractory to such process, which entailed the renouncement of their specific individuality.

For this complex situation emerging after the achievement of civil emancipation, the Jewish community tried to find three types of solutions. Part of the Romanian Jews adopted the ideology and mode of action of modern Nationalism, specifically of the Zionist movement, setting up the goal of transforming the Jewish people into a modern nation within an administra-

tive state on the territory of ancient Israel, with a national language, culture and institutions, similar to all other nations. This movement was popular in Romania where, prior to World War I and during the inter-war period, the Zionist organizations planned and achieved the gradual emigration to Palestine of a part of the Romanian Jews.

Another section of the Jewish community oriented itself towards the left-leaning and extreme left movements, considering that the solutions to the Jewish problems were to be found within the general re-organization of the society, which, by ridding all economic and social injustice, would wipe out the roots of ethnic or confessional discrimination. The advocates of such orientations played an important role in the organization and development of the socialist movement in Romania, with Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea as its most important opinion leader. After the World War I, both the Social Democrat and Communist movements featured an important Jewish component.

Lastly, the third group thought that the solution was to integrate into the Romanian society by preserving their specific cultural and spiritual individuality, and thus achieving full equal rights. It was the *Union of the Romanian Jews* which militated in favor of this idea and paved the way to a political and parliamentary solution for the objective, by participating in the elections in coalition with the governmental parties and by winning seats in the Parliament.

In Transylvania, where pro-Hungarian assimilation tendencies were strong in the wake of the emancipation

of 1867, part of the Jewish population, after World War I and the Union with Romania, supported the Hungarian Party, while others constituted the *National Union of the Jews of Transylvania* featuring a strong Zionist orientation²⁶.

The inter-war period marked the strong affirmation of the Jewish component in the social, economic, political, as well as cultural life of Romania. An important network of community, philanthropic, cultural, artistic, and sports associations, a multitude of organizations and even political parties, a strong Jewish press, all emphasized the way in which the opportunities offered by the new emancipated status had been capitalized by the Romanian Jewry. The ascent of Fascism, of the extreme right movements in Europe and Romania, too, were the alarming signals of anti-Semitism in the pre-war period. The Iron Guard set for itself the task to eliminate physically the entire Jewish component of the Romanian society making known its intentions not only by an extremely aggressive press and literature, but also through violent actions against the Jewish persons and properties²⁷.

After the victory of Nazism in Germany, anti-Jewish pressure increased, extending at official and legislative levels. The signal sent in 1934 by the passage of the Law of the exploitation of Romanian labor, with provisions which limited the proportion of non-Romanian employers and managers in the economic companies, combined at the end of 1937 with the adoption by the ephemeral Goga-Cuza government of the first overtly anti-Jewish law which revised citizenship and endan-

gered the civil rights of thousands of the 756,930 Jews registered by the 1930 census. Although the economic boycott declared by the Jewish businesses against the government and the international protests proved efficient, and the Goga-Cuza government had to resign after three weeks, in the summer of 1940, the complex situation engendered by the blitzkrieg success of Nazi Germany, the fall of France, Romania's main ally of Romania, the major territory losses in Basaraby and Transylvania, made the Gigurtu government introduce a new anti-Semite legislation aligned to the Nazi model. The policy took on paroxysmal dimensions during the dual government of general Antonescu and the Iron Guard (September 1940-January 1941), and continued in 1941-1944. In line with the racial criteria of the Nûrnberg laws, the anti-Jewish legislation annulled civil rights and liberties, decreed the expropriation of all Jewish possessions (within a process called Romanization), eliminated Jewish manpower from the companies, introduced *numerus nullus* in education and the liberal professions, established restrictions on mobility, re-located the Jews from the countryside to towns, enforced compulsory labor and heavy taxation, and dissolved the institutional system of the Jewish communities. Although not all the measures were applied consistently (for instance, the process of "Romanization" of the Jewish properties and the elimination of the Jewish specialists was considered by Antonescu too long a process to avoid unfavourable economical consequences), the coming to power of the Iron Guard added physical violence to these laws, as an

aggravating variable which climaxed in the massacres during the rebellion against Antonescu at the end of January 1941²⁸.

The war that broke in June 1941 turned violence from an exception into mass practice. After the pogrom of Iasi and the "death trains" of Moldavia, there followed in the autumn of 1941 the massacre and mass deportation of the Jews of Basarabia and Bucovina to Transnistria. They were declared "foreign Jews" siding with the "bolshevik enemy". During the summer and autumn of 1942, the plans for mass deportation of the Jews from old Romania and southern Transylvania to the extermination camps in Poland were at work. The opposition put up by leading personalities of the Romanian political and ecclesiastical elite, among which the Royal House was foremost, the actions of the Jewish leaders, especially of Dr. Wilhem Filderman, and not least of all, the change of the course of the war after Stalingrad, put an end to this project, and thus, about 300,000 Jewish lives were saved out of the 441,293 registered by the 1941 census on the territory of old Romania, southern Transylvania, Basarabia and Bucovina²⁹.

In Northern Transylvania, under the Hungarian administration introduced in August 1940, the 151,125 Jews recorded in the 1941 census had been subject to anti-Jewish legislation in action for some years in Hungary. This legislation was racial in nature and pursued the elimination of the Jews from the economic life, liberal professions, public services and the educational system. The German occupation in March 1944 and the

Sláasi government hastened the state of things towards a tragic end, ghettoing and deporting as many as 131,633 Jews from Northern Transylvania by June 1944. The courageous stand taken by such personalities as the Greek Catholic Archbishop Iuliu Hossu or the Roman Catholic Bishop Márton Áron, the salvation actions initiated by Jewish organizations with the support of some intellectuals and local peasants did not as much as limit the proportion of the disaster³⁰.

The Jewish population in Romania reduced to half as compared to the inter-war period (412,312 Jews in 1947) set its hopes, after the terrible shock of the Holocaust, in the new regime, democratic in the beginning, later Communist, which promised to solve once and for all national injustices. It is not by accident that the Jews participate in the building up of the new social-political and economic regime, which, unfortunately, proved very soon to be the deception of a new type dictatorship, whose ferocity was comparable to the one past.

The shattered expectations and the disillusionment with the Communist system corroborated with the emergence of the State of Israel, re-orienting the Jews in Romania towards emigration, so that the number of Jews decreased from 146,264 in 1956 to 24,667 in 1977. The Ceausescu regime, by depriving an entire population of the basic necessities of a decent life and by negotiating the emigration of Jews for hard currency, carried through the process of finishing off the Jewish community, with the result that the latest official census

registered as few as 9,000 Jews in 1992, the indubitable sign of a twilight of a history of half a millennium³¹.

Even if physically the Jewish presence in Romania has become symbolical, the history of the Jews, the traditions of the Jewish culture and spirituality, the imprint of the Jewish contribution on the emergence and development of the Romanian society will remain the perennial values of a historiography aspiring to fulfill its duty, forever preserved in the conscience of generations to come.

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Delia Despina Dumitrica

Uniate /vs./ Orthodox: What Lays behind the Conflict?

A conflict analysis

The current paper investigates the Romanian Uniate/ Orthodox conflict from the perspective of peace and conflict studies, making use of an interpretation of Johan Galtung's conflict theory and his proposed analysis tools.² The aims are to contribute to a more comprehensive and multilateral understanding of this conflict in a wider context than the ideological one and hopefully to suggest some of the means of attenuating the conflict.

“[...] the solution to a contemporary problem will never be found in a problem raised in another era, *which is not the same problem except through a false resemblance.*” P. Veyne¹

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Introduction

The first part of the paper reviews the emergence and development of the Uniate/ Orthodox conflict, proposing four different phases with particular characteristics and arguing that the conflict was shaped and re-shaped throughout these stages from an ideological to an economic level. Ariadna's thread is the quest for power (understood in all its dimensions). The second part of the paper will address the methodological issues, defining the main concepts used and putting forward an analysis of the conflict in view of the proposed methodology. Finally, the conclusion will attempt to peer into possible futures, mapping alternatives for conflict transformation laying ahead.

1. Brief overview of the Uniate/Orthodox conflict

The Uniate/ Orthodox conflict will be looked upon as a process, with several phases and various levels of actors. The point of this overview is to show how this process was impacted and shaped at several significant junctures: 1918, 1945 and 1989. These three dates re-opened and re-defined the conflict, with its three components: attitudes and behaviors of the actors involved towards each other and contradictions born from the competing goals of the actors; put otherwise, they re-defined not only the agenda, but the actors themselves. Subsequently, the process gradually affected the context

- the Orthodox Church and the Romanian state were forced into accepting and accommodating the Uniate Church. In the present phase, the conflict is no longer on ideological level, but on the economic level, namely resources. This opens opportunities for a positive conflict transformation - or not - the final decision resting upon the actors.

1.1. From 1698 to 1918: Conflict emergence

In 1698, the Eastern Catholic Church (the Uniate Church) was born, upon an offer made by the Habsburg emperor Leopold I to the Orthodox Church in the Habsburg territory, including Transylvania: accept the Papal supremacy, the unleavened Eucharist bread, the existence of purgatory and the filioque doctrine. In return, the clergy and laity will enjoy the same privileges as Catholics, along with an exemption for the clergy from labor services and other fiscal duties.³

For almost 300 years, Romanians in Transylvania under Habsburg rule were second class citizens. No wonder that Leopold's offer was considered as the appropriate pragmatic solution by a minority at that time (Orthodox Romanians) in order to coexist and prosper under particular circumstances. The result was the Uniate Church, consisting of the Metropolitan province of Alba-Iulia and Fagaras with the seat in Blaj and headed by one Archbishop, with dioceses in Oradea, Lugoj, Cluj and Baia Mare and with around 200,000 believers.⁴ The Uniate Church preserved the main Ortho-

dox rite, but was placed under the Vatican's jurisdiction.⁵

This phase may be seen as the non-violent emergence, delimitation and definition of the initial conflict, which opposed the Romanian Orthodox Church, on one side, to the Catholic Church and the Habsburg Empire on the other. Not surprisingly, the Romanian Orthodox Church did not happily accept this act. In fact, it never ceased to regard this conversion as a “betrayal”, accusing that its members were lured by the Catholics, in a political stratagem, and the Uniates were rather perceived as the “*victim*” and were expected to re-join the Orthodox rite as soon as this would be possible.

1.2. From 1918 to 1945: Re-shaping the conflict

Once Transylvania became part of Romania (1918), it seemed that the opportunity for rejoining was finally there. However, the Uniate Church had by then one and a half million believers, and was the wellspring of a dynamic intelligentsia, deeply involved in the creation of Romanian nationhood: politicians like Iuliu Maniu, scholars like G. Sincai, Petru Maior or Innochetie Micu Clain. Concerned with the preservation of the Latin roots of the Romanian people, the intellectual uniates (known as the Transylvanian School) “decisively influenced the generation of 1848 revolutionaries who struggled to establish an independent Romanian nation-state. Building on the recorded social memories and

consciously constructed images of the early nineteenth century intellectuals, these revolutionaries produced their own official social memories and images to define a modern national identity that ‘required’ statehood.”⁶

These tight links between Romanian nation-hood creation and the Uniate Church legitimized the latter within Romanian nationalist ideology⁷ and subsequently forced its acceptance as a separate entity by the Orthodox Church. Even more, as the ruling dynasty of the Hohenzollern was Catholic by birth (changing religion only due to political reasons), by 1926 the Uniate leaders were granted a position in the Romanian parliament, thus challenging the dominant traditional role of the Orthodox bishops over the ruling elite.⁸ The increasing Catholic political influence came to an end under Antonescu's government, when Orthodoxy became the means of mass manipulation (Orthodox values were used to mask the extreme nationalist and chauvinistic policy of the Iron Guard) and subsequently equated to being a “*true Romanian*”.

With the acceptance of the Uniate Church as a legitimized, independent actor, the Orthodox Church was no longer in conflict with the Catholic Church (within this particular context), nor with another state, but with a former insider who became an outcast. The ideological threat was therefore even greater, as the doctrines of the two rites were not that different. This could have not only confused the believers, who would not be able to see the reason for distinguishing so sharply between the two Churches (the threat of perceiving the Uniate as ‘brothers’ or ‘siblings’), but it

could have raised doubts on the centrality of Orthodoxy within the definition of the Romanian identity. By losing its centrality, the Orthodox Church would also lose its political influence and monopoly over religion (with everything deriving from loss of the status of 'national church'). Thus the conflict was in itself altered: the fight was no longer to bring back the lost flock, but rather to keep the flocks apart in order to prevent any claim over power and resources.

1.3. From 1945 to 1989: A Latent Phase?

After the second world war, under Soviet influence, the Church as an institution was secularized and put under the direct control of the State.⁹ Due to the "[...] Byzantine legacy of a 'symphony' between secular and spiritual powers [...]"¹⁰ the Orthodox Church adhered to the policy of the new communist government and was granted a special position.¹¹ Feeling more secure, the Orthodox Patriarch made it clear that the Uniates are part of the Orthodox Church, putting assimilation on the Orthodox (and state) agenda, stating at his enthronement: "At this moment, our thoughts turn to our Greek Catholic brothers, who until 250 years ago, were part of our flock... In these conditions part of the Orthodox flock in Transylvania, threatened with death, joined the flock of the tyrannical wolves and they have not yet had the courage to return to the Mother Church [...]. Be true Romanians, like your forefathers... return to

the ancestral Church, the Church of your and our forefathers."¹²

With the Concordat abolished, the absorption process of the Uniates started in October 1948, when thirty-eight Uniate priests made a formal request to the Patriarch for rejoining the Orthodox Church. These priests were carefully selected by the government and, in spite of the protests of the Apostolic Nuncio and of some other Uniate bishops, the reunification proceeded. The assembly's decision was confirmed by the Government in December of that year. The reunification process was not as easy as it might have seemed and over six hundred churchmen were imprisoned.¹³ However, once accomplished some of the Uniate properties were nationalised and some were transferred to the Orthodox Church. On their part, the Uniate clergy and believers "conformed on the tacit understanding that, if given a chance, they would revert to Rome."¹⁴ and functioned unofficially, holding underground meetings, secretly appointing bishops and preserving its believers.

In spite of the meetings between Romanian Orthodox bishops and Ceausescu with the Pope in the '70s, the Uniate problem remained unresolved. Both Orthodox Church and the state saw the matter as closed - legally and ideologically, solved through the reconversion. However, failing to acknowledge that the contradiction still existed did not mean that the conflict was over once and for all. This phase of denying the conflict by imposing an authoritarian solution was in-

deed violent and aggravated the attitudes of the actor whose mere existence was denied.

1.4. From 1989 onwards: Control over resources.

With the demise of communism, the Uniate Church self-restored on the very last day of 1989 (recognized by the government in April 1990) and reclaimed its nationalized properties, as well as those transferred in 1948 to the Orthodox Church. At this point in time, religious freedom has been restored and secured in the legal framework; but at the same time, the Orthodox Church preserved its role as the “National Church of Romania” and openly reclaimed its centrality in the definition of Romanian identity. It was hard to deny the Uniate their right to existence, but at the same time it was easy to influence the public agenda on behalf of the Orthodox Church.

As a result, after the euphoria of the first moments of liberty, when the Orthodox Church promised the return of Greek-Catholic properties,¹⁵ attempts to solve the restoration problem failed. The Orthodox party had no interest in the dialogue, claiming legal ownership over the respective properties. On the other hand, Uniates lacked any documents for their request, as these were destroyed after 1948. In this vacuum favored by the weak legal system, rumors of “unpatriotic” conduct of the Uniate members (due to their affiliation with the Pope) fed the nationalistic feelings against the

Greek-Catholics. The attacks of the Orthodox Church were on several occasions supported by the government to stir up nationalistic feelings against Hungarians in Transylvania (by suggesting that Romanians can only be Orthodox and Hungarians - Catholics, hence Uniate are serving Hungarian interests).


Several attempts to reconcile the two churches' claims over the same resources failed. A 1990 mixed joint commission set up by a governmental decree to investigate the disputed cases did not meet until 1998 and failed after five meetings in 1999. Because of this decree, courts may refuse to consider lawsuits on the claiming of property. A 1993 document signed between Orthodox and Uniate Churches regarding properties was rejected by the Romanian Greek Catholics. A 1995 meeting between the Orthodox Patriarch and the Uniates was doomed to failure because of the unfair discussion set up by the Patriarch.¹⁶ In 1997, a proposal by a Christian Democrat senator on the restoration of Uniate properties in places where there still exist important Uniate communities was boycotted by the Orthodox community and did not materialize. A 1998 meeting between the two churches to reach a compromise failed once again.¹⁷ The 1999 visit of the Pope to Romania was a widely covered event, however with no direct consequences on the Uniate – Orthodox conflict, except at the declarative level. In 2001, two Uniate parishes have sued the Romanian state to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

2. Conflict analysis

Building upon the conflict theory developed by Johan Galtung, one of the founders of modern peace studies, the current analysis seeks to apply an interpretation of the theoretical framework to a concrete situation. As with any analysis of the kind, the limitations reside in the human inability to take into account all aspects of the conflict, due mainly to its complexity.

2.1. Defining concepts

How is conflict defined in this paper? The protean nature of the concept infringes upon the development of a widely accepted definition, though some common elements enable understanding and mutual completion between the various schools of thought. On the same line with Galtung¹⁸, this paper considers conflict as a *clash between incompatible, overlapping goals*, constructed in a triadic manner within a *temporal dimension* and summing up the *attitudes/ assumptions, the behaviors, and the contradictions* involved. (Figure 1) The three corners of the conflict triangle are in correlation, reinforcing and completing each other.



Defining conflict is a tricky task in itself, as the word bares negative connotations from its daily over-use, especially in the media. Current research see conflict as an inherent element of human development¹⁹, one of the elements that induce transformation, as during the process, change comes about. From this perspective, conflict may be the opportunity for a positive change or transformation to occur.²⁰ Not being good or bad *per se*, but rather becoming negative or positive through how it is handled by the participants, conflict is formed around a contradiction, involving different views, feelings and targets. Thus, rather than seeing conflict as a monolithic construct, this paper considers it as constantly changing - a process - re-defining the actors and contradictions involved. (Table 1)

Though conflicts may arise within one individual or between two or more individuals, the present paper will consider conflict on the collective level - conflict between communities. A community is here defined as a group of people sharing some common collective values, rules and purposes, as well as a sense of belonging to that particular group. Communities might behave/ act homogeneously without this implying that they are indeed perfectly homogeneous. But at the same time, communities might be split and act heterogeneously, without this implying that there is no longer a community. Analysis should therefore pay particular attention to communities as a whole and at the same time as potentially factional.

Table 1. Mapping the process of the Uniate/
Orthodox conflict

Period	Contradictions	Main Actors	Characteristics of the phase
1689 - 1918 Emergence phase	Overlapping goals over the same believers	Orthodox Church// Catholic Church// Habsburg Empire	Emergence of the conflict Development as an intra-confessional, ideological conflict
1918 - 1945 Re-shaping the conflict	Denying identity of one of the actors. Overlapping goals over the same believers Overlapping goals over access to and control of power (political, economic)	Orthodox Church// Uniate Church// Romanian nation-state// Ruling dynasty// Catholic Church	Re-defining the contradiction, the actors and the conflict Conflict remains largely intra-confessional, ideological but gains a power dimension (political, economic)
1945 - 1989 Violent absorption	As one of the actors is forcefully removed, the contradiction is erased under an authoritarian decision. The contradiction however exists on a hidden level- overlapping goals over the existence/ non-existence of an actor.	Orthodox Church// Romanian State (Ruling Elite)// Uniate Church	Re-defining the actors - one actor is forcefully assimilated. Conflict moves towards recognition/ survival of the existence and identity. Structural violence
1989 - onwards Control over resources	Overlapping goals over resources (property)	Orthodox Church// Uniate Church// Romanian State// International actors (COE, ECHR)// Power elites// Mass media// Local actors	The actors and the context are re-defined. Conflict moves towards economic goals - maximization of access to resources. Tension in some local communities

Conflict on this level automatically involves more than two actors, because local communities are integrated within a broader society and interconnected through various channels.²¹ Local communities might however share in common certain similarities/ features, like religion or ethnicity for instance. Thus the identity may be local and also on a larger scale, with individuals/ communities remote geographically, yet having something in common. Minorities are hence defined here as a group of people sharing certain features — features that are essential to building the collective identity, as well as a feeling of appurtenance to that specific group, and whose access to power and self-governance is conditioned by another group.

Last, but not least, individuals have multiple identities and appurtenances that cross ethnic, religious and cultural boundaries.²² However, as the complexity of a conflict increases proportionally with the number of the actors involved - thus turning its analysis into an almost impossible task - it becomes necessary that a certain degree of generalization occurs (and this is how Table 1 should be read).

If conflict is defined as having a temporal dimension, this implies at least a beginning - the formation of the conflict - and a transformation. What about a solution? A beginning implies an end, a solution - but is that really the case? Can a conflict between two communities have a solution that would not only resolve the contradiction, but also annul the attitudes and the behavior in the long term for all the actors involved, on both collective and individual levels? As the attempt to

impose a solution through authoritarian means in phase 3 shows in the current case study, solutions are not final unless - according to Galtung - they are “(1) acceptable to all actors, (2) sustainable by the actors”²³ (actors being interpreted here as communities - leaderships and individuals).

Considering that the dichotomy beginning/end, problem/solution instead of helping the overcoming of the conflict, rather fixes the conflict upon itself, thus prohibiting positive progress, the present paper looks at conflict as a transformation processes, where changes are happening at all times shaping both the conflict and the involved actors. Instead of solutions, this perspective proposes that positive handling of conflicts should be viewed as tools that help the actors overcome the disagreement, the attitudes and the behavior associated with conflict. “*But basically, conflict transformation is a never-ending process.* Old or new contradictions open up. Negative, or hopefully positive, conflict energy of the A [attitudes] and B [behavior] varieties is continually injected into the formation. A solution, in the sense of a steady-state durable formation is at best a temporary goal. A far more significant goal is *transformative capacity*, the ability to handle transformations in an acceptable and sustainable way.”²⁴

2.2. Analysis

Based on the above-described concepts, the conceptual analysis starts from investigating the potential

number of actors and hypothesizing their presumed interests in the conflict during the fourth phase - since 1989 to today. The methodology contains an analysis of attitudes, beliefs and contradictions for each of the main actors. As the conflict (and the actors) are not in a vacuum, there is a need for taking into consideration the structural and cultural implications and limitations that affect the conflict.²⁵

Table 2 describes the main actors involved in the present phase of the conflict and attempts to map their potential interests (as inferred from their actions). It also takes into consideration the structural constraints, namely the inherent features of the structure (be it local community, state or international system – in terms of institutional and cultural constraints) that may exert pressure and thus re-shape the conflict. The table however should not be interpreted as a homogenization of actors: within all actors there have been individuals that have expressed different attitudes and behaved differently from their group (for instance, the case of the Metropolitan Bishop of Timisoara, Nicolae Corneanu who, opposing the Orthodox Church's hierarchy, gave back - or at least supported the liturgy by providing worship places - some of the properties to the Uniate Church, among which is the Cathedral in Lugoj).

Table 3 makes use of the triadic nature of the conflict (see figure 1 above) to analyze the attitudes, behaviors and the disagreement for each of the main identified actors. While asserting the attitudes/ assumptions and behaviors of others is always a matter of subjectiv-

ity, some general patterns can be inferred from the explicit actions of the actors. The analysis in Table 3 is based on subjective inferences from the observation of the actions of the actors involved. It is an interpretation of the main actors and their acts in connection to the conflict.

Instead of conclusion: Paths laying ahead.

Transcending the ideological level may open new opportunities for a “detensioning” of the Uniate/ Orthodox relations and enforcement of religious minorities rights. But the transformation of the conflict from around one concerning an ideological disagreement to an economic disagreement (overlapping claims over property) does not imply that the ideological rhetorics is not present on the level of attitudes and behavior. However, ideology does not constitute the core of the conflict anymore.

So where can the conflict go from here? If conflict is seen as a transformative process, than what are the main factors able to influence its transformation towards a positive outcome? Coming back to figure 1, if conflict is to be seen as the inter-linkage of attitudes/ assumptions, behaviors and contradiction, than pressing upon either one or all of the corners can lead to a reshaping of the conflict.

A first possible path would be when attitudes and behavior remain the same, while the contradiction is not resolved. In the absence of any progress or any (at least

Table 2

Main actors	Assumed Interests	Structural constraints
Uniate Church <i>Clergy</i> <i>Believers</i>	Property back (having worship places means the believers will come to exercise their faith under Uniate Church rite and subsequently, according to the legislative framework, the Church will be entitled to higher state subsidies). Exercise believe. Maybe even expand community of believers (this would bring a higher income) Influence/ power on local community leaders.	Orthodox tradition - embedded in the Romanian national identity, affecting not only the values of the communities, but the values of the political elites. Nationalist ideology - played upon by all actors of the political stage - builds upon the Orthodox values of being Romanian. A long tradition of interference of the Orthodox Church into the state affairs (political power). Legal framework on national level (state - government interference in the establishment and functioning of the Churches, state subsidies for recognized Churches proportional to the number of their believers, no proper legal framework for the restitution of religious or communal property). A minority rights framework (either on state or international level), including supremacy of the decisions of the European Court for Human Rights.
Orthodox Church <i>Clergy</i> <i>Believers</i>	Preserve ownership over properties. Preserve flock of people coming to exercise their faith in the Orthodox Churches - State subsidies. Absorb Uniate flock. Preserve and increase political power (on local and national level).	Legal system national and international (some Uniate properties were won in court - which forced the Orthodox Church to give them back. Still, on local levels, Orthodox communities may refuse to do this and delay the process, e.g. blocking the properties). State and Church separation. State subsidizes the Church -> state control over the Church
Romanian state (ruling elites, state bureaucracy)	Support Orthodox Church (as spiritual source of Romanian hood). The Constitution legitimizes the Orthodox Church as the Romanian National Church. Win elections --> win votes. In compact Uniate communities, political actors may change their behavior and promise support. But at the same time, they could play upon nationalistic feelings by equating Uniate with Hungarians and scapegoating them within ethnic Romanian communities. Put forward a kind of public political performance that would legitimize them as "democratic" for the international and internal audience.	National and international legislative framework. Political system is embedded into nationalist ideology (building upon Romanian identity as essentially Orthodox). Believers (Uniate or Orthodox) are in the end voters - at election times, they will cast the vote and elect the ruling elites to be in power. In more or less religiously homogeneous communities, religion may be an important factor to win the votes.

Justice system	The access of Uniates to fill in complaints within the Justice system is denied. Avoid/ refuse cases of Uniate.	National and international legislative framework. There is a traditional interference of the political (executive) in the justice system.
Vatican (Catholic Church)	Preserve a Uniate Church in Romania by restoration of properties -> a richer Uniate Church is also more powerful in the community. Potential expansion of parishes once faith can be exercised.	International framework for minority rights (religious minorities). Romanian national legislative framework (religious life is under the state control). Relations with the Romanian state (diplomacy) - to what extent can the Vatican exert political influence/ pressures and through what means?
NGOs	Ensure (religious) minority rights.	National and international legislation. Culturally, a weak civic movement and participation. International networks of NGOs and relation with supranational institutions, such as COE and ECHR.
Mainstream mass media	Get audience (plays upon sensational and conflictual to sell its product). Some actors take upon themselves the tasks of "crusading" for Orthodoxy (as an inherent feature of Romanian identity).	Regulative framework (provisions against libel, calumny, insult). Self-regulation of the media industry in order to abide by some professional standards (weak in Romania). Media industry is embedded within the cultural framework (affected by the values of Romanian national identity). Political and economic pressures and inferences in the journalistic enterprise. The main function of the media is still perceived by the
Local actors (police, school, city hall etc.)	Interests on local level are the hardest to be generalized, as they involve several variables, including: degree of religious homogeneity of the community, religious appurtenance of some actors, nationalist position etc.	Romanian legal framework, providing for freedom of religion and minority rights. However, on local levels, cultural constraints are higher (especially rural communities are more traditional).
International community (supranational organizations: COE, ECHR)	Secure and implement freedom of religion. Observe the implementation of ECHR decisions	International legal framework on minority rights (including rights of religious minorities). Supremacy of ECHR decisions – need for the state to implement them. International network of NGOs concerned with the issue of freedom of faith, exerting pressures on the governments of states through supra-national institutions and media.

partial) agreement, the situation is prolonged in the hope that it will become the status quo. But this would only deepen the frustrations of the Uniate clergy and believers, which in the long run is neither beneficial, nor productive for any of the actors involved.

It may be that attitudes and behavior become more radical, and therefore no agreement can be reached on the contradiction. If the structure remains the same (meaning the legal framework, the behavior of the ruling elites and the refusal of the judiciary to deal with the problem), than it is more likely that the attitudes and behaviors of the two religious communities will be aggravated. Mutual negative feelings will feed hate speech and prejudices, which on their turn will increase the likelihood of a discriminating behavior. However, the pressures from the international organizations and NGOs may induce a positive structural change on the level of Romanian central state apparatus.

But change may come through yet another corner: behavior. Should behavior change - either by itself or under external pressures - the content of the disagreement can be approached with various alternative solutions. By finding a common ground for tackling the disagreement, attitudes will be increasingly altered (positively or negatively). If attitudes become more positive, than favourable conditions for a more comprehensive solution for the contradiction could be created.

Last, but not least, another approach could be conceived if the structure changes and the contradiction is addressed, namely the judiciary under the pressure of

the international organizations (especially under the pressure to incorporate the EHCR decisions, but also under EU integration trends) starts dealing with the overlapping property claims. Such a change must be accompanied by finding a common ground between the two Churches in order to prevent the escalation of negative attitudes on one part or the other.

Of course, possible conflict transformations could be looked upon from yet another perspective: community and leadership levels. The influence of actors such as the mass media, NGOs, political elites - on both national and local levels - and local actors could provide the glue for a positive conflict transformation, or could deepen the crisis. Behavior could be addressed on the level of the local communities through a more creative approach, like for instance agreeing to use the same worship facilities for both confessions in places where there is only one church - and intuitively it might seem as easier to find a common ground and to start building in local communities; subsequently, the pressure from the bottom upwards could enforce a change in the behavior of the leadership of the two Churches. Political elites, the justice system and local actors have the power to address the legislative and the judicial aspects - creating favorable conditions for the positive transformation to occur by removing some of the structural constraints causing the imbalance between the two Churches.

Table 3: Analysis of the attitudes/ assumptions, behaviors and contradictions as inferred from the explicit actions of the actors.

Main actors	Attitudes/ Assumptions	Behaviors	Contradictions
Uniate Church <i>Clergy</i> <i>Believers</i>	Frustration caused by the impossibility of exercising belief. Frustrations caused by the lack of access to justice system. A distinct Uniate identity. Assumption that the Orthodox Church is “after” the Uniate, aiming to assimilate the believers and to deny Uniate identity. The Other: Orthodox Church (which is also a political actor) and Romanian state.	Bring claims to courts on national and international level. National and international appeals for the restoration of the properties. Attempts to negotiate.	Overlapping claims over property. Overlapping claims over believers --> state subsidy is proportional to the number of believers.
Orthodox Church <i>Clergy</i> <i>Believers</i>	Frustration with the Uniate identity and with the Uniate claims over property. Intransigent position over the Uniate issue – refusal to negotiate. Assumption that Uniate are “blinded” Orthodox that were “lured” by the “diabolical” Jesuit manipulation and forced into betraying their historical faith. The Other: Uniate Church and Vatican (Catholics).	Denial of rights for property, of the number of believers and denial of the Uniate identity as such. Refusal (direct or indirect) to negotiate.	Overlapping claims over property. Overlapping claims over believers (see above).
Romanian state (ruling elites, state bureaucracy)	Assumption that being Romanian means being Orthodox. Suggestion that Uniates are in fact Hungarians, and not Romanians. Frustration with the claims of Greek Catholics as they are shaking the perceived Romanian Orthodox identity. The Other: Uniate Church (depicted either as an anomaly from mainstream, or as Hungarians).	Tendency to “assimilate” the Other. Supporting Orthodox Church. Discrimination against Uniate.	Overlapping property claims. Overlapping ideological claims: what does it mean to be a true Romanian.
Justice system	Assumption that religious matters should not be solved in court. Assumption that the Orthodox Church has “the right” to solve the issue by itself. The Other: Uniate Church.	Refusal to address the matter within the justice system, which results in an indirect discrimination of the Uniate.	Overlapping property claims. Overlapping jurisdictions (religious matters should be solved by the Church, not by the Justice system).

Vatican (Catholic Church)	Frustration with the Orthodox refusal to acknowledge Uniate identity. Uniate seen as part of the Catholic flock. Underlying assumption that Catholic and Orthodox flocks are both Christian siblings.	Appeals to the Romanian government and to the Orthodox Church for negotiations. Advocating co-existence. Diplomacy.	Overlapping property claims.
NGOs	Respect for the principles of human and minority rights. Acting and speaking against mainstream/majorities when human and minorities freedoms are at stake.	Advocating for minority rights. Public reports and statements presented through mass media on national and international levels.	Overlapping claims over freedom of religion.
Mainstream mass media	Assumption that “being Romanian” implies being Orthodox. Frustration with minority claims over majority based on the assumption that Romania is the state of Romanians (nation-state paradigm). This results in a generally stereotyped attitude towards any kind of minority. The Other: minorities (ethnic, sexual, religious etc.)	Looking for sensational by all means (focus on conflictual stories). One sided in favor of Orthodoxy.	Overlapping property claims. Overlapping ideological claims (Orthodoxy equated with “true Romanian”)
Local actors (police, school, city hall, etc.)	Some local actors – equated Romanian with Orthodoxy and therefore see Uniate as the inside enemy. In some cases, these assumptions are translated into aggressive acts. Frustration with the refusal to give up identities that are different from the perceived Romanian identity. Some local actors – concern for minority rights.	Not a homogeneous behavior. Some local actors – discrimination. Instigation to aggressive responses to Uniate claims/ Aggressive responses. Some local actors - responsive.	Overlapping property claims. Ideological - prohibit exercise of faith.
International community (supranational organizations: COE, ECHR)	Recognition of religious minorities and of the right to exercise their faith. Peaceful co-existence and cooperative interaction of minority groups. Assumption is that there is discrimination of religious minorities in Romania.	Implementation of the international minorities framework. Ruling in cases brought to the ECHR. Issuing reports and recommendations, but no direct intervention in the internal affairs of a state.	Overlapping property claims.

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1 P. Beyne, "The Final Foucault and His Ethics", *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 20, no.1 (1993), p. 2

2 See Johan Galtung. *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. PRIO, Sage Publications, 1996

3 Perspectives about the conversion may vary. The Library of Congress Country Studies accessible via World Wide Web states that the conversion was at many times done against the wishes of the believers and that in fact the Romanian Uniate clergy did not receive the same privileges as Catholic priests. (Information accessed last on 12.09.2002 at http://www.workmall.com/wfb2001/romania/romania_history_the_uniate_church.html)

4 According to Janice Broun. *Conscience and Captivity: Religion in Eastern Europe*. Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988, p. 202. By 1773, there were already 2,294 Uniate priests and approximately six hundred thousand believers [David B. Barrett (ed.). *World Christian Encyclopedia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, Romania, p. 367]

5 "Briefly, the substance of such a union was this: the Orthodox Church or community entering upon such a union retained its liturgical, disciplinary, spiritual and theological tradition (identical to that of Eastern Orthodoxy in general), while accepting full communion with the Roman Catholic Church." (Serge Keleher, "The Romanian Greek Catholic Church", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1995)

6 John S. Micgiel, ed. *State and Nation Building in East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives*. New York: Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University, 1996.

7 Without however assimilating the Uniate as a defining element of Romanian identity. Rather, the legitimation was rather contextual and served the recognition of the Uniate Church as a distinct identity by the Orthodox Church. The Romanian identity is essentially Orthodox, this playing towards the collective forgetting of the role of the Uniate - for instance, the Transylvanian School intelligentsia is not linked to the Uniate identity (enforced "collective amnesia" leads to collective forgetting).

8 The privilege of 1926 was granted to four Eastern Catholic bishops: the heads of the Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church, the Reformed Church and the Unitarian Church. (Paul Mojez. *Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe and the USSR*. NY: Boulder, 1992, p. 313)

9 The Vishinski Plan provided for budgetary salaries for the clergy, liquidation of dissidents and infiltration of pro-soviet priests, restrictions on the religious activities of worship. (Robert Tobias. *Communist - Christian Encounter in East Europe*. Indianapolis: School of Religion Press, 1956, p. 317)

10 Earl E. Pope: "The Contemporary Religious Situation in Romania" in Dennis J. Dunn (ed.) *Religion and Communist Society*. Berkley: Berkley Slavic Specialties, 1983.

11 The Patriarch Justinian had close ties with Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, as while chased by the Nazis, the latter was hidden and protected by Justinian. More than this, Dej was himself from an Orthodox family and his father was a priest. In his government, the Minister of Education and some other members were Orthodox. Justinian worked closely with Dej on the "re-education" of the clergy (see Robert Tobias, 1956, p. 325)

12 Robert Tobias, 1956, p. 327

13 Alan Scarfe states that 400 priests were executed. Regardless of their number, it is obvious that the Uniate clergy was severely affected and that cruelty in the treatment of the Uniate believers was hardly necessary. (Alan Scarfe, "The Romanian Orthodox Church" in Pedro Radamet (ed.) *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the 20th Century*. London: Duke University Press, vol I,

1988, pp. 208 - 232). According to the Religion Around the World website, “some 14,000 recalcitrant priests and 5,000 adherents were arrested, at least 200 believers were murdered during incarceration and many others died from disease and hunger.” Source: Library of Congress Country Studies. (Information accessed last on 12/09/2002 at http://atheism.about.com/library/world/KZ/bl_RomaniaUniate.htm)

14 Janice Braun, 1998, p. 206. An attempt in 1956 to appeal for the restoration of the Uniate Church was buried under a new wave of persecution. In 1980, a clandestine Uniate committee appealed to the Madrid Conference of the CSCE for the restoration of their church with no success.

15 The Greek Catholics claim from the Romanian state: 2,000 parishes, 1,800 churches, cemeteries, chapels and presbyteries, 11 monasteries, 5 Episcopal residences, 3 theological seminars, 20 schools, 6 hospitals, 4 orphanages, 3 retreat houses.

16 The Greek Catholics were required to renounce everything that they had achieved since 1989 and to start everything from the beginning by setting up a mixed commission. (Dr. Vincent Cernea: “The Greek-Catholic Church: The current situation” in *Human Rights without Frontiers*, No. 3&4, 1996)

17 According to the coverage of the meeting by a journalist for *Romania Libera* daily, “the Orthodox part gained everything while losing nothing, as the Greek-Catholics lost everything, while earning nothing.” (29 October 1998)

18 Johan Galtung. *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. PRIO, Sage Publications, 1996, pp. 70 - 80

19 Psychodynamic theories of human development see it as “confrontations between growing individual demands and the demands of the social role. They emphasize how the individual

must accommodate to society while gratifying basic human drives.” (p. 31) On this line of thinking, the work of Freud and more recently of Erik Erikson (1982) see personality developing “through a progressive resolution of conflicts between needs and social demands.” (p.33) Also, in the theories of social-cognition, Selman & colleagues have argued that children develop through the relations with their peers, where conflict is essential in becoming aware of the “other”, creating empathy skills and allowing the individual to positively relate himself to his peers. (Lois Hoffman, Scott Paris & Elizabeth Hall. *Developmental Psychology Today*. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1994, 6th edition)

20 Galtung mentions that in Chinese, crisis has a double meaning of danger and opportunity.

21 Even if some communities may be isolated from the rest of the society (either self-imposed, as a result of a coercive act or due to geographical circumstances), total isolation is impossible to be conceived in today’s world. Even if a community might manage to become fully self-sustainable, it will still be caught within the institutional setting of a state and thus forced into at least maintaining some form of relationship with these state structures. Even if this is done only on the level of the ruling elite, spillovers are likely to occur.

22 An individual may be a member of the community X, a mother, a lawyer, with a particular ethnic and religious identity, etc. In cases when communities are defined along ethnic or religious lines, some of the identities might overlap.

23 Galtung, 1996, p. 89

24 Galtung, 1996, p. 90

25 Structural constraints are those emerging from the institutional setting (legal framework, local organization of the community). Structural constraints are derived from the culture of that particular setting (culture being taken in its broadest form of norms, rules, rites, values, patterns etc.)

The Roman Catholic Denominational Education between the World Wars

After the unification process of 1918, in the former Hungarian State schools Romanian language was introduced as a teaching language. Consequently, the Hungarian as a teaching language was solely preserved in the vocational schools. The governments showed little understanding toward the minorities' vocational schools, aiming rather at the unification of the scholar system. The Roman Catholic Church sustained and administrated hundreds of elementary and secondary schools, many of them having a multi-secular history. Based on the documents from the churches' archives, this study presents the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church to preserve and maintain all these schools.

Up to 1918, the institutions of the Roman Catholic Church in Transylvania had maintained a dominant position, with the overwhelming majority of the Hungarians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire members of this church. Moreover, although the separation between State and Church had been operated following the confrontations of the 1890s, the Church continued to exert its influence over society and culture, especially at the educational level. Not surprisingly, considering the overall political atmosphere inside the Monarchy, the church institutions played a tremendous role in the Transylvanian society. The state tried through all means to enlarge and expand the networks of schools under its direct control and sustenance. Nevertheless, the denominational education in the province succeeded in securing an influential and patronising position in most

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activities. During the latter part of the *dualist* period, the state administered as little as 30% of the overall number of the primary and secondary schools in Transylvania.

As for the organisation of the system, no radical changes had occurred. The old structures of the Roman Catholic Church had been preserved. However, before the union of Transylvania with Romania, many parishes belonging to the dioceses of Satu-Mare and Oradea were included in Hungary in consequence of the new frontier lines and the subsequent application of the “*aeque principaliter*” principle - two dioceses governed by one bishop. The same principle had also introduced the administration of a diocese by a non-resident bishop. A similar situation could be found in the diocese of Cenad. Here, however, no change in the structure of the diocese was operated, unless we count as one the change of name from the Cenad diocese to the Timisoara diocese, prompted by the fact that between the World Wars the name used had been that of the latter.

As mentioned before, the Roman Catholic Church was one of the most important historical denominations in Transylvania, with a particular status within the social and economic relations in the region. It maintained an important school network, which in the Ciuc area was exclusive. Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church also patronised a wide range of secondary schools, all of them centuries old. In the beginning, the Roman Catholic Church took upon itself to catechise and educate the younger generation.¹ These were the fundamental objectives of the activities carried out by

its parishioners. The role of catechisation was to integrate the teaching and moralising strength of the Bible into the life and culture of the people. It was only logical, then, that the educational role of the church was performed by schools – *the* place to assimilate culture. It is precisely through this activity that the Roman Catholic Church played an important social and cultural role in the historical evolution of Transylvania.²

Following the Union of 1918, which among others granted the Romanians in Transylvania the right to self-determination, both the situation and the status of the Roman Catholic Church changed radically. The parishioners were mostly Hungarians and partly, Swabians. They too had undergone radical demographic changes. Prior to 1918, the Hungarian population was the dominant ethnicity and enjoyed the full co-operation of the state authorities, whereas after the formation of the Romanian State, they became the minority. At denominational level, the Roman Catholic Church held the dominant position in the former Habsburg Empire, with the vast majority of the inhabitants being Roman Catholic. Then, it became just another church among a group of more within the Romanian State, functioning alongside the dominant Orthodox Church and the privileged Greek Catholic Church of the majority.³

The Roman Catholic Church examined the emerging situation and soon designed new tasks for the given conditions. Preserving and developing its network of schools and other educational institutions became a priority. This is how bishop Márton Áron underlined the responsibilities of his generation: “We have a special

duty bestowing upon us a heavy responsibility. Yet, future will give the measure of our actions and judge us by the values we have created and developed in the process of fulfilling our present mission. We are the artisans of our own destiny, and we can expect nothing from life but what we achieve through consistent, hard work. We have to discard our indolence (...) we have to exist in order to shape a generation that should meet the requirements of our times...”⁴

The activity in the educational field of the Roman Catholic Church and of other denominations was directly determined by the changes occurring in the social and political life of the Romanian society. Throughout the period between the World Wars, especially in the first decade, the efforts of the Romanian State were directed towards the unification of the economic, legislative and cultural spheres. The Romanian political parties envisioned different manners of accomplishing and promoting these goals. The phenomenon translated into a climate of instability in the political life of the country, the arena of confrontation for two important parties: the National Liberal Party (NLP) and the National Peasant Party (NPP). The impact was notable in the activity of the Roman Catholic Church, too. It was best illustrated in the approach to the minority problem: the NLP adopted a unifying centralising politics, whereas the NPP advocated a regional-oriented politics.

The Romanian public opinion also reflected the two parties' conflicting ideologies on the minority issue. An expert in the epoch's history and ideologies asserted

that the policy generated dissatisfactions among the minorities, even in such matters as the choice of terminology, as was the case of the term “foreigners”, deemed derogative.⁵

From the start, the liberals had declared Romania an indivisible national state, definitely not multilingual, which, in accordance with the universal liberal doctrine, provided the equality of freedom and rights for all citizens. Therefore, the liberals considered that at the very foundation of democracy and of a full-fledged state lay the individual rather than collective rights.⁶ The NPP's tenet endorsed a distinct approach to the issue of minorities, but deemed it unnecessary to promote specific minority policies in Romania. Thus, the idea that there was no minority issue in Romania became a generalised viewpoint. Naturally, the apolitical Romanian society had readily embraced the idea.⁷

After the Union, Romania underwent a process of “building the nation”, that is, the genuine process of unifying the state.⁸ Referring to the diverging opinions surrounding the national processes, István Bibó said: “The national frame in Eastern Europe was something to work on and rehabilitate, something to achieve and permanently defend not just against the existing dynastic state, but also against the partial popular indifference colluding with a wavering national consciousness. This situation generates the dominant feature of the unbalanced political spirituality of Central and Eastern Europe: apprehensions about the existence of the community”.⁹ Thus, the building of a nation occurs within the frame of an existing state¹⁰, and according to Bibó's

thesis the setting up of democracy is hesitant in the East European states because of these apprehensions. As a result, nationalism is embraced by the entire society. After the unification process, the Romanian governing political forces considered that the new frame should undergo a radical, rapid and sustainable cohesion. The need for a national elite was dramatically felt, leading to an intercession by the state. Moreover, some social categories immediately enjoyed advantages that theretofore had counted as privileges for some ethnic groups. Such changes affected especially the Hungarians in Transylvania. The necessary adjustments made within the government, the state administration and the social and economic life were, eventually, reflected by the relations between the several minorities and the majority. Yet, the official politics of the state was met with sharp criticism. Traian Bratu, the dean of the University of Iasi, renowned in the World Wars period for his opinions on the status of minorities, stated that the foundation for any state was equal rights for all citizens, to be achieved only if all the citizens were loyal to the state. This goal would only be ruined by hatred or by granting privileges to some over others.¹¹ All speciality literature dealing with the issue of nation and nationalism emphasises that education and culture are paramount in the process of building a nation. The development of the school network in order to create a new elite was sustained by the state; in fact, this was part of the cultural enterprise having for its main objective unification and the eradication of regionalism.¹² This policy also affected the activity of the Roman Catholic

Church. However, as pointed out by an important expert in inter-ethnic relations, nationalism has never been a major issue with the varied ethnic communities in Transylvania, contrary to what the politicians have purported.¹³ The legislation concerning education and the school system issued during the World Wars established the course of development for the Roman-Catholic denominational education under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. As the schools were the most effective tools for preserving national identity, the topic ignited hot debates and led to conflicts of interest. Mikó Imre, one of the few specialists in minority law stated: "Most important among the minority rights is that regarding the schools for the citizens of ethnicity other than Romanian. In the case of the minorities, school is the agent that ensures the survival of the mother tongue and culture, and instructs the younger generations in the awareness of ethnicity. This is the source of all the problems and arguments surrounding the institutions of learning."¹⁴

On analysing the legislation pertaining to education, one can easily observe that the main laws formulate the general setting for the instruction of the minorities. By 1923, the Constitution of 1866 was still in effect, while its provisions were expanded to include Transylvania. Still, in this part of the country, the Directory Council elaborated a full set of measures and regulations. This eventually led to the enforcement of a particular variant of the law. The Constitution of 1923 made general prescriptions regarding the freedom of education, making no reference to special measures concerning the minor-

ity educational system.¹⁵ Paragraph 24 stipulates that the right to education is provided for all the citizens of Romania by law, unless it conflicts with ethics and public order.¹⁶ Yet, the Constitution of 1938 does not safeguard unrestricted and equal access to education for the minorities. Under the royal dictatorship, all of the laws and regulations regarding the minorities were compiled into *The Status of Minorities*.¹⁷ Furthermore, minorities could found schools under the more general law regarding private education. The Churches could lay the foundation of private schools only by civil right.

In many respects, the Romanian legislative system, as is the case of the minority's right to education, was in consonance with the international law system. International law included the principle by which providing education in the mother tongue is *the* way to preserve the minority's national specificity, language and religion. This principle was also promoted by the Treaty on Minorities, signed by Romania on December 9, 1919 in Paris. The treaty safeguards the right to teach and learn in the mother tongue, as well as the setting up and administration of institutions of education and culture, and the unrestricted use of the mother tongue.¹⁸ However, the treaty did not endorse any special rights for the private schools. The state had the right to supervise and check such schools, whereas the minorities were under the obligation to administrate them. It was also the duty of the state to subsidise these schools. The treaty on minorities admitted as absolute the right to teach and learn in the mother tongue, that is, the treaty needed no further approval by the State. Traian Bratu

had underlined this feature of the treaty, maintaining that to observe this legal document was mandatory for Romania to be integrated among the 'civilised' states of Europe.

An international document playing an important role in the activity of the denominational education was the *Concordat* signed between the Romanian State and Vatican. This document came in effect in July 1929, and was paramount in settling the relations with the Holy See. It is noteworthy that the first paragraph of Article 19 stipulates that the Catholic Church has the right to found and subsidise elementary and secondary schools under the jurisdiction of a bishop, with the supervision of the Ministry of Education.¹⁹ The *Concordat* also stipulated that the denominational schools under the jurisdiction of a bishop had the right to choose the language of teaching. The *Concordat* had brought hope among the Catholics, in a country with a prevalingly orthodox population.²⁰

1924 was the year when the first laws were issued regarding the minority education during the World Wars. The Romanian government saw the necessity for a merger of the educational system: the law regarding the public elementary education and the grammar schools. This law was paramount for the educational system. As for the minority rights, the above-mentioned law laid down the principles to follow by the laws to come.

The law extended to seven years the duration of elementary education, emphasising its compulsive character. The law was also meant to eradicate the differ-

ences of the four distinct educational systems. The initiator of the law himself – C. Anghelescu – admitted that the goal of the law was to unify and harmonise the educational system, but also to awaken national consciousness.²¹ As noticed by an observer, the Romanian government officials were aware that public education was the institutional component with a dramatic impact on the fate of a nation, on its cultural and spiritual growth.²²

Under the law, the teaching language was Romanian, and in the regions where the mother tongue of the inhabitants was not Romanian, the Ministry of Education set up schools in the corresponding languages. Nevertheless, Romanian language was compulsory in these institutions too. Hot debates were ignited by some provisions of the law, such as Paragraph 8, which stipulated that the Romanian citizens who did not speak Romanian were under the obligation to enrol their children in either public or private schools in the Romanian language²³. This had in view the Szeklers, whom certain historians and linguists had misinterpreted as not Hungarian, but rather Hungarian-made, and who had taken up Hungarian for their mother tongue. This phenomenon led to questioning the identity of an important part of the Hungarian inhabitants. It was stated that names such as: Ráduly, Szakács, Szûcs, Kurta, Farkas were of Romanian origin.

Fiery debates were prompted by Paragraph 159, too, which stipulated that schoolteachers and other school employees coming to teach from counties outside those newly united would benefit from a 50% rise

in wage. In fact, the underlying issue was the founding of the so-called cultural areas, which were decisive in the process of re-structuring the educational system in these territories.²⁴

The coercive decision for the Hungarian community to support the state schools had also generated passionate debates, as the community had already had trouble ensuring that the activity of the denominational schools preserved their ethnic identity. The law of the private schools, which had regulated the situation of a large category of schools, did not acknowledge the specific and traditional character of the denominational schools. They were considered private schools. Despite a long series of debates and petitions submitted to the United Nations while the law of December 22, 1925 was still in draft, the representatives of the minority failed to have the denominational schools nominated and recognised under the law. Following negotiations with minister C. Anghelescu, it was agreed that under the provisions of the law the minority pupils can be enrolled in denominational schools – considered private schools – or in schools set up by private people, in addition to enrolment in state schools. The negotiations also stipulated that private schools must obtain a special license to function from the Ministry of Public Instruction. By law, these schools were under the direct guidance and supervision of the Ministry. Another stipulation that played an important role and influenced the minority education provisioned that the pupils from private schools must take their examinations in the state schools. As regards the teaching language, the law

specified it to be Romanian for the Romanian or Romanian-born children, whereas for the other ethnic communities, the teaching language was the mother tongue of those enrolled in private schools. The denominational Catholic education suffered a great loss at the hand of certain provisions of the law under which the schools supported by monastic orders and congregations must use Romanian as the teaching language, with the result that many ceased to exist altogether. Further difficulties arose when Geography and History were taught in Romanian.

Private schools did not have the authority to issue diplomas. There were cases where the Ministry conferred the authority to the private schools, with the specific provision that no denominational school could secure such status. The graduates of the Hungarian denominational schools had to pass their examination and obtain diplomas from the state schools. The law concerning private schools authorised the grammar schools set up before 1918, on condition that they observe the general norms imposed on private education²⁵.

It is noteworthy that the law was considered a liberal and tolerant legislative initiative. This was the interpretation given especially by the Romanian press and the speciality literature. The minorities challenged the law initiated by Minister Anghelescu in what concerned the allocation of funds, the restrictions on the usage of certain books, maps, and manuscripts banned by the Ministry of Education, the interdiction to benefit from external financial assistance.

The law of school graduation passed in March 27, 1925 had both short- and long-term effects on the minority educational system in general and on the denominational one, in particular. The law specified the obligation to pass the graduation exam in the Romanian language in order to issue a state diploma or some other document testifying the graduation of the secondary school. The law caused a high incidence of school failure among the minority pupils. According to statistics, 70-80% of the candidates failed their exams in the first year.²⁶

The legislative frame was also valid for the Hungarian Catholic education, later modified by the laws of 1928 and 1939.

The network of the Roman-Catholic schools underwent essential changes after the Great Union (1918). Following the provisions of the Peace Treaties, the state schools in Transylvania were integrated within the Romanian school system. The pupils from 1,318 state schools with Hungarian as the teaching language chose to attend the 755 Hungarian denominational schools.²⁷ The situation would have been acceptable if the number of denominational schools had been increased. Both the Romanian legislative system and the lack of political will had hindered this process. A further factor was the refusal by most schoolteachers to take the oath as required by the Romanian authorities.

In the years following the Union of 1918, the Hungarian churches established 403 elementary schools, of which 61 Roman-Catholic, 33 public schools, 7 secondary schools, 7 commercial secondary schools, 4

pedagogic schools, and 1 pedagogic secondary school.²⁸ This engaged an important financial effort on the part of both the Hungarian minority and the attending churches. Even the Minister of Public Instruction, C. Anghelescu, appreciated the effort. Starting with the 1919-1920 school year, the denominational schools included in their syllabus subjects which were national in character: Romanian language and literature, the Geography and History of Romania. At the time of the Directory Council, the school policy undertook to incorporate the specificity of the Transylvanian society and the history of the educational system in this part of the country, the denominational schools included.²⁹ After the revocation of the Directory Council, this distinctive situation was ignored. In sharp contrast, the educational system was gradually centralised. The Hungarian educational system in Transylvania was subordinated to the Ministry of the Public Instruction, whose policies differed radically from those of the Directory Council. The Ministry and the authorities in Bucharest envisaged an increase in the number of public schools.

The Roman Catholic education proceeded differently during the inter-war period as compared to the pre-war period when the Roman Catholic Church held a dominant position within the state. The vast Austro-Hungarian Empire was prevailingly Catholic. Afterwards, the Roman Catholics of Great Romania became citizens of an Orthodox country with a nationally dominant Orthodox Church. This affected the denominational educational system of the other Churches in spite of the promise made by Onisifor Ghibu, the lead-

ing anti-Catholic, to safeguard the rights of the educational systems other than in the Romanian language. "There will be absolute freedom and everyone will have the right to set up as many schools as they wish".³⁰ In January 1922, the Minister of Instruction promised that there would be no actions to repeal the Hungarian schools and the authorities would not interfere with the internal issues of these schools, for the government was fully aware of the importance of their educational system.

The measures undertaken by the government, however, were the opposite. A language certificate was required of the teachers belonging to the minorities. The Hungarian teachers did not benefit from funds allotted to teachers belonging to other educational systems. There was no retirement program for teachers at the denominational schools, and there was an interdiction to enrol pupils of nationalities other than Hungarian. The seminaries were under the obligation to use Romanian as the language of teaching. These provisions drafted by C. Anghelescu led to serious protests on the part of the non-Orthodox Church representatives, who petitioned the Minister and King Ferdinand.³¹

On December 24, 1923, the representatives of the minority churches held a meeting at Alba Iulia in order to promote such actions as would ensure the functioning of the denominational schools. At the proposal of Majláth Gusztáv Károly, the Roman Catholic bishop, they decided to require a hearing by the Minister. Minister Anghelescu considered the initiative belated, for all the measures taken by the Romanian State sought to se-

cure the learning of the official language and to hinder the process of de-nationalisation.³² Moreover, the situation of the denominational schools was aggravated by the obligation to take the degree examination in Romanian. This led to 70-80% failure.

There was much hope about an improvement in the functioning of the denominational schools, when the Liberal Government was replaced by the National Peasant Party Government. It was believed that the NPP Government under the leadership of Iuliu Maniu would try to find a solution to the problem, which, however, was left unchanged with the exception of funding.³³ If we examine the figures, we will see that from 1919 to 1924, 2,289 public Hungarian educational institutions were repealed. These were elementary schools, public schools, secondary schools, pedagogical

schools and commercial schools. It was estimated that after World War I there were 330,000 Hungarian children eligible for school in the United Territories, Transylvania and Banat. It was for the Hungarian churches to provide the education for these children. Over a period of some years, the churches set up 403 new elementary schools, of which 61 were Roman Catholic. The number of the Lutheran and Unitarian schools also increased when the Roman Catholic Church underwent financial difficulties.³⁴

The following table shows the history of schools in Transylvania:

Table 1. Sponsors of elementary schools in Transylvania

Apparently, the situation of the Hungarian denominational schools was even worse than that of the Ro-

Sponsor	Number of Hungarian elementary schools		Difference	
	in 1913/14	in 1932/33	Abs. Value	Percentage
Roman Catholic Church	386	297	-89	-23,1%
Reformed Church	334	483	149	44,6%
Unitarian Church	28	36	8	28,6%
Evangelic Church	7	6	-1	-14,3%
Israelite Church	31		-31	-100,0%
Greek Catholic Church	49		-49	-100,0%
Denominational (total)	835	822	-13	-1,6%
Public	1318	319	-999	-75,8%
Community	284		-284	-100,0%
Private	50		-50	-100,0%
Total Hungarian elementary schools	2487	1141	-1346	-54,1%

manian denominational schools in these provinces prior to 1914. In 1914 there was 1 Romanian school to 1,007 Romanian inhabitants, while according to the census of 1930 there was 1 denominational school to 1,647 Hungarian residents in Romania.³⁵

From 1930 to 1931, there were 76,255 children enrolled in the denominational schools out of a total of 180,029. This represented 42.4% of the overall number. The causes were varied: families with financial difficulties, limited possibilities for the churches, or the enrolment of many Hungarian children in public Romanian schools. Romanian surveys of the period showed that in the 1927 school year there were 838 denominational schools registering 89,421 pupils: 49,841 were of Hungarian nationality and 25,978 were Roman Catholics. In 1932, 53,9% of the pupils enrolled in elementary denominational schools were Calvinists, 42,3% Roman Catholics, and 2,9% Lutherans. The decrease in number was explicable due to the waning finances of the Catholic school sponsors. The Roman Catholic Church was severely affected by the 1921 agricultural reform. Look at the following table comparing the categories of pupils and schools by counties³⁶:




Figure 1. The number of elementary Hungarian schools in Transylvania.




Figure 2. The number of pupils enrolled in elementary schools in Romania 1930/31.

Public nursery schools with Romanian as the teaching language

Elementary public schools with Romanian as the teaching language

Elementary public schools with Hungarian as the teaching language

Denominational nursery schools

In Roman Catholic schools

In Calvinist/Lutheran schools

In Unitarian schools

In Evangelic schools

Table 2. Distribution of pupils of the elementary denominational and public schools compared to the denominational affiliation of the Hungarian population.

Denomination	Denominational affiliation of the Hungarian population				In 1930/31 in public schools		In 193 denomin
	1910	%	1927	%	Elevi	%	Elevi
Reformed	688205	47,9	722552	48,8	42750	41,2	40753
Roman-Catholic	642858	44,6	643512	43,5	50625	48,8	31980
Unitarian	68125	4,7	70003	4,6	5823	5,7	2187
Hungarian Evangelic	40114	2,8	45378	3,1	4464	4,3	660
Total Hungarian Church	1439302	100,0	1481445	100,0	103662	100	75580

Table 3. Elementary Hungarian denominational schools in Transylvania in 1932

County	Roman Catholic			Reformed			Unitarian			Hungarian Evangelical			Hungarian Denominational	
	Schools	Staff	Pupils	Schools	Staff	Pupils	Schools	Staff	Pupils	Schools	Staff	Pupils	Schools	Staff
Alba de Jos	9	12	350	22	33	1242							31	45
Arad	12	17	1046	9	17	944							21	34
Bihor	38	65	3269	55	116	6889				1	1	26	94	182
Braşov	5	15	637	6	11	578				5	13	634	16	39
Caraş	3	6	246	1	2	115							4	8
Ciuc	47	126	7015										47	126
Cluj	12	34	1419	33	50	2286	3	5	245				48	89
Făgăraş	1	3	81	2	3	109							3	6
Hunedoara	13	26	1223	11	17	697							24	43
Maramureş	4	6	329	2	5	274							6	11
Mureş-Turda	26	49	2465	102	150	8431	13	14	591				141	213
Bistriţa-Năsăud	3	5	285	7	8	381							10	13
Odorhei	33	69	4197	23	35	1998	7	10	422				63	114
Sălaj	23	53	2947	69	111	6802							92	164
Satu-Mare	15	38	2009	43	57	3080							58	95
Severin				1	2	83							1	2
Sibiu	2	8	303	3	6	329							5	14
Solnoc-Dăbâca	5	11	436	28	41	1871							33	52
Târnava Mare	5	9	442	7	14	623							12	23
Târnava Mică	8	9	443	27	36	1604	5	9	399				40	54
Timiş	9	20	879	4	8	380							13	28
Trei Scune	20	37	1682	19	28	1113	5	11	393				44	76
Turda-Arieş	4	6	250	9	19	924	3	3	137				16	28
Total	297	624	31953	483	769	40753	36	52	2187	6	14	660	822	1459

Table 4. Public schools with Hungarian as the teaching language (1918-1927)

	1918	1919	1927
Public	66	21	3
Community	19	12	
Catholic	25	46	27
Reformed	3	20	7
Unitarian		2	
Lutheran		2	1
Israelite	3	3	
TOTAL	116	106	38

The tables show that the majority of the Catholic schools were located in counties such as Ciuc, Odorhei, Mures-Turda, that is, in the regions populated by Szeklers, yet there were many elementary Catholic schools which had also functioned in the Western regions of the country. The dissemination area of these schools was closely related to the dissemination of the Hungarian population, particularly to the denominational affiliation of the communities.

The secondary education was characterised by great diversity in schools and the fluctuating number of pupils. This type of instruction played an extremely important role in forming an elite, and this is precisely how the Hungarian elite had formed between the World Wars. This system had also safeguarded the national identity. According to statistical data, there were

27 pedagogic schools in Hungarian in Transylvania in 1918, whereas in 1928 there were as few as 8 left. In 1918, 13 out of the total number of pedagogic schools belonged to the Roman Catholic denominational education, whereas by 1928 there had remained only 5: 1 pedagogic school for boys in Miercurea- Ciuc, 1 pedagogic school for girls in Sibiu, 1 for nursery school teachers in Oradea, 1 pedagogic school for girls in Oradea, and 1 pedagogic school in Satu-Mare. The pedagogic school of Miercurea-Ciuc functioned at ^aumuleu Ciuc until 1923, and was the most important educational institution qualifying teachers for the denominational schools and deacons for the Roman Catholic churches.³⁷

The survey data for this type of schools point out that, in Transylvania, there were 4 schools qualifying Hungarian teachers, of which 2 were Roman Catholic, 1 Calvinist, and 1 Lutheran, in the 1926-1927 school year. 307 pupils were enrolled in 4 pedagogic schools for boys: 119 Catholics, 76 Calvinists, 110 Lutherans, and 2 Unitarians. There were also 9 pedagogic schools enrolling 601 girls, of which 195 were Roman Catholic. The Hungarian churches were in charge with the administration of the maintenance of the pedagogic school.³⁸

The Public Schools were of utmost importance for the educational system as they addressed the lower middle class bourgeoisie. These schools trained the pupils in the basic scientific and practical knowledge. According to the above-mentioned data, in the 1926-1927 school year there were 9 denominational public

schools, of which 2 were Roman Catholic. Most importantly, just prior to the war, public schools totalled 106, of which 46 were Roman Catholic.³⁹

	SCHOOLS		TEACHERS		PUPILS	
	Nnumber	%	Number	%	Number	%
Secondary Schools						
Roman Catholic	9	50,0	178	49,3	2381	48,2
Reformed	7	39,0	144	39,9	2194	44,4
Unitarian	2	11,0	39	10,8	366	7,4
Total	18	100,0	361	100,0	4941	100,0
Schools						
Roman Catholic	26	76,5	195	74,8	2835	75,8
Reformed	7	20,6	56	21,4	817	21,8
Unitarian	1	2,9	10	3,8	89	2,4
Total	34	100,0	261	100,0	3741	100,0
Pedagogic Schools						
Roman Catholic	5	71,4	54	62,0	278	48,6
Reformed	2	28,6	33	38,0	294	51,4
Total	7	100,0	87	100,0	572	100,0
Commercial Colleges						
Roman Catholic	2	50,0	20	52,6	242	53,9
Reformed	2	50,0	18	47,4	207	46,1
Total	4	100,0	38	100,0	449	100,0
Elementary schools						
Roman Catholic	280	34,2	537	38,3	22557	36,5
					86786	6-11 ani
Reformed	495	60,5	747	53,3	36488	59,0
					92908	6-11 ani
Unitarian	37	4,5	92	6,6	2096	3,3
					9198	6-11 ani
Lutheran	6	0,8	25	1,8	707	1,2
					5415	6-11 ani
Total	818	100,0	1401	100,0	61848	100,0
					194307	6-11 ani

The year 1919 was a turning point in the existence of the secondary schools. This was the year in which the authorities abolished the teaching in Hungarian language in 11 of such institutions. In the school year 1926-27 there were 25 secondary schools – denominational secondary schools for boys, of which 10 were Roman Catholic. The number of pupils enrolled was 4,373, of which 2,523 were Roman Catholics. There were also 5 secondary schools - denominational secondary schools for girls, of which 4 were Roman Catholic. The number of Catholic girls enrolled was 622.⁴⁰

The Hungarian commercial schools with tradition had ceased to exist. The three commercial colleges in Timisoara, Orăştie and Târnăveni were extremely important for the Roman Catholic community of Transylvania.⁴¹

The following table illustrates the situation:

Table 5. (see previous page) Centralised data on the denominational schools in 1928⁴²

As shown by our analysis, the Roman Catholic denominational education was confronted by serious problems between the World Wars. This type of education was specific for the Transylvanian region. The general impact of the process of unification and centralisation the Romanian authorities had embarked upon also affected the Roman Catholic denominational school system from a juridical, institutional and economic perspective, alike.

Notes

Translated by Ana-Elena Ilinca

1 See *Catechezii Tradende*, in Korunk hitoktatásáról, vol. II, Szent István Társulat [The Society of Saint Steven] Budapest, 1980. pp. 224, 247-249.

2 *Általános Katekétikai Direktórium* [General Guide on Catechization], ibidem, p.42.

3 For further discussion, see: Irina Livezeanu, *Cultură si nationalism în România Mare 1918-1930*, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1998.

4 Márton Áron: *Templom és iskola*, in: Erdélyi iskola, VII, 1939/40, 3-4, p.126.

5 Livezeanu, p. 289-347, work quoted

6 Seaton-Watson, R.W., *History of the Romanians*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1934, p. 549-550.

7 See: Livezeanu. Work quoted.

8 Ibidem, p.24.

9 Bibó István, *A kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága*, Kriterion, Bukarest-Kolozsvár, 1997, pp. 38-41.

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11 Bratu, Traian, *Politica națională față de minorități*. Note si observatiuni, Cultura națională, p. 8-9.

12 Livezeanu, work quoted, pp.41-63.

13 Verdery, Katherine, *Transylvanian villagers*, University of California, Berkley-Los Angeles-London, 1983, p. 345.

14 Mikó Imre, *Nemzetiségi jog és nemzetiségi politika*, Minerva, Kolozsvár, 1944, p.427.

15 Official Gazette, nr. 282 of March the 21st 1923.

16 Ioan Scurtu, Ion Bulei, *Democratia la români 1866-1938*, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1990, p.27.

17. Mikó Imre, *A román kisebbségi státútum*, Gloria, Kolozsvár, 1938, see: Mikó Imre.

18 Nagy Lajos, *A kisebbségek alkotmányjogi helyzete Nagyromániában*, Székelyudvarhely [Odorhei] 1994, p.117.

19 *The Concordate* in: Official Gazette, no. 126 of 1929.

20 Jakabffy Elemér, *A konkordátum*, in: Magyar Kisebbség VIII, 1929, p.444

21 Bratu, work quoted, p.14.

22 Jancsó Elemér, *Az erdélyi magyarság életsorsa a nevelésiügyek tükrében 1914-1934*, Budapest, 1935, p.13.

23 Cf. B. Kovács András, *Szabályos kivétel*, Kriterion, Bukarest-Kolozsvár, 1997, p.27; Popa-Lisseanu, Gheorghe: *Sicules et Roumains: Un procès de dénationalisation*, Socec, Bucarest, 1935., p.5; Russu I.I.: *Românii si secuii*, Ed. Stiintifică, Bucuresti, 1990, p.137.

24 Ghibu Onisifor: *Prologomena la o educatie românească*, *Cultură românească*, Bucuresti, 1941, p.341.

25 Nagy, work quoted, pp.135-136.

26 Balogh Júlia, *Az erdélyi hatalomváltás és a magyar közoktatás 1918-1928*, Püski, Budapest, 1996, p.79-80.

27 R. Szeben András, *Az erdélyi magyarság népoktatásiügyének statisztikai mérlege a másfél évtizedes román uralom alatt*, in: Magyar Statisztikai Szemle XII, 1934, p.852.

28 Salacz Gábor, *A magyar katolikus egyház a szomszédos államok uralma alatt*, Aurora, München, 1975, p.66.

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31 Barabás Imre, *A romániai magyar nyelvű oktatásügy első tíz éve 1918-tól 1928-ig* in: Magyar Kisebbség, VIII, 1929, p.79.

32 Constantin Anghelescu, *Activité du ministère de l'instruction 1922-1926*, Cartea românească, Bucuresti, 1928, p.56-58.

33 See Ioan Scurtu, Gheorghe Buzatu, *Istoria românilor din secolul XX*, Aideia, Bucuresti, 1999.

34 R. Szeben, work quoted, pp.885-886.

35 Ibidem, p.852.

36 The data used in the tables are drawn the works quoted and from: The Statistics on Romanian Education for the School-Years 1921/1922-1928/1929, Ministerul Instructiunii, al Cultelor si Artelor, Bucuresti, 1932, p.493-494.

37 Balogh, op.cit, p.92-93; Jancsó, op.cit, p.355-356

38 Ibidem.

39 Ibidem.

40 Ibidem.

41 Ibidem.

42 Same note 36.

The Orthodox Church and the Minority Cults in Inter-War Romania (1918-1940)

In the context of the Union of Greater Romania, a problem specific to the development of the Romanian society and of the re-united national state was the regulation of the status or the varied religious cults. It is well known that under the Older Romanian Kingdom, the Orthodoxy was a state religion. The other cults – Lutheran, Catholic, Mosaic, and Moslem – represented small numbers of believers and had not been regulated under the law; they were *tolerated*. Following the Union of 1918, the Romanian State came to accommodate not just one, but several denominations. Consequently, it had to clarify its relations with the cults in the Romanian provinces of Bucovina, Basarabia, Banat, and Transylvania. These cults which had not existed in the Older Kingdom functioned according to the legislative systems they had belonged to before 1918. Thus came the necessity of establishing the unitary status for the minority cults, which, given the diversity of their religious doctrines, rituals and interests, posed new problems to be settled for the government policy. This also should be the focus of the debates surrounding the forthcoming law of the cults in Romania.

Let us mention from the start that this topic is as vast as it is complicated, consequently, an exhaustive analysis is hardly achievable. I will try instead to encompass one of the more important aspects of the problem.

The ratification of The Declaration in Alba-Iulia on December 1, 1918 has been justly qualified as “the accomplishment of the most significant event in the history of the Romanian people, that is, the Union of Greater Romania”¹. Fundamental actions at all levels followed the Union of 1918. Their aim was to achieve the unity of the country. Priority was given to the administrative and legal plans for an efficient and nation oriented governance. As for the intricate social issue following the Union, this had to be mastered and managed at both political and administrative levels. The reunification of the four historic Romanian provinces had

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called for such measures as would harmonise the institutional system. In this context, a problem specific to the development of the Romanian society and of the re-united national state was the regulation of the status or the varied religious cults².

Under the circumstances, the Romanian state had to clarify its relations with the religious cults of the Romanian provinces: Bucovina, Basarabia, Banat, and Transylvania. These cults had not existed in the Older Kingdom and had just been incorporated shortly before 1918³. Moreover, their system was different for they came from different states.

It is well known that under the Older Romanian Kingdom, the Church and the State had merged to form a perfect unity. In contrast to other denominations, the Orthodoxy was a state religion and the Orthodox Church was the dominant Church. However, a distinction had been drawn between the two institutions. It was pointed out that the Church enjoyed absolute independence on issues of spirituality while the attributions of the State were limited to the rest of the issues⁴. Dimitrie Cantemir himself claimed that the governing of the church from without was the duty of the *monarch*, whereas the 'inner' issue of the people's souls was ruled by the *metropolitan bishop*⁵. This was the status quo until the Union of 1918 when a religious unity was also deemed necessary.

The other cults – Lutheran, Catholic, Mosaic, and Moslem – represented small numbers of believers and had not been regulated under the law. They were *tolerated*, that is, the State did not interfere with their inter-

nal problems, and neither impeached upon their free expression. Moreover, it is noteworthy that throughout our history there had not been any religious wars or persecutions, as was the case in the Western World. Given the limited number of believers, the Catholic and the Lutheran cults could not develop and organise independently, therefore, they came under the patronage of Austria and Germany and their leaders' jurisdiction. A first attempt was made in 1859 at settling this problem. When drafting the Constitution, *The Central Commission in Focsani* convened to stipulate the safeguard of the rights of the two cults. Article 19 provisioned that "in the United Principalities a new law shall regulate the status of the Catholic Church and of the other established religious cults, the nationalisation of the clergy and the independence of these religions from foreign dominion"⁶. The view was quite progressive at the time.

Unfortunately, the attempt was unsuccessful. Moreover, the Constitution of 1866 only specified that "freedom for all cults shall be ensured, unless their services infringe upon public order or ethics". The explanation is to be found in the powerful influence of Germany and Austria, which were directly interested in the fate of their co-nationals and did not readily accept the idea of an emerging nation and state asserting its right to sovereignty over the domestic affairs. The acceptance of Romania in the *Triple Alliance* aggravated the whole situation to the point where these cults came proximal to exclusion, a situation not encountered in any other country. The *Holy See* regarded Romania as a "terra

missionis” ruled by deacons. The two bishoprics in Iasi and in Bucharest were founded at a later date, without the acknowledgement of the Romanian state.

The *Protestant cult* stayed in touch with that in other states. The Lutheran communities received guidance from Berlin and the Calvinist by the Hungarian bishops of Cluj, who prior to 1918 had been under Hungarian administration. As for the Lutheran communities in Basarabia and Bucovina, their situation was different. In 1920, they were accepted within the organisation of the Evangelic Lutheran Church of Transylvania. To conclude, prior to 1918, the status of the religious cults in Romania was not regulated under the law.

From the *legal* viewpoint, the cults were considered private in nature, all their actions pertaining to common law. Nonetheless, some of the provisions in the Law testified that the Romanian State did not ignore the cults completely. For example, the *Moslem communities* came under state guidance, which subsidised and trained the religious staff. The status of some Greek churches was regulated by specific conventions acknowledging them as juridical persons on condition that they obey the state laws, with no right, however, to property of rural estates.

The relations with the Mosaic and the Armenian communities had been regulated merely by ministerial ordinances, which did not secure them the status of legal entities⁷.

Following the Union of 1918, the Romanian State came to accommodate not just one, but several denominations. Consequently, it had to clarify its relations

with the cults in the Romanian provinces of Bucovina, Basarabia, Banat, and Transylvania. These cults which had not existed in the Older Kingdom functioned according to the legislative systems they had belonged to before 1918. The new situation called for the endorsement of specific laws⁸. This is precisely why Article 22 was introduced in the Constitution of 1923: “Freedom of consciousness is absolute. The State safeguards the freedom and protection for all cults, as long as their actions do not prejudice public order, ethics and the governing laws of the state. The Romanian Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic Church are Romanian Churches. The Romanian Orthodox Church as the prevailing religion of the vast majority of the Romanians is the dominant church within the Romanian State, while the Greek Catholic Church comes first before all the other cults. The Romanian Orthodox Church is, and remains, independent from any foreign dominion, yet is unified in dogma with the Ecumenical Eastern Church. Across the entire territory, the Romanian Orthodox Church would have a unitary organisation entailing both lay and clerical participation. A specific law was to set the fundamental principles of this unitary organisation, as well as the way in which the Romanian Orthodox Church regulates, governs, and administers, through its own institutions and under state surveillance, its religious, cultural, foundational activities and sponsorship. The spiritual and canonical matters of the Romanian Orthodox Church will be under the authority of a single central synod. The relationships between the varied state cults shall be regulated under the

law⁹. The representatives of the cults themselves admitted the necessity for a settlement of their relations with the Romanian State¹⁰.

As for the Romanian Orthodox Church, it preserved its hierarchy, and through consistent efforts it accomplished the unification under Andrei Saguna's *Organic Status*¹¹, a document that has remains to this day the foundation of our church. Congregating vast numbers of believers, the Romanian Orthodox Church ranked high within the Orthodox Church. Therefore, the Holy Synod decided in its meeting of February 4, 1925 to set up the Romanian Patriarchate by up-ranking the See of the Archbishop of Bucharest, Metropolitan Bishop of Ungro-Vlahia and Primate of Romania. In keeping with an ancient custom, the rise in order to Patriarchate of the Romanian Church was announced to all related Churches. The Ecumenical Patriarch replied by a *Synodic Thomos*, where he pointed out that the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate appreciated the decision of the Romanian Church and gave the approval for this historical event. Blessings and brotherly greetings were sent by the other eastern Patriarchates and by all the Orthodox Churches¹². By this act, the Orthodox Church had consolidated its unity, which would further contribute to its future development. The other Cults of Romania were to elaborate their own organisational Status to organise their own activities.

The Cults' relation to the Romanian State was specified in the *Law of the Cults* of 1928, a law that had become a necessity after the Concordate of May 10,

1927, at the insistence of the representatives of the Baptist cult demanding legal acknowledgement by the Romanian government. They went for support to Nicolae Titulescu, then the representative of Romania at the United Nations.

A priority agenda was agreed upon when the process of relation settlement was initiated. First, on May 6, 1925 the *Law and the Statute of the Organisation of the Romanian Orthodox Church* was passed, acknowledging the Romanian Orthodox as the dominant Church within the Romanian State. Next came the necessity of establishing the unitary status for the minority cults, which, given the diversity of their religious doctrines, rituals and interests, posed new problems to settle for the government policy. Minister Alexandru Lapedatu, the artisan of the cult law, asserted that in 1928 Romania included the following historical cults: the Romanian Greek Catholic Cult, the Catholic Cult (in Latin, Greek, and Armenian rite), the Calvinist Cult, the Evangelic Lutheran Cult, the Unitarian Cult, the Mosaic Cult, and the Moslem Cult. In his defence of the law, Alexandru Lapedatu argued: "After voting the law on the organisation of the Romanian Orthodox Church, the establishment of a unitary status for the other cults in the country has become a primordial issue in the unification of the State. Its legislative solution suffers no further postponement". Further on, Lapedatu stated: "The Romanian State wishes to establish a new status for the cults. This status can no longer be that of the former medieval clerical states, but a novel one observing the principles of liberty and democracy as pro-

pounded by revolutionary Europe in the first half of the 19th century. The organisation of the new Romanian State is founded on its ancient traditions, the axis of the political and historical development of the Romanian people. The new Romanian legislation has to consider the new conjecture. We do not hoard the past and destiny of other nations, but our own”¹³.

Given the complexity of the matter, beginning with 1925 the legislators consulted with the representatives of all cults. First came Minister Vintila Bratianu, then Lazar Triteanu, the Bishop of Roman. Next came the representatives of the congressional Mosaic communities and the *status* in Ardeal and Banat, the Union of the Romanian Jews, the Union of the Israelite Communities of the Old Kingdom, the Union of the Baptist Communities of Romania, the Consistory of the Romanian Orthodox Metropolitan See of Ardeal, Banat, Crisana and Maramures, the Lutheran Consistory of Transylvania, the Catholic Archbishopric of Bucharest, the Greek Catholic Metropolitan See of Blaj, the Roman Catholic Diocese in Latin rite of Oradea, the Directory Council of the Lutheran Diocese of Ardeal, the Consistory of the Unitarian Church, the Lippovan Bishopric, the Israelite Central Bureau of Transylvania. All the representatives of the minority cults requested an increased independence and autonomy from the State. The theological arguments brought in support of such responsibilities as they may have towards their own believers were deference to the past and respect for their gained historical rights. On this point all of the minority cults proved to be singularly consensual.

After 1918, the relations between the Romanian State and the various religious cults were settled under the State’s new sovereignty over the re-united territory, as materialised into the taking into possession of all properties belonging formerly to other states. Placing all church properties under the state jurisdiction entitled the State to regulate its relation with all and any church institution. Under the principle of the separation between the Church and the State it was compulsory that the authorities of Greater Romania norm the relations with the various religious cults in order to promote the national interests, which did not concord at times with those of the cults on some issues. Let’s not forget that after World War I the Romanian State was in a rather delicate position. It had to clarify the varied aspects of the new Romanian society emerging after the Union. The State was compelled to deal with the challenges posed by the new norms in the international relations and the provisions of the new peace treaties, even while it had to prove itself as a powerful and coherent structure capable of administrating and solving any domestic or foreign problem. All these turned the project for a Law for the Cults of 1928 into a milestone, concentrating all Romanian political and institutional thought and action on the issue of national integrity, independence, sovereignty, and security, and on the observance of the constitutional norms¹⁴.

The discussion of the Law of the Status of Cults of 1928 generated hot debates involving personalities of the religious and cultural life, advocates of diverging opinions. We shall not insist on this any further. It

should be mentioned, however, that the most animated debate was that between the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox representatives. The situation was aggravated by the joint Concordate with the Holy See. This is “The Declaration of the Episcopate of the Romanian Orthodox Church” in the reading of N. Balan, the Metropolitan Bishop, during the Parliament debate: “(...) This Episcopate is aware of its mission and can not overlook that the High Legislative Body has been forced into the awkward position of promulgating the law without having first ensured the complete freedom of consciousness and action. Therefore, the Romanian Orthodox Episcopate has noted with deep regret that its desiderata have been overlooked, the desiderata deriving from the logic of things, based on the indefeasible rights of the ROC, which represents the sweeping majority of the Romanian population. In virtue of its dignity and lofty patriotism, ROC rejects any restriction or constraint upon the national sovereignty. (...) Contrary to elementary international principles, subordinating the ideal of national sovereignty to an opportunism transgressing the principle of truth, the Romanian government believed it was legitimate to adopt and harmonise the provisions of the law of the cults with the text of the convention signed with the Holy See. It has thus imposed upon the whole country to observe the will and the interests of an ecclesiastic organisation from without the borders of Romania. The Romanian Orthodox Episcopate has made public its reservations as well as its will to see justice done and the national sovereignty safeguarded. (...) We shall not cease even

for a moment to fight for a greater cause that is shared by us all, the Romanian government included. And we shall try by persuasive means (...) to restore the ROC in the plenitude of its rights so that it should fulfil its mission.”¹⁵

The Orthodox objection was clarified by Ioan Mateiu at the Deputy Assembly in the report submitted by the Permanent Commission of Public Instruction, Cults and Arts: “Our country, founded on the solid bases of historical Christianity, has been fully aware at all moments of the high spiritual mission of the Church, the institution fundamental to the shaping and advancement of the human society. (...) This is why Romania has accepted the political doctrine of the relation between the state and the cults, choosing from among the various systems that of the State’s supremacy over the Church, also called the system of Church autonomy. Considering the system to be opportune not just in the current stage in our evolution, but also in the tradition of the different religious cults, the Romanian State has persuaded itself that it is only sensible to prolong the autonomy of the cults, one they have enjoyed for centuries, and extend it to all the others with a view to providing equal protection for all.”¹⁶

As submitted in the Senate session of March 31, 1928¹⁷, the law includes four chapters: regulation of obligations for the cults’, rights, the state-cults relation, and the relation between the cults. Essentially, the law stipulated equal liberty for everyone regardless of their religion, the interdiction to set up political organisations on denominational bases, the interdiction to debate

public issues within the Church, the lay nature of the Romanian State, the minimal requirements for the clergy (i.e. Romanian citizenship, beneficiary of all civil and political rights), the right for cults to set up, administer, and control the cultural and the humanitarian institutions under the law, the moulding of the state and cults relation on the principle of equal protection as stipulated in Article 22 of the Constitution, the state checks that the activity of the cults do not endanger the public order and the security of the country, acknowledgement of the Leaders of the Cults only on the approval of the King of Romania, state checks the budget money granted by destination, regulates the status of religious orders and congregations, all mail despatches between the church institutions and the Romanian State will be carried exclusively in Romanian, compulsory study of Romanian history, language and literature in the denominational schools. The law regulated the relation of the state with all the minority cults in Romania such as to provide an improved functioning of the Romanian society. Thus, under the law, the state had important attributions, as the fundamental institution that established the relations between the religious cults, as well as the authority that controlled the activity of the cults in accordance to the legal norms¹⁸.

The issue of the Concordate with the Holy See

Although considered “a modern law, inspired by the historical, spiritual and denominational realities of Romania and founded on the international legislative norms, the law overlooked the legitimate requests of the ROC. This is the reason why the ROC had its reservations.”¹⁹ The main cause was the Concordate signed by the Romanian State with the Holy See on May 10, 1927, and voted by the Parliament on May 23, 1929, assigning the majority Church a position inferior to the minority Catholic Cult.

To fully understand the position of the ROC, one has to take into consideration the delicate problem of the Roman Catholic Church in Transylvania. The majority of its believers were of Hungarian nationality, having for their supreme leader the Pope, whose seat was outside the borders of our country. Furthermore, many of the parishes of the Hungarian Catholic dioceses in Satu-Mare, Oradea and Timisoara were on the territory of Hungary. The Catholics of Bucovina (Poles, Germans, etc) were under the jurisdiction of the Catholic Archbishopric of Lvov (Poland), the Ukrainian Unitarians of Maramures and Satu-Mare were under the jurisdiction of the Unitarian Episcopate of Uzhorod (Czechoslovakia), while the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bucharest, Raymond Netzhammer (1905-1925) was not a Romanian citizen, who moreover had expressed hostile feelings towards the Romanian State during the War²⁰.

The Romanian officials had begun diplomatic discussions with the Holy See as early as 1920. In 1921 they established a Romanian Legation at Vatican and an Apostolic Nunciature in Bucharest, preparing all the necessary documents. Following lengthy discussions, on May 10, 1927, the Concordate was signed by Minister Vasile Goldis on behalf of Romania, and by cardinal Gasparri representing the Holy See and Pope Pius XI. The text of the Concordate was made public only at a much later date. An early reaction was published in *Telegraful roman* on February the 8, 1928, only to be followed by other protests. On March 27, 1928, Nicolae Balan, the metropolitan bishop, protested in a speech delivered in the Senate during the debate of the Law of the Cults²¹. Later on, the same metropolitan bishop criticised the Concordate in Senate on May 23, 1929, considering it “anti-constitutional, excessively in favour of the Catholic cult, completely unjust towards the Orthodox Church, disturbing the public order, and anti-patriotic.” Nonetheless, despite all the Orthodox protests, the Concordate received the vote of the Senate and of the Deputy Assembly in May 1929. On July 7, 1929 the ratified documents were exchanged and on May 30, 1939 the *Agreement with Rome* was signed regarding Article 9 of the Concordate, which proclaimed the so-called “Ardelean Roman Catholic Status”.

The Orthodox representatives criticised a series of fundamental principles of the Concordate considered to be adverse both to the Orthodox Church and to the Romanian State. First of all, the Concordate was considered anti-constitutional, for Article 22 of the Consti-

tution of 1923 stipulated that “the relations between various cults and the State shall be endorsed by the law”. In practice, it was only the relations between the Romanian State and the Orthodox Church that were stipulated by law, while its relations with the Roman Catholic Church (a minority cult) were stipulated by a peer convention.

Article 2 of the Concordate stipulated the formation of the Catholic hierarchy. Therefore, the “Greek rite” held the Metropolitan See in Blaj and four dioceses: Oradea, Lugoj, Gherla, and a one new in the north of the country. In 1931, the diocese of Gherla was moved to Cluj, and a new diocese was founded in Baia-Mare. The latter held under its jurisdiction the Unitarian *Ruteni*, by special administration.

The “Latin rite” held a Metropolitan See in Bucharest and four dioceses: Alba-Iulia, Timisoara, Satu-Mare/Oradea (united under the “aeque principaliter”, that is, they were under one bishop, with the possibility to separate, precisely what happened in 1941), and Iasi. As for the Armenian Catholic Rite counting some 3,000 believers, they had in mind a “spiritual leader” in the city of Gherla. With almost two thousand believers, the Catholic Church held 11 dioceses (of which 5 were Roman Catholic, or perhaps 6, if we consider the position of the diocese in Satu-Mare/Oradea), 5 Greek Catholic dioceses and a leader for the Armenians in Gherla, whereas the ROC only held 18 dioceses for 14 millions of believers. Some dioceses, such as the Roman Catholic ones in Bucharest or in Iasi, or the Greek Catholic in Lugoj and Oradea, had

only some 50,000 believers as compared to the ROC where an archpriest's district alone exceeded the number by far. The large number of dioceses were staffed by a number of Greek and Roman Catholic canonical priests, archpriests and priests exceeding that of the Orthodox.

Article 4 of the Concordate guaranteed the right of bishops, of the clergy and of the people to communicate directly with the Holy See outside the control by the Romanian State. The bishops were appointed by the Holy See, which communicated the Romanian government the person appointed to check whether there were any political reasons to oppose the nomination. (Article 5) The bishops took the oath to the King rather than to the Romanian State. The language in which to take the oath was not stipulated, and no mention was made as to the priests' oath. (Article 6) The bishops enjoyed complete freedom in exerting their rights, along with the prerogatives conferred by the office, and under the norms of the Catholic Church they were at liberty to establish new parishes, to appoint priests without the government's approval, except for foreign priests. (Articles 8 and 12). It is worth recording that in the Catholic Austria-Hungary (Transylvania, included) the priests were appointed by the state, whereas the Romanian state permitted the appointment of bishops, canonical priests, priests and theology teachers even if of a different nationality. (Articles 5, 11, 12, 16). This was not the situation with the other Concordates after the War.

In terms of possessions, the Catholic Church received incomparably larger estates than any other it had owned under Catholic Austria-Hungary. Article 13 stipulated a "patrimonium sacrum" of the Catholic cult with the purpose to support the bishoprics, the seminaries, other related institutions, and the corresponding staff. This "patrimony" represented state rent titles in exchange for the expropriation of the Catholic Church properties. In contrast, the Austro-Hungarian State had given them for usufruct only to the Catholic Church. Thus, in 1918, the property rights belonged to the Romanian State. The Romanian politicians after 1918 were not aware of these juridical and historical realities, and when the agrarian reform was initiated the Romanian State considered them as the rightful properties of the Catholic Church, and thus expropriated them by paying the Church considerable sums of money. The Romanian State agreed to constitute the holy patrimony out of its own budget and the Catholic Church became the owner of considerable funds and fortune administered by the Council of Bishops, under the norms drawn up by the council and signed by the Romanian government and the Holy See.

Further critics addressed the status of the schools where the Catholics benefited from extended privileges and conducted a chauvinistic instruction.

Some historians believe the Greek Catholic Church was at a disadvantage by signing the Concordate for it then became merely a Catholic "rite", thus losing both its national character and the autonomy it had enjoyed until then. The Greek Catholic bishops were appointed

by the Holy See ignoring the Church's traditional canonical right to elect its own priests.

It comes as no surprise that the Orthodox representatives rejected the Concordate. They considered that the Roman Catholic Church had created a 'state in state' situation prejudicing the sovereignty of the Romanian State and placing the Orthodox Church in a position of inferiority, contrary to the Constitution of 1923, which had ensured freedom and equality for all cults²². This is the reason why the law on the status of the cults in Romania had been received with reservations both between the World Wars and later. To illustrate this state of affairs we quote Archbishop Bartolomeu Anania who declared in 1993: "Despite all the changes operated, the Law of the Cults of 1928 could not be brought to agree completely with the Constitution, nor with the Concordate, but remained a hybrid."²³ This should be the focus of the debates surrounding the forthcoming law of the cults in Romania.

Notes

* Translated by Ana-Elena Ilinca

1 Vesa, V. "Infaptuirea Romaniei Mari" [The Making of Greater Romania], in Fischer-Galati, St., Giurescu, D. C., Pop, I. A.: *O istorie a romanilor. Studii critice*, [A History of the Romanians. Essays] Fundatia Culturala Romana, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, p. 227.

2 Schifirnet, C. "Biserica, Stat si Natiune," [Church, State, and Nation], Introductory study in *Biserica noastra si cultele minoritare* [Our Church and the Minority Cults], edition directed and annotated by Schifirnet, C., Albatros, Bucuresti, 2000, p. V.

3 Ibidem.

4 Mateiu, I. *Dreptul bisericesc de stat în Romania reîntregita. Regimul general al cultelor* [State Church Law in Greater Romania. The General Status of the Cults], Bucuresti, 1926, p. 23.

5 Ibidem, p. 24.

6 Ibidem.

7 Ibidem, p. 25.

8 Schifirnet, C., quoted.

9 "Constitutiunea" [The Constitution]. Adopted by Royal Decree, number 1360 of 29th March 1923, Imprimeria Statului, Bucuresti, 1923 in *Constitutia din 1923 în dezbaterile contemporanilor*, [The Constitution of 1923 Analyzed by our Contemporaries] Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1990, p. 615.

10 Schifirnet, C., quoted.

11 See *Statutul Organic al Bisericii Greco-Orientale Romane din Ungaria si Transilvania, cu un Supliment*. [The Organic Status of the Romanian Eastern-Greek Church of Hungary and Transylvania with Supplement], second authenticated official edition of 1878, no. 247, Sibiu, 1900.

On Andrei Saguna, see: Lupas, I. *Mitropolitul Andrei Saguna. Monografie istorica* [Metropolitan Bishop Andrei Saguna. Historic Monograph], Sibiu, 1909 (re-printed in 1911, and 1921; Hitchius, K., *Orthodoxy and Nationality. Andrei Saguna and the Romanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873*, Cambridge, London, 1977, translated into Romanian by A. Jivi, Bucuresti, 1995, Pacurariu, M., *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Romane* [History of the Romanian Orthodox Church], vol.3, Bucuresti, 1981, p. 92-112; Idem, *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Romane* [History of the Romanian Orthodox Church], Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2002, p. 207-208, and 284.

12 Pacurariu, M., *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Romane* [History of the Romanian Orthodox Church], vol. 3, Bucuresti, 1981, p. 392-398.

13 Schifirnet, C., paper quoted [articol citat], p.VI-VII.

14 Ibidem, p. VIII

15 Ibidem, p. XXVIII.

16 Ibidem, p. XXIX.

17 Published in the Official Gazette, no. 89/04.22.1928, p. 3607-3012.

18 Idem, Schifirnet, C., paper quoted, p. XXIX-XXX.

19 Idem, Schifirnet, C., paper quoted, p. XXX-XXXI.

20 See *Raymond Netzhammer, Arhiepiscop în Romania. Jurnal de Razboi, 1914-1918* [Raymond Netzhammer, Archbishop in Romania. War Diary, 1914-1918], Bucuresti, 1993; *Valoarea Concordatului încheiat cu Vaticanul* [The Importance of the Concordate Signed with the Holy See], Sibiu, Tipografia arhidiecezana, 1929.

21 See “Discursul I.P.S. Mitropolitul Nicolae” [The Discourse of His Holiness the Metropolitan Bishop Nicolae], in Schifirnet, C. (ed.) *Biserica noastra si cultele minoritare*, [Our Church and the Minority Cults] Albatros, Bucuresti, 2000, p. 263-304.

22 Pacurariu, M., *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Romane* [History of the Romanian Orthodox Church], 3rd vol., p. 390-405; Mateiu, I. *Politica bisericeasca a statului roman* [The Church Policy of the Romanian State], Sibiu, Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1931, p. 167-197; Nistor, V. *Les cultures minoritaires dans le nouveau budget de la Roumanie*, 1935; Ghibu, O. *Actiunea catolicismului si a Sfintului Scaun în Romania întregita*, [The Activity of Catholicism and of the Holy See in the Unified Romania] Cluj, 1934; Lazar, I. *Biserica dominanta si egala îndreptatire a cultelor*, [The Dominant Church and the Justified Equality of the Cults] Arad, 1936.

23 Anania, V. *Pro Memoria. Actiunea catolicismului în Romania interbelica* [Pro Memoria. The Activity of Catholicism in Inter-War Romania], Bucuresti, Institutul Biblic si de misiune al BOR, 1993, p. 27.

The Connection between the Unitarian Thought and Early Modern Political Philosophy

The aim of my paper is to show links and parallels between Locke's concept of the state of nature and the Unitarian (Socinian) denial of original sin. At first I will give an overview of the Unitarian history and thought, then I will logically and philologically demonstrate a parallelism of Locke's hidden anthropology and the Unitarian doctrine on human being, with data of Locke's Unitarian readings, especially writings of a Transylvanian theologian in the late 16th century, György Enyedi.

In my study I try to demonstrate the connection between some of the central elements in the Unitarian teaching and some of the basic tenets of early modern political philosophy. It refers not really to influences, which can be readily proven from a philological perspective (for the influence of the Unitarian readings by some authors upon their political philosophy writings is unquestionable) but rather to the regular pattern in the attempts to solve them or at least some parallelism. I shall focus upon the teaching about the original sin,

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present in every Christian denomination and rejected by Unitarianism, which I will compare with similar elements identifiable in Locke's version of the early modern contract theory model. (The contract theories of the 17th century influence all of the theological debates of the epoch. In the course of the argument that the change from the natural to the social condition by a shift in goals or some other causes, there arises the Augustinian issue of the need for an earthly authority given man's sinful and wretched nature.) Locke's Unitarian readings were prompted by a philological interest but I wish to emphasize Locke's own theological quest for Unitarianism, rather than merely document the influences, my task being to demonstrate the intellectual parallelisms. Throughout my exposition one shall see that Locke's contract theory conception carefully refuting the original sin was not independent from how he viewed the nature of the political community in general. I set out to reconstruct this community model based on the *Letters on Religious Toleration* and I would like to show that in size, at least, it coincides with particular Unitarian ideas even while it does not stray from the Unitarians' notion of religious freedom in conception either.

1. Of the History of the Unitarian Church and Some of Its Teachings

During the patristic period, within the debates on the Holy Trinity one can find certain perspectives and arguments that are in some respect connected with the

Unitarian teachings, even though the theological tradition of the present day Unitarian churches goes back directly to the Age of Reformation. At first, Miguel Servet, the Spanish theologian later executed under Calvin in Geneva, worked out the Unitarian theology in his *The Flaws of the Holy Trinity* issued in 1531.¹ Next, during the troubled decades of the Reformation, Trinity-rejecting thinkers emerged as individual voices all across Europe, especially in such regions as Germany, England, and Italy, or gathered into small communities² in the Netherlands, only to be prohibited and banned by both the Catholics and the prevailing Protestants. In the 16th and 17th centuries their situation was rather special in Poland and Lithuania, until their school and printing shop was confiscated in 1638. The same was true for Transylvania and the Hungarian territories under Turkish occupation. (These territories registered numerous communities especially in southern Transdanubia, in central Baranya mostly, and in Pécs where they formed the majority just as in Kolozsvár.³ They also ran a school until the forced re-conversion to Catholicism of the city-dwellers under the Habsburgs. The recording of Unitarians living under the Ottoman rule was particularly important for the whole denomination since they were not under the earthly rule of the Transylvanian prince, so it was almost impossible to force them to compromise. Also, the Unitarian intelligentsia fled from Transylvania to the occupied territories and consequently the Unitarian works written in Transylvania were printed there and then smuggled back.⁴ The Ottoman rulers were indifferent to the mat-

ter of religion where it concerned the subject population but within the more general struggle against idolatry of the reformed movement, particularly of the Unitarian severe monotheism, the Unitarians, more than any other denomination, could count on more understanding than any other. Unitarianism spread to Transylvania, Hungary and Poland especially through the Italian humanist thinkers featuring such leading figures as count Giorgio Biandrata (Blandrata), Queen Isabella's court physician, and the Sozzini (Latin *Socinus*) brothers, Lelio and Fausto, whose name they lent to their followers called Socinians. Unitarianism did not emerge in Central Europe as it is today, but inspired by the Western tradition, it evolved independently in the Polish-Lithuanian and Transylvanian intellectual debate workshops where the locals' bold ideas often defeated the Italian masters' designs. Present day Unitarianism is inspired by the works of Ferenc Dávid and his disciples rather than by Biandrata's or the Socinus brothers'. In Poland and in Lithuania Unitarianism from the beginning to prohibition was deemed the religion of the educated humanists; their center, the school and printing shop of Raków ⁵ was considered the citadel of the Polish and Lithuanian humanist education. The first internationally recognized standardized summary of the Unitarian belief, the *Catechism of Raków* was compiled here. From among the Polish and Lithuanian Unitarian authors Grzegorz Pawel (Gregorius Paulus), Ferenc David's colleague in Wittenberg, was the most influential on the Polish-Lithuanian and European thought,

and was regarded by later generations as the father of the Polish-Lithuanian Unitarianism.

The spreading of Unitarianism in Transylvania was facilitated by the fact that its early Italian representatives had been educated in the same Italian Renaissance vein as the Transylvanian upper class. (By the second half of the 16th century, practically all of the high-powered government officials had studied in Padua). The early Reformation movement kept close contact with the humanist intelligentsia whose knowledge was necessary in the ever more important Bible-philology but later the connections became controversial and dissolved in the case of some denominations. With the Unitarians however, as they were permissive of critiques of the Biblical text, the connection between Humanism and the Reformation remained untouched until the end. (A perfect example: Bishops such as György Enyedi, who Hungarianised Boccaccio's short stories and translated ancient romance stories, are practically unimaginable in any other denomination). The Transylvanian Reformation did not mean the spreading of the denominations in their present form readily packaged with clearly defined dogmatics: during the early decades, the position of the separate Protestant denominations and their connection was rather unclear. There were marked local differences and the contemporaries had other issues on their agenda than we do today. At first, the majority of the future converts in Hungary and Transylvania received Luther's teachings. But then, some of the younger trainees for priesthood, featuring among them the bishop-to-be of Debrecen,

the so-called “Hungarian Calvin,” following a shift in the doctrine of the communion, which left out the issue of predestination, rallied round Péter Melius Juhász⁶, himself a convert to the Calvinist strain of the Wittenberg Reformation. (In his theological works Melius assigned a central place to man in the image of God and his dignity in the Italian Renaissance-style, linking them both with the ideal of universal priesthood. Consequently, his views on predestination and free will are radically different from Calvin’s and as regards the church structure he modeled Debrecen on Zwingli’s Zurich rather than on Geneva.) The schism between the Augustinian and Swiss Reformations did not mark an immediate division of the church structure: in the beginning, both parties wished to prevail within a common church structure. In Hungary, the banning of the Swiss Reformation (the Sacramentarians, in the epoch’s wording) was briefly successful, but later Melius and Ferenc Dávid persuaded the believers, mainly the Hungarian, to accept the Swiss strain in Transylvania and its dominions. (Soon, in Hungary, the trend prevailed within Protestantism). Later on, Ferenc Dávid developed an anti-Trinitarian conviction under Biandrata’s teaching and by personal theological reasoning and he opposed Melius out of loyalty to the Swiss beliefs. He even won over the majority of the Transylvanian Hungarians. In 1568, after the separation between Melius and Dávid, the Parliament in Turda was convoked proclaiming religious freedom for the first time in history with the approval of Unitarian János Zsigmond, under the preparations of Ferenc

Dávid and especially with the vote of the Unitarians. The law was not discriminating between denominations: all preachers were entitled to explain the Scriptures and the local authorities to employ the adequate preacher. (Back then and long after, Transylvanian Protestantism was not in the habit of meeting in sessions. The law granted the lay authorities the right to choose a priest.) The evolution of the Transylvanian Reformation was heavily influenced by the political context. Unitarian János Zsigmond was followed by Catholic István Báthory at the helm of Transylvania. The latter did not exert over the Protestants the kind of authority that both the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania did, for instance, but he did make some attempts to limit the Unitarian influence to a minimum. He confiscated their printing shop,⁷ he divested Ferenc David of his position as a bishop and imprisoned him in the fortress of Deva, where he died shortly. (The commemoration of his death, November 15, is the official Memorial Day of the Unitarian Church.) The prince’s religious policy focused on bringing to an end the Reformation in Transylvania: the prohibition of any further potential changes became a redundant element in the laws promulgated under his rule. This bent of his was a hindrance to the theological activity of other Protestant denominations as well but it particularly hindered the Unitarians who were averse to dogmatics and were striving to become an independent denomination. In their denomination structure, Unitarians were compelled to separate from the Swiss wing with which they formed practically the same church un-

der Bishop Ferenc Dávid. Later on they derived their official creeds from the princely authority and the regulations of the assembly laws rather than from their own theology averse to rigid dogmatics. The term itself – Unitarianism – is of political-legal origins: the Assembly in Lécfalva [Lep] introduced it in 1600 to give a name to the believers who until then had been called Davidists.

The Unitarians had a special relationship with the religious strain called “Sabbatarianism” founded by Simon Péchi with the aid of Eössi András at the end of the 16th century. Practically, this religious community was never able to function freely and independently, and its followers were almost always members of a recognized church, oftener than not Unitarian. The members of this denomination re-directed the Reformation towards the Old Testament and the rabbinical literary studies. During the persecution they closed their ties with the laws of Moses, and after 1867 those who survived converted to Judaism⁸ by law. At the early stage of Unitarianism, the charge of “Judaisation” had already been formulated against Ferenc Dávid, which was a rather familiar occurrence in the religious debates of the epoch. Yet with the Sabbatarians emerging in the background, and the Jewish community fleeing the country, it acquired a more serious meaning: it intertwined with the intention to “uncover” the officially Unitarian, Sabbatarian in reality, adherents.

Transylvanian Unitarianism suffered heavy losses during the forced re-Catholicization by the Habsburgs but it managed to preserve its church structure and ba-

sic institutions. In Hungary, after the Ottoman rule, they functioned legally only after 1867 but ever since, theirs has been an unremitting presence. By the turn of the century, they had acquired a special position in Budapest: an independent Hungarian bishopric was founded in addition to the Transylvanian one, and for part of the educated metropolitan intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie, Unitarianism became a church compatible with personal conviction. (Suffice it to mention Béla Bartók’s conversion.) Transylvanian Unitarians played an important cultural role. Let us mention Sámuel Brassai, the last Transylvanian polyhistorian, or Béla Varga, a reflexive witness of history, remarkable philosopher, bishop and professor who renewed Unitarian theology.

Particular strains of the Transylvanian Reformation paired up with particular mother tongues at an early stage. Early on, the number of Saxon adherents had been quite high among the Unitarians: Dávid himself came from a Saxon bourgeois family in Kolozsvár. His real last name was Hertel. Early on, the existence of the Unitarian college in Kolozsvár was determined by balancing between the Saxon and Hungarian influences: it was run in rotation by a Saxon rector and Hungarian lector alternating with a Hungarian rector and Saxon lector. Later on, with better finances, there was both a Hungarian and a Saxon lector in a school where the language of instruction⁹ was Latin. But after the Saxon Universitas successfully created a Lutheran church structure coinciding with its territorial autonomous boundaries, the Unitarian and Reformed churches

strengthened their links to the Hungarians, whereas Lutheranism remained close to the Saxons of the region. This was registered from the start in the religious texts in the vernaculars. Ferenc Dávid always presented his messages to the general public in Hungarian, while Honterus, the Saxon reformer, in German; they both wrote in Latin for the elite. Gáspár Heltai's example is typical: the priest known as an eminent man of letters and printer followed in the steps of Ferenc Dávid from Catholicism through the Lutheran and Calvinist reformation to Unitarianism. While an Augustinian adherent, he wrote and preached in his native language, in German, but as Reformed, and later Unitarian, he became a leading representative of the Hungarian literature ceasing all activity in German. (The debates on the Reformation and the conversion of believers made little use of the Romanian language: only the Reformed in the region of Făgăraș used it to create an important Romanian religious literature. The gap may be accounted for by the fact that Orthodoxy fell outside the daily struggle of the Reformation, its main contention being papal authority. Reformation was a movement of renewal for the adherents formerly affiliated to the same (western) church. Its participants tried to convince the "papists" and each other, generally ignoring the Orthodox)

With the exception of the above-mentioned territories, Unitarianism was on solid grounds in England and America, but the history of their churches differs essentially from that of the Polish-Lithuanian and the Transylvanian communities. Unitarian thinkers

emerged in England too at the beginning of the 17th century drawing significant audiences. But as of 1648, severe prohibitive laws were issued against those who refused to accept the Trinity. They failed to be observed and were eventually invalidated by the subsequent laws of 1813 and 1844. Thus, Theophil Lindsey founded the first Unitarian congregation as late as 1773, with a bigger church to emerge under the initiative of Joseph Priestley's organization. Priestley was forced to emigrate to Pennsylvania because of his republican ideas of which he made no secret, not even during the French Revolution. In the United States, especially around Boston in Massachusetts, Unitarianism had become popular among the more educated and enlightened at the end of the century. After 1806-1808 their circle, the "(theologically) liberals" would become the most influential group at Harvard but they formed distinct communities only after the 1820s, when the representatives of traditional Protestantism practically expelled them. In the 19th century, under the influence of some eminent theologians such as Ellery Channing, Theodor Parker and Ralph Waldo Emerson – the lay thinker with a religious bent, the adherents to Unitarianism played an important part in the American spiritual life well above expectations, considering the scarcity in number. The main ideological feature of the English-American Unitarianism, in contrast to the continental one, was that it was structured as a church only during the Enlightenment, in consonance with the philosophy of the age. It recognized its roots both in the Polish-Lithuanian and Transylvanian precedents and in

the Enlightenment deist thinkers of the 18th century. The religious ideas of the American Founding Fathers, Jefferson, Madison and Washington, and the trends of thought of the initiators of the *Bill of Rights* are to some degree in the tradition of American Unitarianism. (Lines of thought can be traced back to the Unitarian argumentation of the French Enlightenment sages. Voltaire for one, especially in the sections of his *Philosophical Alphabet* where he argues against Catholicism in favor of the Unitarians with no intention whatsoever, on his part or that of his followers, of founding a community based on their ideology. No other religious congregation whatsoever claims its tradition from Voltaire's texts.) Forming an opinion on the American situation is difficult for the Continental European due to the fusion between Unitarianism in its fundamentals and other groups more or less loosely connected to the religious traditions of the mid 20th century. Consequently, the common theological points of view are scarcer among the groupings forming the church itself than within other avowed Unitarian churches.

The Transylvanian Unitarian church has been in official contact with the English Unitarians since 1821 and with the Americans since 1834, which is quite early considering that back then the denomination could not carry out any legal activity in Hungary or in England, with milder restrictions still holding as late as 1844.

Important Elements of Unitarian Teaching from the Perspective of our Study

Following the rationale of our study, the elements of importance in the Hungarian-Transylvanian and Hungarian-Unitarian teaching can be divided into two groups:

1. Teachings on the religious ceremonials, the sacraments and the nature of God underlying interconfessional agreement: Jesus was a real, yet not completely ordinary man (*non est purus et vulgaris homo*) who was the son of God in the sense that from among God's children he was His favorite and also the Lord's prophet. In him the Holy Ghost, perceived as God's power and help, was the most active. The communion taken at fixed religious holidays is a commemoration of Jesus but it is not a sacrament, so a sinner cannot be deprived of it. Baptism, even though founded on the teachings of Jesus, is also merely a human custom that does not readily turn anyone into a Christian in a spiritual sense, nor does its absence bring about damnation. Distinct by their theological convictions, the Transylvanians emphatically rejected the Trinity and assigned less importance to baptism and communion than other confessions. This could possibly be due to the early theologians, especially Jacobus Palaeologus, who wished to reconcile all Christian denominations, all monotheist religions if possible, by drafting a mutually accepted minimum. Thus he considered that baptism was a necessary ceremony during the early Christian period, that it was a sign of conversion from other reli-

gions but it lost all significance for those born in a family already Christian. Its preservation simply as a custom by relinquishing the teaching that those who had not taken baptism were doomed, rendered unnecessary all efforts to renounce it. As of 1578, Ferenc Dávid abandoned the Christening of children in the territories under his influence, which would become the prime cause for his arrest. In contrast to the Transylvanians, the Polish and Lithuanian Unitarians looked for a solution close to the Anabaptists and opposed to the Papists.

2. Teachings on the rejection of the original sin: the reason why humans inevitably sin is because of their fallible and imperfect nature, its essence being the denial of their state as sons of God. Their sins cannot be erased but God, He alone, can forgive them. Jesus releases his followers from sin through the example of his own life in the sense that by following his example one can live and sin less. (“Redemption” is not deemed explicable in this line of thought.) It follows that the perception of Jesus as a human being and the denial of the original sin are logically connected: if there is no original sin, there is no need for the redemption of the Catholic view, and vice versa. If Jesus’ moral example suffices to release men from their sins, then our nature cannot be wretched and sinful as in the Catholic view.

In the 19th century, from among the Polish-Lithuanian and the Transylvanian Unitarians’s writings few books were accessible to the general audience because of the above-mentioned censorship. The collection (Albae Iuliae, 1568)¹⁰ entitled *De falsa et vera unius Dei Patris, Filii et spiritus Sancti cognitione libri duo* arrived in

western Europe for, in addition to János Zsigmond, it was also dedicated to Elisabeth Queen of England. Unfortunately, never being re-published, it was lost in the 17th century. Christoph Sand’s collection entitled *Bibliotheca Antitrinitariorum* (Freistadii, 1684¹¹), containing mainly Polish works, was the accessible source for the 17th century people with literary interest. So was György Enyedi’s literary venture keenly read by John Locke and Isaac Newton, among others: *Explicationes locorum Veteris et Novi testamenti, ex quibus trinitatis dogma stabiliri solet* (Kolozsvár, 1598).¹²

In the last two decades, alongside the Polish-Lithuanian and Transylvanian Unitarian texts, and the earlier theology history works, which were mainly the product of the institutional structure of the church, some more serious philological research was initiated in cultural history. Antal Pirnát, Róbert Dán and Mihály Balázs are considered the best known researchers in the field in Hungary and Lech Szczucki in Poland.¹³

2. Locke and Unitarianism

Locke’s journey from Oxford orthodoxy to Dutch Unitarian readings

All of the specialty literature is consensual over the shift in Locke’s political philosophy as brought on by his Dutch emigration. Locke’s philology is closely

linked to the political context and the history of philosophy. In all analyses, Locke's Unitarian readings¹⁴ are generally associated with his concept of toleration, since the touchstone of the notion of tolerance was the existence or absence of tolerance towards the Unitarians. Moreover, Unitarianism is the only theology of a denomination consistently and explicitly espousing the idea of religious patience. However, apart from these undoubtedly important elements, little attention is paid to a noticeable parallel between Locke's approach to 'man living in a state of nature', the character of the social contract and the ways of entering it, and the Unitarian teachings on the original sin and free will, although they played at least as important a role in the development of Locke's contract theory as did the critiques by Filmer and Hobbes.

According to the research carried out by Marshall, Locke started to read the Unitarian writers in 1679, among whom the most important was György Enyedi, with the work above mentioned. The influence of Locke's regular Unitarian theological readings cannot be traced verbatim in his writings for the general public, but any occurrence of a new motive can be accountable for by them. From the winter of 1680-1681 Locke began to deal more seriously with the issue of the Fall of the first human couple, with original sin and free will, distancing himself gradually from his original, roughly Calvinist perspective on the issue, and nearing the Unitarian thought.¹⁵

The true value of Locke's orientation in this respect is accountable for, considering that the incipient of the

traditional Christian political thought is Augustine, in whose theory the wretched human nature makes worldly power a necessity. The strain of anthropology claiming that the wretched human nature of man is the consequence of the original sin and the rigor of the political theory founded therein mellow down in Thomas Aquinas. Yet, the early modern thinkers dealing with the social contract, particularly the Protestants, were inspired mainly by the Augustinian type anthropology. Most of Locke's forerunners, among which Hobbes's name is hardly enough, drew a sharp boundary between the natural and political states by analogy on the Middle Age Christian conception linking the origins of earthly power to the Fall, and our birth in sin to our birth under authority, meaning that we cannot undo our ties to power. The idea of innocence in the state of nature is not preserved in Hobbes. But under the basic anthropological prerequisite, the notion of a state power activated by man's "spoilt nature", the relationship of the pre-modern and theological origins between men's fallen nature and the origins of power can be pinned down. One will not stray too far if one also brings in the fear of death, the main drive in Hobbes's man in his wretched condition: man is mortal because of his sinful nature. This fills him with fear and the fear caused by his spoilt nature makes it both possible and necessary for a society to emerge and function.

In Locke's works on political philosophy written in Oxford, especially in the manuscripts entitled *Two Treatises of Civil Government*¹⁶ he clearly represented this traditional perspective and according to his notes, by 1676

he was roughly of the same opinion. Throughout the period, while still in his homeland, prior to undergoing the spiritual influences under the Dutch emigration, he started to study the Church Fathers, particularly Athanasius who had made the Holy Trinity part of the creed. They were then followed in Holland by more thorough and broader Unitarian readings, among which György Enyedi's significantly came first. Marshall writes:

By the time the *Treatises* were published it had become clear, as it will be seen later, that Locke opposed original sin, as did the Socinians. It is also possible that he had developed this opposition at the time he was describing the state of nature as peaceable and less sinful.¹⁷

The Most Important Unitarian Reading: An Interpretation of György Enyedi

This can only set one off thinking what aspects of the Transylvanian Unitarian thought, featuring different goals and sources, raised Locke's interest who was busy contemplating his Dutch experience and his broader Protestant readings.

The most significant author read by the British philosopher was György Enyedi, the third bishop of the Unitarian church, best known to researchers of the old Hungarian literature as he who re-wrote and adapted Boccaccio's *The Story of Gismunda and Gisquardus*¹⁸ and as the translator into Latin¹⁹ of Heliodor's *Aithiopikon*

[*Sorsüldözte szerelmesei* in several editions in modern Hungarian], preserved for posterity in one of King Matthias's codices. But the influence on western Europe of his already mentioned theological work had been acknowledged for quite some time, particularly as accounted for by the Dutch edition available during Locke's stay there. In his theological work, Enyedi took into account and interpreted from the Unitarian perspective the Biblical verses used by other churches as arguments for the dogma of the Holy Trinity. Enyedi's work is generally viewed as one targeting an international readership and thus features a well-structured minimum of Unitarian opinions (going by the name of anti-Trinitarians, Socinians, Davidists in Transylvania, or, more simply, followers of the "religion of Kolozsvár.") In this text as well as in Enyedi's other works, especially his sermons, it becomes apparent that the author tried to incorporate arguments by his Unitarian predecessors or forerunners, but the final conclusion is a compromise with the existing possibilities. Enyedi's spiritual ambitions were in perfect harmony with his activity as a bishop. (Under him, no legal proceedings were started against any priest or teacher for their personal theological views. This does not, however, denote some sort of weakness: but if a priest/teacher failed in his duties or in matters of ethics, Enyedi was even stricter than his predecessor). As an advocate of the freedom of thought, he drew on his humanist education and personal temperament. Nevertheless, he managed just as well in his capacity of bishop too. He was in charge of the contacts with the Unitar-

ians under the Ottoman dominion, especially those in Baranya, whom the Transylvanian prince, although the earthly authority, was not able to force into sharing his own private beliefs nor into observing his church regulations. These Unitarians, who equaled in number the Transylvanian Unitarians, were keenly aware of their independence, so, in matters of theology they were always more radical and vocal than the Transylvanians. They had not, for instance, recognized the authority of Demeter Hunyadi, Enyedi's predecessor. Perhaps the renewed connections with the Unitarians under the Ottoman dominion seasoned Enyedi's attitude towards the Turks with some ambivalence. On the one hand, he depicted them as cruel evildoers who tortured the Christians, but on the other, he practically planted the seeds of modernism into the Turkish practice. He asserted that state power was maintained through imposing taxes and loyalty, which could be ensured through interdiction of armed revolts, rather than ruling through souls and religion, as was the Habsburg practice. The theoretical emphasis on the significance of personal belief (beyond the self-evident tradition of the Protestant churches) was the contribution of the Transylvanian Unitarianism, which although no longer a pliable movement, was still not yet a church with solid dogmas under the varied lay authorities. Enyedi's studies in Padua were a methodological help in this respect. Enyedi, as accused during several debates, rather excelled in less priestly matters. He brought back from university a contemporary version of the methodological individualism just spreading in the early-modern mechanical

views, called the "method of Padua", which dated back to Aristotle. Enyedi acquired it from the same Zarabella, who inspired Harvey, and through him, Hobbes, to be applied in biology and in the study of society, respectively.²⁰

In the course of writing the above-mentioned work, the general background was filling in with information about his own Unitarian theological tradition as furnished by the Sozzini brothers, Ferenc Dávid, and especially Jacobus Palaeologus. Under such influence, both the virtual readership of the theological masterpiece and the range of the atonement or the impact of religious freedom as announced in sermon more or less overtly, depending on the situation, changed. Whereas Palaeologus, the Greek monk born in Khios, a Unitarian convert and martyr in Rome, originally imagined the atonement of all monotheist religions including Islam, Enyedi would have been satisfied with the atonement of just the European Protestants on *some* common grounds. Hardly insignificant, if one considers that in the debates of the epoch religious tolerance and peace was a regular item on the agenda of the solitary thinker, while the Unitarian church was foremost in integrating it in its "official" theological teaching from the start. (If there was anything close to an official Unitarian dogma, particularly in the early times, as compared to the teachings of the other Christian churches. This is certainly no indication of immaturity: from the start Unitarianism maintained a theology open to new overtures and further improvement). Enyedi's target readership was

the same that Locke addressed in his letter on tolerance.²¹

Contract theory without the original sin

We have seen above that Locke's growing interest in Unitarianism reached a climax just as he was preparing to write his second essay on government.²² This could explain our intention of finding a parallel between certain anthropological assumptions found in this work and the Unitarian denial of the original sin. Not surprisingly, one can find the critical parts in chapter eight, which specifically deals with the origins of political societies. There is no anthropological assumption per se in Locke's text based on which one could definitely trace the necessity of earthly authority back to human nature. Obviously, man does not have a wretched nature, nor is he innocent, either. It is common for some interpreters to apply the part about the "golden age" (111. §.) to the natural state, while for others to the early stage of government, as the transition from one to the other is not well defined. The connection is even tighter in 116. § and further on, where Locke lined up his well-known arguments against Filmer's conception stressing that we were all born under some form of patriarchal power, wherein lie all forms of worldly power, and which ultimately originates from Adam. It obviously conceives of dominion as punishment, going hand in hand with the original sin. On the contrary, Locke emphasizes that all people

are born free, which in the logic of his discourse is possible only if he imagined the new generation free from the original sin. But the text bears throughout the stylistic characteristics of Locke's turn: nowhere in the text does he clearly refute the original sin. Moreover, in the sections where he either argues with a physical presence or else refutes a general belief, he draws on the commonplaces about Adam and his sons of the political theory literature of his time. The whole work allows for a reading that does not step out from the conceptual frame of Locke's predecessors; he is merely less inconsistent compared with Hobbes, for instance. But later, in *Reasonableness*... and particularly in his manuscripts and notes he explicitly reconsiders his standpoint by stating it more clearly.²³

At this stage one should refer by necessity to the relation between Locke's epistemological, theological and political philosophy works. In his masterpiece *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,²⁴ in the refutation of Descartes's theory on innate ideals, Chapter 19 of the first book, it is argued that the concept of sin cannot be an inborn concept since it is not rendered in similar wording in all cultures. (On the other hand, he has the same argument for virtue). He who cannot discern between sin and virtue but also he who cannot develop the capacity to distinguish is not sinful as a result of his unspoiled nature but is not perfect either. This becomes inevitably a constant reminder of the image of the man who has personal sins, concordant with the Unitarian view. But, to the end, Locke kept close to the ideas explaining the state of human kind through the

Fall, rather than to Unitarianism. Apparently, he disagrees that man's condition as a creature justifies the imperfection of his nature, his mortality and obligation to work, and he will uphold to the end the theory that Adam's perfect original condition, although lost with consequences upon his descendants, did not thereby bequeath sin upon them. Locke argues that he needs this to support the idea of Christ as the Redeemer because redemption needs a certain pre-redemption state that was worse by necessity. This viewpoint is paralleled in *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regain'd* by Milton published in 1667 and 1671 respectively, also close to the Unitarian views. (The *De Doctrina Christiana* dealing with these theoretical ideas was in manuscript back then, with the English translation to be printed only in 1825. It was hardly read by anyone outside the writer's own close circle. One cannot know for sure whether Locke had read the dramatic poems then available but neither can one know whether he showed any particular interest in the literature of his age. Nevertheless, his other Milton readings can be documented. For instance, when he was preparing to write the letter on tolerance, his friends called his attention upon the *Areopagitica*.)

It is particularly interesting to evaluate the fragments by Locke which lead us to conclude that our thinker sometimes left open several possibilities for the poly-genesis of human kind while elsewhere he clearly accepts the descent from Adam. The fragments in his *Treatises of Civil Government* where he expresses the impossibility to trace the origins of power back to Adam, and the epistemological writings where he proves the

non-existence of innate ideals/concepts, both draw with much gusto upon the ethnographic examples supplied by the travel diaries of the age, of which he was a fervent admirer. In both cases he argued against a certain bodily unity of human kind. ("This is how we are, these are inevitably the ideals and institutions that we have, we are people and it cannot be otherwise with Adam's sons.") To the determinism of descent – let us not forget that for his partners in epistemological and social debates, the descent was the principle that legitimized power – he counter-posed the idea of the free expression of people's abilities, which came as an advantage if the abilities could be developed without prerequisites. Bearing this in mind, one then notices that the pertinent passages reveal that Locke did not simply defend the free possibilities of the individual human mind, imagined as a blank sheet, against the biological determinism of the innate ideal and the freedom of agreement against the legitimizing descent from Adam, but that he also hinted that, indeed, all are not descended from Adam. But even in the most poignant fragments, in the sentence from the *Reasonableness of Christianity*... we have quoted above, he left open the interpretation according to which the discourse was merely about the conflicts of legitimization based on descent and contract. And phrasing such as: "...Adam, whom millions had never heard of and no one authorized to be...his representative" can be considered parts of a rhetoric argumentation rather than word for word statements.

One has to take notice of Locke's really careful wording of polygenesis because the polygenesis-mono-genesis debate became a top issue in the ethical, anthropological and, indirectly, political theory debates over the following generations, mostly inspired by him. In opposition with the traditional biblical view of the monogenesis of human kind, the theory of polygenesis had emerged during Renaissance. Many trace it back to Paracelsus yet, in what we are concerned, more importantly it was derived from the Unitarian thinking of Palaeologus as *the* argument against the teaching about the original sin. If we are not all descended from Adam, and which of us exactly are Adamites, the consequence of Adam's fall is definitely of only relative significance for human kind today.²⁵ Considering that these preliminaries were hardly known to his contemporaries, the emergence in the early modern period of the theory of polygenesis can only be linked to Holland, some decades before Locke.²⁶ Since about mid 18th century until today the polygenetic theory has interwoven with the theory of European superiority and certain forms of racism. Especially in the colonies²⁷ it is particularly important to indicate that this theory first emerged as an argument against the traditional theory of creation and its consequences, while in France mainly, it played a similar role against the suppositions about the multitude of worlds fashionable. Both tried to prove that rational creatures regardless of their descent from Adam are capable of cognition, ethical behavior and creation of society.

Yet, being free of the original sin (partly argued by the denial that all are descended from Adam) does not mean innocence, for that would be equal to imperfection. The imperfect man, always the sinner, generally creates a certain political power, which, however, is not an anthropological necessity. Man can dissolve the social contract by the very fact that, in theory at least, for a hypothetical moment, he can be imagined both as a human being and an individual outside the contract.

A few generations later, in the political movements of the 18th century, with less concern for the original sin and theological considerations, a new wording is employed: man is born free.

Notes

* Translated from Hungarian by Szasz Maria Augusta.

1 Miguel Servet, *De trinitatis erroribus libri septem*, Anno 1531 (Facsimile: Frankfurt a. M 1965).

2 Spinoza was in close contact with one of these Socinian communities.

3 Cluj-Napoca (Romania). As the author used the Hungarian toponym (Koložsvár) in the original text, it will be preserved throughout the translation. (tr..n.)

4 Jozsef Hajos says that after the Báthory censorship, Adam Neuser on behalf of Ferenc Dávid went to the occupied Simand to publish a debate sheet. See József Hajos, *Lessing Dávid Ferencéről. Erdélyi vonatkozások az első Neuser-cikkben* in Jozsef Hajos, *Barangolás koložsvári könyvtárakban* (Bukarest-Koložsvár: Kriterion Kvk, 1999), p.265.

5 Raków is an insignificant town today in the Vojvodina of Kielce, at the margins of the Polish Central Mountains, south of Warsaw, close to Radom.

6 Péter Juhász, during his college years in Wittenberg, in the fashion of the epoch, had his last name translated into Greek, then he used its Latin version, *Melius*, to sign his theological works in Latin.

7 Given the limited printing possibilities, the manuscript collection of the Unitarian college became crucially important. Many theological texts that could not be published because of the censorship were read and copied here. Most are in a 20th century printed version or else have never been printed. See the catalogue of the works: Elemer Lakó [Compiled by]: *The Manuscripts of the Unitarian College of Cluj/Kolozsvár in the Library of the Academy in Cluj-Napoca*, vol 1-2 (Szeged, 1997)

8 The Sabbatarians created an important manuscript literature that survived in the last Sabbatist community in Bözödújfalú [Bezdu Nou]. A part of it was published at the turn of the century, and now again. The latest text collection: András Kovács: *Bözödújfalvi szombatosok szertartási és imádságos könyve* (Pallas-Akadémia Kvk.: Csikszereda, 2000.) On their history see: Róbert Dán: *Az erdélyi szombatosok és Péchi Simon*.

9 The school functioned from 1558 to 1693 where the Sigismund Toduta Music High-school is located today.

10 Modern facsimile published with an introduction in English by Antal Pirnát : Budapest, Akadémiai k., 1988. Its modern translation: *Két könyv az egyedülvaló Atyaistennek, a Fiúnak és a Szentléleknek hamis és igaz ismeretéről*, (Kolozsvár, Unitárius Egyház, 2002.[Translated by Lajos Péter, introduction by Mihály Balázs.]

11 Modern facsimile published in: Warsaw, 1968.

12 Newer edition, used also by Locke: Groningen, 1670. Hungarian version translated by Máté Toroczka: *Az o es uy testamentvmbeli helyeknek, melyekbol az Haromsagrol valo tudomant szoktak allatni magyarázattyok* (Kolozsvát, 1619, 1620). Fragments of the Hungarian translation in a modern issue: *Enyedi György válogatott művei* (György Enyedi's Selected Works) (Bukarest-Kolozsvár, Kriterion, 1997).[Selected by Mihály Balázs and János Káldos, with foreword by Mihály Balázs.]

13 For our study, the volume by Mihály Balázs is particularly important: *Az erdélyi antitrinitarianizmus az 1560-as évek végén* (Akadémiai K: Budapest, 1988) For their research results available in world languages see: Róbert Dán and Antal Pirnát [eds]: *Antitrinitarianism in the Second Half of the 16th Century* (Akadémiai K, E.J. Brill: Budapest-Leiden, 1982.)

14 In the overall research of Locke resulting in the more specific discovery of these parallels in the English Unitarian thinker, the Cambridge school has played an important role. I was particularly interested in *Resistance, Religion and Responsibility* by John Marshall (Cambridge, 1996) and I will refer to its philological data several times.

15 See the quoted John Marshall, particularly pp. 141-146. In the last chapter of his book, where he tackles Locke's later line of thought, Marshall calls Locke a "Unitarian heretic", an unfortunate but unequivocal choice of words.

16 Modern edition: P Abrahams (ed), *Two Tracts Upon Government* (Cambridge, 1969).

17 Marshall quoted, p.145.

18 *Historia elegantissima regis Tancredi filiae, nec non secretarii regis Gisquardi*. Kolozsvár, 1582.

19 Manuscript available in the Romanian Academy Library, Kolozsvár/Cluj branch.

20 J.W.N. Watkins discusses in detail the relationship between Zarabella and Harvey, then through him with Hobbes: *Hobbes's System of Ideas. A study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories*, (Hutchinson University: London, 1965, 2nd ed 1973.) On Enyedi's studies in Padua, Zarabella's influence and the resulting conflicts at home, see Mihály Balázs's introduction to the above-mentioned modern edition of Enyedi.

21 I do not believe that the common aim was coincidental. I explain the exclusion of the Catholics from religious tolerance in Locke and Enyedi through the special early-modern view on the political community in my work published in *Kellék* in Kolozsvár: *A politikai közösség koramodern fogalma. John Locke előfeltevései*=*Kellék*, 2001, no.17, p.125-150.

.²² In P. Laslett (ed), *Two Treatises on Government* (Cambridge, 1963, 1987).

23 “Some would have all Adam’s posterity doomed to eternal infinite punishment, for the transgression of Adam, whom millions had never heard of, and no one had authorised to transact for him, or be his representative.” *Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered from the Scriptures*, 4-7; in *A Paraphrase and NOTES Upon the Epistles of St. Paul*, ed. A. Wainwright 2 vols. II, (Oxford, 1989) pp. 679.

24 P. Nidditch (ed.), *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford, 1978).

25 Palaeologus’s theory remained in manuscript during his life time but the Unitarian intellectuals of Kolozsvár, especially György Enyedi who copied Palaeologus’s works, was familiar with it although he did not discuss it in his works for the general public, so its indirect influence on Locke is practically impossible, yet important, to take into account as a parallel. The most

important manuscripts for the present topic are: *Iacobi Palaeologi De tribus gentibus*; *Iacobi Palaeologi De Peccato originis*; *Iacobo Palaeologi Am omnes ab uno Adamo descenderint*. See their modern editions in: Lech Szczucki: *W kregu myslicieli heretickich*. Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków, Gdansk, 1972, p. 229-244.

26 It is about *Preadamintae sive exertatio super versibus 12, 13 et 14 capituli V. Epistolae Pauli ad Romanos* by Isaac de la Peyrere, French Calvinist thinker, which appeared in Amsterdam in 1655. I do not have specific data about Locke having read it but the public burning of the books in Paris after the author foresook his theories lend such fame to the work that Locke must have heard about the matter and the related theory.

27 The original theory about the pre-Adamites in its obsolete form was still being propagated in some Calvinist Boer communities in the not too distant past with clear connections to the Apartheid.

The Community of Lipovean Russians from Romania

The author focuses on the topic of "Lipovean-Russian" from Romania, a denomination that he proposes as an alternative to the mainstream one, "Russian-Lipovean". The author of the paper documents on the history of this ethnic minority, which is also a religious one. In his analysis, the role of the Church is carefully examined, as it shaped the political context in which the Lipovean-Russians lived and their respective cultural life. The author also analyses the differences among different religious branches of this community.

The official literature employs the denomination Russian-Lipoveans. In my opinion, this is not a happy choice, as there are few non-Lipovean Russians in Romania. Moreover, the Lipoveans living in Romania are dispersed over a rather vast area and do not form compact demography. I propose as more opportune the Lipovean-Russians denomination because there are many Lipovean Romanians. The residents of the town of Lipova are called Lipoveans, and so are those living in the district of town Alba-Iulia. There are several vil-

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lages in the regions of Moldova and Oltenia by the name of Lipova or Lipoveni. Hence, I feel the name Lipovean-Russians to be more opportune. Over the last decades, the eponym Lipovean was a frequent occurrence in Romanian linguistics. An exhaustive history of the term Lipovean can be found in the Ph.D. thesis of Alla Vinteler¹, who considers that the origin of this term can be traced back to the patronymic of Filipp – the name of a monk. More recent authors² also endorse the idea.

Over the centuries, the Lipoveans and their ancestors went by the name of *staroobreadtsi*, and their religious cult was called *staroobreadcestvo*, in French: *Vieille Foi*, in English: the *Old Faith*, in Romanian: *believers in the old rite*. All that time, the term “believers in the old rite” was associated varied epithets such as *rascolnik*, *schismatic*, *sectants*. The Orthodox (Pravoslavnic) population in Ardeal was labeled schismatic³ by the Catholics and the Calvinists. In the same vein, several recordings of the believers in the old rite can be found in church and laic Russian official correspondence and documents. Documents recording them were published in Russian (the majority), in German⁴, in Romanian⁵, in English⁶, in French⁷, and other.

To better comprehend the situation of the believers in the old rite we must review briefly the history of the Russian religion. First, let us note that the Eastern Slavs hadn’t experienced slavery and the existence of a slave state in the 9th century when the Byzantine Empire, the most important state in Eastern Europe, was a feudal state, would surely be anachronistic. It is considered

that Russia was officially Christianized in the year 988, by Vladimir, prince of Kiev. Before and even after, the Eastern Slavs, organized in tribes, worshiped deities such as: Perun, Svarog, Dajbag, Veles, Hors, Makas and others. The number and hierarchy of their deities bear no comparison to those of the Greeks, Romans, or Indians. The pagan religion of the Eastern Slavs was conveyed in an oral poetry heavily influencing the subsequent high literature.

The conversion to Christianity of the Slavs in general, and of the Eastern Slavs in particular, had early beginnings. There is evidence that the early conversions of the Eastern Slavs took place in the south of present day Russia and the Ukraine, at the turn of the 4th century. Considering that the Byzantine Empire with its vast territory and influence was in the proximity, this thesis is quite valid. In fact, in that exact period Christianity was spreading to other neighboring populations. However, the definite official date for the diffusion of Christianity to the Eastern Slavs is the year 867 when Kievan Russia congregated for the evangelic sermon of Princes Askold and Dir, themselves baptized by Patriarch Fotii following their unsuccessful attack on the Byzantine Empire. Unfortunately, in 882 Askold and Dir were assassinated by Oleg, the infidel. Following their death, Christianity lost some of its holding and the process of diffusion slowed down in Kiev. Even so, the eastern Slav territory was registered as the 60th Eparchy of the Constantinople Patriarchy⁸. Under the reign of Igor a church under the patron saint Elijah is consecrated in the year 946. Next, princess Olga,

Vladimir's grandmother, is baptized in Constantinople, together with her kin and suite, marking yet another important step in the history of the Russian Church. Hence, when Vladimir, the nephew of Olga, was baptized at Constantinople, the Russian church had already a long tradition. The merit of Vladimir was that on his return from Constantinople he baptized all of his 12 sons, destroyed the idols and ordered that the population be baptized in the Nippers in the year 988. In conclusion, the process of Christening had begun long prior to 988 to be continued after.

The church played an important role in the foundation and the development of the Russian culture, in the spreading of writings, books, literature and artistic values. Writing was introduced to the Eastern Slavs before the spreading of Christianity.

Between the 9th and 10th centuries the Bogomilus movement, named after the doctrine of priest Bogomilus⁹, emerged in Bulgaria. This ideology spread quickly to Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, the Byzantine Empire, and later to Northern Italy, Southern France, and Germany. Over the following centuries the Bogomiles influenced the Eastern Slavs too.

In early 13th century the Mongol State was flourishing. At the same time, Eastern Europe, the Middle Orient and even China were undergoing a period of turmoil and discord. Genghis-Khan took advantage of the situation in the intent of conquering the world. After conquering the peoples of Siberia, Northern China and Central Asia he headed for Eastern Europe, and in 1223 he defeated the Russians at Kala. The year 1236

marked the beginning of the process of subordination and occupation of the Russian territories. 1380 was the year of the renowned battle at Kulikovo with heavy losses on both sides. The Mongol occupation continued for two and a half centuries, throughout which Russia was cut off from Europe, with many cities in the occupied territory destroyed and burned down along with their cultural treasures, the churches in particular. The economy, commerce, culture, all suffered under the occupation. The cities in the North were spared and consequently prospered moderately. During the latter half of the occupation period, the subject population enjoyed moderate freedom. The Churches, particularly the convents, granted freedom by the Khans, developed and accumulated wealth even while continuing to Christen the infidel peasants. It was a time when the church and state official ties strengthened. The metropolitan bishop Cyril tried to unify the doctrines in the religious publications and to impose a uniform standard.

Throughout these two centuries, religion and church in such orthodox countries as Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, the Romanian Principalities, underwent some changes. These countries were under the religious influence and patronage of the Byzantine Empire. After Cyril's death, the Russian metropolitan church was divided into two: the Muscovite church and the Lithuanian church. After the conquest of the town of Kazan, an orthodox department was set up, a church was consecrated and a diocese was established. The

spreading of the orthodoxy in Astrakhan and in Siberia followed a similar pattern.

The intensification of Catholic propaganda in Southwest Russia was an urge for the orthodox to build schools and typographies to fight the papists. The brotherhoods also ran schools that prepared the orthodox to fight the Unitarians. Just as in Ardeal, the leaders of the Russian Church were persecuted by the Unitarians. In the North, confessional education was hindered by specific factors.

In order to speed up the spreading of orthodox influence, in 1625 Patriarch Filaret founded in Russia four metropolitan churches, six archbishoprics and eight bishoprics. Boris Godunov intended to found a university, but his initiative was strongly opposed by the church, so he was content with founding just a few schools. I have mentioned all these in support of the idea that the reforms of Nikon were the continuation and culmination of orthodoxy in Russia.

The issue, then, is not whether there was a reform of the church, but rather how the reform was implemented. Religious reform in Russia was preceded by civil wars, by feudal anarchy, other reforms and the passage of various laws, all taking place in other European countries. Thus, “in the context created in the second half of the 14th century by the centralization propensities, there emerged even larger and more powerful states, which in turn accelerated the process of territorial unification within, as was the case in Poland, the Great Principality of Lithuania, the Russian Principalities of the north-east, or the Serbian kingdom. This

process was accompanied by monetary and legislative unification, the latter also determining the consolidation of the central power, the strengthening of the laic and ecclesiastic territory and the conversion of the peasants into serfs. The social and economic context is reflected in the laws of Vaclav II in Bohemia, in the *Zakonik* of 1349 of Stefan Dusan in Serbia, and in the code of Leo I in 1341 in Hungary.”¹⁰

In Russia the centralization of power intensified in the 15th century and was continued under Tsar Ivan the Terrible (1533-1584), Boris Godunov (1598-1606), Vasili Suiski (1606- 1610). The founder of the Romanov dynasty, Mikhail Feodorovici (1613- 1645) prohibited the peasant’s movement during the field seasons. His son, Alexey Mikhailovich (1645-1676) ultimately tied the peasants to the land. The above laws in conjunction with the religious laws caused turmoil among the Russians.

We have already mentioned that the Metropolitan Cyril was contemplating a reconsideration of the translation of the Scriptures. The setting of unified rules for all Russian orthodox provinces came, too, under scrutiny during the rule of Ivan the Terrible. In this sense, see “The Council of the 100 Articles” summoned in 1551. From the proposal of Cyril to the Synod of 1654 at Moscow, there was a lapse of two and half centuries, during which the differences between books and rituals came under analysis and debate.

The Nikon reform raises many questions. We have no wish to enumerate or pause at every one of them. Some, however, are worth mentioning. Why was it nec-

essary that the reform be implemented precisely then? After the downfall of the Byzantine Empire and the fall of Constantinople under Turkish dominion, Russia remained the only independent orthodox country. Russia concentrated the elite orthodox intelligentsia from Constantinople, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and the Romanian Principalities. To Moscow they brought along many religious books but also customs novel to the land. Let us quote in this line an expert in the history of religions: “When the star of New Rome set, the star of old imperial Byzantium, in the north rose yet another Orthodox Empire claiming for itself the heritage of the fortress lost by the Christians and the splendor of the crown of the orthodox Emperor, the representative and defender of all righteous Christian believers. The Tsar was led to believe this not only by his subjects and the Russian clergy, but mainly by the Greeks and the Serbians too, who came flocking to Moscow with every opportunity to extol him...”¹¹

Bishop Filotei of Pskov, remarking on the progress and growing power of Russia, and on the beauty and grandeur of Kremlin, wrote in a letter of 1512 to prince Vasilie III (1533): “Moscow is the heir of the great capitals of world, of ancient Rome and of the second Rome after Constantinople, the former owing its fall to papal heresy, the latter to the union at Florence. Moscow is the third Rome, the believer in good faith, and there will never be a fourth Rome.”¹² Due to its power and extension, the Russian Orthodox Church became the patron of all orthodox believers around the world. Ev-

eryone looked to Russia for help, both spiritual and material, from the Russian patriarchy.

During the 250-year period some differences between the Russian and the Balkan churches emerged, which then called for standardization. Even though formally the Russian Church was subordinated to the Constantinople Patriarchy, it couldn't operate changes in the rite as readily as the Balkan countries could. Russia's intention was to increase its influence over Southeastern Europe, but it could not coerce the Balkan countries to resume the old rite, and so ended up by accepting the doctrines of the orthodox believers in the Balkans. This explains why Tsar Alexey Mikhailovici involved himself personally in the implementation of the religious reform in Russia. Political and ideological interests played a leading role in the religious reform, while religious interests came only second. Nikon was merely an upstart implementer, uneducated and lacking the necessary training for the position of metropolitan bishop and patriarch. The sudden death of his competitor, Stefan Vonifatiev, shortly after abandoning the race, can only set one thinking. Other advocates of the Nikonian reforms were patriarchs Macarie of Antioch and Paisie of Alexandria, who participated in the Synod of 1667.

If I'm not mistaken, I think that rather than Tsar Alexei adhering and backing the ideas of Nikon's reform, it was really a matter of Nikon tacitly accepting and implementing them. The combined action by the patriarch and the tsar to change the rite and church books aimed at imposing the same standard not only in

Russia and the Balkan countries, but also in the Ukraine and Belorussia. The goal was, on the one hand, to elaborate a uniform orthodox rite across the entire territory of Great Russia, and on the other, to create a rite for all orthodoxy. The situation of the holy books had been rather awkward since the introduction of Christianity. Numerous churches had been built but hardly enough books printed to propagate and to educate the people in the rite. The early translations were poor and superficial. Greek translators were not familiar with the Slavonic language, and the Russians didn't have a good command of Greek, creating a situation that engendered differences from the start. Even though the differences pertained to form only, they ignited hot debates and opposition. Also, as I have mentioned, the development of Christianity generated further differences leading to schism and turmoil. Let us see what differences were triggered by such debate:

Believers in the old rite

'Alleluia' is chanted twice, followed by 'Glory to You, God'.

The sign of the Cross is made with two fingers.

The eight-corner cross is accepted.

Liturgy is served with seven communion breads.

Processions around the church follow the direction of the sun.

Priests are chosen from among parishioners and do not take long training to serve in churches. Priests depend on the congregation for their livelihood.

Priests shave their beards and wear their hair short.

Entrance into the church regulates conduct and dress.

Smoking and drinking are prohibited.

Believers in the new rite

'Alleluia' is chanted three times, in translations there is also a fourth.

The sign of the Cross is made with three fingers.

The six-corner cross is accepted.

Liturgy is served with five communion breads.

Processions around church are counter sun movement.

To solve the differences above, a synod was summoned at Moscow in 1654 where the reform ideas proposed by Nikon were met with hostility. Nikon, however, thirsting for power suggested the use of force against his opponents. They counted among them bishops, priests, monks, as well as nobility. Let's just mention countess Morozova and her sister Urusova. The opponents sided with tradition. Nikon did not even wait for the synod to end to start the attack upon his opponents. The atrocities committed against the believers in the old rite are unbelievable. The adepts were put in chains, burned at the stake, had their tongues, hands, nose, and ears cut off. Whole families and entire villages were sent on permanent exile to Siberia. The atrocities of the official church and of the authorities knew no bounds. After the meeting of 1667, the fight against the opponents was taken over by the state authorities. Why? Simultaneously to the forceful introduction of reforms by Nikon, the Russian Orthodox Church experienced a breach that hasn't healed to this

day. This led to the emergence of two orthodox churches: the Nikonian Church, to become the official church of Russia, and the Orthodox Church in the old rite or the schism church. The latter serviced by the old books and traditional rite, and its believers were called schismatic and Rascolnic.

Amos Porfiru¹³ offered a rather unreasonable analysis of the term Rascolnic, based on some Romanian and bilingual dictionaries. Every dictionary or encyclopedia that discusses realities of other countries derives its sources from documents in the respective languages. I think that it would have been more reasonable for Mr. A. Porfiru to read A.N.Vostokov (1781-1864) *Slovarj cerkovno -slavjanskogo jazyka*, Vol.1-2, Saint Petersburg, 1858-1861 or *Natolnij enciklopediceskij slovari*, Moscova, 1895, Vol. 8, PP. 582-592. It doesn't mean that I totally disagree with the ideas espoused by A. Porfiru. After all, who initiated the study of the Orthodox Church in Russia? The representatives of the traditional church? Certainly not!

We consider that the believers in the old rite were unreasonably labeled schismatic. Schism means "the formal separation of a group of believers from the religious community to which they appertain", or "scission" for schism in French. Query: who was separated from whom, more exactly? Is it possible for an entire population to separate from a leading group, or is the reverse true? Similar explanations can be provided for such terms as sect, sectarian, and others. Sectarian, which means "intolerant with the beliefs of others, exclusive", can very well be applied to the Nikonians. The

schism (*rascol*) represented in the existence of the Russian people a paramount event of great magnitude. The movement, involving the private family life of a vast population, bred many purely religious ideas and tendencies, which intertwined with vital social problems, caused some anxiety within the Russian society at the time. New regulations in human relations were introduced, changes in attitudes and beliefs, but mostly in religious belief.

In those hard times, believers in the old rite were forced to choose between maltreatment and persecution and abandoning their homes for peripheral and isolated locations exempt from the direct surveillance of the authorities and the official church. The Rascolnics were not permitted to live in towns and marriages were validated only if performed by the official church. In the places they moved, the believers in the old rite built new villages, towns, churches, monasteries, cleared and cultivated the land. But persecution units followed them all the way here. Villages and towns fell once again victims to the tsarist authorities. Due to continued persecution, the Rascolnics fled to the South then under Turkish dominion, to the Baltic countries, to Poland, to Bucovina then occupied by the Austrians, and to Dobrogea. When the Russian army attacked the Ottoman Empire the villages of the believers in the old rite were destroyed. The old rite Russian population was banned access to religious and cultural centers, to official institutions. Consequently, the believers in the old rite duly developed several currents called sects. In Romania they came to be known as the

Lipoveni/ Filipoveti. The founder of the sect was Fotii, an army officer who had defected from Novgorod to the monastery of Vagodsk, where he lived for a time under the name of monk Filipp. At the demise of Daniil Vikulov, the abbot, Filipp intended to take his place, but Semen Denisov was preferred over him. Not taking defeat easily, Filipp started writing several letters denouncing the poor administration of the monastery under Semen. To solve the problem a council was summoned, which ruled in favor of Semen Denisov. Filipp together with 50 others then left the monastery and built another not far from Vigovsk.

Filipp introduced the 8 corner cross, ruled that believers must pray only to their own private icons. They must not pray for the tsar. Husband and wife if married before must be divorced and chastised. They should consider one another brothers and sisters.

In 1742 a commission led by Samarin visiting all the northern monasteries arrived at the one administered by Filipp. The Filippovens shut themselves in and wouldn't meet the members of the commission. The commission ordered the gates broken down, but the Filippovens set the monastery on fire with them inside. Some must have survived because the name of sect has been preserved. The first collective suicide was recorded at Pomorie, in Palostrove, in 1687, when 2,700 people set themselves on fire.

Not having a guiding center, a hierarchical authority to organize the activity of the believers in the old rite, many currents - called sects by the official church - emerged. In Romania another sect was that of the

Bespopovtii (without a priest) which had no ordained priest. The official church wouldn't acknowledge the priests of the sect, consequently no baptism, marriage, or burial could be performed. The doctrine of the Bespopovtii forbade marriage, demanded sexual abstinence, but the precepts were not obeyed and the convents often had to close an eye to philandering. Confronted with an increase in clandestine affairs in mid 18th century Ivan Alexeev proposed that the stricter precepts should be observed only by those capable of it, indicating that it was best for the rest to marry.

Another sect, whose members live in the village 2 May, Romania, was that of the Skopits (*skopit* means to physically remove the testicles, to castrate). This sect derived from still another called Plastovscina, whose members sought Salvation through torture unto death. For the same reason they practiced castration persuaded of its honorable and glorious power to heal. Unable to procreate, they disappeared.

The Church and tsarist administration launched fierce attacks upon the believers in the old rite. They even edited special magazines against them such as "Russkij palomnik", "Bratskoe slovo", "Missionerskoe obozrenie", and more. The problem they were confronted with was the extraordinary speed and the vast area of diffusion of the *rascol* and Rascolnics in Russia. In my opinion, however, the problem is misinterpreted. It is a known fact that the service in all the Russian churches was performed in the old rite, so it wasn't really a matter of spreading - they *had been* there all this time. Instead, it was rather the official church that

needed to propagate its new regulations and have them accepted. In other words, rather than the believers in the old rite struggling against the official church, we have the reverse case. They were merely trying to defend a tradition.

All of the tsarist administrative and official church propaganda directed against the believers in the old rite denote deep hate combined with fear. They propagated their image under the slogan: they are the ultimate evil. However, there were indeed 'good' contributions by the believers in the old rite. They settled isolated territories, cleared and cultivated the land, engaged in different trades, built mills, fished and traded. Soon, they were prospering. The convents were ranked as monasteries but were organized on laic principles. There were schools for children of both sexes, with their own qualified teachers, and endowed libraries. They copied books, old rite documents, wrote poetry, painted allegorical pictures. In the localities with old rite residents everyone could read (in sharp contrast, by the 20th century the majority of the Russian population was still illiterate).

A statistics of the year 1863 compiled by Fon Bucheni registers 8,220,000 believers in the old rite representing 1/6 of the entire Russian population. Romania, due to persecutions, was the choice of the old rite believers called Lipoveni. They first settled in Dobrogea, Bucovina, and Moldova. They have a special place in their houses reserved for the cross, icons, and candles where every member of the family prays. Every family has a private bath where they wash every Saturday for one is not allowed to enter the church not groomed.

Notes

1. Alla Vinteler, *Lexicul folclorului lipovenesc*, Cluj, 1974, p.12-15
2. Idem, p.16-21; Sevastian Fenoghev, *Sarichioi* (pagini de istorie), Bucuresti, 1998, p.150-156; Peter Osip, *Rusii de rit vechi (lipveni) in Tarile Romane*, in *Cultura rusilor lipoveni (ortodoxi de rit vechi din Romania) in context national si international*, Bucuresti, 1998, p.152-153.
3. Cf. Siviu Dragomir, *Relatiile bisericii romanesti cu Rusia in veacul XVII*, Bucuresti, 1912; Idem, *Istoria dezrobirii religioase a romanilor din Ardeal: secolul XVIII*, vol.I, Sibiu, 1920, vol.II, 1930.
4. Johann Polek, *Die Lippowaner in der Bukowina*, Czernowitz, 1896, Karl Konrad Crass, *Die russischen Sekten*, Dornpab-Leipzig, 1907, 1914.
5. St. Melchisedec, *Lipovenismula, dica schismaticii si ereticii rusi*, Bucuresti, 1871; I. Nistor, *Cercetari asupra cultului lipovenesc din Romania*, cf. si vol. F. Chirila, A. Ivanov, Th.Olteanu, *Probleme de dialectologie. Graiurile lipvenesti din Romania*, Bucuresti, 1993
6. Cf. Victor Vascenco, *Omisiune istorica regretabila*, in *Cultura rusilor lipoveni*, p.96
7. Idem
8. *Nastol'nyj enciklopediceskij slovar'*, Moscova, 1895, tom.VIII - yj., p.5082
9. V.K.Zajcev, *Bogomil'skoe dvizenie i obscestvenaja zizn severnoj Italii epohi Ducento*, Minsk, 1967
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Cerasela Maria Virlan-Blaj

Comunitatile catolice din Moldova

Studiu de caz - Satele cu populatie romano –
catolica din vecinatatea orasului Roman

The existence of Catholic communities in Moldavia has raised questions not for the Orthodox population from neighbourhood but mostly for the Hungarian and Romanian history researchers.

The term „csangos” was first used in 1783 by Petru Zold, a priest, in order to describe these communities and the term remained as such in the Hungarian historyography (and in the last decade it has also been borrowed by the Romanian historyography) but is not accepted and used by the majority of people belonging to the community.

The present case-study dedicated to the villages situated near Roman attempts to answer some questions related to the origin and evolution of these communities without the intention of an exhaustive study.

Populatia catolica din Moldova nu ridica serioase semne de intrebare asupra gradului de toleranta a poporului roman, dar a pus serioase probleme istoriografiei. Revendicata atat de istoricii maghiari, cit si de unii istorici romani, aceasta populatie s-a declarat in majoritate, la recensamintul din 1992, de origine romana¹. Termenul de „ceangai” utilizat generic pentru a desemna aceasta populatie a fost folosit pentru prima data de Petru Zold in secolul al XVIII-lea, cu sensul de „corcit”, „amestecat” (vom observa mai jos in ce imprejurari) si a fost preluat de istoriografia maghiara, in ultimul deceniu si de cea romana, dar nu este folosit si acceptat de marea majoritate a celor pe care ii denomineaza, fiind considerat peiorativ. Confuzia porneste de la faptul ca aceste comunitati sunt studiate ca un tot unitar, omogen, desi intre ele pot fi observate deosebiri clare.

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Profesorul D. Martinas, in lucrarea sa, *Originea ceangailor din Moldova* opereaza distinctia intre cele doua categorii etnice cunoscute sub denumirea de ceangai:

- grupul celor concentrati „in regiunea municipiilor Roman (grupul nordic) si Bacau (grupul sudic), despre care se stie in mod cert ca nu sunt secui, se imbraca in port romanesc, vorbesc cei mai multi romaneste intr-un grai specific transilvanean si traiesc dupa datina si felul romanilor”, si

- „grupul celor de origine secuiasca, asezati in marea lor majoritate pe vaile Trotusului si Tazlului, putini pe valea Siretului, vorbind un grai matern foarte apropiat de cel secuiesc, avind obiceiuri secuiesti si modul de viata asemanator cu al secuilor”².

Plecind de la aceste consideratii, demersul de fata se constituie intr-un studiu de caz dedicat comunitatilor catolice din jurul orasului Roman.

Din *Dictionarul geografic al judetului Roman*³, publicat in 1891 de P. Condrea, aflam ca satele vecine orasului Roman, a caror populatie e de confesiune catolica, sunt asezate de o parte si de alta a riului Siret, la nord-est de Iasi. Ele sunt distribuite astfel:

- Adjudeni, Sabaoani, Rachiteni, Tetcani, Tamaseni pe malul drept al Siretului;

- Rotunda, Buhonca, Butea, Buruienesti pe malul stang;

- pe platoul dintre bazinele riurilor Moldova si Siret, satele Halaucesti, Barticesti si Iugani⁴.

Primele stiri despre existenta unei populatii de confesiune catolica in aceasta zona ni le ofera documentul ce mentioneaza sprijinul acordat de

Margareta Musata construirii de lacasuri de cult catolice, intre care este mentionata si biserica de piatra din Sabaoani, in preajma anului 1377⁵. Secolul al XV-lea reprezinta pentru existenta catolicismului in Moldova o perioada a confruntarilor cu activitatea husitilor. Favorizati de atitudinea toleranta a domnului Alexndru cel Bun, husitii desfasoara o intensa activitate misionara care se adreseaza cu precadere comunitatilor catolice. Din reactia Curiei papale aflam ca la acea vreme sasii si maghiarii detineau majoritatea in rindurile catolicilor din Moldova⁶.

In secolul al XVI-lea, catolicismul moldovean va fi marcat atit de politica religioasa a domnilor moldoveni, cit si de patrunderea curentelor „reformate” dinspre Transilvania⁷. Miscarea protestanta a determinat reactia Bisericii romane. Sfarsitul secolului inregistreaza o puternica actiune de recuperare a teritoriilor pierdute. Activitatea intensa a misionarilor catolici desfasurata in a doua jumatate a secolului ne ofera citeva informatii despre localitatile din jurul Romanului: un calugar anunta pe episcopul de Camenita ca ereticii din Husi si Roman au fost intorsi la catolicism⁸; in aceeasi perioada, calugarul ungar Michael T. Feghedinus anunta reintoarcerea la catolicism a husitilor din Trotus, Roman si satele vecine (fara a le numi). In 1599, episcopul Bernardino Quirini trece in revista situatia catolicismului moldovean. Sunt amintite bisericile din Roman si Sabaoani, care au fost distruse de atacurile tatarilor si nu pot fi refacute de credinciosii prea saraci. Din acesta cauze preotii lipsesc, caci s-au refugiat in Transilvania⁹. Referitor la activitatea misionara a

episcopului, aflam ca acesta a reusit sa aduca la catolicism multi eretici, printre care se numara si ortodocsi. (E prima mentiune ce se refera explicit la romanii trecuti la catolicism.)

Lipsa preotilor care sa pastoreasca populatia catolica va fi o problema si la inceputul secolului al XVII-lea, un raport anonim din 1606 facind referire la bisericile din Roman si Sabaoani, lipsite de preoti: “Romula... contiene una chiesa cattolica senza rettore Sabojana, villa, il popolo e catolico et ha chiesa murata, ma no vi e sacerdote”¹⁰. Din inventarul cuprinzator pe care episcopul Bandini l-a realizat la 1646, in urma calatoriei prin toate localitatile cu populatie catolica, rezulta ca satele din preajma Romanului sufereau nu numai de o lipsa acuta de preoti, dar si de o depopulare. La Roman gaseste 6 case de catolici, 36 de suflete cu tot cu copii (“ungari et saxones”). Viziteaza si satele din preajma, oferind si o descriere geografica: 3 sate la rind aproape de Siret la rasarit Tamaseni, Adjudeni, Rachiteni, iar spre nord Sabaoani, Lucasesti si Tetcani. Toate satele sunt pastorite de preotul de la Sabaoani, situatia demografica permitindu-i un astfel de efort: la Tamaseni gaseste 70 de locuitori (25 femei, 18 barbati, restul copii), la Adjudeni 63 de locuitori, la Lucasesti 40¹¹. Pentru a rezolva situatia lipsei acute de preoti, Congregatiunea de Propaganda Fide trimite in Moldova calugari franciscani, in majoritate italieni¹², pentru care exista cereri exprese in acest sens¹³.

Secolul al XVII-lea a fost pentru Moldova unul de grele incercari, dese incursiuni ale tatarilor, operatiile militare desfasurate pe teritoriul ei ducind la o scadere

dramatica a populatiei, cei care scapau de captivitate retragindu-se in locuri mai putin expuse. La 1671, Vito Piluzio spune, cu referire la Tamaseni, ca “omini non sono”¹⁴. E un moment in care incep sa se produca schimbari in componenta etnica a comunitatilor catolice. La 1671, preotul misionar G. Battista, ajuns la Roma spune ca in Moldova limba valaha e limba nativa a catolicilor, adaugand ca si limba maghiara e necesara¹⁵. La 1676, Arhiepiscopul de Corint, intr-o relatare despre Moldova, propune infiintarea unui seminar pentru elevi valahi pentru a forma un cler indigen¹⁶. Daca nu ar fi existat romani catolici, nu ar fi avut de unde sa recruteze acesti elevi. E posibil ca, pe fondul dispersiei populatiei, regruparea dupa trecerea primejdiei sa se fi facut in jurul unei biserici ramasa in picioare (bisericile catolice erau din piatra)¹⁷ si in jurul unui preot care sa se fi intors la parohia sa, diferentele etnice pierzandu-si importanta.

Daca sfarsitul secolului al XVII-lea ramane in sfera probabilului, secolul al XVIII-lea ne ofera informatii mult mai clare. Stim ca din Transilvania, pe fondul nemulțumirilor iscate de infiintarea regimentelor de granita, are loc o emigrare a populatiei spre Moldova, unde ii sunt oferite scutiri de taxe¹⁸. Inca din 1699, Antioh Cantemir incuviinteaza aducerea de colonisti cu inlesniri de ordin fiscal¹⁹. In acelasi timp, misionarii franciscani din Moldova isi inmultesc raportarile cu referire la cresterea numarului credinciosilor catolici. Prefectul misiunii franciscane Franciscua Antonio Manzi scrie in relatarea sa despre Moldova la 1745 : “il rito dei Cristiani in questa Provincia una buona parte e

Apostolico-Romano, alții sînt Greci-Catolici uniți, alții sînt Armeni Catolici del Rito greco”²⁰.

În aprilie 1763, superiorul franciscan Iosif M Cambiloli scrie secretarului Congregației de Propaganda Fide: “În Moldova de 7 ani încoace numărul catolicilor noștri a crescut și crește în fiecare zi, nu pentru că necatolicii ar trece la noi, ci pentru că în Ungaria și mai ales în Transilvania a fost și este mare foamete, și acum de cînd s-a făcut pacea între austrieci și prusaci, sînt soldați cu forță și de aceea au venit și vin într-una în această provincie familii întregi și mare număr de tineret de la 14 ani în sus, fiindcă de la așa o vîrstă îi înrolează în armată. Cîte un luteran și cîte un cavinist, nașînd nici un pastor, s-au convertit la credința catolică. [...] de patru ani încoace s-au făcut în Moldova, în două sate, două biserici nouă de ale noastre, cum n-au mai fost așa mari și frumoase [...] una în Halaucești și alta la Talpa. În Halaucești sînt 60 de familii, toate catolice”²¹. Despre componenta etnică a populației din Halaucești ne oferă informații matricolele parohiale, care, la 1776, conțin nume ca: Radu, Grigorie, Enaru, Oprea, Omusoru, Moraru, Dogaru, Niculai, Talmaciu, Plesca, Cobzaru²².

Despre înființarea unor noi sate pe valea Siretului în secolul al XVIII-lea ne dau informații matricolele parohiale; în satul Barticești, matricolele parohiale încep consemnarea locuitorilor la 1780 și primele nume consemnate sînt: Bartic, Martin, Gabor, Blaj, Morar, Dumitras²³ — ceea ce arată că populația e amestecată. Matricolele din Tamaseni înregistrează existența filiilor Rotunda și Buruienesti formate peste Siret.

În relatarea oferită în anul 1780 de Petru Zold — preot secui refugiat în Moldova după evenimentele de la Madefalau — sub titlul *Notitia de rebus Hungarorum qui in Moldavia et ultra degant*²⁴ este amintit, între satele înființate de coloniști veniți din Transilvania, și satul Gheraiești, alături de Halaucești și Talpa. Petru Zold constată că locuitorii acestor sate vorbesc și ungurește și românește, pronunția ungurească fiind foarte neplăcută. Mai observă și că “hainele le sînt românești, nu sînt scumpe și sînt lucrate de femeile lor”²⁵.

Din informațiile rezumate mai sus rezultă că, în secolul al XVIII-lea, satele catolice din vecinătatea orașului Roman își sporesc populația și se înmulțesc. Unele își continuă existența (cu mici întreruperi la sfîrșitul secolului XVII) pe malul drept al Siretului: Sabaoani, Tetcani, Rachiteni, Adjudeni și Tamaseni, alături de vechii locuitori așezându-se noii veniți din Transilvania (mulți dintre ei români). Satele nou înființate se situează pe malul stîng al Siretului: Rotunda, Buruienesti, Butea sau în spațiul dintre bazinele riurilor Siret și Moldova: Halaucești, Barticești și Gheraiești, cu populație în mare parte românească, consemnată în matricolele parohiale. Nici unul din satele amintite nu era proprietate a Bisericii catolice, care să fi exercitat o catolicizare forțată. Dar știm că noile sate se întemeiază în vecinătatea unor sate cu populație catolică care frecventează biserici de piatră. Nu e exclus că populația nou venită să fi frecventat aceste biserici, aflate în pastorația unui preot catolic și cu timpul să fi devenit filii ale vechilor parohii.

Un argument important în favoarea ideii că aceste sate nou înființate au o populație majoritar românească este cel lingvistic. În Sabaoani - sat cu existența continuă de-a lungul timpului - populația își menține până azi particularitățile lingvistice, amestecând cuvinte române și maghiare. În celelalte sate, astfel de particularități nu există, deși nimic nu le-ar fi împiedicat să se mențină. Există, în schimb, alte particularități identificate de D. Martinas ca fiind de proveniență transilvană: africizarea dentalelor *t, d* - urmate de *e, i* (de exemplu *frunci-frunte* sau *munci-munte*), rostirea siflanta *s*: *s, z*: *j* (*sarpi* în loc de *sarpe*, *sasi* în loc de *sase*, *cozoc* în loc de *cojoc*) și conservarea lui *l'* (*muiat*) la verbul a lua: *eu l'eu, tu l'ei, el l'e, ei l'eu*.

Informațiile prezentate aici ne duc la concluzia că istoria acestor comunități se leagă de vecinătăți. Cele mai vechi sunt cele de pe malul drept al Siretului - unele își întrerup existența temporară și la refacere își primesc componenta etnică. Cele noi se formează prin așezarea de populație transilvăneană în vecinătatea celor vechi sau prin roirea populației din vechile sate și alăturarea noilor veniți pe malul stâng al Siretului. Vecinătatea sau chiar relațiile de proprietate cu majoritatea ortodoxă (în secolul al XVIII-lea Sabaoani aparține mănăstirii Secu, iar Halauceni vornicului C-tin Cantacuzino)²⁶ nu le perturbă existența, deși în decursul timpului fiecare sa a pierdut sau a castigat adepți din partea cealaltă, fapt absolut firesc în contextul unei vecinătăți.

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The Veil as Metaphor of French Colonized Algeria

The paper examines the shift of the veil from a religious and traditional symbol to a political metaphor during French colonized Algeria (1830–1962). It discusses the significance of veiling for both the colonizers and the colonists. For France, unveiled women would have been the proof of colonial power. For Algeria, veiling represented resistance to assimilation. Caught in between, the veil can be considered a metaphor for the Algerian colonization.

The first part of the paper explores the religious and traditional meanings associated with the veil. The second part analyses the political importance of the veil during colonization and its use as a tool for misleading the French authorities.

I. INTRODUCTION

May 13, 1958: *“Colons seized the overthrow of the 4th Republic. French women, to applauding crowds, lifted the veils from the heads of a number of Muslim women, who gratefully smiled at the cameraman”* (*New York Times Magazine*). Behind this drama cited by D. Gordon¹, were wives of French generals pretending to be native Algerians.

May 6, 1962: for the first time, terrorist shooting opens on veiled women in the streets of Algiers.

Why was the veil meaningful for both the French and the Algerians? How was the veil perceived by Algerians and by the French? In what way did colonization transform the significance of the veil? How can the

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shift of the veil from a religious and traditional symbol to a political metaphor be explained? I will analyze the significance of veiling for both the colonizers and the colonists. For France, unveiled women would have been the proof of colonial power. For Algeria, veiling represented resistance to assimilation. Caught in between, the veil can be considered a metaphor for the Algerian colonization. The history of the veil during French colonization was intertwined with the history of Algerian women. I argue that it is not true that Algerian women were apolitical. They participated in politics in specific ways, according to the circumstances. Under the French colonization, their way was to take part in secret missions, using the veil as an instrument of concealment. For the role of the veil in colonial history, I will consider the Algerian nationalist attitude toward women. For the place of the veil in the colonizers' attitude, I will examine the image of Algerian women in French at that time.

The first part of the paper will discuss the religious and traditional meanings associated with the veil. The second part will examine the political importance of the veil during colonization and its use as a tool for misleading the French authorities. I will restrict to the colonial time (1830 – 1962). While the traditional pre-colonial aspects about veiling are relevant to this study in order to make visible the new meanings of the veil during colonization, this paper will not cover the post-colonial feminist debates about veiling. I chose the Algerian case because it proved to have a special status among the North African colonies. At the time femi-

nists from Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt struggled for emancipation from foreign and patriarchal power, Algerian women fought for the national cause. Under these circumstances, the battle for the veil became the metaphor of resistance to colonization².

Before starting the discussion about veiling during the French colonized Algeria, I consider it necessary to make distinctions between the paradigms that shaped the place of woman in Islamic society. Barbara Freyer Stowasser³ mentions three paradigms: traditionalist, Islamist and modernist. First, the Islamist paradigm implies equality between the sexes, but demands different roles for each. The Koran prescriptions are highly regarded. Veiling was not a designated rule. Second, traditionalism rejects the Koran prescriptions about equality and enhances woman's subordination. The stress on veiling is a traditionalist product. Third, modernism reconsiders the Koran norms historically. In this context, women's political rights are promoted. Modernism, like Islamism, aims to achieve both an authentic and a Koran-centered Islam⁴. Modernism took an "activist" form in which Western feminism influenced the Islamic discourse. The veil became a highly debated issue. It was claimed to be a symbol of patriarchal oppression.

Although modernity emerged in 1940s Algeria, I consider that a distinction should be made between the modern period before independence (1940s – 1962) and the postcolonial period in respect to the veil. Even though it belongs to modernity, the use of the veil as an instrument during the war of independence is a particular moment in the modern history of the veil. The

present paper aims to consider three patterns, namely: the Islamist, the traditionalist and the “instrumentalisation” of the veil. Although any attempt to see them separately is artificial, for the purpose of being systematic, I will discuss them apart.

“Definitions”

A possible explication of the difficulties in understanding veiling may be found in the linguistic differences between Western and Islamic culture. A brief presentation of the English and the Arabic words will follow.

The veil is defined by Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary as a length of cloth worn by women as a covering for the head and shoulders and often for the face, a concealing curtain or cover of cloth. Another meaning refers to covering or concealing⁵. The etymology for the English word “veil” is Latin: *veile* (Middle English, 13th century) < *voile* (Old North French) < *vēla*/ *vēlum* (Lat.). The term has four dimensions of meanings: material (clothing, ornament), spatial (screen, division of the space), communicative (invisibility), religious (celibacy)⁶.

With reference to the Islamic world, there is no Arabic equivalent for the Western word “veil”. There are over a hundred terms for dress parts, many used for “veiling” (including dual – gendered and gender-neutral terms). A great part of the dispute around the veil is due to a linguistic difference between two Arabic terms:

“hijab” and “Khimar.” The “Hijab” is the word usually translated into “veil” or “yashmak”. The etymology is Arabic: *Hijab* (Islam) < *hajaba* (Arab), meaning “to hide from view or conceal”⁷. “Khimar” means “cover”- any cover: a curtain is a Khimar, a dress is a Khimar, a table cloth that covers the top of a table is a Khimar, a blanket is a Khimar.

The usual “correspondent” word for veil in Arabic is “hijab”. It is the term used by many Muslim women to describe their head covering, which may or may not cover all the face but the eyes, and sometimes also covers one eye (in certain parts of Algeria). In modern Islam, it refers to the modest dress worn by Muslim women that covers the head and body. The degree of concealment depends on the social and economic background of the woman. Additionally, cultural origin, demographic setting, the religious or secular educational background also contribute to the adopted form of veiling. The degree of veiling is most noticeable in the variety of colors and styles. In this paper I will refer only at the hijab as it pertains to Algerian Muslim women – usually black, covering the entire body (including the fingers) and the face excepting the eyes.

Two ideas will be of help from the above definitions. One refers to the linguistic difference between the Western concept of “veil” and the Islamic ones; the other refers to the differences inside the Islamic language. The first idea implies that the Western concept of the veil is monolithic and vague, unable to cover the original local meanings. The variety of terms regarding “the veil” in a society where “veiling” is a specific prac-

tice highlights the complexity of the matter, which cannot be attached to a single word. The second idea distinguishes between “hijab” and “Khimar”, meaning the difference between “hiding” and “covering”. This linguistic aspect will be of great importance when addressing the Koranic prescripts about veiling (section II).

Under these circumstances, I assume the linguistic difference as a major limitation of this paper. Although I will use the English word “veil”, it is the Islamic polysemy of “hiding + sacred + modesty + privacy” which is to be signified. To understand the concept of hijab, it is necessary to review the Islamic justification for the female dress code⁸. The Muslim world has two sources of revelation: one is religious, the Koran (the actual Word of God, recorded by Muhammed, 7th century) and the other is traditional (“Hadiths” and “Sunnah”, second-hand reports of Muhammed’s personal way of life). However, most of the time, there is no clear distinction between Koran rules and tradition in the Islamic world. In the following chapter I will present the prescriptions about veiling as they reflected in Koran and Hadiths.

II. THE RELIGIOUS MEANINGS OF THE VEIL

The Koran’s Prescriptions about Veiling

The word “Hijab” appears in the Koran five times (7:46, 33:59, 38:32, 41:5, 42:51). However, in only one of these (33:59) does “Hijab” refers to what is considered to be the dress code today⁹. Hijab as it appears in the Koran has nothing to do with the dress code for Muslim women. Most of the time, it was the misleading translation of “khimar” as “veil” (Engl.)/ “hijab”(Arab.) which created contradictions. There are three basic rules the Koran ascribes for dressing¹⁰.

The first rule the Koran has for the women refers to righteousness as “the best garment” - what is inside your heart is more important for God than the dress you wear:

“O children of Adam, we have provided you with garments to cover your bodies, as well as for luxury. But the best garment is *the garment of righteousness*. These are some of God’s signs, that they may take heed.
(Koran 7:26, emphasis added)

The second rule prescribes the way of covering the bosom (24:30; 24:31). It is important to notice that these norms refer to both women and men. However, when they are cited, the prescriptions about men’s

clothing are usually neglected (24:30). Even when the Koran refers to clothing rules, hijab or any other way of covering the face is not mentioned. This supports the idea that veiling was not a practice stipulated for Muslim women.

“Tell the believing men to lower their gaze and conceal their genitals; for that is purer for them. God knows what they do.” (Koran, 24:30)

“And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and conceal their genitals, and not reveal their beauty, except what does show, and to draw their *khimar* over their bosoms, and not reveal their beauty except to [very close kin].”

(Koran, 24:31, emphasis added)

The third rule includes the only¹¹ Koranic reference to the hijab as a cloth item. It sets the dress code for the Prophet’s wives (explicit historical context):

“O, believers enter not the dwellings of the Prophet, unless invited... And when you ask of his wives anything, ask from behind a hijab. That is purer for your hearts and for their hearts”.

(Koran, 33:59)

This *Sura* (verse from the Koran) refers to a particular situation in the Prophet’s home and does not imply any generalization. It is about protecting the privacy and the special status of the Prophet’s wives. It does not regard veiling as women’s clothing, but as a practical solution to deal with the afflux of visitors to the

Prophet’s place. Moreover, the Prophets’ wives are attributed a higher status than ordinary Muslim women. It is possible that the relation between the hijab and high status (more common in modern times) has its roots in the Koran.

On the whole, there is not enough proof in the Koran to confirm the practice of veiling. In effect, it is the prophetic tradition that offers much more support for it. It is not the Islamic but the traditionalist way of thought that promotes veiling¹². Next, I will briefly discuss the relation between traditionalism and the veil.

III. THE TRADITIONALIST MEANINGS OF THE VEIL

The Hadiths’ Prescriptions about Veiling

An explanation of the way the traditional writings came into being is relevant here. The Hadiths were collected, interpreted and compiled in the 7th and 8th century as a political attempt to find religious legitimacy for creating a new type of society for the new Arab empire. An unequal distribution of power relations took the place of the Koran’s prescribed equality. In this context, women’s place became the most disadvantaged one. “Their Koranic status as moral citizens of the early Arabian [nation] enjoined to obedience to their husbands for the sake of family solidarity, was interpreted

(...) to mean their legal social dependency and political exclusion”¹³. The Hadith traditions proliferated; there were many authors and religious schools. Islamic feminists perceive these traditional sources as a contamination of the true Islamic religion.

The schools teaching Koranic law elaborated the “law of the veil”, a very strict prescription whose validity is still recognized. Features such as the veil and face masks were subsumed under this law. The analysis of hijab as it appeared in these regulations would entail an extensive discussion. I will limit it to several citations:

The Prophet said: “The worst among women are those who freely leave their homes without hijab. They are hypocrites and few of those will enter paradise.”

(Hadith - Sunan Baihaqi)

Prophet said: “What has been allowed to be shown is the hands, bangles and rings but the face must be covered.

(Hadith - Aisha)

“Jilbaab should fully cover the women’s body, so that nothing appears but one eye with which she can see.”

(Hadith - Tafseer Al-Qurtubi)

A selective use of the verses from Koran is typical of the traditionalist approach. For instance, only the first part of the following paragraph is usually cited:

“If any of your women commit fornication call in four witness from among yourself against them; if they testify to their guilt, confine them to their houses until death overtakes them or till God finds another way for them. ‘

(Koran, 4:13)

According to this part, confinement is justified, if the woman has committed adultery, and four witnesses testify against her. However, Muhammed added:

“And as for the two of you who are guilty thereof, punish them both. And if they repent and improve then let them be. Lo! Allah is Relenting, Merciful.”

(Koran, 4:14)

For the Western eyes, the veil, segregation and seclusion in the house seem connected manifestations of the Islamic way of thinking. Relevant for the discussion of woman in colonized Algeria is to examine the private space. Does it really represent a site of segregation and seclusion? What is the woman’s status in the private domain? How much of her condition is due to religion and how much to tradition?

The following section will be focused on the family in Islamic society. As in the case of the veil, when discussing the family in Islam, both Koranic and traditional sources will be considered. Even though many subjects such as inheritance, divorce, custody and other juridical aspects are very important, I will address those issues more relevant for the discussion of the veil, namely, familial values, patriarchy, and woman’s status.

IV. THE TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC FAMILY

IV.1. THE ISLAMIC NOTION OF "PRIVATE" SPACE

To start with, what is the meaning of "privacy" for Islamic society? In particular, can we speak about a domestic sphere in the same sense it appears in the Western society? I argue that Western discourse transferred a concept into the Islamic world without being aware of the local way of constructing reality. As for the "veil", there is no Arabic equivalent for the English notion of "privacy". The English notion of "privacy" means the state of being apart from company or observation, seclusion, freedom from unauthorized intrusion and secrecy¹⁴. The Arabic concept referring to private space is "harim". Its semantic sphere is linked to the following paradigm: modesty + sanctity + forbidden¹⁵.

It is important to notice that the Koran does distinguish between the private and the public domains and provides clear rules on the expected behavior in these two spheres of life. Architecture itself can be perceived as closely related with the concept of "harim" and through it, with women's position. Women are associated with the inside, home and territory. They lived their lives within the private enclosures of their domestic quarters. When they went out they veiled their faces, thus taking their seclusion with them.

Because the pride of the family ("hashama") demands intimacy and modesty, the house is closed from the outside world. The access to houses other than one's own, for example, must be restricted and only by permission of the inhabitants of the house. It is important to know that a traditional Islamic household may have almost fifty members living under the same roof. In order to avoid any potential sexual temptation, sexes are segregated as much as possible. For this reason, there is a delimitation of sleeping places, and meals are taken separately by men and women (the only man a woman is allowed to eat with is her son).

Taking everything into account, the meaning of "privacy" for Islamic society is different from the Western idea of private space as it appears in the highly disputed dichotomy of public and private sphere.

As the private sphere was one of the targets aimed by the French colonization, I will present some facts related to traditional familial values. Although the concept of "traditional family" is now highly questionable, I will present the recognized principles that were certainly valid during the colonial period.

IV.2. FAMILY VALUES

Islam creates and legitimizes patriarchy. However, the way the Koran addresses men's and women's status seems contradictory. On the one hand it claims equality, but on the other, it affirms man's superiority over

woman. There is an emphasis on the equality between man and woman before God.

“God created you from one soul, then of it He made its mate, and from those twain scattered many men and women”.

(Koran, 39:6. See also 4:1, 49:13)

The only ranking of humans in the eyes of God is the one given by godliness and virtue regardless of lineage, wealth, power and gender (see Koran 9:71; 23:35). However, this stress on equality seems impossible to reconcile with the demand for woman's subordination to man. Generally, the Koran confirms and legitimizes patriarchal power. The man is placed at the head of the family:

“Men are in charge of women, because Allah had made the one of them to excel the other and because they spend their property [for the support of the wife]. So, good wives are obedient, guarding in secret that which Allah had guarded. As for those whom we fear rebellious, admonish them and banish them to beds apart, and scourge them. Then, if they obey you, seek not a way against them.”

(Koran, 4:38)

Woman's role and men's role are prescribed by the Islamic religion. As a consequence, any attempt for equality (in the way it appeared for Western women) would run counter to the religious norms. Ties between husband and wife are not expected to be more than sexual. The man is seen as being responsible for main-

tenance of his family. The wife is responsible for the care and welfare of children. Woman is charged with the religious education of the children. An Algerian proverb says: “if you educate a man, you educate an individual but if you educate a woman, you educate an entire family”.

On the whole, it definitely cannot be claimed that the Koran offers equality between man and woman. However, the relationship between the two sexes as depicted in the Koran is not one of extreme dominance and submission as it developed in the Islamic traditionalist discourse. Traditionalists enforced patriarchy and assigned new meanings to the Koranic precepts. The prescriptions regarding private space (modesty and obedience) were interpreted as both physical and political invisibility. Veiling was enforced as a symbol of women's separateness, a way for extending the isolation of the physical space in the public sphere. Inside the Islamic family, the veil was accorded social functions.

IV.3. THE VEIL AS A GENDER DIFFERENCE

Having the family at its center, Islamic society rejects individualism and encourages the control of its members' behavior. The good of the family comes before personal good. People are encouraged to view themselves as linked with and reciprocally responsible for family and relatives. Sacrifice by individual family members to benefit the family as a whole is expected.

As a consequence, women's behavior is subject to regulation.

Jealousy is a powerful force. The blood relationship is considered the main factor in establishing the right to property. For a wife, adultery is considered the most blamable act. In this context, the control of sexuality beyond the context of marriage and concubinage (for men) was legitimate. Man's motivation is the fear of humiliation. Islam perceives woman's sexuality as active, capable of disturbing the moral order, and so, threatening¹⁶. One of the solutions for overcoming the potential disorder and for the control of private domain is veiling. Under the influence of the traditionalist discourse, anxiety about the wife's infidelity became of great weight. The link between veiling and seclusion is emphasized.

IV.4. THE VEIL AS A SOCIAL CONVENTION

The veil was also an important social convention connected with economic standing¹⁷. Veiling and high seclusion were the marks of prestige and symbols of status. Only the few wealthy families could afford the most elaborate measures for secluding women, such the grand architectural arrangements. In the houses of the poor, women and men were crammed together in the same limited space. However, when poor women went out - far more often than the richer ones - they too veiled.

In this context, it is relevant to know how women felt about veiling. Unfortunately, the surveys regarding this matter were made mainly after Algerian Independence. It can only be presumed that for the most part, the reasons for veiling were the same in the time before the war for Independence. Not to ignore the fact that some of the motives that made women veiling were a product of modernization.

According to ethnographical researches¹⁸, one of the most important reasons for the wearing of the veil was the religious prescription. The veil was considered not an option, but a privilege and a commandment from Allah. Islamic religion claimed that far from feeling subdued by wearing the veil, Muslim women perceived it as a religious duty. In Islamic culture the veil was a matter of honor, a special way to conform to God's will. It was not only women who were supposed to commit to a strict moral code¹⁹. Islam ascribes the veil for women and the beard for men, which is part of the call for the return to the traditional Sunna. The European colonists conceived of the veil differently. The following chapter analyzes the way French colonizers perceived the veiled women.

V. THE VEIL AS A MOVEMENT

V.1. THE VEIL FOR THE COLONIZERS

Barrier to Visual Control

Before discussing the colonizer's attitude towards the veiled woman, a brief overview of the modern discourse on transparency is needed. The 18th century brought the ideal of a perfect transparent world. Rousseau's ideal was a transparent society. In 1787, Jeremy Bentham elaborated the plan of the Panopticon. It was an architectural figure that consisted in a tower central to an annular building divided into cells. The occupants of the cells were isolated from one another by walls and subject to scrutiny by an observer in the tower who remains unseen. The Panopticon thus allowed seeing without being seen. For Foucault, such asymmetry of seeing-without-being-seen is the very essence of power because ultimately the power to dominate rests on the differential possession of knowledge²⁰.

The metaphor of the one that is seen without being able to see the observer turned to be the most dramatic frustration the French colonists experienced in Algeria. Veiled woman could see the foreign colonizer, but the colonizer could not see her. The veil became a barrier to the visual control of the Western eye. Anger, frus-

trated desire and fantasy gave a distinctive character to French colonization in Algeria.

The veil was seen as the concrete manifestation of resistance by the colonized to an imposed reciprocity: veiled women were able to see without being seen. Colonist desire was thus articulated as the desire to unveil Algeria, for women's insistence on wearing the veil meant the colony's resistance to the French authority.

French Men's Attitude towards Veiled Women

...the political doctrine: 'If we want to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its capacity for resistance, we must first of all conquer the woman; we must go and find them behind the veil where they hide themselves and in the houses where the men keep them out of sight.'

Frantz Fanon. *A Dying Colonialism*.p.23

Why did "la mission civilisatrice" have women as the first "target"?

Since veiled women served as metaphors for Oriental culture, the political strategy did not have exclusively a military character. According to F. Fanon, the French colonizers perceived Algerian women as embodying the true and authentic self of Algerian culture. Since they represented the essence of the culture that was colonized, having access to them and their bodies symbolized the means for a successful penetration to the heart

of the colonized culture. As a consequence, a metaphorical link between “Woman” and “Colony” was established²¹. In this context, the veiled woman (the other sex) and the colony (the other culture) were related. Colonies themselves were idealized as female. Later, they were credited with the power of invigorating the greater France. The main question related to the Algerian case by the European colonizers was if there was any possibility for a complete assimilation.

The French colonizers were aware at the strategic importance of family in Islamic society. “French” education was introduced in order to emancipate woman and in this way to obtain control over the Algerian family. Native women were given the “historical” mission of changing the Algerian men. French authority set up Lycées and discouraged veiling.

General Melchior-Joseph-Eugène Daumas (1803 – 1871) was the most prominent masculine voice of the time. His numerous publications shaped the European vision of Algerian women for almost a century. He was the first colonial official to establish woman as an object of systematic and scientific inquiry. His aim as a writer was “to tear off the veil which still hides mores, customs, and ideas”. J. Clancy – Smith sees here a possible suggestion of rape²². F. Fanon broadly examined the same colonial desire²³.

Daumas examine the way “La Femme Arabe” was perceived by the French colonizers, with a great emphasis on her sexuality. By forcing women to unveil (as in the events of 13 May 1930), or by spreading studio-made postcards representing unveiled Algerian women,

French colonizers emphasized the impulse to see what was concealed. With regard to the missionaries, Elisabeth Warnock Fernea highlighted²⁴ the main characteristic of their approach to the Orient: “Generally, travelers and missionaries sent home the accounts that the readers expected, accounts that only confirmed Western preconceptions”. However, in the eyes of the colonizers, the Algerian woman remained unmistakably ‘she who hides behind a veil’²⁵.

French Women’s Attitude towards Veiled Women

Although French feminists did not perceived their “mission” in Algeria as different from the one of French men, there were specific issues French women were particularly interested in. The first feminist wave was shaped by the unquestioned belief in the superiority of “western” values. Feminists in France were generally happy for any recognition from the government of their causes, regardless of the effect such new laws had on colonized women. The European wives of colonial administrators had the duty to “civilize,” educate and Christianize indigenous women. A few French women actually advocated for the rights of colonized women. Hubertine Auclert (1848-1914) referred to Algerian women as “our Muslim sister” but in fact remained most interested in using her Algerian experiences as arguments for the rights of women in France. She saw parallels between the French exploitation of its colonies and the exploitation of French women by French men.

Another French woman, Marie Bugeja was the wife of a colonial official and was born in Algeria. She wrote *Our Muslim Sisters* in 1921 and later several novels and articles. In spite of her book title, she did not see Algerian women in an egalitarian light, and subscribed to the familiar colonial idea that the key to “civilizing” Algeria was to give her daughters a French domestic education. She saw in the veil nothing more than a style that would disappear in time, like the corset in France.

“I have never approved of the veil nor fought against it because I believe that my campaign proves sufficiently that what I want to take away from Muslim women is the veil of ignorance and I have ignored a ‘style’ that has become an ‘obligation...A style that can fade like any style.”²⁶

The concept of “the new woman” was often discussed. In the eyes of French feminists, the “new Algerian woman” was supposed to be educated, but maintaining the “feminine” virtues, Westernized and unveiled. However, she should not be over-Westernized.

“I don’t want to see our North African Muslim sisters, without preparation, discarding the veil and plunging into the turbulence of life; they must first be initiated. Only the invigorating atmosphere of a well-established school will allow them to gain liberty wisely”.

I consider that what colonists identified as the source of women’s oppression was not always based on an accurate understanding of Muslim society. Europeans were making assumptions based on a superficial

knowledge, and naively equating veiling with patriarchy. The assumption that Muslim need to abandon native ways and adopt those of the West was incorrect. It is true that androcentrism and misogyny must be opposed, but in the case of Algeria, unveiling the women did not necessarily meant destroying patriarchal power. The European agenda was wrong in the issue of the veil. As in the case of the French men, for the French women, the Algerian ones remained the “unknown other”.

V.2. THE VEIL FOR THE ALGERIANS

In the situation when unveiling was the French political doctrine, the potential of the veil to acquire a political meaning was very powerful. From a religious symbol, the veil became charged with political meaning. It represented a political commitment to a different type of society than the French one, an explicit form of opposing colonization.

Algerian Women in the Public Space: the Veil as an Instrument

During the war for independence, veiled and unveiled Algerian women became linking agents, using the veil as a camouflage for carrying grenades, manifestos, revolvers and mines. According to the purpose of the military operations, Algerian women unveiled them-

selves, pretending to be Europeans, or wore the veil when French soldiers suspected unveiled women. This subversive acts were possible because authorities did not perceive the woman's potential for public action.

How was it possible for Algerian women to become politically active during the independence war? How can women's shift from domestic seclusion into underground political action be explained? What are new meanings of the veil during the war? This section attempts to examine to what extent women's involvement in the public sphere can be regarded as conforming to Islam.

A "public space" in the Western sense, does not exist in the Islamic world. The theocratic state, "umma" [religious community] reflects God's absolute will, so any attempt to achieve the "public will" (as in Rousseau's contract) is categorically excluded. Regarding the women, in order to build God's society on earth, their integration into the community is taken into account. It is for this reason that the Koran legislates the equality of the sexes in moral citizenship of the umma. On the whole, the members of "umma" are not seen as citizens, but as subjects in their relationship to God²⁷. However, this submissive image is only apparent. As a matter of fact, the Koran does not designate civic obedience as an obligation imposed regardless of the moral character of the tenet of authority. On the contrary, the Koran speaks about the morality of opposing injustice (Koran, 9:17). Therefore, according to Islamic law, women's participation in the Independence war (as moral citizens of the umma), is legitimated.

Even before the War of Independence, women were not involved in public life. When contacts with colonizers took place, they were also victims of French domination. Unveiling and rape were the oppressive ways the French colonizers relied on women. In spite the image of Algerian women as secluded in their houses, without much contact with the French, their participation in the war demonstrate their awareness of the colonial exploitation. That the French colonization meant a terrible oppression was demonstrated by the extreme solutions found to oppose it. Under the circumstances, women's unveiling during the war and their turning into military agents was regarded as a necessity and a practical solution.

Taking everything into account, I consider that Algerian women were not apolitical. What the war did, in this respect, was to make visible women's potential for public activity. They participated in politics in specific ways, according to the circumstances. Under the French colonization, their way was to take part in secret missions, using the veil as an instrument. However, their importance in the war was not recognized. Under an exceptional situation, as the French oppression in Algeria was, women's military actions were perceived as a temporary deviation from their ascribed role. Their involvement in the war was necessary and strategic.

When independence was finally gained and their military help was not needed any more, it seemed legitimate for the patriarchal power to impose women going back. One of the first slogans proclaimed in Algeria during 1962 was *Women go home!* It seems that women

themselves did not perceive their contribution in the war as more than a duty under extreme circumstances. The war did not make women aware of their collective power. Their objective was subordinated to the national one and perceived as such. No attempt for a feminist movement was made after it.

Algerian Men's Position: the Nationalist Movements

At the turn of the century, as part of the strategy of resistance to colonial order, the Algerian nationalist movements instituted reforms. It is possible to identify two reform movements during that period – one secular (inspired by the French and the Young Turks) and one religious, inspired by the Arabs.

On the one hand, the Young Algerians (non-radicals, French educated), did not advocate a radical break with Islam. They argued that Islam was not necessary incompatible with Western models. For them, women's rights were a prime example of the internal virtues of Western modernity.

On the other hand, the religious reforms (Ulema) were successful in reaching and responding to the problems of Algerians whose religion and customs were under threat due to colonization. Ulema's credo ("Arabic is my language, Algeria is my country, Islam is my religion") had a large response. The movement advocated the improvement of women's status and defended their education, but only in strict religious

schools. It was assumed that this would help women become the moral guardians of their families.

It was in the context of this moral guardianship that the veiling of women was promoted: it was supposed to protect women from the gaze of foreigners and also from the temptations of French fashion. Ulema was particularly conservative on the issue of veiling. Veiling became a reaction to the French administrators' attempt to encourage women's education and discourage them from wearing veils. The protection of women from such "French assimilation" symbolized (for the Ulema) the protection of their true identity. Up to a point, during colonization, women were caught between two forces: the one coming from the French administration, the other, from the nationalist movements.

One element that made the conservative and the nationalist discourse very popular was that it associated moral decay with contamination by French values. Another important component was the privileged role assigned to women. They were responsible for restoring the lost authenticity of the community. This anti-imperialist and populist discourse gave a new dimension to the veil and reconstructed the original patriarchy.

On the whole, the nationalist discourse can be considered a product of colonial hegemony. Embracing Islam was a response to the French "civilizing mission". The emphasis on veiling as a religious duty was a response to the colonial desire to unveil. As M. Lazreg notes, "before the colonial conquest, the Algerians perceived their Muslimness not very differently from the

way French conceived of themselves as Christians. However, with colonial subjugation, Islam achieved the highest importance in defining Algerian identity. In this sense, the nationalist project, including the issue of women's education, was an effect of colonialism"²⁸.

In 1950 the nationalist movement was generally in the favor of emancipation, but as far as the women were concerned, they were supposed to be the guardians of Algerian identity. What they wanted was a free Algerian Woman, not a free French women (David Gordon).

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The paper analyzed the new meanings the veil acquired during the French colonization of Algeria. Recourse to the religious background and to the traditional Islamic family was needed in order to analyze the local significance of the veil before colonization. Under the French, veiled women were the concrete manifestation of the Algerian resistance. The desire to unveil them became the colonizers' political doctrine in Algeria. Under these circumstances, the potential of the veil to acquire a political meaning was very powerful. From a religious symbol, the veil became increasingly charged with political meaning. Because of the dispute around it, the veil acquired new meanings. It represented a commitment to a different religion and culture than the one of colonizers', an explicit form of opposing French authority. The battle for the veil put Algerian women in

the center of French colonization. I argued that women were not apolitical. They participated in politics in specific ways, according to the circumstances. Veiling and unveiling was a strategy used in order to mislead the French soldiers and thus to take part in secret missions. However, neither Algerian women nor Algerian men did perceive women as a powerful autonomous force. Women subordinated their aspiration to the national ones. The feminist movement became a presence only in the late 70s. Attempts to reconcile Islamic religion with feminism had the veil as an important issue. The story of the veil is still going on in Algeria.

Notes

1 David G. Gordon. (1962) *Women of Algeria. An Essay on Change*. Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard University Press. p. 143.

2 When discussing Algerian women, I am aware of the risk of simplification. Both "Algerian women" and "traditional Islamic family" are abstractions. I assume the reduction of their cultural complexity to a single image as a limitation of the paper.

3 Barbara Freyer Stowasser. (1996). "Women and Citizenship in the Qur'an" in Amira El Azhary (ed). *Women, the Family, and Divorce in Islamic History*. N.Y. Syracuse University Press. P. 34.

4 *ibid.* p. 37.

5 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. (1991). U.S.A. Springfield Mass.

6 Fadwa El Guindi (2000). *Veil Modesty, Privacy and Resistance*. London. Oxford International Publishers Ltd. p 6.

7 *Idem.*

8 It should be mentioned that there are authors sustaining the non-Islamic origins of the veil (Zuhur 1992 “Revealing Veiling: Islamic Gender Ideology” in *Contemporary Egypt*. Albany: State University of New York. It is claimed that veiling existed before Muslim society in Hellenic, Judaic, Byzantine and Balkan cultures with different meanings, purposes and, very important, not exclusively as a female attribute. However, many Muslims call “Hijab” an Islamic dress code, without questioning its origins.

9 There is a large dispute referring to the correct translation of the Arabic terms “hijab” and “khimar”. Different English translations of the Koran offer different versions of these paragraphs. As my access to the original version is mediated by these contradictory interpretations and as the discussion of these verses is essential, I choose to trust the information most of the authors I wrote seemed to agree on.

10 There are many ways one can approach the prescripts about veiling. In the present paper, I choose to discuss it from a feminist perspective only.

11 There are authors (e.g. Masjid Tucson) sustaining that in this verse, “hijab” is not meant, but “khimar”.

12 I am aware at the risk of generalization about Islamic societies. I choose to simplify many cultural differences in order to make the presentation more explicit.

13 Barbara Freyer Stowasser. (1996). “Women and Citizenship...” p. 36.

14 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary.

15 Fadwa El Guindi. *Veil*...p. 84.

16 Idem.

17 Huda Shaarawi, Margot Badran [trans. and ed]. (1986) *Harem Years: The Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist (1879-1924)*. In *Feminist Press*. at <http://www.pinn.net/~sunshine/main.html> (last accessed 19 Dec.2001).

18 Jen’Nan Ghazal Read and John P. Bartkowski. (2000). “To veil or not to veil? A case study of Identity Negotiation among Muslim Women in Austin, Texas” in *Gender and Society*.3. pp. 395–417.

19 Maha Azzam. “Gender and the Politics of Religion in the Middle East” (1996) in Mai Yamani & Andrew Allen (Eds). *Feminism and Islam: legal and literary perspectives*. NY. New York Univ. Press. p. 227.

20 Michel Foucault (1980) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. New York. Ed. Colin Gordon et al. p. 223.

21 *ibid*. p 142.

22 Julia Clancy-Smith. La Femme Arabe in Amira El Azhary (ed.). *Women, the Family*... p.56.

23 Frantz Fanon. *A Dying* ...pp. 31-32.

24 Elisabeth Warnock Fernea. Foreword to *Women, the Family, and Divorce in Islamic History* ed. By Amira El Azhary Sonbol. 1996. p. x.

25 Meyda YeGenoGlu (1998). *Colonial fantasies. Towards a feminist reading of Orientalism*. UK. Cambridge University Press. p. 36.

26 Marie Bugeja. *Enigme Musulmane: Lettres à une Bretonne*. Tangier and Fez. 1938. P.150 cited by Jeanne M. Bowlan *Civilizing Gender Relations in Algeria* in *Domesticating the Empire. Race, Gender and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism*, University Press of Virginia, 1998 p. 186.

27 Barbara Freyer Stowasser. “Women and Citizenship in the Qur’an” in *Women, the Family*... p. 26.

28 Marnia Lazreg, (1990) “Gender and Politics in Algeria: Unrevealing the Religious Paradigm” in *Signs*, 4.

The Challenge of Diversity Answers and Dilemmas

In the following I will discuss three issues: (1) I will begin with the personal motivations which have directed my interest towards the study of diversity and multiculturalism; (2) I will then announce four main theses and four auxiliary theses in an attempt to define the frame of the debates; (3) finally, I shall try to outline the main points of the political theory of Will Kymlicka, the contemporary Canadian philosopher who became famous at a relatively young age.

Personal reasons for the study of the diversity issue

The experiences that led me to reflect upon the problems of diversity and minority status were essentially the following.

The first challenge was a famous statement made by a spiritual leader of the Hungarian minority of Transylvania between the two world wars, Protestant Bishop Sándor Makkai, who, after 15 years of remarkable contributions to the organization of his community and to the development of the cultural dialogue be-

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tween the Romanian and the Hungarian intelligentsia in the post-Trianon context – he even elaborated a so-called “universal mission of the minority” – in 1936 left Romania to settle in Hungary. Soon after, he published a pamphlet in which he developed the idea that the minority status is incompatible with human dignity and, consequently, all minorities have to fight for their emancipation and to get rid of this status (Makkai, 1937). I happened to read about the topic in mid 1980’s. I was intrigued, of course, because I myself was a member of a minority community with quite a number of problems and for which, given its size, Makkai’s suggestion seemed to provide neither an easy solution nor one worth following.

This problem became a real intellectual challenge to me in the early 90’s when, after lengthy readings, I discovered the dimensions of the discrepancy between the ethno-political order of the world on the one hand, that is, the existence of nearly 200 states currently acknowledged by the international community, and the global ethnocultural reality on the other, marked by the existence of a number of 10,000 cultures, which represented just as many genuine parallel societies within the 200 full-fledged political communities (UNESCO, 1996).

The second event that profoundly influenced me was the incident of March 1990 in Tg. Mures. The conflict began at one of the local secondary schools I had graduated myself, a school which determined to a considerable extent my views upon my identity and my relationship with the two ethnic communities that co-habited the region where I spent my early youth. Back

then I had to realize that if the spirit in which I was raised is to perform a political role in the democratization process of the Romanian society, it could have dangerous consequences as far as the success of a quick transition to a firm democracy is concerned.

In the years that followed, I witnessed many situations that could have, at least in part, confirmed my intuitions. Thus, I witnessed the creation of an ideological front representing the ethno-political options of the Hungarian minority, beginning with amendments to the Constitution, continuing with the problem of autonomy, down to the project of the Hungarian University in Romania, objectives that remain irreconcilable with the state- and nation-building strategy of the Romanian majority, despite the numerous achievements of the past few years, or even in spite of the controversial recent agreement between the PSD (Social Democrat Party) and the UDMR (The Union of Democratic Hungarians of Romania).

It is important to add to the above that I do not speak here, of course, about the political options of the UDMR, which might very well lack social support. I simply interpret the results of the sociological polls conducted between 1993-2001, which are quite relevant for the opinions of both Hungarians and Romanians on this subject: there are discrepancies revealed by all conducted researches concerning the main ethno-political objectives of the minorities as compared to the options of the majority. Although these sociological findings theoretically ascertain some ethno-political tension between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian mi-

nority in Romania, fortunately, this is not the case. On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that the Hungarian minority is overcome by a feeling of collective failure and continues to be exposed to political manipulation under the so-called “Hungarian danger”, both elements being deeply harmful, in my opinion, to the chances of success for the Romanian democracy. I recall every now and then the warning of a renowned specialist in Eastern Europe’s ethno-political problems, István Bibó: a society driven by fear and deeply traumatized, generation after generation, by collective fear cannot be a real democratic society. Therefore, the existing ethnopolitical discrepancies between the majority and the minority in Romania, coupled with the wish of overcoming these discrepancies, have deeply motivated my investigations in the theory and the philosophy of the political.

One last incentive for my interest in the phenomenon of multiculturalism has been the segregation proclivity manifest at every stage of the ethnopolitical disputes between the rival communities, reflecting both a lack of mutual trust and the failure of the conventional institutions to regulate the coexistence of several communities within a multicultural space.

These were the primary events and intellectual challenges that led to my investigation of the conditions in which ethnocultural communities can help each other in finding a mutually agreeable institutional way of living together, or, more ambitiously, to the investigation of *the normative bases of an authentic minority existence*. The discovery of Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka’s

works and meeting him in person anchored me in the study of the strategies and notions of the normative political philosophy.

Defining the working frame

Before starting on a brief critical presentation of Will Kymlicka’s position, I shall review some important theses in the hope of clarifying the theoretical frame of his discourse.

1. Following an accurate analysis of the discrepancy between the actual number of states in the world and the number of distinguishable cultures therein, one might readily conclude that the current ethnopolitical arrangement of the world is *morally arbitrary*.

2. If we accept this thesis, we are forced to admit that the theories that emphasize the importance of *security and stability* in our contemporary world could become counter-productive and could cause human disaster unless ways are identified to supplement this aspect with a debate of the theories pertaining to the problem of *justice and equity* between cultures and communities.

3. If we feel inclined to accept this second thesis, then we will have to admit that the theoretical and conceptual instruments pertaining to the consequences of diversity and to the new ethnocultural situation of the world are outdated. We witness an almost unprecedented resurgence of the ethnocultural identities mobilizing for ethnopolitical and institutional acknowledgement, which claim for alternative conceptual and institutional instruments.

4. Fully acknowledging the aforementioned, we must admit that political theory remains indebted with regard to acceptable solutions for either side in what concerns the *political institutions* designated to mediate the coexistence. We, thus, must differentiate probably between the concepts of the *community* and of the *national state*, prevalently and traditionally understood as co-extensive notions.

To complete and reinforce what has been said so far, four additional theses can be added, representing some of the issues of contemporary political thought and pinpointing some of the discrepancies in the basic concepts, as well as their consequences upon the strategies and policy practices of the marginalized minority communities.

a) The first additional thesis speaks of an emerging consensus by the majority of theorists on the inefficiency of the legislative frame of the representative majority democracies and the inadequacy of the juridical protection of minorities.

In accordance with the current practices of the international community, the main institutions of a state, which are founded on the principles of representative democracy, are used and exploited by the so-called “official nation” (as a rule, the cultural and linguistic majority) to pursue its own interests. This will lead eventually to the exclusion of the minority culture from the public sphere. This, in turn, results from the underrating of the minority cultures, and is perceived as a powerful force of assimilation, foreboding the gradual dissolution of the traditional communities, seen frequently as an at-

tempt upon the future of the community, with the possibility for it to degenerate into a powerful source of conflict. One should note that the attention of the international community has turned upon these particular aspects of the issue in the wake of the events of 1989, consequential to the “third wave of democratization” (S.P. Huntington, 1993) and triggered by the emergence of the representative democracy as *the* ordering principle of power in the regions of the world which are modeled on deep cultural and ethnical division and where order and stability have been guaranteed or preserved, as the case may be, over the centuries only by dictatorial or autarkical measures. In these regions, the attempts at democratization marked one further result – among others – the political mobilization of the minorities, which hoped that through active involvement in the political struggle will succeed in a peaceful, political way to solve the urgent problems of their future.

Our experience so far testifies that due to the prevalence of the “majority rule” which assigns an exclusive status to the will of the majority and, in the case of the ethnoculturally divided societies guarantees for the internal democracy and for the effective functioning of *political institutions of coexistence* remain a challenge.

b) The second additional thesis shows a more and more widespread opinion among the experts according to which the universal human rights cannot preserve the equality of chances and a full guarantee of the minority’s right to freedom.

The universal human rights, as guaranteed by the ethno-culturally *non* neuter institutions of the state in

question, rather than by a super-national, neuter and universal institution, benefits the citizens belonging to the mainstream majority culture. This then will *double the effort* on the part of the minority members, who want to preserve their language or other specific traditions while engaging in finding a pathway through the dominant culture as well as through the minority culture.

For the long term, this inequality of chances has also assimilationist consequences that can only be counterbalanced by providing further special rights. The specialists concerned with the matter insist that for the universal human rights to produce the same effects in case of the citizens of the majority culture and the citizens of the minority culture alike, it is necessary for the universal human rights to be supplemented by a new “generation” of rights focusing on the needs of the community – i.e. the *minority rights*.

c). The third thesis points out that what has been stated so far has special significance for Central and Eastern Europe not just in terms of our special interest, but rather purporting to the unfulfilled, rival ambitions to create a national state and the suspicions with which such an endeavor was subsequently met with, all of which are constitutive of a most serious obstacle in the development of the political institutions of coexistence of cultures and nations. The competing ambitions of establishing nation-states in the region have always tried to exclude the others, determining more and more political repression, producing, with each generation, new arguments involving a mutual *lack of trust*, conjuring up the “historical” sufferings. It is to be feared that if the

region cannot step away from this vicious circle of mutual and collective accusations, there is a risk of falling into a dangerous game where the ambitions of a national state are instigated to adopt an ethnic purification policy and of a more or less “peaceful” assimilation policy.

d.) The last additional thesis speaks about the reaction to the difficulties of the democratization process in the culturally divided post-communist societies, which, to use only some more or less recent examples in history, such as that of Northern Ireland, Israel, or of the more fortunate South Tyrol, warn that the *liberty of a community* might be achieved only by methods that do not exclude *ab ovo* the possibility of human sacrifice.

Wide ranging advocates of this position believe that neither the redefinition or the gradual adaptation of the institutional frame of the representative democracy, nor the struggle for the minority rights and the attempts to change the collective mentality can yield a definite solution for the conflicts between the ethnocultural communities living alongside in the same country. In their opinion, only the *unilateral*, consistently applied methods, accepting even human loss, can ensure the acknowledgement of the minority’s will, guaranteeing a long term viable solution. Although the principles underlying such opinions are difficult either to ascertain or to reject reasonably, one should be aware that the relative *inefficiency* – within the context of a traditional, representative majority of the Westminster type democracy – of the struggle for minority rights by *parliamentary methods* can determine, as a consequence, a

gradual increase in numbers among the endorsers of such theories. As we shall see in what follows, the so-called “*perverse effects*” of the double standards applied by the intergovernmental international organizations such as the OSCE play a very important part in influencing these opinions (Kymlicka, 2001).

The normative consequences of the diversity in Will Kymlicka's theory

Let us now move on to the presentation of Will Kymlicka's political philosophy, the proponent of no less than a rational and argumentative grounding of ethnocultural equity in answer to the problems, capable, at least in my interpretation, *to normatively found a theory on the authentic existence of the minority*. The presentation that follows synthesizes the ideas in several of Kymlicka's works published between 1992-2001, the most systematic of which is *Multicultural Citizenship* (Kymlicka, 1995).

The Premises of the Liberal Theory of Minority Rights

Two concerns have played a crucial role in fundamenting Will Kymlicka's endeavour to elaborate a *liberal theory* on the consequences of diversity: the lack of general principles and of a normative basis for ethnocultural equity and justice, and the fact that in the

absence of a coherent liberal offer regarding the principles of ethnocultural justice and minority rights, consistent with the liberal orientation, rival ethnocultural groups in numerous regions of the world continue to accuse each other for having started and sustained protracted conflicts, without any chance to reconcile their stands.

In the context of questions that are regularly raised by members of ethnocultural minorities, as regards the chances of their communal survival, the problem is usually not that the traditional theory of universal human rights offers inadequate answers, but that it does not provide any answer at all, and thus the required wide consensus within the international community on the acceptable solutions for all parties involved in treatment of ethnopoltical conflicts is *ab ovo* impossible.

For example, from the fact that freedom of speech is granted, one cannot deduce any prescription as for the language used to exercise this right, just as the right to vote and be elected cannot in itself solve the controversial issue of internal borders and of power sharing among ethnocultural groups that feel mutually threatened by the sheer existence of the other.

In the absence of general principles and of a normative basis for ethnocultural equity and justice, what happens most often is that the answers to the questions regarding the conditions in which ethnocultural minorities are integrated in the political communities recognized by the international community are given by the *majority nations*, according to their own interests, within the institutional framework of representative de-

mocracy based on the principle of the majority, which – paradoxically – is perceived by the minorities as social injustice contrary to the spirit of democracy.

The feeling of subjugation that results from this practice underlies both the sources of ethno-political mobilization discussed by authors like Horowitz (1985), Gurr and Harff (1994) or Lake and Rothchild (1998), and the differences between the ethno-political options of the majority and minority that Zellner (1999) identified.

The situation is further aggravated by the fact that the social theory that legitimizes these practices is deeply rooted in the history of political thinking. The great classics of social philosophy and almost all the traditional political theories have used the concept of ethnoculturally homogeneous society, considering that the prototype of the political community is the *polis* of ancient Greece. The most influential authors of political theory kept in mind the ideal situation of the *political nation*, a homogeneous community from the point of view of origin, language and culture, even if they themselves were the citizens of multicultural states or empires. Throughout history, the use of methods to regulate ethnocultural conflicts by eliminating cultural differences – genocide, forced mass population transfer, assimilation and secession – has always taken place in the more or less tacit spirit of the hypothesis that an ethnoculturally homogeneous community is the only viable solution to ensure long-term stability and the prevention of conflicts that may occur within such communities.

The second aspect of the motivation that underlay the elaboration of a liberal theory of minority rights pertains to Kymlicka's remark that the fate of the world's ethnocultural minorities – especially of those who live in post-colonial democracies and in the states that started building a democracy after the end of the Cold War – is predominantly in the hands of xenophobic nationalists, religious extremists or military dictators, who may not hesitate to use force in their endeavour to manage problems arising from ethnocultural diversity. In the absence of a coherent liberal offer regarding the principles of ethnocultural justice and minority rights consistent with the liberal orientation, the chances of liberal democracy as form of government may remain slight in the affected regions. Moreover, the peace and stability of large parts of the world will continue to be at the mercy of nationalist political entrepreneurs who can take advantage of the inequitable situation of any ethnocultural community involved in the strategic dilemmas of co-existence in the same geographical area. The theoretical fundament of a possible international consensus regarding the conditions of equitable multicultural co-existence, acceptable to all parties involved, can therefore be conceived rightly as a prerequisite of overcoming crises in which rival ethnocultural groups in numerous regions of the world accuse each other for having started and sustained protracted conflicts, which seem to be impossible to resolve.

Terminological Premises of the Theory

A first objective of the liberal theory of minority rights is to identify and eliminate those internal contradictions of the liberal discourse – regarding the consequences of diversity – that can be blamed for the failure of conventional liberalism in the case of multicultural societies. Such clarifications seem to be necessary especially regarding three very often used concepts: the notion of *multiculturalism*, the concept of *ethnocultural neutrality* of the modern state and the term of *collective rights*.

Due to the way in which the concept of *multiculturalism* has become so common in public discourse, tending to “mean everything and nothing in the same time” (Kincheloe-Steinberg, 1997), one cannot distinguish between the different aspects of ethnocultural diversity which this concept covers in concrete cases. During the early '90s a general tendency to treat the situation and issues of ethnocultural groups in the same manner could be observed, without taking into account the nature and origin of the forms in which they appeared and are present today in different parts of the world. In fact, different types of ethnocultural communities have been accommodated throughout history in very much different conditions in political communities and the types of state existing at the time, which mainly determines their present situa-

tion, the nature of the problems they are faced with and, quite importantly, the ethno-political strategy they choose in the relation they are going to maintain with the majority nation.

According to Kymlicka, ignoring to differentiate between *two basic categories* of ethnocultural groups can have unpleasant consequences, both in the political theory and in the practice of international relations.

In the first case, ethnocultural diversity has its origins in the fact that certain communities, which in the past used to be active and complete societies from the institutional standpoint, the tradition of self-governance included, were incorporated in a larger state. This incorporation usually happened against their will, as a result of colonization, conquest or territorial transfer from one empire to the other, though examples of voluntary incorporation as a result of federalization are also known.

In the second case, ethnic plurality results from the immigration of individuals who come from underprivileged or underdeveloped regions of the world. The immigrants usually belong to different ethnocultural communities, the traditions of which remain an important determinant of their everyday life.

Unless this essential distinction is not ignored, we can notice that those communities that were incorporated in new states generally tend to create *parallel societies*, which are more or less segregated within the political nation. These communities pursue the accomplishment of different forms of autonomy and self-governance, considering that this is the only way in

which they can ensure the preservation of their culture, language and community life characterized by specific traditions. These communities are called *national minorities*, according to Kymlicka.

Immigrants, on the other hand, who left their country of origin as a result of their own decision, are pursuing rapid integration in the society that accepted them as immigrants. The decision to immigrate is usually taken as a result of economic or, sometimes, political reasons and the objective is to become the citizen of a more prosperous, more democratic or freer country. The quick learning of the language, the integration in the state institutions and in the dominant culture are in these circumstances the immigrant's interest. The groups of immigrants, whom Kymlicka calls *ethnic groups*, do not lose their interest for their identity and neither their ethnocultural allegiance – for instance, they continue to preserve certain traditions, traditional costumes, religion, culinary traditions, etc – but these interests are usually of secondary importance as compared to their interest to obtain citizenship.

The conceptual difference between *national minorities* and *ethnic groups*, empirically confirmed by Gurr's (1994) causal analysis, bears important normative consequences: the two causes generate different problems, which cannot be overlooked by the methods of ethnopolitical conflict prevention and management. The attempts to equate these two distinct aspects of ethnocultural diversity and to treat them through similar methods generally betray hidden political interests

and, instead of offering solutions, they become part of the problem.

Another terminological confusion which is frequently encountered in public discourse refers to the so-called *ethnocultural neutrality* of the modern secular state. The claims of the national minorities are often labelled by the opponents of minority rights as tribal, pre-modern nationalism, and are compared to “civic nationalism” of the majority nations, which does not take into account ethnocultural identities but defines the state as an ethnically and culturally neutral structure, which grants equal rights and has equal expectations from all its citizens, regardless of their particularities. Thus, civic nationalism characterizes more evolved periods of social development, and it differs from “ethnic nationalism” by that it does not aim at the institutional preservation and reproduction of a certain culture or of a certain ethnic identity: it strives instead to fundament a citizens' community, according to the principles of democracy and equality accepted by everyone. Starting from these principles, the advocates of civic nationalism declare that while majority nations leave behind them the “infant disease” of ethnic nationalism, in agreement with the requirements of modernity, the national minorities and ethnic groups invoke the spirit of the 19th century through their claims.

The ethnocultural neutrality of the state perceived as such is regarded by Kymlicka as a myth with no empirical support in reality. In his opinion, each state that can be included in the category of liberal democracies has passed through a period in its development in

which the spread of a so-called “societal culture” on its territory constituted the reason that led to the mobilization of most social energies. According to the most widespread theories of modernization, gradual modernization of the society created the need for adequately trained workforce, characterized by enhanced mobility. In the absence of a public training system, in a common language that respects the standards of the country, it is hard to imagine that the citizens will set off with equal chances in the competition on the labour market. For a prosperous country it is imperative that its citizens be ready to make the sacrifices that the system based on reciprocal social services asks for, and obviously the citizens characterized by their awareness of the ‘us’ and a common identity are readier to make these sacrifices.

Societal culture is thus territorially-concentrated, it generally appears as a consequence of the process of modernization, and its main characteristic is that it encompasses all institutions of the society, both of the private and the public sphere. Through the common language it provides meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities. Societal culture includes therefore each domain of the communal existence except the cultural or religious customs characteristic for small or family communities, which are accommodated, but not necessarily reflected. Therefore, societal culture refers to less than the ethnographic meaning of the concept of culture – it is ‘thinner’ than this – but, through the pluralism that describes it, at the same time

it represents a wider range of options than those contained in the ethnographic sense of the term *culture*.

The emergence of a societal culture on the territory of a state it is usually the result of an intentional and consistent government policy. The first and foremost decision that must be made by a government for the consolidation of a societal culture is connected to language. When a government decides what language to use when communicating with its citizens, what the language of instruction in schools is, what the language used by people in state offices, courts, healthcare institutions is, then it also makes the most important decision regarding the future of societal culture. (This implicitly means that the language that is not supported by a certain societal culture, in the conditions of modern industrialized societies is condemned first to gradual neglect, and then to disappearance. Such a language can be kept alive in a ritualized form and for a shorter or longer while by the elite – often fanaticized – or it can be preserved, for an equally uncertain stretch of time, within the traditional, isolated communities outside the mainstream of the society.)

The process of building and consolidating a societal culture is usually at the same time a strategy of “nation-building” – in Zellner’s (1999) sense –, due to the simple fact that the language of the societal culture is generally the language of the ethnocultural majority that inhabits that country. The decisions taken by a government as regards the declared official language on the territory of the country, as well as the one concerning the language of instruction in schools, the official holi-

days, the conditions of being granted citizenship, the official symbols of the state can be interpreted not only as reflexes of ethnocentrist prejudices, but also as endeavours to create, in a way that is accessible to every citizen, the conditions of institutionalized liberty and equality. These decisions unavoidably define a *certain* national identity, even if they do not make use of the language of ethnonationalism. In such conditions the *ethnocultural neutrality of the state* or a rigorous division between the state and ethnicity exist only in ideologically loaded discourses.

In the process of nation-building the citizens belonging to the culture of the majority are privileged whether intentionally or not, as compared to those who do not speak the official language, and those who are socialized in another culture. Those ethnocultural communities that face this disadvantage may choose among three strategic alternatives: *isolation, integration or assimilation* and engagement in a process of *building their own societal culture*. The different categories of ethnocultural communities choose one or the other of these alternatives depending on their specificity.

As a rule, isolation or exclusion is the option of isolationist religious sects, which voluntarily accept exclusion from the mainstream of society, which they hold as irrelevant from the point of view of their theological beliefs.

Integration – and from the perspective of several generations, assimilation – is generally chosen by the communities that result from the process of immigration. According to empirical data, there are very few

cases of immigrants that protest against the obligation to learn the official language of the adoptive country or that refuse to educate their children in the language of the state. It is obvious to them that a sound knowledge of the language spoken by the majority is an indispensable condition to access social services and opportunities. The fight for rights of the ethnic groups is therefore reduced to claims, expressed usually by the instruments offered by law, for the means that ensure the fair conditions of integration.

The third alternative of response to the disadvantages resulting from the majorities' nation-building strategy generally characterizes national minorities, who respond to these challenges with their own endeavours of nation-building. In their case, due to the ethnocultural particularities that characterize them, the issue is not that they may remain excluded from public institutions, the economy or the academic sphere, which use another language as a means of communication. In their case the societal culture and the linguistic barriers set up by the majority jeopardize the traditional institutional system of the minority, which fulfils several functions of a distinct societal culture. The minorities' characteristic response to these challenges is usually manifest through an opposition against the integrationist trends, which they perceive as assimilationist policies that jeopardize the future of the community. The means they deploy in their fight for official recognition of their language and culture do not differ from the nation-building attempts of the majority. For them it is just as important that the common

language make all their own cultural meanings accessible to all the members of the minority, or to provide access to meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities. The nation-building strategies deployed by the minorities cannot therefore be considered any less modern than the corresponding projects of the majority, because both take into account all that seems indispensable for the ethnocultural community to survive in the conditions of modernity.

The concept of *collective rights* has also been the reason for much confusion within the liberal theory conceived in conventional terms. The most frequent approaches of this issue try first of all to find the division between the individual and collective nature of rights, looking for answers to questions such as: is it the individual or the community that is the subject of certain rights; is the use of rights in some cases individual or collective; and, last but not least, do certain rights suppose the existence of groups, of collectives so as to be practiced or simply make it possible to be referred to. This manner of treating the issues has proved to be unproductive, generating rigid and formal points of view, without contributing to the normative clarification of the problems that arise from ethnopolitical conflicts. Examining the specific claims of ethnocultural communities from this perspective we can discover, for instance, that several of those demands of the minorities that regularly generate tension belong to the category of 'individual' rights, such as the right to use one's mother tongue in courts and in dealing with state authorities, or the right to be exempted from certain civic obligations

stipulated by law, which are contrary to one's religious belief. The fundamental provisions of the legal system specific of liberal democracies on the other hand – such as the right to representation, the right to assemble and the freedom of the press – can hardly be interpreted as individual rights. The most typical cases of collective right – trade union rights or the right to form associations – have, in most cases, nothing to do with the demands of ethnocultural communities.

Another category of confusions that burdens the issue of minority rights originates in debate that took place between the liberals and the communitarians in the second half of the '70s and the first half of the '80s, about the moral primordality of the individual or of the community. As a result of the views expressed in these debates all those who tried to militate for one form or another of collective rights risked being labelled as communitarian and being excluded *ab ovo* from among those who claimed to be liberal.

Trying to eliminate these confusions, Kymlicka offers two categories of relevant arguments: he reviews the forms of *differentiated citizenship* that can be found in the practice of most liberal democracies, and dispels the widespread misconception that these institutionalized forms of collective rights, meant to guarantee equality between different ethnocultural groups necessarily lead to the denial of individual rights.

The cases of institutionalized solutions of collective rights and of special status that currently exist in different states of the world can be divided into three basic

categories: *the right to autonomy*, *polyethnic rights* and *special rights of representation*.

The right to *autonomy or some sort of self-government* is claimed and generally obtained by national minorities that demand different forms of regional power or of political autonomy because they consider that their survival as a community and the development of their own culture can only be ensured in this way. *Polyethnic rights* consist in certain specific stipulations meant to ensure the possibility to affirm and preserve the ethnocultural particularity of ethnic groups and religious minorities that resulted from the process of immigration. These cultural-religious allegiances should not entail negative economic consequences and should not endanger the groups' integration into the political, academic or cultural institutions of the dominant society. The minimum of polyethnic rights is meant to defend against discrimination and prejudices (especially in the case of visible minorities), and to extend the school curriculum in such a way as to reflect the history of ethnies and their contribution to the life and culture of the country. The *special rights of representation* are reserved to social groups that are considered to be the victims of systemic and persistent discrimination. In these cases the traditional way of interests representation – based on the outcomes of the usual electoral process – cannot warrant the necessary protection, which calls for special measures to ensure the effective representation of the discriminated groups in the political system. Such institutionalized solutions are found in most liberal democracies; practically, in every modern state with a demo-

cratic system one or several forms of the above-mentioned *special group rights* are applied.

Concerning the relation between specific group rights and individual rights, Kymlicka mentions two complementary aspects of the claims that national minorities and ethnic groups have, which are usually overlooked by theoreticians who elaborate on the issue of collective rights. There is, on the one hand, a category of expectations that the community has regarding its own members, and a category of claims that the community has concerning its relation with the majority society, on the other. Both categories affect the stability of ethnocultural communities, but they spring from different sources of potential instability. The first attempts to defend the community against the destabilizing consequences of exit, and therefore it regards the removal of the danger of the members' gradual estrangement from the traditional way of life. The second category of measures pursues to offer protection to the communities against the intervention of the majority society in what regards decisions – either political or economic – that can jeopardize the existence and the future of the minority. In order to distinguish between the two categories, Kymlicka introduces the notions of *internal restrictions* and *external protection*.

In most cases, the liberal critics of collective rights raise objections against what they consider to be *internal restrictions*. They express their concern about the fact that as a result of institutionalizing collective rights, the ethnocultural communities may limit the individual freedom of their members with the help of state power,

in the name of group solidarity. Some liberal critics wage attacks upon the measures of external protection, too, which concern mainly inter-community relations, pointing out that under the guise of protecting group particularities, situations of inequity could be institutionalized at the disadvantage of members of the majority communities.

In Kymlicka's opinion, reference to some counterexamples, however illustrative they may be in their context, cannot invalidate the experience of dozens, sometimes hundreds of years of effective social practice. He states that each of the three categories of specific group rights is able to warrant the *external protection* of the ethnocultural community in relation with the surrounding majority. The right to special representation offers the assurance that the minorities' opinions will not be ignored or overlooked in decisions made to affect the entire population of the country. Autonomy, in the spirit of the principles of majority democracy, eliminates the possibility of excluding the minorities from resolving issues of critical importance for the preservation of their culture, while polyethnic rights defend some aspects of cultural and religious traditions which the market cannot sustain, or which are disadvantaged by certain legal stipulations. All the three categories of rights level the disadvantages of minority communities entailed by political decisions and the economic pressure of the majority. In addition, in most cases, external protection is not in conflict with individual rights, as it only regards the inter-community relations between the majority and the minority, and it

does not influence the internal relations of the minority, or the relations between the minority community and its members.

Consequently, the concept of collective rights favours confusion to the extent it ignores to take into account, in a fairly nuanced manner, the variety of differentiated citizenship characteristic of contemporary liberal democracies, on the one hand, and if it mixes the different aspects of external protection with internal restrictions, on the other hand, thus suggesting a false dichotomy between collective and individual rights.

The Main Provisions of the Theory

While the liberal thinkers in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century were preoccupied by the theoretical consequences of the situation of minorities and of ethnic groups (especially in the context of colonial administration, without ever reaching, however, a consensus on the normative consequences of the accumulated experience), the views of the liberal authors in the second half of the 20th century is characterized predominantly by the circumspect avoidance of the issue, by "benign neglect" and by favouring anti-discriminatory positions against those that support the need for institutionalized forms of protection. The change in attitude manifest in the removal of the problem from the agenda of political and academic debates is due mainly to the following three factors: the collapse of the British colonial empire, the polarization of inter-

ests during the cold war, and the domination of American thinkers in the history of liberalism after World War II. The aversion to minority rights, which so well characterizes the political theory of the second half of the century, is the combined result of the failure of the minority protection system set up by the League of Nations, on the one hand, of some unexpected consequences of the civil rights movement in America, on the other, and, thirdly, of the ethnic revival of some groups of immigrants in the United States. The combination of these circumstances resulted in exaggerated generalizations that had a decisive role in distorting the liberal tradition, leading to the ingrained idea that the institutionalization of minority rights would mean to renounce the liberal principles of equality and justice. This idea is, therefore, relatively new in the philosophy of liberal politics, its origins being linked to clearly identifiable stages in the evolution of the history of ideas. Its large scale spread has had consequences that are hard to ignore: it has generated tensions and contradictions within liberal thinking, and it has led – in flagrant contradiction with some early liberal beliefs – to the refusal to accept, in the case of national minorities incorporated in the frameworks of states dominated by other nations, what is considered to be natural in the case of state-forming majority nations: the political recognition and institutionalized defense of ethnocultural identity.

The more and more widespread awareness of these contradictions within liberalism represents a major challenge for the contemporary political philosophy both in the western world, and in the case of develop-

ing states or states that are in full transition toward a consolidated democratic system. Based on the unfortunately rich experience in ethnopolitical conflicts and on the limited effectiveness of the methods meant to prevent and manage them, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the theoretical basis of liberal democracies and the authenticity of liberal thinking are weakened by prejudices and preconceived ethnocentric ideas, by the exaggerated generalization of the importance given to some particular cases, as well as by the confusion made between some circumstantial ethnopolitical strategies and what are considered to be universal moral principles.

The *liberal theory of minority rights* or, in an equivalent denomination, the *theory of multicultural citizenship*, elaborated by Will Kymlicka, seeks to eliminate these contradictions from within the liberal tradition. The method the author chose can be described briefly as an endeavour to integrate into the theory of classical liberalism the normative consequences of the forms of differentiated citizenship that exist in contemporary liberal democracies, examples that have been minimized or ignored in both public and academic discourses due to preponderantly political reasons. Kymlicka's theoretical approach undertakes the reconsideration, up to the ultimate consequences, of the liberal principles, as well as the use of ideologically clarified concepts in a critical spirit, which generates so far unexplored contexts.

In essence, the message of Will Kymlicka's theory is built around two major theses. *The first* states that minority rights are not only *not* in contradiction with the

basic principle of individual liberty and autonomy, but – in the particular conditions of minority existence – they practically *create the circumstances in which these principles produce their effect* and become more than sheer political declarations. Consequently, there is a more profound relation between individual liberty and the person's membership in a cultural community, complete from institutional point of view, than it has been assumed during the preceding stages of liberal thinking. Most people want to live their life in their own culture and desire to have access to meaningful ways of life within their culture's system of institutions, and in this perspective access to opportunities transmitted through cultural membership and by the societal culture is a *major condition of individual liberty*. This allegiance to one's own culture characterizes both the members of the majority nations, dominant within political communities, and those of the national minority communities, so that this feeling must be regarded as closely linked to human nature, justified and legitimate under all circumstances. Access to opportunities transmitted through cultural allegiances as well as membership in a societal culture can be considered rightfully as being part of the *primary goods*, and therefore their institutionalized protection is in full agreement with the liberal principles.

The second thesis reflects the author's belief that special group rights, if circumspectly defined and well differentiated, can ensure *effective equality between the majority and minority*, in perfect harmony with the classical liberal spirit. From the liberal perspective there are three methods to plea in favour of specific group rights:

through invoking the *principle of equality*, through making reference to the *historical or international treaties*, and through highlighting the *advantages of multiculturalism*, modes characterized by the tacit presupposition that the one who wants the minority rights to be implemented will have to provide the necessary proofs. In Kymlicka's opinion the question can be also reversed, liberal principles allowing the interpretation according to which the burden of proof lies on the one that rejects the justified character of the demand to institutionalize minority rights and the one that considers these rights to be attempts contrary to the liberal project (the *analogy with the states* argument).

In order to grasp the justified character of this standpoint, it must be remarked that the liberal tradition bears a serious inconsistency in this respect, too. According to the principle of the ethnocultural neutrality of the liberal state, frequently invoked in the context in which claims for granting minority rights are refused, a consistently liberal position should under no circumstances take into account community allegiances or the ethnocultural identity of the citizens. Valuing personal liberty and individual autonomy above all, the liberals' supreme aim should be to spiritualize and – in a distant perspective – to eliminate all borders, because in a world without borders the spectre of options and alternatives at the individuals' discretion would be considerably widened. However, liberals are not interested only in warranting universal rights and equal chances to individuals, but also in the institutional protection of cultural membership, even at the expense of limiting and

severely conditioning immigration. The advocates of liberalism admit, therefore, even though only tacitly (like Rawls and Dworkin, for instance) that individuals belong to different societal cultures, which ensures the context of their liberty and informed choice: the fact that in that part of the world also, which functions according to the principles of liberal democracy, there are several states, is due to the fact that people belong to different cultures, and their comfort within these familiar frameworks is not indifferent to them.

Making these truths explicit – which are rarely uttered, though they are defining as regards the ethno-political reality of the modern world – we will find it easy to realize that in the case of a multinational country the official unwillingness to institutionalize special group rights will have to be considered as a severe inconsistency in applying liberal principles: the recognition and institutionalized protection of cultural membership cannot be guaranteed in the case of one ethnocultural community and refused in the case of others. The uncontested freedom of the liberal state to decide on its own in the case of claims for citizenship and to limit access to it in such a way as to have the functions of societal culture protected obliges that state to take into account the expectations referring to the institutionalization of differentiated citizenship, too. In Kymlicka's opinion, it results from here that those liberal theoreticians that accept the limitations of citizenship to a certain category of people without offering clarifying arguments to the legitimate nature of these limitations or to its compatibility with the liberal prin-

ciples have a hard and ungrateful task: if they wish to be consistent with themselves, they are forced to offer arguments, in a manner that does not avoid the above-mentioned, to sustain the rejection of the justified character of special group rights.

The thesis referring to the moral equality of ethnocultural communities leads us to the conclusion that in the context of debates on minority rights, the fundamental question is not whether or not one can officially acknowledge the differences between different communities or ethnocultural groups – the undeniable existence of liberal democracies is the very answer to this question – but whether the special differences characteristic of national minorities can or cannot make the object of such official recognition. It is interesting to remark that liberal practice and theory answer this question differently. The literature on political theory is characterized by a relatively unanimous consensus insofar as the refusal of most groups' rights is concerned, but in practice, as we have seen, we can encounter numerous and diverse institutional forms of differentiated citizenship. The theoretical approaches are based not so much upon moral philosophy, but rather on contextual arguments invoking stability and international peace, or on references to the consensus of majority democracy, or social harmony in general. Even though these worries are legitimate, the arguments linked to them are not sound enough in order to sustain the institutional forms of ethnocultural *inequity*. On the contrary: the unilateral rejection of claims referring to minority rights, as well as the setting up of ethnocratic systems that ignore the

interests of communities belonging to other cultures jeopardizes both peace and international security, democratic consensus and social harmony.

Two collateral problems result from the two basic theses of the liberal theory of minority rights, in connection with which we must demonstrate that the fundamental theses of the theory do not generate non-liberal consequences. On the one hand, it is necessary to elaborate on the answer given by the liberal theory of minority rights to the challenges represented by *intolerant ethnocultural groups*, who apply restrictive measures within the community, which are unacceptable from the liberal perspective. On the other hand, it must be explained what the *source of solidarity* in liberal democracies that institutionalize minority rights will be, and what will prevent ethnoculturally diverse societies that apply the provisions of the liberal theory of minority rights – or, in other words, the theory of multicultural citizenship – from slipping into the uncontrolled phenomenon of successive secessions.

As for the first aspect, the author points out that the refusal to conform to liberal principles is not a problem that only concerns minorities. Both minority communities and majorities are equally faced with the challenges of non-liberal interests, *often springing from dissensions on ethnopolitical strategy options and from community apprehensions that spring from the feeling of mutual threat*, and that much common effort will be necessary for problems as such to be resolved without negative consequences for individual freedom and autonomy.

As for the second aspect, we must keep in mind that in history liberals have repeatedly insisted on the procedural and legal definition of the concept of *citizenship*, hoping in this way to fundament social solidarity. However, despite frequent reference to a so-called ‘civic identity’, the liberal understanding of citizenship and of what it would imply has had, along the years and decades, a powerful load of substance, identity and membership in the political community. It is still not clear how this load could be made explicit - or overcome - in the conditions of political communities that are divided from ethnocultural point of view. The fellow-feeling that should ideally characterize the citizens of a multinational democratic state should be a unifying one, without suggesting, however, the blending of different identities. As this feeling has not been articulated yet, what we have so far is the dilemmatic evidence of historical experience: granting the right to self-governance to the national minorities that desire this statute may endanger social unity and solidarity, because it promotes the concepts of distinct political communities; the denial of these rights may become equally destabilizing, however, as it aggravates the feeling of exclusion, it feeds collective apprehension linked to the uncertain perspectives of the community’s future, and in this way fundamentals the secessionist option.

As a synthesis regarding the normative significance of the liberal theory of minority rights, as elaborated by Will Kymlicka, we can remark that the theory in general brings proofs not only to support the need for the liberal definition of the conditions of effective equality be-

tween groups, but it also supports the statement that in what regards the members of non-dominant ethnocultural communities, *the authentic effects of individual rights and of universal human rights are only accomplished if institutionalized equality between communities is warranted*. Otherwise, sooner or later, we must consider the disappearance of ethnocultural differences – even in the conditions of rule of law, as well as within the most tolerant and most neutral social medium.

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Fetzele patriarhatului

Sandu Frunza: Va spun din nou bun venit la *Seminarul de Cercetare a Religiilor si Ideologiilor*. Astazi avem o invitata cu totul si cu totul special, doamna profesoara Mihaela Miroiu de la Universitatea din Bucuresti, care ne va vorbi despre “Fetzele patriarhatului : Cazul învățământului universitar din Europa de Est”. Nu despre fetzele patriarhatului, asa cum au crezut unii... Am fost întrebat de câțiva prieteni teologi de ce tinem o conferinta despre patriarh, ce vrem noi sa aducem in discutie într-o conferinta despre patriarh? Va fi, de fapt, o conferinta despre ideologia patriarhatului aplicata pe învățământul din Europa Centrala si de Est.

Trebuie sa precizam ca doamna profesoara Mihaela Miroiu este creatoarea scolii de gândire feminista în România; este de fapt un simbol pentru tot ceea ce

înseamna gândire feminista si studii aplicate de gen în România. Doamna profesoara predă cursuri de etica politica, de teorii politice feministe si etica aplicata; este creatoarea singurului Master de Gen si Politici Publice, este coordonatoare de doctorat în stiinte politice, teorii politice contemporane, teorii politice feministe si etica politica. Este una dintre creatoarele efective în domeniul studiilor de gen, al gândirii feministe. As putea aminti faptul ca in planul cercetarii internationale domnia sa aduce o noua teorie în ceea ce priveste functionarea dilemelor în studiile de gen; este vorba despre teoria convenabilitatii. Pe lângă aceasta, aduce foarte multe studii aplicate la contextul românesc.

Ceea ce se poate observa la o prima privire de pe lista de publicatii a invitatei noastre este spiritul de echipa. O parte din lucrari fiind publicate alaturi de

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prestigioase nume atât din lumea feminină, cât și din cea masculină. Aminti dintre cărțile domniei sale “Gîndul umbrei abordări feministe în filosofia contemporană”, care după cîte știu este prima teză de doctorat pe studii de gen în România. De asemenea, aminti “Despre natura, femeii și morală”, “România stare de fapt”, “Învățămîntul românesc azi”, “Societatea retro”, “Introducere în etica profesională”. Este co-autoare la manualul de filosofie, la cel de cultură civică; este editor al mai multor lucrări dintre care tin neapărat să amintesc “Lexiconul feminist”, deoarece oricine a încercat să citească o carte privind studiile de gen cred că și-a pus mereu problema: cum ai putea să exprimi în limba română textele respective, mai ales o serie de termeni care nu există încă în limba română. Cu această carte avem o primă soluție. Doamna profesoară are o prestigioasă activitate internațională asupra căreia nu mai insist acum deoarece pentru membri noștri vor fi disponibile mai multe date pe pagina noastră web. Cred că este bine să mă opresc aici. Cred că au trecut cele trei minute pe care eu le aveam pentru această prezentare. S-o rugăm pe doamna profesoară să ne expună tema propusă pentru întâlnirea de astăzi.

Mihaela Miroiu: Vreau să fac o rectificare. Nu sînt la Universitatea București, sînt la Școala Națională de Studii Politice și Administrative din București, proaspăt ex-decan al Facultății de Științe Politice, o emigranta din zona filosofiei în zona științelor politice, cu o oarecare plăcere și cu o oarecare neplăcere, prin urmare cu sentimente destul de amestecate. Din păcate, a

trebuit să părăsesc zona filosofiei, mulți dintre dumneavoastră aparțineți încă acestui domeniu, a trebuit să-o părăsesc în favoarea unui domeniu mult mai pragmatic și mult mai abstract. Chestiunea aceasta este coerentă cu o oarecare înclinație pe care am avut-o încă de studentă și înspre sociologie și spre faptul că nu mă conving teoriile decît la nivel instrumental. Dacă pot face ceva cu ele. Pentru ele în sine am o aderență ceva mai scăzută, probabil și pentru că sînt femeie și apetitul pentru « cai verzi pe pereti » este ceva mai redus.

Rîsete în sală...

A fost o semiglumă. Există probe destul de serioase și de concludente în ultimii treizeci, patruzeci de ani cînd femeile au fost libere să arate că mai și gîndesc nu numai imita gîndirea bărbaților, că au apetit și pentru metafizică și pentru epistemologie și pentru filosofia moralei, chiar în calitatea de creatoare. Vreau să salut prezenta tuturor la această conferință, sper să nu vă dezamăgească și să nu considerați că v-ați pierdut timpul. Va salut în mai multe calități. În primul rînd, cred că de foarte bună colegă a colegilor mei de la Universitatea din Cluj și vorbesc aici în special de colegii mei de la Facultatea de Științe Politice, de la Facultatea de Studii Europene, de la Facultatea de Psihologie cu care am construit în ani o relație extraordinară și pentru care am foarte mult respect, de asemenea pentru colegii mei care alcatuiesc, după părerea mea, cea mai consistentă cercetare interdisciplinară de studiu de gen din România și, probabil, pe care cei mai mulți dintre dumneavoastră îi cunoașteți, unii lipsesc, nu sînt în sală, Enikő, de

exemplu, stiu ca e plecata din tara. Si va mai salut si ca... sigur am aici si o fosta colega de liceu, care mi-era foarte draga si mi-e drag s-o întâlnesc din când în când în Cluj, ea nu e studenta la voi, nici profesoara la voi, slava Domnului, e în alt domeniu decât învățământul. Dupa cum vedeti, m-am deconspirat ca si eu sînt ardeleanca si acesta e un alt motiv de aderenta la aceasta zona a României si a fost chiar preferinta mea sa traiesc oarecum între cele doua lumi ca sa nu ma simt frustrata fundamental de lipsa mea din Transilvania si de lipsa Transilvaniei din mine într-un anumit sens. Eu ma simt foarte aproape de Universitatea aceasta si va promit ca atîta vreme cît sînt sanatoasa, periodic voi fi si la Cluj, pîna cînd n-o sa va saturati realmente de prezenta mea.

Tema conferintei mele este “Fetzele patriarhatului”, nu ale patriarhului, care dupa parerea mea face o fata destul de buna în mod surprinzator, ca si presedintele Ilescu în ultima vreme, unul prin deschidere fata de Occident si celalalt pentru ca totusi pare sa fie gardianul Constitutiei. Deci am o surpriza placuta cu cei doi patriarhi, cel de stat si cel religios, deci nu despre ei este vorba în expunerea mea, ci despre un concept care cumva acopera o realitate despre care multi dintre dumneavoastra stiti, pentru ca deja sînteti initiati în aceste abordari. Patriarhatul, într-un sens generic, este pur si simplu regimul de putere în care negi existenta discernamîntului si liberului arbitru pentru categorii largi de oameni în favoarea unui patriarh, în favoarea unui tata simbolic, tata spiritual, sau daca vreti parinte politic sau ideologic, care detine monopolul discernamîntului, libertatii, monopolul faptului de a fi

normator si legiutor. În sensul acesta, luam conceptul de patriarhat. Spunem ca modernitatea se instaureaza atunci cînd relatiile patriarhale se abolesc, respectiv cînd în locul patriarhatului traditional, al unei constructii bazate pe *pater familias* se naste ceea ce se cheama contractul social fratern. Ei bine, din contractul social fratern al modernitatii au lipsit femeile, contractul era totusi strict patern, în consecinta, modernitatea chiar daca s-a instalat în sensul abolirii patriarhatului în relatiile de putere dintre barbati, nu a disparut în relatiile de putere între genuri. Este un fenomen care se mentine atît ca fenomen de natura spirituala, cît si ca fenomen de natura politica si economica. Eu vreau sa vorbesc practic despre trei lucruri: semnificatia conceptului, ca sa stiti de la ce plec, în al doilea rînd: ce s-a întîmplat în tranzitia româneasca si est-europeana încît metamorfozele patriarhatului sînt destul de interesante si, în al treilea rînd, ce se întîmpla în învățământul superior care în loc sa fie ceea ce trebuie sa fie, un vîrf de lance al schimbarii, pare dimpotriva sa consacre si sa legitimeze patriarhatul. Acestea sînt cele trei puncte esentiale.

În momentul în care în relatiile de gen avem o dominanta a puterii patriarhale, practic, mesajul pe care îl primesc femeile este mesajul tacerii. Ele trebuie *sa taca* în teologie, *sa taca* în filosofie, trebuie *sa taca* în politica si trebuie *sa mai taca* si despre femei. Ce înseamna ca trebuie *sa taca*? Aceasta-i o imagine care contrasteaza cu ideea ca ele sînt clevetitoare. Ele nu trebuie sa produca o cunoastere autorizata în aceasta zona, ci doar s-o preia. Pentru ca, am sa citez dintr-o feminista extrem de

creativa Mary Daly, pîna la urma în conditii patriarhale, femeilor li se tolereaza sa învete, sa-i învete si pe altii, dar nu sa gîndeasca cu mintea proprie. Si-atunci, cînd ma voi referi la “hard”-ul patriarhatului ma voi referi exact la acest lucru. Ce obstacole exista în calea faptului ca femeile sa fie producatoare de cunoastere si nu doar purtatoare si transmitatoare de cunoastere, inclusiv în mediul universitar. Sigur, pentru ca aceasta conferinta are loc în cadrul Facultatii de Filosofie am sa va spun doar doua lucruri relevante în sensul legitimarii filosofice ale patriarhatului. În primul rînd este ideea comuna cu cea a religiei, a nasterii *ex nihilo*, respectiv a faptului ca materia în sine nu are sens, nu are forma, este nedeterminata si are nevoie de spirit pentru ca ea sa capete sens, iar aceste simboluri de natura filosofica sînt asociate cu femininul si cu masculinul, asta e traditia pe care o stim foarte bine înca din filosofia greaca si continua inclusiv în modernitate. Acest lucru, daca vreti, anuleaza cumva si din punct de vedere epistemologic posibilitatea femeilor sa fie altceva decît “umbre ale unui gînd”ca sa folosesc o metafora a lui Nichita Stanescu. Sau cum zicea Noica: ele sînt “sinea” si nu “sinele”, respectiv nu sînt cugetul ci problema, cel mult problema, nu sînt subiectul cunoasterii, ci mai degraba obiectul cunoasterii. Legitimările acestui mod de gîndire, în care se anuleaza dreptul la *Weltanschauung*, la producere de *Weltanschauung* pentru femei sînt în întreaga istorie a filosofiei, cu foarte rare exceptii, inclusiv în filosofia romîneasca – si cine frecventeaza, sa zicem, numele semnificative va întîlni varii metamorfoze ale aceste conceptii despre « acefalia »

femeilor la nume foarte respectabile, pîna la forme extrem de misogine, de exemplu: Femeile sînt nulitati cel mult simpatice al caror singur rol este sa destinda barbatul din tensiunea spiritului aducîndu-l la nivelul mundanului. L-am citat aproximativ pe Cioran... sau nu pot sa fie metafizicieni si, urmeaza un omagiu, “pentru ca ele sînt însasi metafizica”, l-am citat pe Paleologu. Dar acelasi lucru îl gasiti si, inclusiv, la persoane cu reputatia de mari filosofi contemporani romîni. În analogia dintre femei si bunul salbatic, respectiv în ideea ca filosofia este într-adevar utila public si extrem de accesibila daca e înțeleasa de catre femei sau de catre salbatici pentru ca se afla la gradul 0 de cunoastere, prin urmare daca poti comunica cu ele, atunci înseamna ca ai facut cu adevarat filosofia foarte populara. Aceasta paradigma este, desigur, de factura romantica, dar cel care a preluat-o si reluat-o si dezvoltat-o, respectiv Gabriel Liiceanu, niciodata n-a negat ca ar avea aceiasi parere. A preluat-o pur si simplu. Am dat cîteva citate, aproximative ca sa vedeti ca fetele patriarhatului sînt în filosofie o constanta generala. În privinta religiei, foarte pe scurt, nu o sa ma leg de aspectele de natura teologica care sînt mult mai clare, respectiv plecînd de la faptul ca din Facerea s-a ales nu varianta androgina, ci varianta nasterii femeii din barbat, un derivat al acesteia, ci de lucrurile foarte simple pe care le primesc ca mesaj oamenii obisnuiti care niciodata nu intra într-o cunoastere teologica de natura elaborata. Este vorba despre mesajul pe care-l primești la botez cînd, o mama care naste un copil e considerata de Biserica Ortodoxa, necurata timp de sase

săptămîni, dacă are o fată și timp de trei săptămîni dacă are un băiat. Botezul este o ceremonie diferită pentru băieți și fete, pentru că băieții au acces la altar și fetele nu, la trecerea prin altar; la căsătorie pe lîngă faptul că nu ți se cere consimțămîntul explicit, mesajele sînt foarte clare în legătură cu rolul pe care-l avem fiecare dintre noi, respectiv care este partea *cap* a cuplului și care este partea *trup* a cuplului. Astea sînt mesajele care vin la nivelul simțului comun, mai ales prin tradiția de natură religioasă. La nivelul, dacă vreți mai sofisticat, mai academic, pot să vină sub influența filosofiei, sub influența teoriei politice, sub influența chiar și-a sociologiei. De exemplu, la ultimul recensămînt al populației orice fel de operare s-a bazat pe conceptul de “cap de familie” care a fost dat de la început cu presupunerea că este bărbat.

Felul în care apare și se încastrează patriarhatul e extrem de divers, dar foarte constant și-l găsim de la domenii ale cunoașterii pînă la domenii ale practicilor sociale, foarte răspîndit. Problema este că a devenit așa de mult o a doua natură, încît oamenii îl socotesc normal și nu îl mai chestionează în nici un fel. Vreau să vă spun de la început că acestui concept nu i se opune cel de matriarhat, ci cel de parteneriat. Cu alte cuvinte, de foarte multe ori inamicii gîndirii feministe pretextează: voi vreți să răsturnați puterea androcratică și s-o înlocuiți cu una ginocratică. Este complet fals și este un mod de gîndire adversativ, dihotomic și maniheist pe care feminismul nu-l practică. Este vorba pur și simplu de convingerea că umanitatea comună se compune deopotrivă din femei și din bărbați și dacă vrem o

umanitate întregă, aceasta înseamnă că libertatea, inclusiv libertatea de expresie, autoexpresia și autodezvoltarea trebuie să fie împartite în comun, inclusiv imaginea umanității trebuie construită de către reprezentanții ambelor sexe. Patriarhatul nu este deloc numai inamicul, să zicem, femeilor care vor libertate de autoexprimare, este și inamicul bărbaților care vor același lucru; pentru că de pildă, el capătă aspecte senioriale în foarte multe dintre relațiile sociale și ierarhice în care ei se ciocnesc cumva de același lucru. Pentru că este o formă de dominare, desigur că-i dăunătoare și pentru cei care domină și pentru cei care sînt dominați.

Că să venim la al doilea punct pe care vreau să-l tratez: ce a făcut comunismul în legătură cu existența acestei forme de putere mi se pare un lucru extrem de important să știu care au fost metamorfozele patriarhatului în varii situații. Ceea ce vă voi spune în continuare e rezultatul foarte comprimat al unor cercetări extrem de ample. Unele dintre ele s-au făcut sub egida UNESCO și au fost publicate în volumul *Good Practice in Promoting Gender Education in Central and Eastern Europe*, în anul 2002 a apărut publicația, altele sînt rezultatul Barometrului relațiilor de gen în România apărut în anul 2000 sub egida Fundației pentru o Societate Deschisă, foarte multe date le găsiți în volumul *Women 2000* scos de către Comitetul Helsinki, comitetul internațional Helsinki, de data aceasta, și desigur că-i vorba despre analiză poststatistică, analiză calitativă a datelor din care va apărea și un volum, cred foarte explicit, la editura Polirom, probabil în primăvara

anului viitor. Pentru cei interesati, de exemplu, în patriarhatul în gîndirea politica romîneasca, desi în afara de dl. Profesor Boari nu stiu daca mai sînt politologi aici sau studenti la Stiinte Politice, a aparut acum un volum care se cheama *Patriarhat si emancipare în istoria gîndirii politice romînesti* tot la Polirom editat de catre mine si de catre Maria Bucur de la Universitatea Indiana. Studiile sînt efectiv pe doctrinele romînesti, doctrina liberala, nu actuala, ci cele din perioada premergatoare celui de-al doilea Razboi Mondial; e vorba de liberalism, conservatorism, legionarism, nationalism, si de gîndirea socialista interbelica. Cred ca studiile sînt realmente foarte interesante în primul rînd pentru ca scot la suprafata o analiza care nu s-a mai facut niciodata asupra acestui mod de gîndire. Autorii sînt toti oameni foarte tineri, proaspeti absolventi de facultate, unii masteranzi, altii doctoranzi, au o privire proaspata în legatura cu istoria gîndirii politice romînesti.

Ce s-a întîmplat în comunism? Ceea ce este foarte interesant este urmatorul lucru: comunismul, pe scurt vorbind, a însemna o trecere de la un patriarhat traditional existent înainte lui, la un egalitarism comunist asezonat cu un patriarhat de stat. Ceea ce a facut comunismul a fost sa faca saltul de la patriarhatul traditional în relatiile de gen la egalitarismul de gen însoțit de patriarhatul de stat. În perioada în care se petrecea acest proces în tarile comuniste, în vestul Europei se petrecea cu totul altceva. În vestul Europei, în secolul al XIX-lea începe sa fie terminat, abolit patriarhatul traditional si înlocuit cu patriarhatul modern. Adica cu situatia în

care femeile depind din punct de vedere economic si ca statut de barbati, dar încep sa depinda tot mai puțin în sens juridic si în sens politic, respectiv capata treptat drepturi politice, dar în acelasi timp procesul industrializarii le scoate efectiv din economie si ele devin economic dependente. Acesta e procesul început în secolul al XIX-lea, începutul secolului XX în Occident. Ce se întîmpla de pilda în România în aceiasi perioada? Noi avem o societate rurala bazata pe obste sateasca, 80% din economie era rurala. Ce fel de proces de industrializare serios puteam avea atunci, ce fel de separatie care a contat foarte mult putem avea? Adica separatie între sfera publica si sfera privata. Noi nu putem vorbi de o separatie de tip occidental între sfera publica si sfera privata în România, ca si în celelalte tari est europene pentru simplul motiv ca nu am avut acelasi proces economic care a generat aceasta separatie. Noi nu am experimentat în România patriarhatul modern în perioada de pîna la comunism. Aceasta este marea diferenta între noi si ei. Este o experienta pe care aproape nu am avut-o sau am avut-o la modul extrem de nesemnificativ. Acest egalitarism practicat în perioada comunista a adus pentru femei, de exemplu, cîteva lucruri care pot fi socotite cîstiguri. Care ar fi acele cîstiguri? În afara de, sa zicem, o egalitate formala în, nu stiu daca putem sa spunem drepturi, între sexe, pentru ca a vorbi de egalitate în drepturi într-un stat care neaga drepturile în practica sa, e greu de discutat despre asta, femeile au primit un sprijin foarte serios de la stat în privinta cresterii copiilor, adica s-a înfiintat toata rețeaua de creșe si de

gradinite care sa asigure acest proces. Au avut acces la locuri de munca si la educatie de toate felurile, fara nici un fel de discriminare. Mai mult decît atît, s-a practicat sistemul promovarii pe cote care si astazi apare asa...ca o tara în gîndirea noastra, asa încît s-a realizat la nivelul vietii, sa-i zicem publice, un anumit echilibru de gen. S-a realizat, foarte bine... numai ca sînt cîteva lucruri pe care noi le stim la fel de bine. Si anume: un regim comunist si mai mult decît atît, un regim totalitar cum a fost cel românesc a fost un regim în care statul devine patriarh absolut. El devine, daca vreti, capul absolut al fiecarui cetatean. Mintea care guverneaza, cel care spune ce e bine si ce e rau, ce e drept si ce este nedrept, ce nevoie are fiecare om. Prin urmare, relatia de dependenta nu se mai face pe cale patriarhala clasica, femeia depinde de barbat, ci se face pe o cale diferita, femeia depinde de stat ca si barbatul, relatia devine o relatie de dependenta fata de stat. Statul este legiuitor, normator, el este cel care ne da noua inclusiv configuratia nevoilor pe care ar trebui sa le avem. România este chiar un caz deosebit în toata Europa de est prin politica pronatalista, pentru femei totalitarismul a însemnat interventie pîna la nivel biologic în sensul cel mai serios al cuvîntului, respectiv pîna la nivelul controlului intimitatii. Si atunci, sigur, problema pe care ne-o punem, pentru femei, este aceea ca accesul la putere a fost posibil atunci cînd puterea era goala de sens, iar accesul la resurse a fost posibil atunci cînd pauperitatea era generalizata si în mare masura maxima. Cineva o sa ma contrazica pe buna dreptate, sa-mi spuna ca acum pauperitatea este maxima

si e foarte adevarat, dar e vorba de o pauperitate maxima în conditii de polarizare sociala si nu de omogenizare sociala cum e era cazul celalalt. Ce s-a întîmplat dupa ce comunismul a colapsat asa cum multi stiti din experiente de lectura si unii din experienta cunoscuta poate mai direct. Ce s-a întîmplat în tranzitie cu formele patriarhale? Sigur, a disparut statul ca patriarh absolut. Numai ca, ceea ce am constatat noi în cercetarile pe care le-am facut a fost ca în România, ca si în celelalte tari est-europene, acum se produce fenomenul instaurarii patriarhatului modern. Procesul prin care trece aceasta tara si aceasta regiune este cel de instaurare a patriarhatului de gen de factura moderna. S-a renuntat la egalitarismul comunist din toate punctele de vedere si practic nu într-un mod explicit, în mare masura, se prabuseste egalitarismul de gen pe doua cai fundamentale: procesul de dependenta economica si de dependenta de status al femeii fata de barbat. Aici nu este vorba despre inegalitati formale, ci aici este vorba despre trecere de la egalitate la dependenta. Nimeni nu a intentionat asta politic, nu a existat nici un fel de program ca fenomenul acesta sa se produca, dar în realitate fenomenul se produce. Întrebarea este de ce se produce acest fenomen? Cum adica ajung femeile acum, pentru prima oara în istoria României, sa fie în masa dependente de veniturile barbatilor? Aceasta e o întrebare coplesitoare, mai ales în conditiile în care statisticile ne-ar face sa dormim foarte linistiti. Respectiv, somajul în rîndul femeilor este mai scazut decît somajul în rîndul barbatilor. Si totusi

traiesti într-o țară în care femeile depind din ce în ce mai mult ca venituri de bărbați...

Există câteva fenomene care ne spun foarte clar de ce se întâmplă acest lucru pe care nu l-a intenționat și nu l-a programat nimeni. Un prim aspect foarte clar este cel care se leagă de un tip de politică pe care eu o asimilez *conservatorismului de stînga*. Ce este cu acest conservatorism de stînga, un concept la care tin foarte mult și care multă vreme a contrariat oamenii pentru că în mod clasic conservatorismul este cel de dreapta. Întregul Occident a experimentat conservatorismul de dreapta și bineînțeles că a construit teoriile și ideologiile sau ideologia aferentă unui astfel de conservatorism, și nimeni nu-i trece altceva prin cap fiindcă stînga este acolo progresista. Nu pot să-o vada că o stînga conservatoare, or, noi știm că dacă tratăm conservatorismul ca pe o rutină instituționalizată, efectiv ca pe deprinderi încastrate în cele mai importante practici și instituții sociale și, în același timp, că asta înseamnă că se acceptă o schimbare, dar o schimbare extrem de lentă astfel încât să nu se zdruncine sursele fundamentale ale stabilității, avem și explicația fenomenului, respectiv după cincizeci de ani de politică de stînga radicală, sigur că deprinderile sînt astfel construite în practicile și instituțiile sociale, încît rutina instituționalizată te trimite mai degrabă înspre stînga. Acest lucru este extrem de vizibil și are legătura cu ce va spune următorul aspect: la o întrebare foarte serioasă cine a cîștigat tranziția, răspunsul este, în afară de cel evident: îmbogățirii, cei care au furat, cei care au avut acces la redistribuire, dar și sindicatele din

industriile falimentare. De doisprezece ani în România politica este fundamental influențată în sensul reformelor economice și sociale profunde de mișcarea sindicală. Aceste sindicate sînt constituite în industriile cu bărbați, în care bărbații domina peste 80-90%; e vorba de industria grea. Ce s-a întâmplat în acești doisprezece ani? Aceste sindicate au oprit sistematic reforma, lucru pe care îl știm, politicienii n-au avut atîta curaj ca să împiedice acest proces, reformele au fost sistematic ratate. Să nu ne uităm la procesul de integrare care nu ne vine dinăuntru, ne vine din afară e clar, dar cînd e vorba de o problemă internă, e destul de evident că sistematic, acest nucleu dur al stîngii conservatoare a cîștigat batalia pentru o transformare conservatoare, nu bruscă a societății. Ce a însemnat cîștigul și ce legătură are cu patriarhatul? – o întrebare firească. Foarte simplu. Pentru că toate aceste categorii de lucrători, care nu mai produc spre vînzare, sînt plătiți din bugetul public. Întrebarea este : cine produce bugetul public? Cine produce produsul intern brut? Dacă ne uităm la sursele produsului intern brut, vom vedea că este vorba despre industria ușoară în special industria textilă, e vorba despre comerț, servicii, bănci și, în sensul unei contribuții foarte active, mai e domeniul sănătății, al educației etc. Dacă ne uităm la tipul de forță de muncă majoritară care domina ramurile în care se produce produsul intern brut vom întîlni mai ales categorii de slujbe în care domina femeile. Dacă ne vom uita la locurile unde se consumă cel mai mare produs intern brut, este vorba categoric de zonele unde domina bărbații. Pe scurt, în ultimii doisprezece ani, femeile sînt

producatoarele prevalente ale produsului intern brut, iar barbatii sînt consumatori prevalenti ai produsului intern brut. Într-un mod foarte ciudat, costurile tranziției sînt suportate prin excelență de către femei, într-un mod indirect, chiar dacă nu intra ele masiv în somaj, chiar dacă nu este vorba de o cadere dramatică a lor pe piața muncii, veniturile lor sînt mult reduse, mai ales din cauza unei fiscalități care trebuie să rezolve, de pildă, problema presiunilor sindicale din industria grea. În felul acesta, educația este subfinanțată în mod dramatic și ea este foarte feminizată la nivelul compoziției forței de muncă, iar în, să zicem așa, ramurile bugetare, la modul propriu, sigur, poliția, armata, toată lumea bună dintr-o anumită zonă are venituri mult mai mari decît cei care fac parte din categoria noastră. Învățămîntul este feminizat și din cauza aceea poziția lui bugetară este extrem de joasă. Ca și sănătatea. Pe măsura ce o anumită ramură de activitate se feminizează, importanța în bugetul public scade. Pe măsura ce intra mai multe femei într-o activitate este clar că intra în picaj și prestigiul și banii acelei forme de activitate. O rațiune extrem de importantă este și aceea că femeile nu au exercitiul revendicării drepturilor. Iar atunci cînd le revendică par ridicole, sînt înecate în ironii, imaginea protestatarului este imaginea barbatului care bate cu pumnul în masă. De aceea, n-o să găsiți mase de femei care-și revendică, în același fel cu barbatii, drepturile. Mai mult decît atît, în ramurile productive ocupate cu femei privatizarea este aproape cvasi-totală și, prin urmare, a dispărut și activitatea sindicală. La noi, ce se privatizează se desindicalizează. Femeile nu sînt

protejate de stat, ele nu mai intra în aceeași salărie protectivă care implică parteneriatul cu guvernul sau cu patronul să se bată pentru drepturi de natură sindicală. E un proces care poate fi analizat din punct de vedere economic și social, nu spun că anumite categorii nu-i convine să-l analizeze, el este analizat dar în mod obișnuit oamenii se uita în cu totul altă parte cînd este vorba despre statisticile de gen, de pildă se uita la statisticile pe ocupații. Un alt fenomen de dependență este creat cam în felul următor: Aproape 40% dintre absolvenții de liceu din România nu mai intra nici unde, nu mai merg nici unde, devin casnice sau prostituate. Cu alte cuvinte, dacă nu intra în învățămîntul universitar iau drumul a doua dependente: de un barbat, dacă se mărită sau de mai mulți dacă se prostituează. Or, acest fenomen este iarăși cum nu se poate mai nou în istoria României. O masă din ce în ce mai mare de femei care intra în structuri de dependență! De ce există fenomenul sau cum poate fi el încurajat într-un mod indirect? Într-un mod foarte simplu. În general, statutul de casnică este un statut care începe să crească dramatic în țară, într-un fel extrem de elementar. În momentul în care se face o statistică, barbatii care n-au servicii trec în categoria someri sau persoane fără ocupație. Dacă femeile nu au servicii sînt trecute temporar în categoria somere sau în categoria casnice. Persoanele fără ocupație și somerii sînt subiect al politicii, casnicele nu, pentru că pare că este rezultatul liberei opțiuni, casnica nu face politică, nu interesează, nu se fac politici pentru categoria aceasta. Și atunci sigur că n-o să trecem niciodată la rubrica de casnici

barbatii care n-au servici si traiesc pe lînga casa
« omului », ocupîndu-se de copiii facuti în comun. Ei
ramîn subiect politic, indiferent de situatia în care se
afla. Sa nu mai vorbim despre categoria halucinanta a
70% dintre taranci care se cheama “lucratori familiali
neremunerati”. Alta categorie minunata a tranzitiei
romînesti. Jumatate din populatia Romîniei merge la
tara. Ce înseamna ca merge la tara? În primul rînd, ca
depinde ca venituri foarte serios de cineva, lucratorul
acesta familial neremunerat prin definitie n-are bani,
eventual practica economia naturala închisa. Trecînd
peste faptul ca acolo influenta fundamentala, daca este
vreuna, este influenta religioasa care numai emancipare
de gen îti transmite, nu? Are un nucleu dur al influentei
patriarhale care vine din zona rurala pe doua cai: o
dependenta cvasi-totala care vine din domeniul eco-
nomic, în lipsa unei economii monetare pe de o parte,
si, pe de alta parte, din faptul ca ideologia de baza este
cel mult cea de influenta religioasa. Nu exista contra-
candidat de influentare decît, sa spun asa, eventual
televiziunea. E singura care mai poate face ceva.
Televiziunea ce transmite? Transmite în mare doua
categorii de mesaje pe aceasta tema. Unele sînt
postfeministe, mesaje papusa Barbie, femeia care e de
toate, de trei ori femeie, de zece ori femeie; nu stiu de
cîte ori trebuie sa fie un barbat barbat ca sa
demonstreze ca exista. Femeia Barbie are cariera, e
frumoasa foc, are sex-appeal, poate sa le faca pe toate
în acelasi timp, are bani, are succes etc. Acesta-i
modelul postfeminist, modelul de succes tip Barbie.
Celalalt este modelul antifeminist si se vede efectiv din

unele zone în care dumneavoastra stiti bine... de
batjocura... nici nu le mai citez. Ajunge efectiv o
batjocura foarte serioasa inclusiv ideea de femeie si în
care sînt manipulate foarte multe vedete de televiziune,
care inclusiv la emisiuni dintr-astea care-ti rup inima
(vezi Surprize, surprize) apar într-un mod atît de sexi de
nu stii despre ce-i vorba în context. Este clar un
« postmodernism » total, orice merge, babele plîng,
subiectii lesina, prezentatoarei i se crapa rochia si
decolteul. Adica este asa o învalmaseala de influente de
toate naturile, încît în final esti nauc. Or, tu nu ai un
sistem de educatie cumva publica în care efectiv
problema echitatii de gen sa-ti fie structural asezata, în
schimb ai doua influente posibile: biserica si
televiziunea. Unde te duci în partea asta? Este extrem
de greu de spus ce se alege din aceasta combinatie, care
este desigur un oximoron, pe de alta parte, trebuie sa
recunoastem ca e naucitoare. Sînt cîteva lucruri care
hranesc acest proces, procesul prin care se instaleaza
acum patriarhatul modern. Conservatorismul de stînga
de care v-am spus si conservatorismul de dreapta care
în principal se creaza si prin intermediul partidelor, sa
zicem, cu o influenta mai mare de dreapta, foarte
traditionaliste, apare si prin mesajul intelectualilor
elitisti si prin mesajul religios. Un alt factor care con-
duce la un patriarhat îl reprezinta, fara îndoiala, zona
extrem de subitrica a clasei de mijloc. Cînd nu ai o clasa
de mijloc, este greu de spus ca poti sa construisti o
societate contractuala cu echilibru, daca vreti, de
negociere si în care problema consimtamîntului, a
autoafirmarii si a libertatii sa se puna ca probleme

generale, ca oferte generale pentru majoritatea populatiei. Pe de alta parte, exista un fenomen de polarizare dramatic. În lista aceea faimoasa cu cei o suta de bogati, dintre care unii au praduit prin credite neperformante tara noastra, nu exista decît doua nume de femei si acestea sînt fiicele lui Voiculescu. Nu s-a facut un top ai celor mai saraci – cîteva milioane – unde de buna seama, daca e vorba de candidatul perfect la saracie, e vorba de candidata perfecta la saracie si ar fi sigur vaduva vîrstnica, zona rurala, eventual rroma etc. Pe dimensiunea de gen polarizarea afecteaza foarte în sus barbatii si foarte în jos femeile. Mai ales daca sînt si mame singure. Acuma, întrebarea este : ce au toate astea cu învatamîntul universitar?

Învatamîntul universitar am zis ca teoretic ar trebui sa fie vîrful de lance al schimbarii într-o societate si mai ales într-o societate în tranzitie, daca si-ar asuma faptul ca are un rol social extrem de important în reforma. Este un fenomen si românesc si est-european si eu va spun, universitatea dumneavoastra este cea mai avangardista din România, dar nu neaparat si din punctul acesta de vedere. Universitatea “Babes-Bolyai” este într-o pozitie foarte privilegiata în contextul în care universitatile au anumite rutini de natura paternalista. De exemplu, într-un fel, Politehnica sufera în continuare de un anumit atasament fata de politicile sîngii conservatoare pentru ca vrea sa-si pastreze cît de cît un *status-quo*, cînd cererea pentru politehnica scade dramatic o data cu industria în care ea își varsa absolventii. “Babes-Bolyai” se afla într-o zona privilegiata pentru ca realmente în toata zona

universitara româneasca are reputatie de universitate care demonstreaza practic cum se construiesc autonomia universitara..

În privinta relatiilor de gen – asta era vestea buna – vreau sa va spun ca, în tranzitie, femeile sînt marile cîstigatoare în privinta educatiei superioare. În toate tarile foste comuniste, procentul femeilor înrolate în învatamîntul superior depaseste pe cel al barbatilor. Deci marea masa de studenti în aceste tari sînt studente. Acesta este un lucru, sa zic asa, impresionant, pozitiv. Un alt fapt foarte interesant este ca, de pilda, ele depasesc 65% la stiinte sociale, stiinte economice, drept, filologie, intra foarte bine în aceste zone în care chiar ca domina procentual. Au acces la specializari netraditional feminine. În timpul studiilor au note mai mari decît cele ale baietilor, la admitere le este ceva mai usor se pare, la ora actuala, daca vorbim despre un dezechilibru de gen în privinta studentilor, noi trebuie sa avem politici afirmative foarte serioase în legatura cu baietii. (*Rîsete în sala.*) Nu trebuie sa rîdeti, dar exista dezechilibre foarte mari în privinta unor domenii în care baietii intra putini, nu pentru ca nu vor, ci pentru ca nu fac fata concurentei la admitere, din cauza perioadei frivole, mai ciudate pe care o au ei în adolescenta. Si ulterior își mai revin din aceasta situatie, prin urmare probabil ca ar trebui sa luam în serios politici legate de procente pentru echilibrare. Procentul optim de echilibrare ar fi 40% / 60% sa zicem. Nici un gen sa nu scada sub 40. Cred ca o corectare a acestei tendinte de feminizare masiva a educatiei superioare se poate face prin o astfel de politica. Vestea proasta este

ca, desi femeile încep sa aiba o viata triumfatoare din punct de vedere al studiilor, din procentul de someri cu studii superioare ele detin 70%. Mai mult decât atât, în întreg estul Europei, veniturile nu depind de educatie, ci de ocupatie. Adica degeaba te educi daca nu ai acea ocupatie care aduce bani. În întregul est al Europei procesul de feminizare a învățământului ca personal este în evidenta crestere. Pina acum câtiva ani de feminizat era feminizat învățământul primar, aproape total, învățământul gimnazial peste 84% si învățământul liceal aproximativ 64%. La ora actuala, începe sa fie feminizat învățământul superior. Am putea sa murim de încântare! Dar nu o facem. De ce se feminizeaza învățământul superior? Învățământul superior se feminizeaza proportional cu lipsa de atractivitate a carierei universitare.

Aceasta-i vestea proasta. Pe masura ce cariera universitara este mai putin atragatoare, barbatii parasesc aceasta zona, pentru zona în care se câștiga bani sau prestigiu social, iar femeile tind sa ramâna acolo.

Feminizarea învățământului superior ca personal are loc la baza, femeile intra masiv ca preparatoare, asistente, lectori. La vîrf ramîne barbatul. Posturile de decizie, de prestigiu academic sînt preponderent masculine.

Discrepanțele de venituri la personalul din învățământul superior sînt foarte mari, respectiv salariile la vîrf sau, daca vreti, veniturile la vîrf sînt mari pentru ca învățământul românesc este ierarhic si seniorial, ca si celelalte din zona est-europeana. Poate multi dintre dumneavoastra cunosteti sistemul de învățământ britanic sau american în care lumea se împarte în *doctors* si *full professors*. La noi, este o ierarhie baroc. Si drepturile

sînt extrem de proportionate cu aceasta ierarhie. Trebuie musai sa fi îmbatrînit binisor ca sa ajungi profesor plin si eventual sa mai conduci si doctorate. Acesta este un handicap iarsi foarte mare pentru femei. Cum, de pilda, e posibil sa creezi scoli de gîndire la modul foarte serios si scoli de cercetare fara programe doctorale? Numarul de conducatoare de doctorat în România este infim. Care este posibilitatea sa creezi o scoala dupa, sa zicem, o teorie de care te-ai atasat mai mult, daca nu ai doctoranzi? La fel si în ceea ce priveste masteratele sau coordonarea masteratelor. Lucrurile sînt foarte asemanatoare pentru ca învățământul este deosebit de seniorial si de ierarhic si de masculinizat la vîrf cam în toata zona. Decizia universitara este o decizie care este prin excelenta masculina, senatele universitare sînt prin excelenta compuse din barbati, conducerile superioare ale universitatii sînt compuse din barbati, iar daca prin greseala, politic nimereste o femeie în fruntea educatiei, ca în cazul nostru, aceea este opaca la problemele de gen.. Nu i se pare ca este o problema. Respectiv asigura managementul gospodaresc al educatiei, dar nu reformarea. Or, într-un fel ea se potriveste perfect cu paradigma patriarhala feminina dupa care rolul femeilor este sa întretina si sa îngrijeasca. Si nu sa schimbe, nu sa revolutioneze, nu sa miste lucrurile din loc. De exemplu, nu vede mai nimeni o problema extrem de grava în termeni de discriminare de gen si anume ca fetele din comunitatea rroma traditionala, practic, n-au sanse sa ajunga niciodata în educatia superioara pentru ca sînt maritate la zece, doisprazece ani si pentru ca statul nu intervine

nicicum sa le sanctioneze parintii care încalca copiilor lor dreptul la educatie. Nu intervine nimeni. N-a intervenit nici în legislaturile trecute. Este o comunitate lasata, în virtutea unui multiculturalism prost înteles, complet în pace sa lezeze dreptul la educatie al fetelor.

O alta ratiune serioasa o reprezinta conservatorismul si antifeminismul mediului academic. Acest conservatorism se refera mai ales la faptul ca problemele din aceasta categorie nu sînt luate în seama. Întrebare: de ce nu sînt luate în seama? Reforma din educatia româneasca este condusa prin excelenta de barbati trecuti de 50 de ani, 60 în cele mai multe cazuri. Multi nu au “know-how” pentru acest lucru si nici nu-i afecteaza problema. Deci sînt doua lucruri: o data ca nu sînt pregatiti teoretic sa se gîndeasca la asta si doi ca nu au interese directe în legatura cu acest gen de probleme. O contributie serioasa pentru ca status-quo-ul din învățamîntul universitar sa fie foarte patriarhal în relatie de gen, inclusiv din privinta statului, o aduc femeile din mediul universitar în primul rînd pentru ca exista cîteva sindrome foarte clare. Ele intrînd în pozitii inferioare în învățamînt si ramînînd multa vreme în pozitii inferioare stiu ca depind de foarte multi oameni – în general, acesti oameni sînt barbati –, ca ele trebuie sa joace dupa o muzica ce li se cînta, sa intre în gratiile maestrului, de exemplu, sa se afilieze pe lînga un guru, un maestru... Este foarte important sa nu calci pe alaturi ca s-ar putea sa te trezesti alaturi de învățamînt. Faptul de a intra în gratii si de a pastra în mare masura o relatie de acceptare – esti acceptata într-un club select - înseamna pentru o femeie sa faca ea însasi în mare masuri politici

implicit misogine. Mai mult, sa considere ca cea mai mare pretuire care i se poate aduce este sa i se spuna “ai minte de barbat!”. Aceasta-i forma suprema de acceptare. De aici încolo gata, ne-am relaxat, totu-i minunat, sîntem la fel. Ti se accepta egalitatea daca ai minte de barbat. Sigur, exista si un antifeminism preventiv. În România n-apuca sa se dezvolte vreo astfel de miscare ca si apare antifeminismul preventiv, care întotdeauna-i mai zglobiu, mai zgomotos si are mai multe canale de manifestare decît cealalta oferta. Trebuie sa prevenim feminismul înainte sa apara pentru ca el clatina obisnuitele, *establishment*-ului, vine cu probleme, si si asa avem destule, nu?

O alta contributie serioasa o reprezinta carierele academice ale femeilor. Femeile nu fac, statistic vorbind, aceleasi cariere academice ca si barbati. Din motive foarte diferite. În primul rînd pentru ca în perioada tineretilor cele mai multe încetinesc sau parasesc cariera universitara din motive de copii si de familie. Barbati din mediul universitar se pare ca n-au familii si copii. Am glumi! Oricum, nu au în sens activ. Nu este problema lor. Statistic s-a constatat ca cele mai reusite cariere didactice în mediul universitar le fac barbati casatoriti. Cele mai reusite cariere feminine le fac femeile necasatorite sau femeile divortate. De ce? Pentru ca o parte dintre noi e complet sprijinita sa-si faca o astfel de cariera în sensul ca se elibereaza de diverse categorii de griji si este încurajata pentru prestigiu, cealalta mai putin. Mai mult, daca o femeie face cariera academica, atunci se spune c-o face în compensatie pentru ca si-a ratat viata de femeie. N-a reusit saraca sa-

si faca o familie, sa-si faca si copii, deci neavînd încotro face cariera academica. Genul acesta de motivatie nu este frecvent deloc în ce priveste barbatii. Nimeni nu spune ca un barbat face cariera fiindca si-a ratat de familie sau fiindca n-are copii. Libertatea de miscare este îngradita mai mult pentru femei. O sursa cît de cît importanta de venituri pentru barbatii din mediul academic românesc o reprezinta itinerarea pe la diverse universitati la care lucreaza. Foarte putine femei fac acelasi lucru. Inclusiv plecările în strainatate pe o durata mai lunga de timp sînt mai accesibile barbatilor nu pentru ca discrimineaza pe cineva la intrare, acolo nu se fac astfel de discriminari, dimpotriva se discrimina pozitive, daca vreti, ci pentru ca este vorba de probabilitatea mult mai mare ca o femeie sa se trezeasca înlocuita sau parasita din cauza asta. Deci se retine sa faca acest lucru. Inclusiv în situatii de tipul: se organizeaza conferinte. Probabilitatea ca o femeie sa fie panelista sau chairperson e foarte mica. Cînd este vorba inclusiv de premii si rasplati simbolice, peste tot în estul Europei întîlnim foarte putine femei, sînt tari care nu au nici o femeie membra a Academiei pentru ca ideea de *merit* si *succes* în cariera, în stiinta se asociaza foarte clar numai cu o categorie de oameni. Toate aceste mecanisme au fundamental rolul de a bloca lucrurile asa cum sînt într-un fel de patriarhat implicit. Patriarhatul implicit este hranit si de faptul ca multe din experientele femeilor, pe care nu vreau sa le discutăm acum pentru ca nu mai avem ragaz, nu nu figureaza în nici un fel de curricula universitara. Ca si cînd ele sînt mult mai putin importante decît euglena verde sau trinitrotoluenul.

Cînd noi vorbim despre subiecte ale cunoasterii si vorbim despre experientele femeilor, experientele femeilor sînt episteme pentru gineceu, eventual subiecte de bucatarie, dar nu au demnitate academica, respectiv episteme respectabile. V-as putea da nenumarate exemple, dar poate ne rezervam timp pentru alta data despre felul cum aceste categorii de experiente pot intra realmente în curricula si cum e posibil sa devina subiecte ale cercetarii.

S.F.: Multumim doamnei profesoare Mihaela Miroiu. Domnia sa a lasat posibilitatea unui “alta data” în felul acesta, promitînd deja ca va veni la o noua conferinta, speram în semestrul al II-lea, sau cînd va putea. Îi multumim ca ne-a facut o serie de clarificari conceptuale, pentru ca ne-a ajutat sa constientizam o serie de probleme pe lînga care cu siguranta trecem destul de simplu, fara sa ne dam seama de gravitatea lor si, mai ales, trebuie sa-i multumim deoarece dupa o astfel de intîlnire parca studiile de gen incep sa-ti devina simpatice, mai ales daca reusesti sa te eliberezi de stereotipurile pe care le aveai înainte în legatura cu problemele pe care acest domeniu le ridica. Cred ca ar trebui sa trecem la partea ca doua a întîlnirii noastre. Asadar, va rugam sa puneti întrebări, sa faceti comentarii, sa va exprimati nedumeriri... Puteti trimite biletele pe care sa le citim...

Razvan Tabrea: As vrea sa va întreb daca relatiile de gen sau comunicare de gen ar fi cea mai fericita

translatie în spatiu nostru, atât real, cât si mental, al termenului englezesc *gender*?

Mihaela Miroiu: Am sa va raspund la problema cu *gender* unde eu am avut nenumarate contrarii si ele sînt consemnate si publicate, respectiv în volumele pe care le-am publicat la început – este vorba despre “Jumatatea anonima. Studii de filosofie feminista” care era o culegere de texte; polemizam prima oara cu o traducere a acestui termen [cu] care si eu mai am probleme; într-un al doilea volum am tradus *gender* prin “gen social” ca sa precizam ca e vorba de relatii sociale între genuri. Am avut eu însami foarte multe probleme din cauza ca româna nu are neutru, are ambigen si atunci si capra are gen si masa are gen si becul are gen. Devine o poveste care din punct de vedere lingvistic este fortata semantic. La început am fost partizana traducerii prin “gen social” ca sa-l distingem de genul gramatical. Dupa care se întîmpla ce se întîmpla peste tot: lumea curge indiferent ce faci; termenul în sine a devenit un termen foarte încetatenit pentru relatiile între barbati si femei, relatiile sociale, culturale etc.; este un termen de mare circulatie si a trebuit sa renunt eu. De ce în aceasta batalie initiala am renuntat eu? Pentru ca nu puteam sa fiu Pruteanu la nesfîrsit. Dar cum o practica moderna, vorbesc de cea americana si vest-europeana este aceea ca atunci cînd ai un termen foarte încetatenit acesta nu se mai traduce, cred ca este bine sa-l adoptam. Cît se poate feminiza discursul în va dau doar cîteva exemple. De pilda , ca sa va sochez putin, Iris Maryan Young, probabil ca ati auzit de aceasta

filosoafa – are un studiu foarte interesant despre fenomenologia graviditatii în care priveste relatia sine-altul în starea de sarcina într-un mod cu totul surprinzator si diferit fata de modul de abordare a relatiei sine-altul în filosofiele obisnuite. Iata o experienta care e femeiasca si asupra careia se poate face o fenomenologie foarte interesanta. În acelasi timp, sînt studii asupra temporalitatii, asupra intuitiei timpului care difera la cele doua genuri. Va dau exemplele acestea pentru ca e vorba chiar de un “hard”, de probleme de ontologie si la care se raporteaza diferit, de pilda în privinta problemei alteritatii si a problemei temporalitatii prin experiente interne femeile se raporteaza în mod diferit, si de aici se poate naste un mod de filosofare diferit. Eu va dau si un alt exemplu banal. De obicei, în filosofie a fost acceptata o singura universala afirmativa cu care filosofii au lucrat tot timpul: “toti oamenii sînt muritori”. Problema este de ce nu acceptam si cealalta universala afirmativa: “toti oamenii se nasc”? Si vreau sa va spun ca poti ca de la obsesia neantului si a mortii care domina filosofia, si de ea se leaga inclusiv constructii în privinta problemei sensului vietii, sa mergi si-n cealalta parte putin, plecînd de la alte experiente si de la alte intuitii, care, atentie, nu se substituie celor barbatesti, ci dau pur si simplu o imagine pe care n-o putem avea proiectata prin *Weltanschauung* barbatesc, pentru ca barbatii n-au avut cum s-o aiba. Este vorba de a întregi modurile acestea de percepere filosofica, prin teorii care pleaca si de la experiente care nu sînt accesibile barbatilor filosofi, dar facîndu-le filosofice, intrînd cu ele în discursul public

pentru ca filosofia sa poata fi nuantata, diferita, sa includa si alte lucruri decît a inclus anterior. V-am dat exemplul strict al filosofiei. În privinta eticii de pilda si a filosofiei politice iarasi sînt lucruri extrem de importante. De pilda eticile feministe care sînt de mai multe feluri, sa zicem cea mai de mare notorietate este “ethic of care”, “etica grijii” iarasi un termen prost tradus în româna, da, prost, pentru ca acolo este si pasare e îngrijire si grija, ... si a tine la... La noi înțelegi ca iei pe cineva în brate si-l schimbi de pampersi, nu? Deci e greu sa traduci semnificatia integral Ai eticile relationale ca alternativa, Sînt eticile ginocentrice, deci cele centrate pe femei. De fapt ceea ce se întîmpla în filosofie, vreau sa va raspund numai în privinta filosofiei pentru ca apartin (mai ales apartineam) acestui domeniu, este urmatorul lucru: imaginea filosofica în genere, asa s-a întîmplat sa fie formata din punct de vedere istoric este andromorfica. Noi nu avem în filosofie si o imagine ginomorfica, ceea ce a trecut drept antropomorfism filosofic, în fond este un androcentrism. Si-un andromorfism. Sigur ca exista si multe lucruri comune în experientele noastre si atunci spunem ca avem si-o alta fata a existentei care e data efectiv de experientele diferite, de intuitiile diferite ale femeilor. Noi avem înca la ora actuala o oferta ginomorfica în filosofie care nu are decît o experienta de 30-40 de ani, fata de cealalta experienta care nu mai vorbim de cînd este. Or, contributia substantiala nu trebuie sa fie o insurectie, ci pur si simplu transformari, metamorfozele firesti ale filosofiei în conditiile în care vii cu alte tipuri de intuitii teoretice de la care pleci.

S.F.: Doamna profesoara Mihaela Mudure de la Facultatea de Litere.

Mihaela Mudure: O întrebare care e în interes personal, poate ca va fi si în interesul celor aflatî aici. Cum vede doamna profesoara Miroiu prezenta si participarea masculina în discursul feminin românesc?

Mihaela Miroiu: În legatura cu ce s-a discutat înainte (si fac o paranteza) este adevarat ca femeile sînt diferite biologic si asta n-o poate reprograma înca nimeni si sper sa n-o poata reprograma. Nu as vrea sa ajungem sa avem parinti tehnologici. Totusi cresterea copiilor nu trebuie sa ne încurce. Adica parinti în sensul cultural, social efectiv sîntem si unii si altii. Deocamdata însa, se pare ca noi avem un patriarhat fara tati. Paternitatea nu-i o practica în România. Paternitatea are mai degraba un rol simbolic si un rol corectiv, îi mai dai cîte-o bataie ca sa vada copilul ca are tata. Problema este ca noi nu avem, nu vreau sa va spun ca e teribil sa traiesti într-o societate în care practic orfelinatul patern în sensul activitatii paterne este atît de dramatic. Mai mult decît atît, pretentia barbatilor este sa fie îngrijiti pîna la adînci bătrîneti. Lucrurile acestea sînt de natura culturala. Infantilizarea barbatilor în sfera privata este un fenomen constant ca si lipsa parteneriatului de gen în privinta cresterii copiilor. Barbatii sînt copii eterni, eu am mai spus asta de s-a suparat cineva pe mine în Cluj, ei se muta de la o mama de un tip la o mama de alt tip (sotia), aceasta-i o problema culturala. Au pretentia de

îngrijire tot timpul. Or, aceasta nu tine deloc de biologic, tine de învățare socială. Așa că eu cred că faptul de a fi părinte sau sot ori împiedică pe amândoi ori nu împiedică pe nici unul. Pe femeie nu ar trebui să o împiedice chestiunea asta mai mult de 5-6 luni. Am văzut un clip ce s-ar întâmpla dacă bărbații ar crește copii de americani. În prima lună făcea copilul cu degetul un gest obscen, la un an dormea printre sticle de bere, la doi ani citea Playboy pe olita, la trei ani lua o amendă că-și parca prost motocicletă, era înfricosător. Și asta este o formă de a scăpa de problemă: uite ce nenorociri s-ar întâmpla dacă i-am crește noi! Sigur, argumentele pentru că nu să-ți se retragă dreptul la cozonac și dreptul de a fi îngrijit pot să fie multe, inclusiv de natură religioasă. Sunt convinsă că trebuie aduse argumente de diverse feluri ca să pastrezi un statut. În privința participării bărbaților: din fericire feminismul nu e nimeni monopol de gen. Feminismul poate să fie și o teorie, este și o ideologie, este și o politică ș.a.m.d. În sensul acesta, cu excepția feminismului radical care ia în considerare separatismul teoretic, celelalte forme de feminism sunt practicate sigur cel mai mult de către femei, dar și de către bărbați. În Cluj știu că deja aveți o echipă în care câțiva dintre colegii clujeni fac cercetare la modul serios și substanțial, la București nu sunt prea departe de asta. De pildă, la masteratul de gen și politici publice, în ultimii doi ani, patru din zece au fost băieți. Și lucrează foarte serios în cercetare, o să și vedeți rezultatele. Volumul *Patriarbat și emancipare* este un volum la care sunt două autoare și patru autori. Mai ales oamenii tineri doctoranzi de-ai

mei sunt doctoranzi de-ai mei bărbați, fac cercetări care au legături foarte serioase cu teoriile politice feministe. În privința bărbaților maturi, categoric fără colaborarea lor a fost destul de greu să misti ceva. Și am avut parte de colaborare. O să vedeți că volumul acesta, care cred că va produce destul scandal în legătură cu starea de fapt a relațiilor de gen în România, este o recidivă a unei colaborări mai vechi cu Vladimir Pasti care lucrează foarte mult în domeniul acesta de cercetare. Există o cooperare cu toți colegii inclusiv cu ceilalți conducători de doctorat de la mine din Universitatea. Eu nu cred că asta e problema femeilor, numai a lor, sub nici o formă. Este o problemă de natură culturală. Este o problemă de natură socială. E o problemă de natură politică. Mai mult decât atât, hai să fim serioși, dacă procesul de dependentă a femeilor de bărbați crește, devine o catastrofă și pentru bărbați. Să zicem că înghiți că o femeie când e tânără să depindă de tine și-ți place, dar după ce nu-ți mai place și ea nu știe să facă nimic și nu știe să câștige venituri proprii, ce faci? Rămii cu ea de gât? Adică vreau să spun că divorțezi mult mai simplu de femeia autonomă decât de una dependentă, după cum trăiești mai bine cu ea pe termen lung. Gândiți-vă puțin și la dumneavoastră. Cea mai bună metodă să te ții legat cu lanțuri este că cineva să depindă de tine. Este mai bine să fie două fapturi autonome care coexista, câtă vreme au ce împărtăși. Dar nu relații de servitute. Vreau să spun că servitutea sigur nu face bine nici unuia, nici altuia. Și chestiunea aceasta este valabilă chiar și atunci când ești filosof mai ales în perioada marelui hybris. Când suntem tineri, dacă nu

avem hybris, nu mai avem niciodata. Daca nu te proiectezi putin megaloman, atentie nu e vorba decât de paranoia productiva, când crezi vei revolutiona ceva ? Or, sigur ca în aceasta etapa poate sa-ti placa daca în fata ta se afla o multime de persoane, prin excelenta femeii, care casca gura la tine si se mira cât esti de destept. Se tot mira cât esti de destept. Dupa care ramîn mirate si tu începi sa te miri: “mai, da’ asta-i proasta? Altceva decât sa se mire si sa ma admire mai stie sa faca?” Va rog sa ma credeti. E vorba de o situatie atît de dezechilibrata încît poate sa-ti placa pe moment si sa ti se para avantajoasa, dar în realitate, daca nu e parteneriala si nu apreciezi si reciproc mintea celuilalt, o relatie nu poate dura. Devine o povara. Si trebuie sa ne gîndim bine, ca pîna la urma noi trebuie sa ne bucuram în întregime unul de altul si în chip mintal, si în sensul performantelor intelectuale si de felul în care aratam... Noi, de exemplu, femeile sînt frustrate estetic, pentru ca barbatii nu sînt atasati ideii de frumusetate atît de mult si atunci nici nu se straduiesc. Noi sîntem frustrate ca oferta estetica masculina e mai redusa. De ce sa fim frustrati si unii si altii. Nu e bine sa încercam sa fim cât mai întregi si unii si altii oameni? Si sa nu ne exploatam calitatile cum zicea Kant? E o datorie morala imperfecta sa dezvolt talentele si calitatile oricare ar fi ele, inclusiv talentul de-a ma face mai frumos, de ce nu?

S.F.: Doamna de la masteratul de psihologie.

Întrebare: Care este diferenta metodologica, in ceea ce priveste cercetarea de gen, intre tipul de cercetare calitativa, dupa modelul psihologic, si cea cantitativa?

Mihaela Miroiu: Statistica nu da seama de cazurile particulare, nu da seama de cazul individual de foarte multe ori, ci îti arata o imagine care sigur cumva transcende categoric experientele individuale. În schimb, statistica este buna la altceva. La macropolitici. Nu poti face macropolitica cu cercetare calitativa. Esti obligat sa tii seama de ele în momentul în care se pune problema unei macropolitici.. Macropolitica arata si felul în care se distribuie bugetul public. Constat, sa zicem, de exemplu, ca devenim constienti ca mediul educatiei se feminizeaza foarte tare si ca problema este ca femeile tac si rabda, respectiv ca nu revendica bani din bugetul public pentru educatie. Desi este normal sa înceapa sa fac presiuni “Stati putin, domnule, ce faceti? Va bateti joc de un domeniu pentru simplul motiv ca este ocupat mai ales cu femeii? Si pariatii inclusiv pe mitologia pe care tot o auzim, cea despre « misia dascalului »...” si care, va rog sa ma credeti ca mie-mi face greata. Sînt profesoara de 24 de ani, întîmplator mi-am facut copilaria, inclusiv cea de bebelus, sub catedra, fiindca mama mea era directoare de scoala. Nici nu stiu alta viata în afara de asta. Dar când aud discursul despre “misia dascalului”, “vocatia de apostol al neamului” s.a.m.d. stiti a ce-mi miroase mie? “Daca tot va place asa de mult, ia sa fiti voi platiti prost !!” Daca tot va satisfaceti alte categorii de autorealizare prin intermediul educatiei (este aproape o perversiune personala), ia sa va platim putin! Daca exista o ideologie despre caracterul mesianic al profesoratului si despre placerea noastra de-a a-l profesa, aceasta presupune o rasplata deja suficient de

mare si nu mai e cazul sa atentam la banul public, mai bine-l lasam la politie sau la combinatele siderurgice. De asta va spun ca e vorba de macropolitici.

În privinta psihologiei, ma rog, eu ma pot amesteca mai putin în problema aceasta. În paranteza, celor care nu stiu si au anumite curiozitati si de obicei asociaza feminismul cu tot felul de prejudecati sau ciudatenii. Sînt maritata cu acelasi barbat din 1976, de pe vremea Ducai-voda, din punctul de vedere al celor foarte tineri de aici. Nu-i un merit si nu e nici o vina, este un fapt. Am un fiu care are 24 de ani aproape, l-am facut foarte devreme, nu am nici un fel de probleme personale împotriva barbatilor, chiar am prieteni foarte buni, ma înțeleg excelent cu ei uman si intelectual, nu încercati sa cautati explicatii acolo unde nu sînt. Dar exista o altfel de explicatie pe care v-o pot da si care, sigur, este mult mai serioasa. Pîna în 1991 eu am crezut ca femeile nu pot produce filosofie. Da. Asta am crezut. Am crezut ca femeile pot învăta filosofie, pot sa fie bune profesoare, inclusiv universitare, de filosofie, dar era ceva acolo care nu mergea. Respectiv ca, sigur ca oricine aparținînd domeniului acesta vede filosofia ca pe forma secularizata cea mai înalta de dezvoltare a spiritului si într-un fel ai vrea sa participi la aceasta. Eram copleșita de cît de mult au produs barbatii în filosofie si n-aveam nici un motiv sa cred ca si femeile au produs ceva în filosofie. Atentie! Femeile care se asuma ca femei gîndesc si altfel, produc si alt tip de teoretizare, pleca de la alt tip de intuitii teoretice. Cînd am vazut ca aceasta se poate si-am vazut-o prin intermediul filosofiei feministe, prima mea grija a fost sa fac o noua

teorie. Desigur, dupa ce am studiat mult. Vreau sa va spun ca eu nu cred ca am avu curaj intelectual la modul foarte serios pîna nu am dat peste feminismul filosofic. Daca e vorba despre o frustratie, ea este de natura intelectuala. Am simtit ca femeile au un prag limita de dezvoltare. Acuma nu mai simt asta deloc! Prin urmare, nu am venit spre feminism dintr-un complex de alta natura. A fost un complex intelectual.

SF: Lorin Ghiman, student la filosofie.

Lorin Ghiman: Aceasta problema a patriarhatului, asa cum este ea, pe urmele patriarhatului de stat este o problema si pentru barbati si pentru femei?

Mihaela Miroiu: Absolut. Eu recunosc ca exercitiul autonomiei este foarte slab si ca traditie istorica, nemaivorbind despre comunism unde exercitiul autonomiei lipseste si pentru femei si pentru barbati. Este o criza fundamentala a unor valori care nu sînt pe piata, inclusiv a cererii românești. De pilda, probabil, daca drepturile omului nu ne reau erau vîrâte pe gît, multi nu le-am fi cerut. Va spun un lucru foarte trist: daca ne uitam la modul serios în istorie la ceea ce s-ar chema miscari politice care au radacini serioase de masa în România, liberalismul e una dintre ele? Sa fim seriosi! În traditia româneasca cred ca a existat mai ales o miscare, cea legionara, cu mare priza de masa. Trist, dar asa este. Ce a mai avut baza de masa în afara de asta? Deci, noi sîntem un caz foarte ciudat, straniu, atuncea, sigur ca într-o tara fara misare liberala ceruta de la « firul ierbii », de catre persoane individuale pentru ca

asta coincide cu interesele lor personale si si le organizeaza politic, nu ne putem astepta, cu atît mai putin, la o miscare feminista. Aveti dreptate ca noi avem o problema de autonomie si de individualitate si de exercitiu al drepturilor care transcende problema de gen. Ceea ce vreau însa sa va spun si sa va repet este ca nici un barbat nu a avut obstacole în dezvoltare pentru ca a fost barbat, în schimb, femeile da. Indiferent de clasa, de grup etnic, de stare, de ce vreți, femeile din grupul respectiv au avut probleme pentru ca sînt femei. Barbatii nu au avut probleme pentru ca sînt barbati. De aceea avem o problema *de gen*. Prin urmare, pe linga probleme generala, pe care corect o invocati, si o criza teribila în sensul acesta si va spun foarte serios ca parerea mea este ca barbatii din România au o *criza* de identitate, e o enorma criza de virilitate în tara asta, e o criza de barbatie, atentie!, în sensul pozitiv al cuvîntului. Autonomie, curaj, îndrazneala, autoafirmare, anumitele valori traditional masculine nu sînt pe « piata publica ». Mai mult, se poate ca din cauza provocarilor pe care le suporta femeile, inclusiv datorita faptului ca încet, încet se raspîndeste o ideologie a autoafirmarii pentru femei si barbatii *nu au* aceasta problema pusa în mod explicit, barbatii pot chiar piarda si sa aiba probleme mari din cauza aceasta. Foarte adevarat! Dar tema mea se referea la relatii de gen. Era vorba despre

patriarhat în relatiile de gen. Mai mult, cererea pentru patriarhat este enorma. În momentul în care vrei sa-ti rezolve altii toate problemele, este clar ca vrei tatic tot timpul. Sa judece altii ce-i bine pentru tine! Va amintiti *Fratii Karamazov*, capitolul “Marele Inchizitor”, partea aceea exceptionala, cred ca unul dintre cele mai frumoase texte despre libertate din întreaga istorie a culturii, cînd îi spune la un moment dat Marele Inchizitor lui Iisus venit a doua oara pe Pamînt: “Doamne, nu exista povara mai insuportabila decît libertatea. Cei mai multi si-ar da-o bucuros altuia în schimbul faptului de-a li se spune ce e bine si ce este rau.” Or, noi ne aflam cu un exercitiu al tutelarii atît de lung si cu un trai într-un patriarhat atît de prelungit, încît este clar ca avem o problema sociala mai generala, care transcende problema de gen, dar în interiorul careia avem si problema patriarhatului de gen.

SF: Cred ca e bine sa ne oprim aici. Îi multumim înca o data doamnei profesoare pentru bunavointa cu care a raspuns invitatiei noastre. Va rog sa aveti în vedere invitatia noastra de a participa la conferinta domnului Profesor Adrian Miroiu, care va fi vineri si care ne va vorbi despre Conceptul de existenta. Multumim tuturor.

Mihaela Miroiu: Va multumesc foarte mult pentru invitatie si pentru orele acestea petrecute împreuna, sper ca nu v-am obosit fara rost.

*** Am cuprins doar partial discutiile pe marginea conferintei.**



Raluca Mocan

Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, Omul politic între mit și rațiune - o analiză a imaginarului puterii

Alfa Press, Cluj, 2000, traducere de Mihaela Calut, 170 p.

În contextul motivării crizei valorilor politicului prin influențele imaginarului și soluționării iluministe pe calea întăririi rolului raționalității, lucrarea lui Jean-Jacques Wunenburger constituie un posibil răspuns la întrebarea: este realmente imaginarul responsabil de aceasta criză?

Studierea domeniului politic se adaugă concludent cercetărilor autorului asupra imaginarului, sacrului, a interacțiunii lor cu raționalitatea, care constituie obiectul al unor lucrări precum “*La fête, le jeu et le sacré*”(1977), “*L’Utopie ou la crise de l’imaginaire*”(1979), “*Le Sacré*”(1981), “*La raison contradictoire*”(1990) sau “*L’Antropologie du politique*”(2001).

Criticând epoca raționalității de tip modern din perspectiva esecurilor de legitimare, a fanatismelor rațiunii, autorul propune reorientarea analizei politicului asupra întrepătrunderii ideilor raționalității cu imaginile simbolice cu rol stabilizator și de legitimare, subliniind importanța metodologică a mitografiei politice, a

edificării asupra valorii hermeneutice a mitului, la nivelul imaginarului puterii.

Structura lucrării cuprinde două părți. Prima, “*Elemente de mitologie politică*” se focalizează asupra liniilor de forță ce structurează imaginarul politic al antichității, concluzionând că încercările raționalității politice de a organiza o cetate social-politică au întâlnit invariabil -ca limită externă - mitul.

Partea a doua, “*Limitele rațiunii politice moderne*” critică modelul contractualist din perspectiva unei epistemologii alternative asupra fundamentelor simbolice din geneza unor concepte cardinale precum autoritate, lege, egalitate, stat, națiune.

Pentru a decela elementele constitutive ale problemei ființei-împreună, din prisma imaginarului politic, este vizat dintru început mitul central al culturii europene: Mitul Varstei de aur, în dubla proveniență greco-latina și iudaică. Acest nucleu al credințelor colective are sensul de ficțiune a unei fericiri imposibile, într-un timp al originilor, fiind mitul fondator prin excelență datorită articulării principiului unității socio-politice. Nivelurile analizei sunt multiple: temele constitutive (topologia și cronografia Varstei de aur), structura dramatică (fondarea istorică a comunității), semnificațiile morale și politice, principalele reactualizări ale mitului în istoria ideilor. Temele principale (miteme) prezente în poemul hesiodic “*Munci și zile*” și în “*Metamorfozele*” lui Ovidiu sunt armonia, abundența, pacea, nemurirea, carmuitorul fiind Cronos (respectiv Saturn), deci un Rege Divin. Versantul spațial suprapune topografia celei caracteristice mitului țării

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fericite: Insulele Fericitilor, Campiile Elizee, Gradinile Hesperidelor, Arcadia. Structura dramatica marcheaza aparitia umanitatii prin gestul violent al rasturnarii Regelui Divin, gest al carui agent se face Zeus, urmat de Prometeu. Se produce trecerea in istorie -timpul ciclic devine linear (propriu traditiei monoteiste)- ordinea originar-divina fiind substituita de institutiile si legile specific umane. La nivelul semnificatiilor mitului fondator exista doua interpretari: prima intelege indepartarea de momentul fuziunii oameni-zei ca pe o continua decadenta, drept coruptie fatala; a doua interpretare considera instituirea artificiala a vietii ordonate ca gest civilizator si factor esential al progresului. Mitul face manifesta opozitia Dreptatii de tip divin (proprie comunitatii spirituale) fata de dreptul natural instituit de rationalitatea laicizata in cadrele Polis-ului.

Mitul rasei eroice, mitul tarii fericite si cel al intoarcerii lui Mesia sunt actualizari ale mitului fondator, substituind succesiunea varstelor cu cea a raselor (in cazul primului), respectiv istoria reinnoirii ciclice cu timpul liniar al crestinismului. Reveniri ale mitului sunt si versiunile milenariste asupra puterii ce restaureaza domnia ordinii pierdute (nazismul, comunismul), curentele oculte (New-Age), ecologice sau anarhiste.

Subcapitolul al doilea opune doua mituri fondatoare cu rol de logici simetrice, opuse antagonic: mitul prometeic, al varstelor si mitul dionisiac. Primul intemeiaza societatea civila, celalalt genereaza o comunitate de tip mistic. Gestul prometeic al separarii

partilor divina si umana in cadrul mesei rituale reprezinta instaurarea ordinii politice prin afirmarea drepturilor si libertatilor umane ca autonome fata de Dreptatea transcendentă. Polis-ul se bazeaza pe organizarea prin legi umane, pe principiul isonomiei, adica pe egalitatea, simetria si reciprocitatea cetatenilor identici ce-si impart spatiul comun (*es meson*) independent de vreun principiu ordonator exterior. Modelul antagonic il constituie cel al ordinii mistice din fratrii comunitare (cultul dionisiac, orfic, pitagoreic), caracterizat prin distribuire ierarhica, prin abolirea istoriei si reintegrarea in starea de fuziune cosmica, pe baza riturilor esoterice de legare si unificare. Multiplicitatii cetatenilor i se opune unitatea confreriei, institutionalizarii unei ordini juridice pe fundalul unei dezvoltari a ordinii cosmice (in civilizatia prometeica) ii corespunde ordinea atemporală cosmo-teogonica a gruparii religioase dionisiace. Cele doua polaritati necesita concilierea prin tesatura politica, pentru asigurarea Dreptatii divine esoterice in sanul legaturilor politice exoterice. Solutia platoniana a "*artei regale*" este dezvaluirea "*cele mai marete si mai bune tesaturi*" (*Omul politic*, 311 a-c). Este proiectul de reconciliere intre mit si rationalitate, de compensare interna a modelelor, a regimului nocturn (cautare a Unului-Tot, fuziune) si a celui diurn (al separatiilor proprii ratiunii diaretice) –in sensul dihotomiei imaginarului operate de Gilbert Durand.

Identitatea si diferenta sunt inradacinate in Polis prin asocierea Hestiei (simbolizand caminul, interioritatea) cu Hermes (favorabil contactelor cu

exterioritatea). Paradigma platoniciană a tesutului mediază între structuri opuse, între o logică a separației verticale și una a circulației, a intercomunicării orizontale.

Subcapitolul al treilea cercetează asupra legitimității aplicării categoriei (recente a) totalitarismului proiectului Cetății Ideale, pornind de la afirmația lui G. Lapouge că platonismul este *“prototipul normelor totalitare inerente oricărei utopii occidentale”*. Cetatea

Ideala, paradigma a ordinii ideale, unite, virtuose este permanent actualizată de literatura utopică ulterioară, filosofului Platon revenindu-i statutul de fondator al statului total. Problema formulată de J.-J. Wunenburger este dacă este absolut necesar ca individualitatea să fie sacrificată în scopul supremației colective și adevărului unic al statului. Istoria ideilor întâlnește critica lui Aristotel -Politica,II,2- asupra faptului că Platon a sacrificat multiplicitatea cetății în favoarea unei mistici a Unului. Repartizarea piramidală a societății în trei clase, spațiul închis, exterminarea celor cu inaptitudini, suprimarea intimității familiale favorizează eventuale interpretări ale anticipării statului total, iar în centrul tezelor numite totalitare sunt identificate suprimarea proprietății private și eugenia. Wunenburger aduce obiecții la adresa acestor afinități anacronice: “epistema” antică situează concepția asupra libertății la antipodul celei moderne (de libertate civilă), ideea de subiect individual necunoscând maturitatea permisă de religia creștină.

A doua respingere se situează în perspectiva ierarhiei caracteristice modelului organic al *“marelui lant*

al ființei”, cum este numit de A. Lovejoy, în contrast cu masificarea contemporană a indivizilor: în antichitate aceștia nu puteau crea legi autonome, căci ar fi fost incompatibile cu interesele tuturor, cu unitatea hegemonică ce veghează la salvagardarea totalității Ființei.

A treia respingere se întemeiază pe hermeneutica Cetății Ideale cu valoare de model al unei societăți închise, esoterice, al unei comunități ecleziale (întruchipare a utopiei creștine pacifiste, în antiteza cu utopismul revoluționar, milenarist).

Ultimul subcapitol al primei părți, *“Fundamentul mitic al suveranității”* analizează întemeierea puterii politice (*potestas*) pe principiile non-rationale *potentia* (impunerea puterii asupra celuilalt) și *auctoritas*, subliniind izomorfismul figurilor Dumnezeu – Tata – Rege, în sensul genealogiei simbolice de legitimare. Autorul avansează ipoteza unei disimulări a religiosului în formele raționalității politice, pe linia observației lui Carl Schmitt că *“omnipotentă legislatorului modern [...] este o reluare literală a teologiei”*. Imaginarul politic permite crearea unui mit modern al generării spontane a autorității prin contrafacerea legitimării de tip regal. Această autoproducere imanentă a autorității se manifestă în cazul sefilor mesianici, al salvatorilor națiunii. Raționalitatea democratică conține asadar reziduuri de tip irațional (sacralizarea poporului, idolatrizarea sefului statului), autorizând cercetarea imaginarului politic ca și fața ascunsă a suveranității populare.

Partea a doua a lucrării, “*Limitele rationalității politice moderne*” evaluează polemic diverse soluții oferite de gândirea politică modernă, pentru a deschide interogații asupra figurilor puterii, egalității, statului, națiunii, asupra chestiunii acute a crizei politicului.

În capitolul întâi sunt enunțate postulatele contractualiste ale constituirii statului rational, întru binele comun al poporului și prevalența voinței generale actualizate în legi. Omnipotentă legii impersonale este un mai bun garant decât suveranul pe care-l substituie? Autorul consideră că filosofia iluministă absolutizează legea (imperativ rational, incontestabil, identic pentru toți), făcând din ea obiectul unei resacralizări. Vocea rațiunii este suspectată de a fi succesoarea imperativului Legii Divine. Este chestionată în final posibilitatea existenței, sub masca dreptului, a unor funcțiuni subtile de reglare a voinței individuale prin simularea libertății politice, Domnia Legii neexcluzând aservirea corpului social față de puterea statului.

Următorul capitol evidențiază natura polisemică, hibridă a conceptului egalității, ce fundamentează regimurile democratice. Din perspectiva legii naturale, libertatea și egalitatea sunt simetrice sau angajează interpretări ce le privilegiază alternativ, în ordine deductivă?

Egalitatea contractuală a cetățenilor societății civile este considerată condiția derivată pentru ca toți să-și poată exercita o libertate înscrisă în natura individuală, existând astfel obiecția formalismului acestei egalități parțiale. Distincția dintre egalitatea metafizică (de natura naturată, în raport cu o totalitate transcendentă)

și egalitatea naturală (metaistorică, aparținând physis-ului, anterioară intrării într-o societate civilă) este urmată de constatarea fundamentării acestui drept prim prin două concepții sincretice: *rights of man* (egalitate proprie unei societăți civile anume, empirică, funcțională) și *human rights* (egalitate generică a umanității, cu miza dogmatică într-o definire absolută a Omului).

A treilea capitol al părții secunde problematizează “noua alianță” dintre rationalitatea politică și sfera religioasă, în contextul slăbirii forței mitului voinței generale – sub acțiunea individualismului egocentrist și a dictaturii opiniei publice –, a fragmentării societății. O pluralitate de morale religioase vor să participe la același proiect politic al unei societăți civile, ramanând sarcina gândirii filosofice, alternative să decidă care mod de înscriere a religioasă în spațiul cetății ar putea fi legitimat.

Capitolul patru cercetează coapartenența elementelor rationale și irrationale la ideea de națiune – element de mediere prin care indivizii renunță la puterea lor, delegând-o unei autorități de drept. Autorul subliniază caracterul infra-rational al conceptului-limită de **națiune**, considerată “*partea blestemată a politicului [...], ramășita de istorie, de tradiții sacre*”, “*focar al unui patos mitic*” (origine iratională a excluderii Celuilalt), contrazicând voința ratională în cetate. Raportarea la stat este succesiv relevată ca suport ambiguu, organic al acestuia, ca principiu de unificare internă. Relația Stat-Națiune variază de la simbioză (națiunea ce legitimează statul revoluționar, absolutizându-l) la contrapunere

(rezistenta personalitatii nationale in fata fortei alienante a statului). Natiunea, forma ireductibila a constiintei politice si mit fondator, presupune un nucleu de sacralitate, actualizator de arhetipuri colective (Patria Mama, imaginea paterna a natiunii in razboi).

Autorul valorizeaza natiunea ca obstacol in calea nediferentierii generalizate, simultan amendand alunecarile militare ale societatii egocentrice (ambele manifestari totalitare). Finalul capitolului lasa deschisa problema originara a generarii libertatii colective intr-o umanitate simultan una si plurala, perpetuu dedicata alternativei dintre o rationalitate identitara si o dorinta fara sfarsit de diferenta.

Ultimul capitol dezbate problema crizei politicului, a dublei depolitizari: a cetateanului si a omului politic, remarcand supravietuirea cvasi-identitara a institutiei politicului, dupa transferarea misiunii sale asupra tehn structurii economico-financiare. Radacinile caderii politicului in prizonieratul polaritatii economic-etic sunt infipte in amonte, la originea comuna a ideologiei liberale si celei socialiste, ale caror efecte (identice) sunt

supunerea statului criteriilor utilitatii si rentabilitatii si degenerarea rolului acestuia in cel de arbitrar intre interese private (statul protector, statul providenta).

Lenta epuizare a modelului istoric este asimilabila trecerii politicului in simulacru. Conceptia mecanicista a puterii a fost inlocuita de una cibernetica, in care conteaza doar intelegerea functionarii interne a sistemului-stat, odata su interactiunile, interconexiunile si autoreglarile acestuia **res publica** fiind muribunda.

Restructurarea vietii politice presupune evitarea rationalizarii excesive a socialului, inlaturarea presupozitiilor -comune liberalismului si marxismului- asupra preeminentei economicului asupra politicului si apoi asupra culturalului. Lumea postindustrială trebuie sa constientizeze necesitatea inversarii ordinii prioritatilor, in vidul de identitate creat. Posibila alternativa avuta in vedere de Jean-Jacques Wunenburger este inradacinarea vietii politice intr-un sistem de reprezentari simbolice, singurele ce ii pot conferi unitate, coerenta, putere.



Codruta Cuceu

George Voicu, The Evil Gods. The Culture of Conspiracy in post-communist Romania

Polirom Publishing House, 2000, 245p

Motto:

“The paradigm of conspiracy is thus a sort of *kitsch* in which the pattern of religion and the pattern of secularization coexist”

George Voicu

The intricacy of the notion of “transition” or “provisional times” is from a temporal point of view, tantamount to a moment of choice and from a spatial perspective it is tantamount to the image of crossroads. Essentially “transition” means to break up with a certain economic, political, cultural system, to exceed it and to pass to another system. But “transition” also means a certain change of the some system. Any change, either economic, political or cultural, comes along with this great need of breaking up with the “old”

structures, seen, from an always new more pragmatic perspective, as ineffective.

How much does this breaking up mean the destruction, the exclusion of the old structures and how much it is less abrupt, thus trying a reconstruction, a reintegration of the old structures into new areas it is quite difficult to decide. The fact is that the Romanian society, after 50 years of prominent communism, (which modified it for good and all), does not have any other solution than to follow the “softer”, second alternative from above, that of an “organic”, step by step reconstruction” of its structures, reconstruction which somehow implies a return to something from the past – perhaps to the real understanding of the contexts that brought about the errors and the major crises of our history. Therefore it is understandable why we still do not have the bond-bursting means to become aware of the risk to never pass over these “provisional times”.

The bridges that bind the old times to the new ones, that bind totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism, communism and post-communism exert an offer wearisome magnetism upon today’s bewildered Romanian society. And if it is true what Gustave Le Bon assumed – that “the only important changes, which cause the renewal of civilization are the changes that occur in what regards the opinions, the conceptions, the beliefs”, - it seems that 1989 event took place also due to the conceptual changes, paradigm shift, owing to a democratic urge.

For a convalescent Romania, convalescent after the communist illness, the dramatic break-up with the past

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moment was more violent as it was more necessary, but what followed were the “soft” attempts to reform, to restructure [for neither structures nor people can be destroyed], attempts that followed, of course, the honorable - because of their effective models/patterns of - Western societies. Those models’/patterns’ functionality which fascinates, the desire to apply them to the Romanian reality, are the ones that constitute the real pillars of the European integrative attempts, and not, as bewildered people seem to think and encouraged by some statesmen, the power of some secret organizations’ conspiracy whose plan is to rule the whole world. This mechanism of thinking is highly criticized by George Voicu in his book *The Bad Gods. The Culture of Conspiracy in post-communist Romania*.

After 1989, Romania was passing through a strange shock period, a time of demonstrations [for the crowd was then the one who represented power, it was the only power] and that period was also the time when the theories of conspiracy multiplied. The crowd was then so vulnerable and easy to manipulate that it seemed that it was no more able to distinguish what was truthlike and what was not, and it was very frail to rumours, myths and legends created at that time, to groundless stories [see the rumours about terrorists who were said to kidnap children and about all sorts of other criminals]. These “underground” explanations are justified by the need of meaning, of rationality, of coherence in that time’s “new disorder”, for by these explanations the social failure becomes understandable and born and it is not interpreted as personal.

The attempt to find the source of the evil is always surrounded by a mystical a magical halo and not in the least a rational one, even if its aim is to offer some rational answers and solutions to people’s fears and frustrations. Conspiracyism is all about a certain kind of self-victimization and lack of responsibility. The superposition of passivism regarding social and political involvement on the incapacity to understand some social changes and on a certain type of trust in conspirationist discourses supported by the ritual of keeping a secret and preserving an illusion is accountable in post-revolutionary Romania. The Romanian society was used to blame the mechanisms of power and that institutional structures which represent it, so the people was used to blame an external court, a kind of “Evil Genius” for all its failures and for all our sorrows and sufferings.

For Romanians, the Conspiracy Theory is, one of the main elements invoked in ultra nationalist discourses of those statesmen who try to oppose globalization, federal type of state or multiculturalism which fully represents the evil New World Wide Order. On this background, and published ten years after The Romanian Revolution, published after ten years of observing the changes of the society, George Voicu’s book offers a detailed radiography of the way by which the theories of conspiracy rise and are kept alive and vivid, of how they influence and intoxicate the Romanian collective fancy and of the way of perceiving other ethnic or religious communities.

With his book, George Voicu follows, in an excellent and honourable way, some of the forerunners of

the conspiracy theories' criticism like Popper, Eco, Girardet or Daniel Pipes, offering us not only a theoretical approach of the mechanisms of conspirationist, paranoid, way of thinking, but also an ironic and healthy description of the Romanian political scene.

Voicu actually analygrees two levels which interfere-one is that of the neutral, objective explanation of the theory of conspiracy and the other one is the more critical level of conspirationism that is, of political discourses that encourage people to believe such theories. One of the most important ideas of this work is that the conspiracy theory comes to replace a lack of religiosity, God's absence or God's death, it comes to fulfill people's need to believe in some Transcendent Power. The conspiracy theory seems to come as a result of secularization for it replaces the Transcendent with some Immanent Power. And this power lies in the existence of a certain plan, but this plan is always seen as the worst diabolic one. This plan is always made up by a vindictive, exacting providence that lies beyond Good or Evil. This new providence's attribute seems to be in the conspirationists' opinions, wisdom and rationality. Its power is outstanding because it is well hidden, but not irrational. Its power lies in people's knowing of its existence and the resistance of the theory of conspiracy is usually supported by means of rumour. There is a strange relationship between the rational, apparent but delusive character of conspiracy and its irrational, hidden but essential character.

Thus, the conspirationist is seen as a saviour of knowledge, that is, as Karl Popper said, of the search

for the truth, the search for an objective explanation of the ultimate meaning of life and of the Univers. He pretends to be a criticist of what is only apparent and a person who, following a classic type of rationality, seeks the essence of things, which is always beyond appearances. He always starts speculatively and in an inquiring way from the visible effects and he presupposes that there must be an invisible evil cause that makes things the way they are. His discontent and his feeling that he is exiled and thrown out in this world, that he is helpless and not free against his destiny characterizes the man who strongly believes in the existence of a conspiracy.

As Hannah Arendt said, when discussing Plato's dialogue *The Laws*, in her book entitled *The Human Condition*: "the actions of men appear –from this perspective- like the gestures of puppets led by an invisible hand behind the scene, so that man seems to be a kind of plaything of a god", but this is all about an evil God, which represents the secularization of a counter-Providence, for the traditional Providence is abandoned, or a Providence who exists together with its victims.

The "directors" of the conspiracy exist by virtue of a certain demonic determinism, by virtue of a curse or of a gene of Evil which constitutes the ultimate substratum of the world. Analysing who are thought to be the conspirators, the author finds out that they always represent otherness, the strangers and the minorities or the Western individualist, self centred, unspiritualized and pragmatic human being. But the genuine source of the evil is, for some Romanian statesmen, always the

Jew. The author affirms that from a Romanian conspiracyist perspective, those strangers always seem to have a reason and a legitimacy for conspiracy, that is, to dominate the the whole world and/or especially Romania, as if Romania were the “chosen” target of conspiracyist plans of destruction and division. This represents according to Voicu, only the hybris of a little, not very significant nation or of a not yet definitively built identity.

The stake of the paradigm of conspiracy is not only a secularized size of a religious view - for instead of the traditional Providence some very powerful, very intelligent but also a very bad beings appeared - but also an ideological and political one. The ideological roots of conspiracyism could be found, according to Carl Schmitt in romanticism conspiracyism is thus a means by which certain political and social aims are achieved. It is also away of explaining the existence of

Evil negative principle in the world and of comforting people's fears in a frightful world. But behind the author's theoretical purpose to explain the particularities of Romanian conspiracyism lies a rather more political one. Voicu criticizes conspiracyism as a political ideology which aims at maintaining the old political and institutional structures, an authoritarian, closed society, and ultra-nationalist and xenophobic attitudes.

George Voicu's book is meant to be a radiography of today's Romanian society, of its preconceptions, superstitions, and, as every such radiography it has got a healing role and a purpose to help and to recover the analysed community, still ill of clichés, stereotypes, erroneous images which constitute hindrances in Romania's way towards real democracy. For, as Vladimir Tismaneanu assessed, it is impossible to become a democratic country by means of myths.



Ovidiu Podar

Sandu Frunza, Iubirea si Transcendenta. O introducere la problema spatiului median al experientei religioase in Iudaism si Crestinismul Rasaritean

Editura Dacia, Cluj, 1999

Autor in 1996 al volumului *O antropologie mistica. Introducere in gandirea Parintelui Staniloae*, Sandu Frunza, lector la Catedra de Filosofie Sistemica a Universitatii "Babes-Bolyai" din Cluj Napoca, unde preda cursuri de Filosofia religiilor, Antropologie religioasa, Filosofie evreiasca, ne propune in 1999, la Ed. Dacia, in colectia Homo Religiosus, al carei coordonator este, un al doilea volum de referinta in biografia sa intitulat *Iubirea si Transcendenta*, avand ca subtitlu *O introducere la problema spatiului median al experientei religioase in Iudaism si Crestinismul Rasaritean*.

Inca din prefata semnata de Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae Kallos, Presedintele Comunitatii Evreiesti din Cluj, suntem invitati la o parcurgere a unei carti bune, cinstite, nobile, axate pe o tema centrala ca iubirea – in Dumnezeu si intre oamenii – de mare actualitate si mai

mult decat atat binevenita la acest sfarsit de secol (unul al intolerantei, urii, invrajbirii) si inceput de mileniu, comandament fundamental al iudaismului si crestinismului deopotriva, care face din sintagma "iudeo-crestina" prin care se caracterizeaza spiritualitatea si cultura marii parti a umanitatii, una cat se poate de exacta.

Inchinata parintelui D.Staniloae si profesorului A.Codoban, rod al unui travaliu de mai multi ani, autorul doreste ca aceasta carte sa fie un "loc al intalnirii si dialogului dintre Iudaism si Crestinism intr-o perspectiva deschisa de abordare filosofica a experientei religioase". Sandu Frunza ne avertizeaza inca de la inceput asupra multiplelor posibilitati de abordare filosofica a problemelor pe care le implica cele doua spiritualitati monoteiste: una care se poate face in termenii unei metateologii care armonizeaza tendintele speculative cu nevoia de rigoare de tip hermeneutic sau dogmatic ce este reclamata imperios de exigentele unui discurs religios. Problemele care apar pentru filosof in acest caz e faptul ca teologia fie ea iudaica sau crestina se revendica in permanenta ca fiind un act de traire, dorindu-se domeniul prin excelenta al experientei lui Dumnezeu, exigenta pe care se bazeaza insusi sensul ei mistic. De pe pozitii specifice unei antropologii a religiilor se poate face o alta abordare, in perspectiva careia experienta religioasa in cauza este o formula a experientei religioase in general. Tocmai de aceea autorul isi propune in acest volum reliefare a datelor oferite de spatiul median al experientei religioase asa cum este ea infatisata in Iudaism si Crestinism,

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preocupare care, în ciuda tratării experienței religioase în termeni de cunoaștere nu constă în încercarea de a reconstitui o gnozeologie sau o metafizică religioasă, și nici în explicarea exhaustivă a fenomenelor religioase sau o întemeiere filosofică a problemelor ce sunt dezvoltate. ”Accentul cade pe încercarea de a contura spațiul median – locul privilegiat al întâlnirii dintre Iudaism și Creștinism, dar și cel al despărțirii lor esențiale – și pe oferirea unei descrieri spre o înțelegere a faptelor religioase care, într-o circularitate logică, instituie spațiul median fiind în același timp aduse în existența de acesta ”.

Partea I, *Iubire și Cunoaștere*, stă sub semnul catorva cuvinte din *Tratatul teologico-politic* al lui Spinoza care subliniază că “iubirea lui Dumnezeu e cea mai mare fericire a omului”, “supremul sau bine” care izvorăște “nu din frica unor chinuri, nici de dragul altor lucruri, ca plăcerile, faima, ...ci numai pentru că îl cunoaște pe Dumnezeu”. Aratându-se într-un mod clar în ce constă diferența dintre sacrul transcendent și sacrul transcendent, autorul reia problema celor trei moduri de cunoaștere (catafatică, apofatică și teognozia) ajungând la cunoașterea lui Dumnezeu din împrejurările cotidiene, că “cea mai armonioasă îmbinare a modurilor distincte a cunoașterii lui Dumnezeu”, și propunându-ne concluzia că “întregul demers revelează faptul că cele trei trepte ale cunoașterii dau seamă asupra a trei structuri a experienței religioase, care se conturează în planul mai larg al unei morfologii a spațiului median”. Tot în această primă parte, Sandu Frunza ne face cunoscute și cele două paradigme fundamentale ce pot

fi identificate în iudaism – Eu-Tu – și creștinism – Eu-Tu-El –.

Partea a doua tratează “omul cu vocația Torei” plecând de la un text din Zorah II, 99 a-b: ”Tora este ca o iubita frumoasă și bine făcută, care se ascunde într-o încăpere tainică în palatul ei”, și care “nu se dezvăluie decât celui care o iubește”. Partea a doua se constituie ca o concisă incursiune în probleme fundamentale de iudaistică plecând de la instituirea monoteismului, respingerea idolatriei, destinul mesianic și ajungându-se prin omul ca suflet al lumii, teofania Arborelui Sefirotic, Shekina și exilul, la o suită de probleme depre interpretarea Torei, la relația dintre Iudaism și mistică, Lumina și mediere.

Partea a treia e dedicată omului cu “vocația paradisiacă”, a celui care se suie “sus la Tatal împreună cu El”, parăsind pământul și cele ale pământului...Căci fără Cuvântul, e cu neputință a ajunge la Tatal Cuvântului” – Sf. Maxim Marturisitorul, *Filocalia, II* – în care remarcăm în primul rând capitolele III și VI, capitole cheie care ne vorbesc despre ontologia darului ca ontologie a iubirii, și iubirea ca experiență religioasă limită.

Partea finală a cărții e intitulată *Transcendere și Transcendentă* în care sunt puse problemele Dumnezeului incognoscibil, al spațiului median al experienței religioase și problema reprezentării. Voi încheia această prezentare cu cuvintele cu care autorul însuși încheie acest volum: ”Dincolo de orice speculație, experiența Dumnezeului incognoscibil ne învață că omul devine o ființă vulnerabilă dacă nu respectă o lege esențială a



epectazei: atat cat se adanceste in lume trebuie sa se adanceasca si in transcendentă. Atat cat se adanceste in exterior, atat trebuie sa parcurga si spre interior. Ca fiinta religioasa, el nu-si poate gasi echilibrul decat daca face in efortul spre indumnezeire tot atatia pasi cati face spre a raspunde nevoilor umanitatii sale de fiinta ce-si cauta fericirea in lume”.

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Publilius Syrus, *Maxime*

trad. Camil Muresanu, Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Cartimpex, 2002, 104 pp.

Tezaurul cultural al antichitatii latine s-a bucurat, indeobste, la noi, de o buna receptie, concretizata intr-un sustinut travaliu de traducere si exegeza, in masura sa puna la dispozitia publicului majoritatea contributiilor sale de anvergura din cele mai varii compartimente ale cunoasterii si artei, de la Vergiliu, Horatiu si Ovidiu la Plaut si Terentiu, de la Seneca la Epictet si Marc Aureliu, de la Titus Livius si Tacit la Cicero si Quintilian.

Or, iata ca, desi plasandu-se in prelungirea aceluasi demers recuperator, una dintre cele mai recente initiativ publicistice ale editurii clujene Cartimpex evolueaza pe o linie de conduita mai putin previzibila: bunaoara, ni se propune sa abandonam pentru o vreme batatorita „cale regala“ si sa vizitam antichitatea romana pe usa din dos. Volumul care materializeaza aceasta invitatie

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este un florilegiu de *Maxime* aparținând lui Publilius Syrus, în ediție juxtalineară, apărut în 2002, în talmacirea academicianului Camil Muresanu.

Cine este Publilius Syrus? Întrebarea nu e, în acest context, deplasată, dat fiind că - după cum certifică și studiul introductiv semnat de autorul traducerii - avem, într-adevăr, de-a face cu „un cvasianonim, din biografia căruia se cunosc puține detalii ...” (p. 5). Frugalele repere ale traiectului său existential - ele însele, de altfel, obiect de controversă - pot fi condensate în câteva rânduri: judecând după *cognomen*-ul de „Syrus”, atârșat pentru totdeauna numelui său de către Macrobius și Sf. Ieronim, se poate banui cu temei că s-a născut undeva în Siria, chiar la Antiohia, poate. Sclav în copilărie, el a fost adus la Roma pe când mai detinea încă acest statut, probabil prin jurul anilor 84-83 a. Ch. Ulterior, la o dată greu de precizat, a devenit libert al celei de-a doua soții a lui Cicero. S-a afirmat că *mim* - categorie reunind artiști de extracție în general modestă, ce se întreceau în a improviza dialoguri scenice alerte, spre deliciul vulgului și-al potentatilor zilei. E de presupus că o atare indeletnicire i-a procurat lui Publilius Syrus o oarecare faimă, de vreme ce, în cadrul jocurilor organizate de Iulius Caesar în 46 a. Ch., i s-a îngăduit să-și încerce iscusința într-o confruntare „de breasla” cu alți confrăți, prilej cu care a și repurtat marea victorie a biografiei sale, cucerind laurii premiali. Foarte probabil, a decedat la scurt timp după anul 43 a. Ch.

Cum se vede, nimic din parcimonia acestor date nu explicitează în vreun fel interesul viabil pe care i l-a arătat posteritatea. Destul să observăm însă că, dintre

antici, galeria admiratorilor săi include nume sonore, precum Seneca, Petronius sau Aulus Gellius, primului revenindu-i, de altfel, și meritul de-a fi consemnat în scris maximele versificate (în metru iambic ori trohaic) pe care Publilius Syrus le nascocise odinioară în cursul prestațiilor sale scenice și de-a fi întocmit, astfel, cea mai veche antologie a lor. Dintre autorii creștini, Sfântul Ieronim găsește cugetările pomenite adecvate pentru a le furniza discipolilor săi, ca pilde și exerciții. În continuare, reflecțiile lui Syrus se propagă, prin copii succesive, până prin cel de-al unsprezecelea veac al erei creștine, marcând, astfel, un prim mileniu de supraviețuire autonomă de la moartea autorului lor. Traversând relativ silențios evul de mijloc, maximele intra într-un veritabil con de umbră pe parcursul Renasterii (în pofida efortului izolat al lui Erasm, care le editează la Strasbourg, pentru întâia oară), spre a fi apoi redescoperite în secolul al XVIII-lea, odată cu momentul de glorie al moralistilor francezi și cu voga literaturii parenetice și sapiențiale.

Se cuvine, asadar, să salutăm această primă transpunere *sistematică* în limba română a unei culegeri de dictoane cu un destin atât de special. Asupra calității traducerii în sine nu avem a ne pronunța, sarcina evaluării acesteia, după toate canoanele filologico-critice, incumbând, desigur, experților. În ce ne privește, ne rezumăm la a semna, pentru început, unele inadvertențe și neclarități care tin mai curând de procedura de editare a culegerii:

Bunaoară, în *Nota asupra traducerii* suntem anunțați că traducătorul utilizează ca reper orientativ „editia *Publilii*

Syri mimi sententiae, ordonata, revizuita si explicata de Dr. Otto Friedrich, aparuta la Berlin, la 1880, in editura Theobald Grieben“. Suntem, insa, preveniti, totodata, ca editia in chestiune nu este urmata indeaproape, ci cu unele libertati, de vreme ce in aceasta „... sunt reproduse 390 de maxime atribuite *gresit* [s.n.] lui Publilius Syrus“, altele decat cele „vreo 150 de proverbe sub numele lui Syrus, dar cu siguranta provenind din multe alte surse“ (p.15), proverbe prezente in aceeasi editie berlineza. Asa incat, pe cale de consecinta, autorul versiunii romanesti decide explicit sa nu reproduca in editia d-sale aceste „piese“ de paternitate incerta. Or, in acest punct se impun doua observatii:

In primul rand, ramane total echivoc pe baza carui criteriu sunt decretate sentintele si paremiile respective drept incorect atribuite lui Syrus, atata timp cat admitem ca „e posibil ca ... Publilius Syrus *sa fi compilat cugetari risipite prin felurite opere, unele azi pierdute* [s.n.]“ (v. prefata, p. 11). Caci, in atare conditii, pare mai curand sa rezulte ca, si daca suntem de acord ca nu i se poate contesta in totalitate mimului latin aportul genuin, acesta nu poate fi oricum limpede identificat, trierea adagiilor autentice de cele atribuite lui Syrus pe nedrept devenind, astfel, mai degraba problematica.

In al doilea rand, se face simtita o anume inconsecventa metodologica in pregatirea editiei. Astfel, dupa precizarile ferme din aceeasi *Nota asupra traducerii*, prin care autorul versiunii romanesti isi proclama inaderenta in raport cu reproducerea fragmentelor fals sau indoielnic atribuite, prezente in editia berlineza suscitata, nu poate fi decat deconcertant sa constati ca

traducatorul pastreaza, totusi, „... vreo 4-5 maxime cu paternitate *discutabila* [s.n.]“, pentru care „s-a folosit litera R“ (nota 11, p. 9)!

Trecand, in sfarsit, la textul propriu-zis al cartii, gasim stringent sa ne interogam asupra impactului pe care-l poate avea un florilegiu de intelepciune antica asupra orizontului de expectante al cititorului contemporan.

Astfel, cu toate ca „Maximele lui Syrus n-au fost gandite de un moralist, preocupat sa faca educatie“ (v. prefata, p. 10), ele beneficiaza din plin de tezismul usor antipatic pe care-l presupune indeobste stilul gnostic. Ordonate alfabetic de zelul didactic al unei postumitati sarguincioase, cugetarile in discutie isi dozeaza foarte inegal performantele, mergand de la truisme (v. afor. 134: „Remuscarea e ca o rana in suflet“) pana la naivitati patente (v. afor. 476: „Generozitatea nu este nicaieri vorbita de rau“ sau afor. 608: „Orice fapta de vitejie aduce glorie“) si chiar rea-credinta (v. afor. 261: „Totdeauna cand jura solemn, omul altceva gandeste“). Aforismul 249, doar irelevant in original (*Homo extra corpus est suum, cum irascitur*), devine - printr-o falsa subtilitate - flagrant tautologic in talmacirea romaneasca („Cand se infurie, omul isi iese din fire“). De asemenea, o sententa precum cea cu nr. 601 („E o prostie sa pastrezi ceea ce nu stii la ce slujeste“), de un pragmatism cam pedestru, face azi, dupa exaltarea polimorfa a gratuitatii, de la Baudelaire la Gide, proasta impresie. E drept ca din montura cel mai adesea terna, cenusie, te intampina uneori nebanuite surprize minerale, splendoarea delicata a cate unei geme de chihlimbar:

Muliebris lacrima condimentum est malitiae - „Lacrima femeii e mirodenia sireteniei“ (afor. 395). Dar, chiar si-ntr-o asemenea circumstanta, este oarecum stanjenitor sa constati ca un dicton precum cel abia citat, numarandu-se printre si asa putinele „piese“ memorabile ale volumului, le-ar da destule motive de indispozitie apologetilor „corectitudinii politice“!

Fireste, pentru un lector inarmat cu destula rabdare, formulari pregnante s-ar mai gasi (desi, intamplator, nu acesta e si cazul a doua dintre cele trei maxime invocate de traducator in introducere, la p. 12, ca exemple presupus exponentiale in acest sens!). Spre pilda: *Anus cum ludit, mortis delicias facit* - „Cand o baba dantuieste, distreaza moartea“ (afor. 30). Totusi, aceasta este mai curand exceptia decat regula, adagiile mimului latin Publilius Syrus putand constitui, in covarsitoarea lor majoritate, un punct de atractie ideal pentru turistii locurilor comune.

Insa, chiar si in atare conditii, intreprinderea d-lui Camil Muresanu este departe de a fi superflua. Nu trebuie uitat, bunaoara, ca traducatorul este, totodata, un reputat istoric. Or, in lumina acestei observatii, o declaratie precum cea inserata intr-una din notele infrapaginale ale *Notei asupra traducerii*, conform careia „Aceasta traducere a rezultat dintr-o placere personala ...“ (p. 12, nota 1), se incarca brusc de valente suplimentare. Caci, pe langa delectarea marturisita pe care indeletnicirea in cauza i-o putea pricinui distinsului erudit, suntem tentati sa reperam in subtext si un interes mai amplu: scrutarea trecutului. si, chiar daca preocuparile directe ale lui Camil Muresanu au coborat

pe firul cronologiei numai pana in anticamera modernitatii (sec. XIV - XV, in speta), ne place, totusi, sa credem ca d-sa are, fie si indirect, prin ricoloseu, constiinta importante pe care florilegiul de sentente ale lui Publilius Syrus o poate comporta pentru acei specialisti ai disciplinei care inteleg sa-si cantoneze eforturile investigative in parcele de trecut mai indepartate. Pe scurt, daca macar unele din intuitiile Scolii Analelor isi mentin, astazi, valabilitatea, eventuala lipsa de interes literar a adagiilor mimului latin poate fi rapid compensata de interesul strict istoric pe care-l angajeaza, de indata ce realizam ca in ele rezoneaza vocea *marginalului*, a celui aservit foburgului, poftelor gloatei si capriciilor mai-marilor momentului. Or, dintr-o atare perspectiva, antologia s-ar anunta drept un document psihologic pretios, promitand sa asigure un inceput de contrapartida demersului istoriografic curent, condamnat de insasi natura majoritatii surselor sa radiografeze cvasi-exclusiv tribulatiile elitelor. Am avea, astfel, sansa de a auzi si glasurile celor care, de obicei, tac - si, prin aceasta, premisele unui generos capitol de istorie a mentalitatilor ce infloreau in suburbiile Romei la apogeul Republicii.

Desigur, nu trebuie ignorat, totusi, ca istoricul sedus de o asemenea cercetare si-ar vedea demersul grevat de nu putine dificultati. Fiindca emerg, in acest punct, mai multe intrebari - bunaoara: aforismele lui Syrus reflecta codul mental al *tuturor* membrilor (integri) ai claselor defavorizate sau numai pe cel al propriului sau grup socio-profesional? si cum putem sti ca adagiile in discutie codifica un fragment de psihologie reala, si nu

sunt simple conventii retorice, menite sa flateze o anumita *poza* a cuviintei si cumpatarii, cu care, fie si in pofida conduitei lor efective, cetatenii cu rang ai momentului puteau, eventual, cocheta? sau, in fine: cum putem fi siguri ca, citind cugetarile mimului latin, ascultam macar propria lui voce (chiar abstractie facand acum de contextualizari mai largi), de vreme ce - ne amintim - ravna eruditilor l-a surprins pe Publilius Syrus in mai multe randuri spoliindu-i de reflectii pe alti autori (de nu va fi fost la mijloc mana pios-mistificatoare a copistilor - dar aceasta nu usureaza nicidecum ancheta!)?

Totusi, dincolo de asemenea chestiuni dilematice, prin lectura in discutie, un cititor dotat cu niste curiozitati de o natura mai putin tehnica are, pur si simplu, ocazia de a plonja intr-un moment de glorie din trecutul „Cetatii Eterne“, beneficiind - cum spuneam - de rarul privilegiu al unei cai de acces mai putin obisnuite. Astfel, prin maximele lui Syrus se perinda o lume forfotitoare si vitala, ale carei vedete sunt, fireste, profesionistii viciului: *meretrix* (tarfa), *avarus* (avarul), *cinaedus* (desfranatul), *aleator* (jucatorul de zaruri) -

personaje pitoresti care, dincolo de diatriba intransigent-conventionala la care le supune concitadinul lor, tind cumva sa se autonomizeze in pagina, asigurand carnatia unei epoci care a beneficiat prea ades - si, de aceea, intrucatva unilateral si excesiv, poate - doar de elogiul grav, vag plictisit, nu o data formal, al posteritatii.

La o asemenea recuperare simpatetica invita, de asemenea, si ilustratiile volumului, anturand lapidarele sentente ale mimului latin cu un cortegiu vizual trepidant si eclectic. Un oratorul impietrit in mijlocul unei declamatii, planul teatrului roman de la Pompei, statui de zeitati tutelare si muze, ebulitia negutarilor in for, mai multe masti tragice, o scena de banchet, un mim in travesti, o gimnasta curbata provocator, o figurina falica - sunt numai cateva dintre imaginile antologiei (imagini a caror sursa de provenienta s-a omis, din pacate, a fi deconspirata!).

Iata, asadar, un motiv suficient pentru care travaliul de talmacire al lui Camil Muresanu ramane, in pofida oricaror reticente de amanunt, un gest cultural meritoriu.



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Michel Foucault, Istoria nebuniei în epoca clasică

Ed. Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1996

Cartea lui Michel Foucault este o analiza complexa a experientei nebuniei, asa cum a fost ea perceputa în Evul Mediu, Renastere si, mai ales, în epoca clasica, cea care a reprezentat momentul trecerii la o noua abordare a ideii de spital si internare. Structurata în trei parti, cartea trateaza în amanunt, aducând si numeroase date istorice, raporturile sub care nebunia a fost interpretata: se vorbeste despre relatiile dintre: rational-irational, exilare-internare, universalizarea nebuniei - subiectivizarea ei, relatia om-animalitate si consecintele acestei interpretari.

Pana în secolul 15, Europa s-a aflat sub imperiul leprei si al bolilor venerice. În momentul aparitiei nebuniei si al recunoasterii ei ca si forma de manifestare inadecvata mediului social, aceasta a determinat luarea unor masuri de izolare a celor "alienati" de comunitatile

în care traiau si de a fi dusi în afara oraselor, sau trimisi pe alte teritorii, cu ajutorul corabiilor.

"Corabia nebunilor", o imagine ce duce cu gândul, mai degraba la un aspect mitologic, si-a facut aparitia în peisajul sfîrsitului Evului Mediu, ca si simbol al realei imbarcari a nebunilor pe corabii si trimiterea lor pe alte meleaguri.

Misticismul care a invaluit de la început aceasta ipostaza a unui nou flagel a fost alimentat de practicile religioase ale vremii, dar si de constiinta mitologica ce înca isi mai facea simtita prezenta în acest sfîrsit de epoca.

Nebunia si nebunul sunt personaje majore ale începutului Renasterii, denotînd amenintare si batjocura, vertiginoasa neratiune a lumii si usoara ridiculizare a oamenilor. Pentru omul Renasterii, nebunul este cel caruia îi sunt revelate sensuri ascunse ale lumii, semnificatii ale tenebrelor si haosului, privilegiul absolut al nebuniei fiind acela ca domneste asupra tot ceea ce este rau în om.

Evul Mediu îi conferea nebuniei un loc în ierarhia viciilor; Renasterea o situeaza pe prima treapta, ca expresie a tuturor slabiciunilor umane, dar, se produce aici o relativizare: sunt percepute "nebuniile", formele umane ale nebuniei, aceasta subiectivîndu-se treptat, nemaifiind o figura a escatologiei, ci raportîndu-se la om si la lucrurile care îl înconjoara; peste Corabia nebunilor cade uitarea; nebunia se ancoreaza solid în mijlocul oamenilor, e retinuta si mentinuta, fiind nu barca, ci spital; nebunia nu mai are de a face cu adevarul

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si cu lumea , ci cu omul si cu propriul lui adevar pe care stie sa il perceapa.

Renasterea a depozat mizeria de pozitivitatea sa mistica; nu se mai vorbeste de glorificarea durerii , nici de o mintuire comuna a saraciei si a caritatii, ci i se spune omului despre datoriile lui fata de societate si se vede in nevoias un efect al dezordinii; se pune, deci problema nu a exaltarii mizeriei in gestul care o usureaza, ci a suprimarii ei; mizeria aluneca dinspre o experienta religioasa care o sanctifica spre o conceptie morala care o condamna.

Clasicismul a inventat internarea, cam asa cum Evul Mediu inventase segregarea leprosilor; locul lasat gol de acestia a fost ocupat de niste personaje noi in lumea europeana: “internatii” . Gestul care inchide are semnificatii politice, sociale, religioase, economice, morale. Fenomenul are dimensiuni europene; case de corectie sunt infiintate si in Anglia si in tarile de limba germana. La sfirsitul secolului 18, in centrele de internare erau amalgamate mai multe categorii de populatie: condamnati de drept comun, tineri care au tulburat linistea familiei sau i-au delapidat bunurile, oameni fara de capatii si smintiti, un amestec ciudat si confuz; acest gest organizeaza, intr-o unitate complexa, o noua sensibilitate fata de mizerie si fata de datoriile existentei, noi forme de reactie in fata problemelor economice ale somajului si trindaviei, o noua etica a muncii si, precum si visul unei cetati in care obligatia morala coincide cu legea civila, sub formele autoritare ale constringerii. Ele , centrele de internare explica in parte conform carui model a fost perceputa si traita

nebunia de catre epoca clasica. Practica internarii desemneaza un alt raport al omului cu ceea ce poate fi inuman in existenta sa.

In secolul 17, in toata Europa internarea are acelasi sens, cel putin la origine-ea reprezinta unul din raspunsurile date de acest secol unei crize economice care afecteaza lumea occidentala in intregul ei: scaderea salariilor, somajul, rarefierea monedei.

In afara perioadelor de criza, functia de represiune a internarii e dublata de o noua utilitate-nu mai e vorba de a-i inchide pe cei fara ocupatie, ci de a da de lucru celor inchisi si a-i face astfel sa contribuie la prosperitatea tuturor-era o forma de a tine sub control masele, de a resorbi lenesii si de a proteja social in fata rascoalelor si a agitatiei. Munca e perceputa ca solutie infailibila, remediu al tuturor formelor mizeriei.

In acest spatiu inventat de o societate care descifra in legea muncii o transcendentă etica va aparea nebunia si va ajunge repede pe punctul de a si le anexa. Secolul 20 va cere ca aceste zone unde, cu 150 de ani inainte s-a incercat inchiderea saracilor, vagabonzilor si somerilor, sa fie transferate numai nebunilor. Nebunii fusesera de la inceput inscrisi in marea proscrisie a lenei, ei avindu-si locul alaturi de saraci, buni sau rai, si de lenesi, si fiind supusi unor reguli de munca obligatorie la care, nu de putine ori, nu au facut fata muncii si ritmurilor vietii colective.

Elementul nou in epoca clasica este acela ca legea nu mai condamna: inchiderea se face in cetatile moralitatii pure, unde legea care ar trebui sa domneasca va fi aplicata sub formele riguroase ale constringerii

fizice. Marea idee burgheza, si in curind si republicana e ca virtutea, si ea, este o afacere de stat; se pot da decrete pentru a o face sa domneasca , se poate stabili o autoritate pentru a asigura respectarea ei; marele vis al burgheziei in epoca clasica este identificarea legilor statului cu legile sufletului (putem avea orice cu bani in afara de moravuri si de cetateni).

Rolul bisericii e la fel de mare, punindu-si amprenta in ce priveste educatia morala; sursa raului ar fi marea lipsa de instructie si de ascultare pentru lucrurile spirituale. Pentru biserica catolica, dar si pentru cea protestanta, internarea reprezinta mitul fericirii sociale - o politie a carei ordine ar fi complet transparenta la principiile religiei; casa de internare era simbolul acestei “politii”, care reprezenta echivalentul civil al religiei pentru edificarea unei cetati perfecte.

Internarea nu are nici o unitate institutionala in afara aceleia care ii poate da caracterul de politie, cu atat mai putin coerenta medicala, psihologica sau psihiatrica.

Ceea ce caracterizeaza secolul 17 este nu avansarea spre recunoasterea nebunului, si, prin aceasta la recunoasterea lui stiintifica; dimpotriva, e resorbit intr-o masa nediferentiata, identificat cu mai putina claritate; nebunul epocii clasice, inchis alaturi de venerici, desfrinati, libertini, homosexuali, isi pierde indiciile individualitatii, se disipeaza intr-o aprehensiune generala a neratiunii; practica internarii nu se supune unei decizii medicale, tine de o alta constiinta – in general, judecatorul este cel care ia decizia de internare, recurgandu-se destul de rar la o expertiza medicala; se

poate spune ca tocmai pe fondul unei experiente juridice a alienarii s-a constituit stiinta medicala a bolilor mintale; ca subiect de drept, omul se elibereaza de responsabilitatile sale chiar in masura in care este alienat; ca fiinta sociala, nebunia il compromite pina la culpabilitate; in secolul 18, pentru prima data, omul alienat este recunoscut ca incapabil si ca nebun.

In psihopatologia secolului 19 (si a noastra si mai mult), nebunul este recunoscut ca atare nu pentru faptul ca o maladie l-a indepartat spre marginile normalitatii, ci deoarece cultura noastra l-a situat la punctul de intalnire intre decretul social al internarii si cunoasterea juridica, discernind capacitatea subiectilor de drept; stiinta “pozitiva” a maladiilor mintale si sentimentelor umanitare care au promovat nebunul la rangul de fiinta umana nu au fost posibile decit o data ce aceasta situatie a fost bine fixata. In perioada clasica nebunia a devenit ceva de privit: nu mai este monstru ascuns in sine, ci animal cu mecanisme ciudate, bestialitate, in care omul, de multa vreme, este abolit. Animalul din om nu mai are valoare de indiciu pentru un “dincolo”; el a devenit nebunia omului, fara legatura cu nimic altceva decit cu ea insasi: nebunia sa in stare de natura. Va veni o vreme cand aceasta prezenta a animalitatii in nebunie va fi considerata drept semnul – mai mult chiar – insasi esenta maladiiei. In epoca clasica, dimpotriva, ea manifesta cu o stralucire aparte tocmai faptul ca nebunul nu este un bolnav. In alta ordine de idei, animalitatea dezlantuata nu poate fi stapinita decit prin dresaj si indobitocire. In reducerea omului la

animalitate, nebunia isi gaseste adevarul si vindecarea, cel dintii fiind abolit.

In momentul devenirii antropologice a filosofiei, in care omul a vrut sa se recunoasca intr-o plenitudine naturala, animalul si-a pierdut puterea de negativitate, pentru a constitui forma pozitiva a unei evolutii; omul este fiinta naturala in chiar animalitatea sa, iar internarea exalta aceasta animalitate a nebuniei; a respecta nebunia nu inseamna a descifra in ea accidentul involuntar si inevitabil al maladiei, inseamna a recunoaste aceasta limita inferioara a adevarului uman, care nu e accidentala ci esentiala; nebunia nu ameninta omul modern decit cu aceasta intoarcere la lumea posomorita a animalelor si a lucrurilor, la libertatea lor ingradita.

Epoca clasica vedea in nebunie revelarea unei libertati care face ravagii in formele monstruoase ale animalitatii. In aceasta epoca nerationalul este suportul nebuniei; in cea moderna , nerationalul e doar unul din modurile de aparitie ale nebuniei.

Plasata sub semnul tuturor neratiunilor minore, nebunia se vede asociata unei experiente etice si unei valorizari morale a ratiunii; dar legata de lumea animala

si de neratiunea ei majora , ajunge la monstruoasa ei inocenta. Psihiatria noastra a mostenit in secret toate acele raporturi pe care cultura clasica le instaurase cu neratiunea; le-au modificat; le-au deplasat; au crezut ca vorbesc despre nebunie in obiectivitatea sa patologica; in ciuda lor, aveau de a face cu o nebunie stapinita inca de etica neratiunii si de scandalul animalitatii.

Aceasta este concluzia la care ajunge autorul, la finalul primei parti a cartii. Cea de a doua parte trateaza, in mod detaliat, experientele nebuniei de o maniera analitica, in sensul in care vorbeste despre o clasificare a formelor nebuniei si despre patru tipuri de constiinta a nebuniei (critica, practica, enuntiativa si analitica), pentru ca in ultima parte sa accentueze latura antropologica de evaluare si conditiile de instaurare a azilului.

Complexitatea cartii e data si de faptul ca ea aduce cu sine o multitudine de exemple concrete in ce priveste conditiile de internare si tratare a bolnavilor, mergind si pina la o acurata analiza a celorlalte domenii in care aceasta problematica este reflectata (istorie, sociologie, literatura, filosofie, arte plastice, stiinta).



Lorin Ghiman

The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics

Corruption and Development, volume 2, number 1, May 2002

While preparing the review of this number of RJSP - a journal published by the Civic Education Project Romania, with the support of the Romanian Society of Political Science - it crossed my mind that I should write two distinct reviews: one in Romanian and the other in English. This, in order to comply with a strange sort of splitting, a theory of the double truth sui generis, a theory that becomes palpable whenever talking about Romanian socio-political realities and the more so when the main topic is corruption.

I think we deal with a culture of corruption of the Romanian society within which I am involved, being a Romanian, practically and discursively, on the one hand and, on the other, we are confronted with the international theories and concepts that are related to the problems of corruption and development, theories for which we have only an outside view. The present lack of communication that exists between these two streams of ideas makes it very difficult for us to cor-

rectly lead an analysis. Besides this diptych inside-outside (which is probably another consequence of the precarious situation of the Romanian mentality), we can also name another one, belonging to the Romanian socio-political field: praxis-logos. The difference between words and deeds imposed itself so evidently in the Romanian society that skepticism became our second nature.

This is why I initially intended to write two reviews. I gave up the idea mainly for of the following two reasons. The first one is that not being a specialist, I had certainly done a “biased” reading. The second one would be the fact that the authors themselves try to overtake the dualities named above and to go beyond all the empty political discourses, from mass media through their pertinent and coherent professionalism. The place and valour of the socio-political studies are reestablished by their approach of the factual reality and by their methodology which focuses on suppressing this system of oppositions: inside-outside, theory-practice.

Now I would like to briefly resume the articles which this issue of the journal comprises.

In the first theme article, *The Dark Side of the State: Mafia' and National Interest' in Postsocialist Romania*, Oana Mateescu analyses two cases of corruption, noticeably different from one another, in a very specific mannner, described by the author herself as an “ethnography of the state - an anthropological investigation both of local bureaucrats and businessmen’s practices and of political pronouncements at the central level (...) based on ex-

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tensive fieldwork: (...) interviews, (...) participant observation and analysis of central and local media reports and of official documents.”

The ‘Jimbolia’ affair, which dwells on the contraband with petroleum products with Yugoslavia during the ’93 - ’95 embargo, proves, claims the author, that the discourses of those who represent the political power have no ground when stating that the corruption phenomena come from “the outside”. Far away from being strange to the Romanian state, there are cases of institutional corruption, namely the use of position and of means of pressure for purposes that do not coincide at all with the public interest. The syntagm that best summarizes this flight from the reign of the law and also the mechanism used is excellently given by the author: ‘It is in our national interest to break the law’. Unfortunately, we must say that the pertinent conclusions are not sufficiently supported by the mass-media analysis, which is almost exclusively based on a single paper.

The second case study is about a firm that seems to seize control over an entire city under the protection of bribed personalities from the political and administrative field and even from the police. A totally different kind of corruption is described here, whose genus proximus is *mafia*, understood as a parasitical organism of power that prejudices the state. The ethno-sociological investigation presented by the author is impressive, but so is the hushing up of all the names of public persons and firms. Not even the name of the town is given on account of “the sensitive nature of this material.”

How can one not grin when the author claims that “these changes do not affect the thrust of the analysis”?

I would like to make myself well understood: I do not need more evident proofs than those presented in order to be convinced that such phenomena exist in Romania, and I do not want to criticize either the method or the conclusions reached by Oana Mateescu, who delineates a reality often difficult to render. What worries me is the author’s attitude and the supposition that this attitude cannot be avoided. The text gives us the impression that the author lives in a terrorized country, a country systematically robbed by Corruption, from where she manages to smuggle out, with great precaution, an article of this sort while rightly accusing “the socially displaced law” and the helplessness of the social body. However, with or without the protagonists’ real names, the facts remain the same and “the main thrust of the analysis is not affected”. In addition to this, I think that, in this discursive milieu, the names may not have such a great importance. There is still a rest, and this rest makes a great difference.

James A. Mitchell’s article, *Corruption, the Electoral Process, and the Politics of Transition in Romania*, is an interesting mise-en-scène of “the relationship between an administration’s track record in the battle against corruption and its prospects for re-election”, in postsocialist Romania, with a prologue on the history of local corruption. Beginning with the assumption that “corruption is endemic in societies where there is no distinction made between public administration and private interest” and that therefore authoritarianism is

traditional in Romania, Mitchell states that Romanians literally have “a culture of corruption”. This idea is relevant and fertile for new investigations that could delineate the subject much further.

With regard to the *mise-en-scène* mentioned above, I find it a little bit artificial, on account of the absence of a particular “character”: demagoguery. The politics of formal and sham alignments to different international norms and conventions is as traditional in Romania as is authoritarianism. It is a politics supported with mere mockeries of concrete actions that are nevertheless proclaimed everywhere. If not taken into consideration, it would remain behind the curtain directing everything right under the eyes of the attentive voters and the international forums.

Andrei Stoiciu’s article, *Corruption: Policy Recommendation and Policy Exposure*, based on a solid empirical analysis of the most important Romanian media, during January 2002, highlights the fact that “the media discourse on corruption clearly reflects its own agenda” while describing and reflecting the theme of corruption. This discourse assumes neither the role recommended by the World Bank in its suggested strategies of fight against corruption, nor the one envisaged by the government, and not even the one the press itself often claims to be playing, that of “watchdog of democracy”.

The lack of correspondence between the recommendations from the outside and the measures and initiatives of the authorities on the one hand, and their renderings in mass-media on the other, seems thus to

be a key-problem in fighting corruption. A result of this is that the solution to the problem is a distant one.

Of the two research articles (*Mahala: The Slums of Bucharest - A Space of Urban Change*, written by Andreea OGREZEANU and *Mixed Times: On Informal Credit in Oltenia*, realised by Puiu LATEA and Ovidiu CHELCEA), I would like to point out the second one. The authors manage to combine ethno-sociological investigation, historical perspective, and economic explanations of the informal credit phenomenon (which is called in the spoken language “a *cumpara pe cont*” sau “*pe caiet*”). They thus obtain a precise, vivid and at the same time witty image of Oltenia’s socio-economic realities (and through legitimate extension, of the socio-economic realities of Romania).

A longer approach than a book review normally allows would deserve each of the two discussions: *National Corruption Day: A Theoretical essay on the Sources of Corruption*, authored by Mihai VARGA, and *Globalization, Nationalism and Petite Imperialism*, written by Attila MELEGH. I will only discuss the latter.

There have been many commentaries more or less based on the Hungarian Status Law. Professor and researcher A. MELLEGH manages to avoid any *parti-pris* in analysing the political background for the Status Law and the controversies it generated. The author makes use of a more general perspective on political ideologies that takes into consideration the complex East-West relationships.

In my opinion, the theoretical source of this article (as well as the resources for future analyses) should be



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looked for in the critical examination of the cultural-ideological and (geo)-political relations between “East” and “West” in postcolonialism, in a methodology similar to that used by Edward W. Said in his works, adapted, of course, to the realities of the region. This is in fact what the author does.

Offering thus this type of interpretation to Melegh’s article, I think we should give up the claim to any pure scientific approach (understood as objectivity), as Ioana Bunescu does. Such a claim is not functional, but simply formal. There are cases (for example Arab-American-Palestinian relations or the interregnum in ex-Yugoslavia) in which objective and scientific points of view are meaningless, critical positions being preferred if they are open to dialogue. I would say that Ioana Bunescu, instead of continuing the discussion, really closes it. The very aim as Said understands it, that of cooperation among equals, liberated from any Occidentalizing and/or jingoistic rhetoric, is lost.

Melegh’s article is one of the principal items among the socio-political analyses of the region. I would like to remark, as a conclusion, upon the symbolism of the situation: an article written by a Hungarian, published in Romania, in an international journal which focuses on socio-political realities. It is beyond any doubt that the future, whatever it holds, will belong to each and every country from Central and Eastern Europe in an equal manner.

Alina Branda

Andrei Oisteanu, The Image of the Jew in Romanian Culture

Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001.

The issue of *cultural stereotypes* as result of the relation in between different identities proves to be of great interest for contemporary specialists in different social sciences. It is obvious that this topic could be successfully assessed by historians, sociologists, anthropologists, specialists in social psychology interested in it.

The recent years attest a deep involvement of many specialists of the above mentioned fields in various approaches that focus “cultural stereotypes”. Even if their methodology and discourse are a bit different from one to another (depending on the researchers’ background), the final tasks seem to be the same: to perceive the deep mechanism of creating cultural stereotypes, to see how and why they are or had been perpetuated at the level of daily practice, ideologies and other forms of discourse, to deconstruct them.

I assume this process started in the field of postcolonial studies, as an effort of reevaluating the main discourses that the West had about the Rest (to

make use of Stuart Hall's title). In that frame, it was just an analysis of the way in which western discourses on "the Rest" were the only available ones and how, because of that, the other voices were simply impossible to be heard, to be perceived. This type of approach was the first one constructed around the concepts of Otherness and cultural stereotypes and I think it was worth to mention that.

If the first analyses of cultural clichés were framed as mentioned above, in the effort of deconstructing the dominant, one sided discourses, the up to date assessments of this issue are more diverse in terms of areas of investigations, research methodologies, goals. For example, the stereotypes on Balkans (as these are patterned in Western mentality) could be investigated as well; or clichés that had been constituted in the intercultural life of different ethnic communities in Eastern or Central Europe.

In this respect, the topic of study would be the views on any other ethnic community (marginalized or not) The investigation has to be conducted towards perceiving the ways in which a peculiar community is seen by another, the strategies that are developed in constructing a certain discourse on it.

I assume that Andrei Oisteanu's book *The Image of the Jew in Romanian Culture* is a study of this kind. The author's attempt is obvious, from the very beginning : to investigate the representation of the Jew in a certain culture (in this specific case, the Romanian one). It is an ambitious project, as Oisteanu does not focus just a certain cultural source (for example: the Jew in the

Romanian folklore or any other). He intends to cover up in his assessment, all the bits that compound culture: starting from folklore or oral sources, ending with different forms of elite discourses.

The intention is to see how the stereotypes on Jew are generated and perpetuated at different levels of Romanian culture, which are the elements that have a special, important role in these processes, who are the main agents who are responsible for creating a certain discourse, rather odd and dangerous.

The process of creating the negative stereotypes on Jews (for certain reasons, the author prefers the term Jew, a simplifying way of naming an identity, a cliché in itself) is simple and it does not specifically belong to the Romanian culture. The Jew is wherever in the imagery of people an incarnation of the idea of Otherness, the permanent rejected Stranger.

Anyway, the specific way of depicting the Jew in Romanian culture is pointed out following different stages: the *physical portrait* is the one that it is stressed first. As the author assesses, there is no realistic background for such negative clichés (the physical anthropologists demonstrating that there are no racial differences between Jews and Europeans). All these images are symbolically created to mention that the difference exists, to perpetuate the gaps in between communities.

Then after, Andrei Oisteanu approaches the *moral and intellectual portrait* of this identity, following the same pattern (how it is viewed in the Romanian culture). The same too simplistic mechanism of stressing the difference (another system of values) is the one that gen-

erates clichés on the morality and intellectual abilities of the Jew.

The last two chapters of Oisteanu's book (*The Mythical and Magical Portrait* and *From Deicide to Ritual Infanticide*) focus the symbolic faults that are attributed to the Jew, obviously existing just at the level of imagery.

The author's effort is to demonstrate how damaging this process of accusing the Otherness could be, how the difference is not usually accepted and understood, how the manners of segregation could be profiled.

It is quite accepted that all these processes are not developed according to a realistic view, they are almost always induced by ideological discourses as they have the capacity of stimulating the imagery of a certain community and sometimes its emotional responses to certain stimuli.

The researcher's approach is considerable as he focuses all the levels of creating these products of imagery (beginning with the physical portrait, ending up with the spiritual one). It is also remarkable, as I men-

tioned before, how large is his area of investigation (in terms of sources that he analyzes, different stages of forming the discourses on Jew).

Even if his study is focused just on the Romanian culture, Oisteanu is always tempted to make references to other cultural contexts, pointing out quite often, the similar ways of rejecting this homo alienus (the Jew), wherever in the world. All the links that the author establishes, proves his capacity for synthesis and of course, his erudite way of assuming this topic.

This book is remarkable as it succeeds to deconstruct the basic ways in which the Jewish identity is profiled in Romanian culture, considering as mentioned, several types of discourses that could illustrate this process.

Andrei Oisteanu is not just an intelligent observer and analyst of this mechanism, but also a gifted writer, in the strict sense of the term, as the literary features of this text are obvious.